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Abstract 
The aim of the thesis is to explore the forms of cultural exclusion experienced by 
ethnic minorities in the Chinese education system and to consider what might 
improve the inclusion of them. It is achieved primarily through examining the 
relationship between ethnicity and educational performance for Tibetan and 
Muslim ethnic groups in comparison with the mainstream Han group. The 
research is oriented by a cultural-ecological framework, by the theses of cultural 
capital and social capital, and by the theory of multiculturalism. The study makes 
a contribution to the limited research focusing on ethnic minorities in China, 
particularly from a sociological perspective. 
The main findings relate to minorities' interpretations of and responses to the 
social system. In attempting to achieve social mobility through education, 
minorities have found that they are driven to desperation, or become resistant to 
or disengage from the social system, despite the fact that the state encourages 
them in economic prosperity and entitles them to equal political membership. It is 
argued that the desire, on the part of minorities to achieve social mobility through 
education is undermined by the mainstream agenda of integrating them into the 
Han nation state at the expense of their cultures. 
The main analytical tool of this study is the framework of `discursive repertoires'. 
This is used to analyse data arising from an historical investigation of Chinese 
culturalism, of current educational policy and public discourses on minority 
education, and from ethnographic fieldwork. Data from these three sources are 
triangulated to give an overall view of the experiences of ethnic minorities in 
educational terms. 
Fieldwork was conducted in the first half of 2003 on the Qinghai-Gansu 
borderlands, a communication hub between Buddhism, Islam and Chinese 
atheism and Confucianism, northwest China. It was comprised of observation, 
questionnaires and interviews with school people (students and teachers) and 
outside people (community leaders and parents) from a wide range of ethnic and 
socio-economic backgrounds. 
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Why do some ethnic communities persistently perform poorly in schooling 
whereas some others perform better? Why is it that a number of minority 
members cannot achieve social mobility as much as they should in accordance 
with their achievement in education? This research aims to explore what hides 
behind the failure of ethnic minorities in the educational system and in related 
social mobility that are primarily shaped by the larger society. It is achieved 
through an examination of the relationship between ethnicity and educational 
performance in the first instance. On this basis it argues that the failure in 
inclusion of ethnic minorities of distinctive cultures is largely responsible for the 
poor minority performance in the larger society, and relatedly, in schools. This 
introductory chapter first examines the issue of educational achievement and 
ethnicity that aims to highlight the important role that social mobility plays in 
minority school performance. The specific attention paid to the concept of social 
mobility reflects my understanding of it, which in turn guides my arguments 
throughout the thesis. Social mobility is far more than economic achievement as it 
has long been understood or defined. Rather, it should also be understood in terms 
of recognition or social citizenship which `is as real as economic status and is 
perhaps even more foundational' (Loury, Modood & Teles 2005: 2). In other 
words, a (broadly understood) social dimension - and particularly a cultural 
dimension within it in the ethnic minority case of distinctive cultures - is in 
essential need of being incorporated in discussions of social mobility. Therefore 
the focus is sequentially turned to multiculturalism, a new social paradigm that 
emerged from the critical scrutiny of the marginalisation or exclusion of minority 
cultures by the wider society, which has largely caused the failure of ethnic 
minorities in the educational and social systems. On the basis of these discussions, 
I present the rationale and research aims of this study. 
Educational achievement and social mobility 
Standardised public education is widely acknowledged as essential for citizens to 
gain equal opportunity to access mainstream institutions (usually operating in the 
dominant language) (Kymlicka 2001: 20), so as to achieve upward social mobility. 
This idea of equality makes demands in the first place for the equal achievement 
of students from different backgrounds in education. However, educational 
achievement is often unequal for some social or cultural groups as the UK and the 
USA literature shows. ' One of the major forms of unequal school performance is 
closely associated with differences in ethnicity in that some ethnic groups tend to 
outperform others. For example, while some ethnic minority groups tend to 
outperform the ethnic majority group (e. g. Indians and Chinese in the UK and 
Chinese, Koreans and Indians in the USA), some other minority groups 
persistently perform poorly (e. g. African-Caribbean in the UK and African 
Americans and Mexicans in the USA). 2 The achievement gap between different 
ethnic minorities against the ethnic majority has motivated academics to carry out 
comparative studies to discover remedies for lower educational performers. 
Kao and Thompson (2003) suggest that three theoretical approaches pervade 
debates on minority school performance, namely, cultural orientations of certain 
ethnic groups that promote or discourage academic achievement; the structural 
position of ethnic groups that affects the environments of children, parents or 
schools; and genetic differences. The last approach is largely dismissed in 
academic discussions today for its racist overtone and the lack of empirical 
evidence (ibid.: 419-420). Whereas the argument of cultural orientations is 
directed at the cultural norms of ethnic groups, that of the structural position 
largely focuses on parental socio-economic status (SES), which is connected with 
parental participation, quality of instruction, school peers, teachers and other 
influences. Most academic discussions fall along the interplay of the two 
approaches of cultural orientations and the structural position whereby some 
1 There is overwhelming literature on this issue. What follows is merely a simplified review of a 
wide range of factors explored in the UK and USA literature that cause the failure of ethnic 
minorities in either schools or the larger society. Of which some are only applicable to certain 
minority groups while other may be to different ones. This review aims to present, not exhaust, 
some main academic findings so as to inform my study in the remaining chapters. 
2 Actually even within the same ethnic group the educational gap is also observable. See Kao and 
Thompson (2003). 
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theoretical arguments fall in between (ibid. ). Departing from these approaches, 
recent research has been conducted increasingly in greater details that is grounded 
in various contexts. This has made research findings convincing as well as easier 
for schools and governments to design context-specific policies for different 
students. However, the contextualisation of research subjects has very much 
complicated explanations of variations in the educational achievement of different 
ethnic (sub-) groups. The more serious consequence of this complication is that 
there is less consistency in academic explanations and so it becomes difficult to 
develop a coherent theory. 
What is largely absent here is the issue of upward social mobility that education 
supposedly aims at in that the concern of social mobility directly holds up the 
motive and motivation of ethnic groups for education. 
3 In fact, `educational 
aspirations are universally high for all racial and ethnic groups' (ibid.: 435). This 
is to say that abstract aspirations are high for all groups despite differences in the 
concrete reality. So what has prevented some minorities from concretising, and 
further, realising their abstract aspirations? Put another way, what has 
complicated their desire for (or even commitment to) social mobility that led to 
their different educational outcomes? In this light, students are not only passive 
subjects of their cultural or socio-economic backgrounds, they are also actors who 
develop their cultural norms in response to education and related opportunities for 
social mobility. Under this view, John Ogbu (1987,1998) formulates a cultural- 
ecological framework that attempts to explain how different ethnic minorities 
shaped their views of the social system as a response to the perceived treatment 
they received from the mainstream society. 4 
3 It is not fair to say that all arguments are not concerned with social mobility. The difference is 
whether or not social mobility is the focus of analyses, (and further, whether or not it is understood 
merely economically as I shall discuss below). In other words, studies should substantially move 
beyond schools per se on the one hand, and on the other hand, should be expanded from pre- 
school preparation to perception about post-school opportunities. 
° Ogbu (1987,1998) places minority school performance against his framework of the (social) 
system and community forces, and argues that distinctive minorities foster different cultural 
models (community forces) in response to the system or the dominant group's treatment of them. 
He locates minority communities in action to depict their strategies towards existing power 
relations. Such an interactive perspective allows Ogbu to set up the pair of concepts - voluntary 
and involuntary minorities - with which he has explained why some minority groups have the 
motivation to perform well while others show resistance or reluctance in school study. However, 
this heuristic framework does not stand without its defects, and in fact his key concept of 
3 
Social mobility is in the first instance measured by economic indicators of income 
or occupation (profession) (Loury, Modood and Teles 2005). While an income 
indicator is purely economistic, professional membership is associated with both 
economic well-being and power and prestige. Nonetheless, both approaches 
primarily focus upon the labour market. This focus is challenged by a third 
approach under the concept of social citizenship which sees social mobility in 
terms of recognition - the degree to which individuals are recognised by others as 
being equal partners in the community. Further, whether or not or to what extent a 
group is recognised by others does not necessarily correspond to its position in the 
labour market but is partially independent (ibid. ). In this light, social mobility can 
also be understood as `securing symbolic goods dispensed not by markets, but by 
private and public institutions' (e. g. language policy) (Teles, Mickey and Ahmed 
2005: 523). Meanwhile, different social or cultural groups develop different 
understandings of social mobility, or individual or group progress, on account of 
their differential historical experiences and cultures (ibid. ). Moreover, many of 
the means by which people seek to advance themselves are profoundly shaped by 
public policies that political institutions have introduced. Therefore the state plays 
a central role as a decision-maker and producer of goods (ibid. ) in personal 
advancement. Thus, the social dimension (broadly understood) of social mobility 
is perhaps even more foundational (Loury, Modood and Teles 2005) when 
mobility is seen from a perspective of life courses as a whole rather than merely 
measured by economic achievements. 
Indeed, when we depart from the point of social mobility, the question that should 
be asked in the first place is: can ethnic minorities achieve as much as they should 
in social mobility in accordance with their educational performance? And the 
sequential questions will be: if ethnic minorities cannot achieve equal social 
mobility in spite of equal educational attainment, what blocks their success in the 
larger society? Does inequality in opportunities for social mobility just impact on 
individuals or is it systematically encountered by ethnic minority groups? More 
specifically, is the persistent failure of some ethnic minority students in schools a 
reflection of the failure of their communities in the larger society (see, for 
in/voluntary minorities is particularly misleading. A detailed discussion of the relative strengths 
and weaknesses of his theory can be found in chapter two. 
4 
example, Ferguson 2005)? In this vein, the relationship between educational 
performance and social mobility become much more complicated than we may 
assume, which requires research into educational achievement from within and 
without schools, and relatedly, not only into educational outcome but also 
process. As a matter of fact, even those minorities who outperform their majority 
peers are still likely not to achieve as well as they should in the labour market 
(Strategy Unit 2003; Woo 2002). In this light, both low and high educational 
performers among ethnic minorities can be regarded as having to overcome 
specific barriers either in schools or in the wider society. Therefore, a common 
ground around the relationship between education and social mobility emerges 
that brings together both low and high educational achievers of ethnic minorities 
in relation to the majority in the social system, and thus it is possible to advance a 
consistent set of arguments that allows for consideration of both the cultural and 
socio-economic dimensions. 
In his analysis of the persistence of low educational performance of blacks in the 
USA, Ferguson (2005) subtly and convincingly relates socio-economic to cultural 
factors. He argues there have long existed differences in the ways in which the 
ethnic majority and minority (for Ferguson, whites and blacks) have coped with 
and adapted to their positions in the nation's hierarchy of power and privilege, 
which reflect psychological self-defence mechanisms, social interaction patterns 
and disparities in access to opportunities. Such patterns help determine `the 
economic wherewithal of families to provide for their children, the child-rearing 
methods that families grow accustomed to using and the ways that they 
understand and interact with mainstream institutions such as schools'. In a word, 
the minority socio-economic status is largely associated with race or ethnicity 
(ibid. ) that is socially constructed. This race- or ethnicity-rooted disparity is likely 
to lead to, for example, the differences in parenting that supposedly prepare 
minority children for different cognitive or learning styles on the one hand (Blair 
2001; Osborne 2001), and on the other, do not prepare minority children with the 
necessary knowledge bases before schooling or even before kindergarten 
(Ferguson 2005). As a result, minority students appear to have difficulties in 
understanding what is being taught in schools. In a word, these kinds of pre- 
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school parenting practices result in minority children's under-preparation in skills 
and knowledge that are needed in formal education (ibid. ). 
Moreover, these socially constructed differences are also practised by the 
educational system itself, which directly impacts on minority school performance. 
This may be associated with the curriculum that is irrelevant to, or negatively 
represents ethnic minorities (Blair 2001; Demie 2001,2002). Practices may also 
be reflected in schools' and teachers' treatment of minority students, which have 
made minority children study ineffectively. These practices are various but are, 
quite often, interconnected. They include teachers' ignorance of the different 
learning styles and experiences of minority students, such as some minority 
children's aversion to intellectual competition; teachers' neglect of the 
disadvantage of the language of minority children when the medium of instruction 
is not in mother tongues of minority students; lower expectations of minority 
students among teachers who consider that minorities are intellectually inferior; 
teachers' frequent and harsh sanctions on minority children (Blair 2001; Demie 
2001,2002; Ferguson 2005). These practices are likely to result in a poor quality 
of instruction from teachers, and prevent the latent potential of minority students 
from being brought out, not to mention being cultivated (Ferguson 2005). 
5 
The observations made by Ferguson and others reveals that the disadvantage of 
minority students is, in one essential way, caused by racism related to colour or to 
culture, or both. 6 Racism is an overwhelming social power that is associated with 
S However, teachers may favour some minority students (e. g. Chinese and Indians) over others, 
even those from the ethnic majority (e. g. whites), for their characteristics such as industriousness, 
obedience, cooperation and so on. In return, these students are also likely to receive quality 
instruction from teachers, which significantly help them with their self-esteem, enthusiasm and 
finally, high performance. Nevertheless, one must be cautious when attempting to take this as a 
model for other minority groups with lower achievement by which minorities, both successful and 
failed, are likely to be considered to be responsible for their schooling. Further, whether or not to 
possess certain aforementioned desirable characteristics or qualities can possibly be associated 
with their community cultures without a sufficient examination of the role that the social system 
can or should play in helping minorities with their school performance. Another consequence is 
that this will easily undermine self-esteem of students with low achievement given the sensitivity, 
subtlety and significance of the cultural issue in self-consciousness and self-evaluation. In this 
sense, even if some aspects of certain minority culture are considered to be in need of examination 
and transformation, how to achieve this goal is largely dependent upon how to achieve a balance 
between the examinations of cultural norms of ethnic minorities and the way the social system 
treats minorities. I will come back to the issue in chapter two that focuses on power relations. 
6 As a result of the blurring divide and mixing between culture and race, the concept of cultural 
racism emerged in the UK. Cultural racism is a further discourse built upon biological racism that 
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various social dimensions, ranging from legal, scientific, economic, to more 
subtle forms such as social, cultural, religious and psychological (Moodley 
1999: 151), which appear to be structural, institutional or individual (Blair 
2001: 29). These forms are entangled with and reinforce one another on the one 
hand, and on the other, are not necessarily conscious in the minds of the people 
who are carrying them out such as teachers. One consequence of racism is to 
prevent minority children from getting access to quality instruction in schools, 
and at the same time to block minority members' access to the labour market in 
the wider society, which casts a dark shadow on minority children's motivation 
for study in schools (Blair 2001; Demie 2001,2002). Due to its complexity and 
subtlety, it is very difficult for many minority people to overcome racism by 
themselves, and so it remains the case that many minority students are poor 
school performers. On the other hand, for those who outperform their ethnic 
majority, better performance seems to be the evidence of their success in 
overcoming racism in schooling. However, this does not necessarily mean that 
their better performance will lead them to a correspondingly better career as 
mentioned earlier, nor does it mean that they pay the same price to gain the same 
outcome or that they enjoy the learning process as much as their majority peers 
do. In this sense, their success in schooling is not necessarily a result of racism 
lessening in the larger society, but largely a result of their individual effort and the 
mobilisation of their community resources as Zhou (2005) delineates in her 
Chinese case (also see chapter two). 
In the meantime, racism can also foster a counter-school culture that is adopted by 
some minority students to disengage themselves from schooling, which in turn 
evokes cultural differences in vilification, marginalisation or assimilation of groups who also 
suffer from biological racism (Modood 1997b: 155). Therefore biological racism is essential to 
cultural racism although it might be a less explanatory aspect of a complex phenomenon 
(ibid.: 156). For a discussion of the differences and connections between (colour) racism and 
cultural racism, see Modood (1997b). Also see May (1999) on anti-racism and critical 
multiculturalism. 
7 How to conceptualise racism or classify and define different forms of it is another complicated 
issue. However, although it will be over-simplistic and naive to apply the concept of racism 
directly to the Chinese case as my study will show, similar forms of discrimination to those of 
racism in the context of ethnicity in China is widely observable such as individual, institutional or 
structural discrimination (in particular see chapters six and seven), or discrimination as an 
ideology (especially in chapter eight). As my main theoretical sources are not racism (see chapter 
two), I am not going further with the language of racism. Interested readers can consult Miles & 
Brown (2003), particularly parts 11 and III. 
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contributes to their poor school performance. Peer pressure is a typical example 
that in essence is counter-academic in nature. Ferguson offers another example 
along similar lines in relation to youth culture. He argues that some black children 
would rather be `distracted' by black youth culture (e. g. rap music) from 
academic activities like leisure reading, class attendance and reading scores 
(Ferguson 2005). For them, spending time on black youth culture can be a gesture 
of showing black identity. In other words, rap music is more than a simple 
entertainment for black youth as it is for whites in that it plays a role of self- 
expression and self-assurance in relation to black identity. Furthermore, some 
other factors that may cause the poor school performance of minority children can 
be indirectly connected with racism, such as school resources, school finance, 
class size, grouping and tracking (ibid. ). By and large, racism is, to a large extent, 
responsible for poor minority performance in schools and/or the larger society in 
that it is difficult for minority children to define and value themselves through 
academic studies, nor can they value academics while still maintaining the 
integrity of the self (Osborne 2001: 45). Meanwhile, it also leads to an imbalance 
between educational performance and social mobility even with good school 
performers from ethnic minorities. 
The politics of multiculturalism 
Racism is rooted in a belief in the superiority and universality of the dominant 
ethnic group that sets the standard for the rest of society. The standard is roughly 
the equivalent of what Kymlicka terms `the societal culture' (1995,2000,2001, 
2002). In contrast to such a situation, Kymlicka aims to advocate a thin societal 
culture that is territorially concentrated, and `centred on a shared language which 
is used in a wide range of societal institutions, in both public and private life' 
(Kymlicka 2002: 346). In other words, the aspects of, for example, religion, family 
customs and personal lifestyle are supposed to be left to citizens themselves 
without interference. However, Kymlicka also encourages appreciating more than 
one societal culture because a single societal culture only reflects one, usually the 
dominant group's, culture, and therefore can hardly function properly in 
promoting the integration of citizens in a multinational society (ibid.: 346-347). 
This advocacy of the pluralisation of societal culture is fundamentally driven by 
the idea of the rejection of the view of universality and superiority that has 
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granted legitimacy to the dominant group to oppress other groups. Iris Young 
(1990) unmasks the injustice of this universality by drawing attention to three of 
its oppressive consequences. First, all the rules and standards have already been 
set in terms of dominant culture before dominated groups participate in the social 
game. This has resulted in blindness to group differences, and further, in 
disadvantaging these late-participants. Correspondingly, it is also blind to the 
specificity of the privileged group, and gives them the illusion that their own 
viewpoint and experience embody a neutral and universal humanity. This 
universalism in the end leads to a serious consequence in that disadvantaged 
groups have internalised a devaluation of themselves, which has helped to 
produce a double consciousness in their self-understanding that is always looking 
at one's self through the eyes of others (Du Bois 1969[1930]: 45, cited in Young 
1990: 60). 
By and large, without recognition and appreciation of cultures other than the 
dominant one, dominated cultures and their members are likely to be marginalised 
from formal institutions. One severe consequence is that this marginalisation 
usually leads to the implication that dominated cultures are of low value, and 
further, that the ownership of dominated cultures has a low image. This 
marginalisation and low perception of dominated groups will lead students of 
dominated groups to find themselves in a discontinuity between their community 
cultures and the school (i. e. public institution) culture so that they have to make 
an effort to bridge the gap by investing (much) more time, energy or even more 
money in schooling. Relatedly, they have to overcome other difficulties in 
schooling caused by the low perception (e. g. the perception of their lack of `merit' 
as a result of the cultural discontinuity) and maltreatment of them by teachers 
(and their fellow students as well) and the low quality of instruction as argued 
earlier. They will suffer as a result of their treatment and not become as 
competitive as their peers from the dominant groups in schools or in the labour 
market. 
Low attainment of ethnic minorities in schools, and/or further, in the larger 
society, raises a serious question for the state, academics as well as the public as 
to how to treat ethnic minorities of distinctive cultures in mainstream institutions 
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that are established on the basis of the dominant culture. This is not about 
education per se that focuses on merit of students. In other words, minority 
families or communities should not be blamed without caution for their failure in 
educational performance when they are largely victims in this `civilization clash'. 
By the same token, it would be over-simplistic to take successful minorities as the 
role model in that this implies that the failure of other minorities is the result of 
their lack of intellectual merit (and relatedly, motivation) and positive cultural 
norms and values for education rather than a result of unequal treatment of ethnic 
majority and minority cultures by public policy and discourse in the wider 
society. In this light, what is now known as multiculturalism emerged in close 
association with a movement under the banner of cultural rights. The term 
multiculturalism came into being in the 1960s and 1970s in countries like Canada 
and Australia, and to a lesser extent, Britain and the United States (Modood 
2001: 562). This movement was closely associated with the post-war influx of 
immigrants to Western countries, and evolved into a coalition with other 
movements emerging earlier or later: the feminist movement, black or gay 
movements etc. Academically it is usually discussed under such labels as the 
politics of difference, politics of recognition, identity politics or (politics of) 
multiculturalism, all of which are embedded in a similar underlying idea of 
cultural rights or cultural membership while carrying slightly different 
connotations (Kymlicka 2002: 327). The range of requirements for the rights 
demanded by these different groups is wide and various. 8 
On the other hand, each country has employed different policies towards ethnic 
minorities' requirements for rights that are based on their different histories and 
political philosophies (Castles 1995; Castles and Miller 1998; Modood 1997a; 
Favell 2001; Koopmans and Statham 2000). Parekh discusses four views on the 
political structure of multicultural societies that he names proceduralist, 
assimilationist, civic assimilationist and millet models (2000: 199-206). Each 
model is an attempt to cope with the relationship between diversity and unity. The 
proceduralist model means a state that stays morally neutral and lays down `the 
8 Parekh (2000: 3-4) classifies and evaluates three most common forms of cultural diversity with 
regard to cultural rights, namely, subcultural diversity such as Gays and Lesbians, perspectival 
diversity such as feminists and environmentalists, and communal diversity such as indigenous 
peoples, immigrants and religious communities. 
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minimally necessary general rules of conduct, subject to which citizens remain 
free to lead their self-chosen life'. The millet model refers to the kind of structure 
in which aliens settling in the hosting society are allowed to govern their 
communities with their own laws, customs and practices. As a view occupying a 
halfway house between the proceduralist and the assimilationist, the civic 
assimilationist model is based on the view that although cultures other than the 
dominant one are free to flourish, this is confined to the relatively private realm 
such as family or communal associations. Perhaps the most serious consequence 
of this model is that members (especially the youth) of other cultures internalise 
their inferiority which has led them to confused lives or to retreat into their 
communal ghettos - as Iris Young similarly observes above. 
9 However, Parekh 
considers that the assimilationist and millet theories are both defective as they 
more or less ignore the claims of diversity or unity respectively. The other two 
models respect both diversity and unity, but fail to appreciate their dialectical 
interplay. 10 
Therefore, multiculturalism is a social perspective that emerged from the growing 
awareness of cultural diversity, i. e. of the importance of diversity for people to 
have a meaningful life and for a modern society that recognises and appreciates 
the richness of humanities that is encouraged by cultural diversity. Further, 
multiculturalism can also be used to orient policy-making. In other words, 
multiculturalism is a social paradigm that has been provoked by a social 
movement on the one hand, and on the other, advanced by academic discourse 
and reflection on these movements. In the meantime, it has also been adopted by 
governments such as Canada and Australia as national policy. Whereas it is not 
always clear-cut between these different levels (e. g. in Britain, multiculturalism has 
not been taken up as a policy whereas in practice the state has promoted a 
9I have found the civic assimilationist model particularly relevant to or quite much mirroring the 
situation in China, which is also comparable to the republican model in France as Favell (2001) 
argues, to which I will come back in chapters two, five and nine. 
10 Castles and Miller roughly divide different policy patterns into three categories (Castles and 
Miller 1998: 244-252): the differential exclusionary model; the assimilationist model, and the 
multicultural model. However, exclusionary and assimilationist models are either problematic or 
unlikely to succeed. The former has been proven to lead society towards segregation whereas the 
latter has produced social injustice as a result of the neglect of the cultural and social situation of 
settlers. On the contrary, the multiculturalism model - even if it may be superficial and imperfect 
particularly in its early period - significantly responds to the needs of settlers and is a statement 
about the openness of the nation to cultural diversity, and so is a justifiable alternative (ibid.: 252). 
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package of multiculturalist measures (Modoodl997)), multiculturalism is 
essentially understood as recognition of cultural diversity in my thesis. This 
understanding is directed at a public accommodation of diversity, and more 
importantly, serves to suggest a new direction in policy-making that considers 
entitling minorities to social citizenship in the form of their cultural rights or 
membership in the larger society. As a result, this understanding will lead to 
reconciliation between legal formalities and public discourse and attitudes in 
terms of the cultural membership of ethnic minorities. 
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About this research 
In spite of some disagreements, '2 one standpoint that is held by all the 
commentators cited above is the rejection of the view of the universality and 
superiority of the dominant group in either terms of colour or culture, or their 
mixture. This is also the bedrock of my arguments. However, historically there 
was not an analogous concept to racism in the Chinese context although it is true 
that China imported the term of racism from Europe in the nineteenth century. 
This is because the Chinese population was rather homogeneous historically in 
terms of race, and China is not an immigrant country which has brought in a large 
number of peoples with different physical features as that has occurred to the 
USA and UK. This makes the ethnic composition in China less heterogeneous 
compared to the USA and the UK. 13 Relatedly, Kymlicka's classification of three 
models of multiculturalism (or group differential rights) that correspond to three 
different types of minorities is not applicable to China. 14 Nonetheless, China has 
long had its own version of universality and superiority of the dominant group, 
the Chinese Han. This is what is known as culturalism (in this sense it may be 
A distinction between multicultural society and multiculturalist society must be made here. The 
former is a term describing diversity of society whereas the latter refers to recognition of diversity. 
In other words, a multicultural society could be a monoculturalist society where other cultures 
than the dominant one are marginalised. In fact it is rarely the case that a society is not 
multicultural whilst recognition of cultural diversity by the public, academics or in policies is not 
always the case in many multicultural societies. 
12 The USA case is different from that of the UK. Interested readers can consult May (1999) and 
McLaren and Torres (1999). 
13 The concept of immigrant country I am employing here is different from that applied to the kind 
of country where the majority of its settlers were immigrants such as Australia, the USA, Canada 
or Singapore (See Ogbu and Simons 1998). It also incorporates countries with a large number of 
immigrants such as many Western European countries. 
14 Therefore I am not adopting Kymlicka's framework systematically in my study whereby some 
of his concepts will be employed at times when necessary. 
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relatively close to cultural racism rather than colour racism), a tradition of 
seemingly ranking peoples though by its own criterion that took shape in the 
Chinese context as I shall discuss in chapter four. Culturalism held Confucianism 
as its doctrine to distinguish outsiders from insiders, or barbarians from civilizers. 
In this sense, the most important difference between the culturalism discourse in 
China and the (colour-derived) racial discourse lies in the view of the potential 
transformability of aliens, physically or culturally, partially or completely. In spite 
of the fact that Chinese would also employ the cluster of terms of race (zhong, 
renzhong, zhongzu) on certain occasions, it does not necessarily convey the same 
meaning as my case studies will show in chapter eight. '5 
Indeed, even today, culturalism is still essential for China to distinguish `them' 
from `us'. This is true with its domestic minorities, and also true in its attitude 
towards foreign peoples, regardless of the race they belong to, as I shall argue in 
detail in chapter four. One example is associated with the way that the mainstream 
group members perceive Tibetans and Muslims in northwest China as my case 
studies will show in detail in chapter eight. In spite of their physical and linguistic 
closeness to the majority Han compared to Tibetans, Muslim Hui are regarded as 
more alien than Tibetans because Islamic culture (rather than sinicised Muslims) 
is more incompatible with the Han culture from a Han perspective. In the 
meantime, they would be accepted if they remove their religious markers and/or 
sinicise themselves as I shall discuss in chapters seven and eight. 
15 Duara (1993) has observed that the threat towards Chinese cultural values arose on several 
occasions and produced several reactions from the Chinese literati and populace in history. On this 
basis he suggests that culturalism that assumes the cultural superiority of the Chinese (seeking no 
legitimation or defence outside of the culture itself) is difficult to be identified as a distinct form-in 
Chinese history. This argument is too narrow to be justifiable in that the supposed cultural 
superiority of Chinese, even under threat at times, has never faded away. Quite the reverse, since 
China successfully accepted and sinicised alien cultures such as Buddhism in history, this has in 
turn reinforced its belief in the power of its culture (in a literary and moral sense. Same as below). 
In fact Chinese hold a general view towards the power of culture, to which other 'hard' forces are 
not considered to be comparable, such as technology or military that are regarded not as advanced 
as culture. This is also why, though partially, contemporary Chinese leaders insist on 'ruling the 
country with morality' (yi de zhi guo), and some Chinese intellectuals believe that Chinese culture 
is the remedy for the increasingly chaotic world. More relevant information can be found in 
chapter four. In addition, the imagined cultural superiority of the Chinese should also be 
understood from a context-specific view - this culturalism is not exercised as aggressively or 
tangibly as, for example, the racial superiority is in the West (so this difference itself appears to be 
cultural). This is perhaps, though partly, why it is regarded as not being constantly continuous 
from a Western perspective. 
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Another very important feature of Chinese culturalism is that it is that level of 
education is a central criterion by which an alien can be identified as Chinese or 
vice versa, dependent on whether or not she or he `cultured' with the Confucian 
classics. Hence Chinese culturalism is primarily race- or colour-blind but uses an 
education-based criterion to distinguish between different peoples. In spite of the 
differences outlined, both the UK and USA (cultural or colour) racism and 
Chinese culturalism conduct marginalisation or assimilation of dominated groups 
under the view of superiority and universality of the dominant culture and group. 
It is thus interesting to look in detail into the process by which this Chinese 
culturalism operates with regard to its ethnic minorities, and whether or not it is 
also entangled with racial discourse to some extent or in some contexts. More 
importantly, how this culturalism works in the education system, its traditional 
terrain, becomes particularly interesting to examine. 
As I shall illustrate in chapter five, underachievement in China is an issue which 
arises in relation to the education of ethnic minorities or, literally, minority 
education (minzu jiaoyu). Recent research and statistics on the achievements of 
minorities reveal a complex picture. Nationally, several minority groups 
persistently have higher achievement than the majority Han (e. g. Korean, Uzbek, 
Tartar) and at a regional level, some individual minority groups or sub-groups 
perform better than the Han (see, for example, Harrell and Ma 1999; RhSKTS and 
JF 2003; RPB and RhSKTS 2002; Xinwen Bangongshi 2005). Nevertheless, the 
situation in which minority students on average perform relatively poorly in 
schools still persists, although the degree to which this is the case varies 
geographically and/or ethnically. Further, the picture of the educational 
performance of ethnic minorities from a better-off socio-economic background 
appears to be more complex and complicated as a result of the exclusion of them 
in the larger society. This will be shown through minority narratives of education, 
social mobility and cultural difference in chapters six and seven. 
Therefore, my research begins with the examination of the relationship between 
ethnicity and educational performance that is directed at forms of cultural 
exclusion experienced by ethnic minorities. The examination is located in the 
process in which ethnic minorities' desire for or commitment to achieving social 
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mobility through education is complicated by the mainstream agenda of 
integrating them into the Han nation-state. The research is oriented by Ogbu's 
cultural-ecological framework that studies the relationship between ethnicity and 
educational performance in the context of an interaction between the social 
system and ethnic minorities. It is also directed by the thesis of cultural capital 
and social capital developed by Bourdieu, Putnam and other social scientists, and 
by the theory of multiculturalism elaborated by Kymlicka, Parekh and others. The 
research sets out to decipher the discourse in which the ideological agenda of 
integrating minorities into the cultural majority develops at the expense of 
minority cultures and their symbolic images. The study is underpinned by a 
dialogic hermeneutic framework in which identity construction is modelled as 
discursive repertoires. Discursive repertoires are examined through historical 
investigation, current policy and public discourse analysis, and ethnographic 
fieldwork, which are interconnected and meanwhile constitute a triangulation 
approach for my examination. 
The examination starts with an investigation into the historical formulation of the 
cultural superiority and universality of the Han that is labelled as culturalism as 
argued earlier. This culturalism determined ethnic community boundaries and 
membership, sequentially shaped the Chinese educational tradition that in turn 
holds up a Han culture- or Confucian-based elitist view at the philosophical level, 
and operated an examinations-guided institution at the technical level (the civil 
service examinations). As a legacy, it has largely determined education policy and 
public views, and the educational experiences of ethnic minorities today despite 
the fact that the exact form that the culturalism takes has changed over time and in 
relation to changing material conditions. Therefore, the study goes further to 
examine current state policy with regard to the education of ethnic minorities and 
academic literature relating to ethnicity, education and culture. Finally, I look in 
detail into the varied educational experiences of ethnic minorities in the cultural 
exclusion that are mainly premised on the ethnographic data of interviews 
between the inquirer (myself) and individual research participants from Han, 
Muslim and Tibetan communities. 
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My research thus scrutinises the varied experiences of ethnic minorities in relation 
to their cultural exclusion, and the social exclusion that is interlocked with the 
former, in schools as well as in the larger society of contemporary China. The 
cultural exclusion is grounded in the historical culturalism of Han superiority and 
universality that has essentially contributed to the establishment of the societal 
culture, which has become thickened in the climate of modern Chinese society. 
Under these circumstances, ethnic minorities are deprived of the cultural or social 
capital and so put on an unequal footing with the majority Han. This process 
involves a variety of growing or weakening components such as moral, cultural 
and social mobility with respect to education, which are entangled with one 
another and together complicate the educational landscape in the wider social 
context. Therefore, my study is not only about education, nor does it make 
education its primary aim. Rather, it departs from educational performance, and 
tries to unveil what variables hide behind the achievement gap by looking at 
socio-economic, political, cultural and historical dimensions. The study aims to 
make a contribution to a limited (albeit growing) research focusing on ethnic 
minorities in China, particularly from a sociological perspective. 
The study focuses on northwest China as the research field for the reason that the 
existing literature on ethnicity in both Chinese and English largely concentrates 
on the southwest. It equally incorporates both culturally and politically more 
visible ethnic communities (e. g. the Tibetan) and less heard of and so relatively 
under-researched ones (e. g. Muslim Hui, Salar and Bonan, the Muslim groups in 
this study that are different from the more visible ones in Xinjiang, e. g. Uygur). 
More importantly, this methodological approach allows the research to bridge the 
gap between studies of ethnic minorities that are usually conducted separately 
along the lines of related ethnic cultures. So while a study centres on Muslim Hui, 
the majority Han and/or other ethnic minority communities such as Tibetans in 
the region that have immediate contact with Hui are usually absent in the study. In 
this way, my research is particularly interested in the interaction between different 
`civilizations', in my case focusing on interethnic relationships between Muslims, 
Tibetans and Han against the social system. Moreover, this interaction is not one 
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between two groups of a minority and the Han as some research has done, 
16 but a 
multi-dimensionally interactive `net' in which more than two groups interact with 
one another that is driven by and also in turn (re)shapes government policies 
towards ethnic minorities as a whole. In this light, I set up two research aims: 
1. To examine the causes and effects of the cultural exclusion of Tibetan and 
Muslim students in schooling. 
2. To consider what might improve the inclusion of ethnocultural minorities in 
schools. 
The first research aim needs to be realised through answering five research 
questions as follows: 
1. How did Chinese culturalism historically shape ethnic community boundaries 
and membership, what is its educational legacy and how has this legacy 
determined the educational experiences of ethnic minorities? 
2. What do the existing literature and policy documents tell us about the way in 
which the mainstream society treats ethnocultural minorities with regard to 
schooling? 
3. How does the mainstream cultural group in state schools perceive Muslim and 
Tibetan students and their ethnic communities? 
4. What are the attitudes of Muslim and Tibetan students towards the curriculum, 
their ethnic communities and their own identity in schooling as well as the 
larger society? 
5. What are the Muslim and Tibetan parents' evaluation of schooling, socio- 
economic status and cultural identity of their ethnic communities as a whole? 
The second research aim will be developed in the concluding chapter as illustrated 
in the following section. This is largely oriented to the theory of multiculturalism. 
16 A very recent example is that several papers on interethnic relations between the Han and 
Islamic peoples (Hui or Uygur) in China were published in the latest issue of Asian Ethnicity 
(Mackerras 2005; Yee 2005; Zang 2005) that were presented in the conference on `Ethnicity in 
Multicultural Asia: Theory and Findings' held in Hong Kong in November 2003. 
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Outline of the chapters 
The next chapter, chapter two departs from the notion of power relations and 
scrutinises the cultural-ecological framework of Ogbu, the cultural capital theory 
of Bourdieu and the social capital thesis of Bourdieu, Putnam and other social 
scientists with especial reference to minority education. In doing so, the chapter 
develops a theoretical framework that principally aims to inform the empirical 
studies which follow. Chapter three is an explanation of the research approach 
and description of the fieldwork. Chapter four is an historical investigation of 
Chinese Han culturalism. This aims to locate the education of ethnic minorities - 
both the policy and the educational experiences of ethnic minorities - in the 
Chinese cultural context that historically shaped it. Chapter five is a critical 
literature review of educational policies, practices and the mainstream discourses 
about the minority population with reference to education. It maps out a backdrop, 
against which the minority population and their cultures are located and evaluated 
in line with the mainstream Han ideology. 
Chapters six, seven and eight are empirical studies that draw upon fieldwork in 
the borderland areas between Qinghai and Gansu provinces, northwest China. 
Chapter six examines the cultural membership choices and constraints facing 
Tibetan people by focusing on the predicament that Tibetan parents and students 
face in school choice. Chapter seven reveals the Muslim community's 
disengagement from state schools as a response to their ethnic identity as a people 
of `familiar strangers' in the wider Chinese Han cultural context. Chapter eight 
looks at how the mainstream members in school perceive Tibetan and Muslim 
minority communities and students. Through close scrutiny of the similarities and 
differences in the mainstream group's perception of Tibetans and Muslims, it will 
decipher the discursive repertoires in which the ideological agenda of integrating 
minorities into the mainstream develops. 
Based on a summary of the empirical studies, chapter nine, the conclusion, 
addresses the pedagogical implications of the minority school performance for 
both schools and the larger society. This aims to promote a theory of cultural 
citizenship by advocating a (re-)negotiation of the project of nation-building and 
modernisation of the state and minority rights, which is directed at achieving the 
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goal of fully including the minority population of distinctive cultures into the 
larger society. In the meantime, this approach also serves to identify further 
research areas as an extension of this study. 
Terminology 
A few key terms that are used throughout the thesis need to be clarified here 
whereas explanations of other terms will appear in the remaining relevant 
chapters. In modem Chinese there is only one word for different ethnic 
populations within its boundaries, (min)zu, which had long been translated into 
nationality in English. However, informed readers may have found that I adopted 
terms ethnic, ethnicity rather than nationality in spite of the fact that self- 
consciousness of ethnic identity was largely absent in the governmental 
identification of the 56 ethnic groups that embarked upon some 50 years ago. '7 
Probably because official definitions are not derived from nowhere or merely a 
result of social engineering, and meanwhile the definitions have inevitably led to 
an awareness of ethnic identity among both the Han and non-Han groups, 
nationality, the English translation of the Chinese concept of (min)zu, was 
gradually replaced by ethnicity in its English translation in some government 
documents and academic research some 15 years ago. This signals that the 
concept of ethnicity has been imported to Chinese discourse. 18 
However, my adoption of the term of ethnicity or ethnic is in a more linguistic 
sense for reasons of convenience even though I also employ the term of 
nationality on several occasions with regard to historical discourse wherever 
necessary. On the other hand, my thesis does not particularly focus on the 
confusion over the ethnic identity issue. This is also associated with the nature of 
the ethnic minority groups that my thesis takes as subjects, Tibetans and Muslims 
in the northwest. They are relatively less unsure about their ethnic identity than 
many others even though they may not know the official terminology used to 
17 More information on the official `Ethnic (Minorities) Identification Project' (nzinzu shibie 
gongzuo), such as its rationale, criteria and arbitrariness, can be found in Fei Xiaotong (1980) and 
other scholars (e. g. Gladney 2004, Tapp 2002 and Xie Jian 2004). 
18 In return, a new Chinese word for `ethnicity' that was adopted in Hong Kong and Taiwan 
before being accepted by mainland China is used within academic circles, zuqun (lit. ethnic 
group). In spite of this, ininzu is still the only name for `ethnicity' or 'nationality' that is bewared 
and used by other entities or people. 
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describe them until reaching schooling age (Ma Rong 2003a: 13). However, I 
identified the ethnicity of some students in the mainstream school in the fieldwork 
whereas it appeared to be obscure to me. My records were basically dependent 
upon their self-consciousness and self-identification. The relevant information can 
be found in chapter six. 
I use the pair of terms minority/majority in line with the government and public 
discourse in that (ethnic) minority always refers to non-Han groups whether or not 
they are quantitatively dominant groups, for example, in their autonomous 
regions. Correspondingly, the term majority is exclusively directed at the Han 
community. ' By the same token, I refer to the majority Han when employing 
such terms as dominant, mainstream, ordinary, subordinate or common whereas 
terms like dominated, peripheral, subordinated or marginal are used to refer to 
ethnic minorities, unless indicated otherwise. 
19 For an examination of heterogeneity of the Han, readers can consult works by researchers like 





This chapter aims to set out the theoretical framework of the thesis so as to inform 
and guide the subsequent chapters of historical background, policy analysis, and 
more importantly, of empirical investigation. Following the previous chapter 
which briefly highlighted the theoretical models this research adopts, the 
theoretical framework of this chapter will take power relations as the departure 
point, and school performance as the main indicator, to focus on the social system 
and community forces towards it. In this light, three relevant theoretical 
approaches with regard to education, culture and society, and interrelations 
between them are critically examined in Section One. The approaches are 
respectively a) the cultural-ecological framework elaborated by John Ogbu; b) the 
theory of cultural capital proposed by Pierre Bourdieu and; c) the theory of social 
capital developed by Bourdieu, Putnam and other social scientists. Section Two 
further explores the links and divergences between the three approaches that are 
directed at the intersection between capital, culture and power relations. In the 
conclusion to this chapter, I highlight some of the theoretical and methodological 
deficiencies of the three theses. 
Three theoretical approaches 
Cultural-ecological theory 
In the literature dealing with unequal school achievement with regard to ethnic 
minorities, one of the most influential frameworks is John Ogbu's `cultural- 
ecological theory' (Ogbu 1987; Ogbu & Simons 1998). Ogbu develops his theory, 
based on an examination of power relations between different groups, mainly by 
examining minorities' interpretations of and responses to the social system. He 
locates minority communities in action to delineate their strategies towards 
existing power relations. Such an interactive perspective allows Ogbu to set up 
the pair of concepts - voluntary and involuntary minorities - with which he has 
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explained why some minority groups have the motivation to perform well while 
others show resistance or reluctance in school study. 
Ogbu places minority school performance against his framework of the (social) 
system and community forces, and argues that distinctive minorities foster 
different cultural models (community forces) in response to the system or the 
dominant group's treatment of them. In Ogbu's eyes, different minority groups 
interpret and respond differently to the system as a result of their distinctive 
histories. Those mainly driven by economic interests, and who voluntarily 
immigrate into the host society or system, believe that they will have better 
opportunities for their advancement than in their place or country of origin. These 
minority groups therefore hold a positive perception of their situation that leads 
them to take positive actions towards their future prospects in their ecological 
environment: to work hard in society and to perform excellently in school. So 
these groups' members tend to overcome the cultural and linguistic barriers they 
face in schooling and are finally able to perform better in school. Ogbu classifies 
these as voluntary minorities. 
For Ogbu, voluntary minorities do not regard themselves as being in opposition to 
the dominant group in the light of power relations, although they may face some 
discrimination from, or have to be subordinated to, the dominant group for some 
time when they first arrive in the host society. By contrast, those who view the 
system as an oppositional power against them are the minorities who were 
historically forced to come to the host society or conquered by the current 
dominant group. They therefore believe that they are and will be facing numerous 
barriers that will block their success in society even if they achieve highly in 
schools and work hard as an adult. This perception will cultivate a negative view 
among them towards the dominant group and the system, and put both sides in a 
relation of mutual mistrust. As a result, this will significantly undermine their 
motivation in schooling and they will end up performing poorly. They are 
involuntary minorities in Ogbu's terms. 
22 
In examining interaction between the system and minority communities, Ogbu 
provides four distinguishable types of cultural model of ethnic minorities (Ogbu 
and Simons 1998,169-176): 
" Frames of reference, the way a person or a group looks at a situation in terms 
of whether or not he or she or they will succeed. 
" Instrumental responses or folk theories of `making it', i. e. a group's ideas 
about how to achieve success in society. This is also connected with what kind 
of people different communities tend to take as role models. 
" Degree of trust in dominant (for Ogbu, white) people and their institutions, i. e. 
whether or not a group sees the institutions as providing a route to success in 
society through educating their children properly. 
" Beliefs about the effect of adopting the mainstream (white) ways on minority 
identity, i. e. whether or not the learning of mainstream culture, language or 
ways will harm their group identities or help them overcome cultural barriers. 
Here Ogbu primarily looks at two dimensions that together lead various minority 
groups to differing interpretations of and responses to the mainstream group: 
economic aspirations and the cultural concern, both of which are significantly 
informed and shaped by their relationship with the dominant group. This allows 
for an understanding of minorities' responses both instrumentally and 
symbolically, and more importantly, of the dilemma and possibility of 
reconciliation between an expectation for economic success and a desire for 
cultural identity. In other words, the underlying question in Ogbu's approach is 
whether or not or to what extent it is possible to achieve upward social mobility 
through education and at the same time to secure a cultural identity. 
Ogbu's model has some defects, in both theory construction and applicability to 
cases in other contexts or countries. The dichotomous typology of 
voluntary/involuntary minorities in relation to variability in minority school 
performance has been challenged (Gibson et al. 1997). The inadequacy of the 
theory also lies in the fact that Ogbu overlooks both generational and gender 
differences (ibid. ). In response to the criticism, Ogbu reminds readers that his 
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classification is about `the dominant patterns of belief and behaviour within 
different minority groups', which `represent Ends of a Continuum' (Ogbu & 
Simons 1998: 168). He also points out that there exist `class and regional 
differences in beliefs and behaviours within each minority group' (ibid. ) - this 
implies the possible variability in performance between classes, between regions, 
and even between genders and generations within a minority group. ' 
What fundamentally reduces the validity of his theory is not the dichotomous 
typologies of accommodation and resistance, or success and failure, which 
correspond with his core typology of voluntary and involuntary minorities, nor his 
neglect of variability in school performance within a minority group along the 
lines of class, region, generation or gender. Rather, what makes Ogbu's thesis 
most vulnerable is that in the process of approaching his research subjects, he 
quite often diverges from the underlying concept of his thesis, power relations. 
This reduces the value of his typology of the system and community forces, and 
undermines the foundations and applicability of his classification of voluntary and 
involuntary minorities. In what follows I look in detail at the deficiency of his 
concepts in the light of power relations. 
The system and community forces. Ogbu equates the system with the dominant 
group. This has several consequences. First, all dominant group members are 
assumed to possess the same perceptions of and attitude towards minorities. 
Secondly, in the way that the concept of `system' is formulated, the policy issue is 
left out. As a matter of fact, the system is largely invisible and hence missed out 
in Ogbu's effort to take an interactive approach towards power relations, and 
becomes irrelevant. This ruling out of the system is also evident in a lack of 
analysis of the national ideologies on which policies in both schools and the larger 
society are premised (van Zanten 1997). Yet it is necessary to understand policy 
in order to understand how the system impacts on community forces. As a result, 
Ogbu does not substantially touch upon the interaction between the system and 
community forces through which power relations are supposed to be formed, and 
1 In his revised version, Ogbu did look at generational dimension. See Ogbu and Simons (1998). 
24 
community forces are thus basically an Ogbuian version of interpretations of 
minority perceptions of the system. 
So far as community forces are concerned, the interaction between the minority 
and majority is not the only or absolute drive in forming community forces as 
Ogbu suggests. The interaction between different minority groups also plays an 
important part, even though this, to a considerable extent, may be shaped by the 
system. The conflicting aspects of interaction between differential minority 
groups is usually caused by unevenness in the political role or cultural profile of 
different minority groups, as well as in related opportunities in employment or 
education, etc. Some or all of these may be an unfortunate sequel to the 
differential policies and measures of the state towards different minority groups in 
accordance with the state's interests or ends. This differs from what is assumed or 
implied in Ogbu's analysis, that is, that different interpretations of and responses 
to the same treatment are largely determined by the minorities' differential 
histories. Rather, community forces may be caused by different treatments of the 
system. In other words, power relations are not dichotomous as the system and 
community forces distinction implies, but are multi-dimensional, i. e. they are 
involved with the relationships between the system and minority communities, 
between the majority (that does not necessarily overlap with the system in all 
contexts) and minority groups, and between minority communities. 
Different treatments of the system also imply that there may be ambiguity, visible 
or invisible, in the system itself. This is mainly caused by ambivalence in the 
concern with relationships between cultural and political loyalty and cultural 
tolerance, when the system is trying to integrate ideas of political control, cultural 
diversity and citizenship cultivation, etc. into a coherent whole. This is 
particularly salient in the religious issue such as the idea of laicite in French 
public policy (Favell 2001) or the CCP's contested attempt to maintain a balance 
between political loyalty and popular autonomy (Potter 2003). The former refers 
to the situation in which religious practice should recognize the principles of 
public political order, i. e. `sacred secular ideas'. In other words, particularistic 
interests in and practices of one's own culture is structured or `disciplined' 
through a state political engagement in the form of public associations in the 
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sense that the interests and practices would impair the liberty of others if an 
official sanction is absent. As a result, the political structure imposes its priority 
over cultural interests when there is a conflict (Favell 2001: 74-79). The Chinese 
ambivalence is rooted in the tension between `liberalization of socio-economic 
relations' and `the imperative of repressing aspects of socio-economic change that 
threaten its political authority' (Potter 2003: 337). In the course that the Party-state 
transfers its focus onto building a market economy, it correspondingly loosens up 
on political control. While arousing more desire for better socio-economic status, 
the transitional economy and society have also fostered cynicism and quiet 
resistance among the masses to both their political and economic situation. 
Religion appears as one of the main outlets for this cynicism and resistance, 
which is partially a result of the loosening-up of political control. Under these 
circumstances, the degree of state control over religion practice has become 
problematic and resulted in ambivalence for both the policy-makers and policy- 
executors. In attempting to maintain or adjust power relations in accordance with 
the interests or ends of the system, the system becomes ambivalent over the best 
way of keeping a desirable balance between several competing forces, which 
results in ambiguity in its policy. 
Voluntary and involuntary minorities. Ogbu's amendment in response to criticism 
of his dominant patterns of the classification has some validity. His `dominant 
patterns' allows for discussions of divergence of individuals or subgroups in 
accordance with class or regional differences within minority groups. 2 
Nevertheless, Ogbu neglects the possibility of change in a minority group's status 
from involuntary to voluntary or vice versa, in particular historical circumstances 
-a factor Ogbu in particular puts weight on in addressing community forces. 
Such changes should be understood in terms of either historical transmission or 
geographical diffusion, or both simultaneously. A group that used to be voluntary 
in the past can become involuntary in the present or vice versa, as can be seen in 
the case of Black Americans in their first and second emancipations (Fordham 
1996: 80-101), and the Mexican case in the USA as will be revealed later on. This 
also involves the situation in which a group can change status as it moves to new 
2 Ogbu's approach does not cover the gender issue, which is also a reflection of power relations 
though I am not particularly dealing with this either in my research. 
26 
areas, e. g. Koreans in Japan may be involuntary and in the USA they may become 
voluntary. In the same vein, immigrants with a colonised history are not 
necessarily involuntary minorities (Eldering 1997). In short, whether or not a 
group is a voluntary or an involuntary minority can shift according to the 
historical or territorial context in which power relations keep changing. 
Another related difficulty in the classification of voluntary and involuntary 
minorities lies in factors existing in the cultural-ecological settings of minority 
groups, and which influence the status of minorities in different ways that 
compete with each other. Gibson (1988) considers that in terms of different 
factors affecting minority (the Sikhs) school performance, some of them play a 
positive role while others play a negative role. For instance, when they hold 
optimistic occupational aspirations, they may have to cope with racial and ethnic 
hostility which tends to block their access to a deserved career; when parents hold 
positive expectations, their children may encounter peer pressure that is hostile to 
good performance. In short, no single set of factors is simultaneously either 
positive or negative in minority schooling. Some factors may make minorities 
`voluntary' and some others may be quite the opposite. It is therefore difficult to 
establish a set of neat criteria to define a minority group as a voluntary or an 
involuntary one. This is why some minorities display characteristics of both 
voluntary and involuntary minorities (Gillborn 1997). 
Ogbu predicts that `differences among minorities in school performance are 
largely due to differences in community forces' (Ogbu and Simons 1998, note 
11). This leads him to hypothesise a cause-effect relation between voluntary 
minorities and high achievement, and involuntary minorities and low 
achievement. This is also open to question, even in terms of the claim that this 
phenomenon represents a dominant pattern. This contradiction is, again, caused 
by Ogbu's neglect of the role the system may play in minority school 
performance when he is prioritising community forces. In other words, in terms of 
power relations between the system and ethnic minority communities, whereas 
involuntary minorities are not necessarily poor school performers (Eisikovits 
1997; van Zanten 1997), the system can significantly obstruct some voluntary 
students in school performance and finally turn them into low achievers. The 
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latter can be seen, for example, from the case when the medium of instruction is 
exclusively the language of the dominant group. This situation tends to lead an 
inefficient learning process and an ineffective and unsatisfactory academic 
outcome, coupled with frustration and hopelessness, caused by the linguistic 
barrier. Relatedly, high performance in voluntary minorities is not automatically a 
result of `additive' learning (Ogbu 1987, Gibson 1988, Ogbu and Simons 1998). 
By additive learning, Ogbu means that, on the one hand, minority students have 
learnt `new skills, behaviours, and language that will enable them to succeed in 
society'; on the other hand, they could also `retain their own culture and 
language' (Ogbu and Simons 1998: 175), and, further, their ethnic identity. So 
learning a new culture and language is to add something more to their own culture 
or language. However, contrary to what Ogbu predicts here, for some voluntary 
minorities, the situation is that when they learn mainstream culture and language, 
the latter replace their own culture or language rather than simply add something 
more to them. This is rarely the desirable outcome to voluntary minorities. 
Lastly, by adopting the concept of settler society, Ogbu is cautious in trying to 
restrict the application of his theory to the case studies within his selected 
societies, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore, 
`where the ruling or dominant group is made up of immigrants from other 
societies who have come to settle there because they want to improve their 
economic, political, and social status' (Ogbu and Simons 1998: 162). This 
confinement is more likely to be a response to the criticism of the insufficiency of 
his theory when it is applied to different contexts or types of society, as some of 
his critics demonstrated (Gibson et al 1997). Nonetheless, power relations are an 
essential and common existence in all types of society. Therefore, whether a 
group is voluntary or involuntary in relation to its history is not exclusively 
connected to whether or not the society is a settler one. Rather, such a distinction 
can also be fostered in differing types of society, given the status of different 
ethnic groups in clusters of power relations. In other words, it does not make 
much sense for Ogbu to try to enhance the reliability of his theory by 
disconnecting the associations in terms of power relations between his cases and 
cases in what he defines as non-settler societies - Europe, China or elsewhere. In 
fact, Ogbu himself in the same article claims that his `framework is not 
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specifically directed at any particular race and even at any particular country' 
(Ogbu and Simons 1998: 167. Emphasis added). This claim is further 
supplemented by examples referring to several non-settler societies, such as 
China, Japan, Mexico, Ghana and France (ibid. ). 
On the whole, the concept of voluntary and involuntary minorities can be said to 
be somewhat misleading when applied to many cases, including Ogbu's cases as 
can be seen above. More importantly, the association of certain minorities with 
certain types of response and behaviour can also implicitly lead to stereotyping 
these minorities with the result that they are responsible for their disadvantaged 
status (Gillborn 1997). Hence this is not a valuable distinction. On the other hand, 
the system and community forces distinction has heuristic value as a general 
framework based on power relations between different social forces (see also 
Navarro 1997 and van Zanten 1997). This heuristic value at the same time also 
requires that we are clear about our definition and understanding of power 
relations: power relations are an essential and common, i. e. cross-society 
existence; power relations continue existing through constant interaction between 
differing social forces, which is multi-dimensional rather than from one side/layer 
or two sides/layers alone; power relations are changing in different contexts. 
Furthermore, methodologically, it is also evident that Ogbu provides a highly 
operationalisable model of a combination of both macro level and micro level 
approaches for an empirical study of the relationship between ethnicity and school 
performance, as my empirical studies will show. 
The concept of cultural capital 
Highlighting community forces shows that for Ogbu cultural and linguistic 
difference explanations put forward by some educational anthropologists in the 
USA do not account for the differences among some minorities in school 
performance, though cultural discontinuity between home and school does cause 
learning problems (Erickson 1987; Ogbu and Simons 1998: 161). While it may be 
difficult to assess what factors, community forces or cultural differences, are more 
significant in minority school performance in general terms as opposed to looking 
at the issue on a case by case basis, a theory across the Atlantic that provides a 
parallel with cultural discontinuity explanations seems to be more widely 
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accepted and applied by European academics. The French theorist Pierre 
Bourdieu, in analysing the educational achievement gap between different classes, 
explains that distinctive class groups possess differential cultural heritages, some 
of which are more likely than others to be transformed into cultural capital 
(Bourdieu and Passeron 1977; Bourdieu 1986). It is cultural capital that causes 
different academic achievements of students from different cultural groups and, 
furthermore, leads this educational pattern to persist. Cultural capital, according to 
Bourdieu, takes three forms: embodied, objectified and institutionalised. Its 
embodied form refers to the domestic transmission of cultural heritage. This is 
`the best hidden and socially most determinant educational investment' (Bourdieu 
1986: 48). 3 Its objectified state is observable in the form of cultural goods such as 
pictures, books, instruments, machines, etc. Its institutionalised form is most 
significantly embodied in academic qualifications or `credentialisation'. That is to 
say, the embodiment of a particular culture rather than others is recognised and 
reproduced through the educational system. This institutionalisation has the 
crucial effect of guaranteeing the monetary value of a given academic 
qualification. In this way, it ultimately converts culture into economic value or 
capitalises culture. 
Put simply, the institutionalisation of embodiment (partly through objectification) 
is a process in which the culture of certain groups is turned into (cultural) capital. 
Certain cultural groups are thus endowed with cultural capital. In terms of class 
disparity, this endowment is associated with ownership by the higher class of 
`highbrow' (usually dominant) culture and language. The possession of highbrow 
culture and language means possession of cultural capital, the culture and 
language institutionalised through the educational mechanism. In turn, the 
possession of cultural capital by higher class children appears as `merit' in 
schooling. In such circumstances, while the education system presupposes the 
possession of cultural capital equally for credentialisation in school, lower class 
students are placed in a disadvantaged position due to their lack of cultural capital 
or `merit', simply because they are from a different culture. This educational or 
institutional system enables the higher class to maintain its dominant position 
3 All the page numbers for Bourdieu 1986 refer to Halsey et al. (1997). 
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through legitimating the normative status and reproduction of its cultural heritage. 
Moreover, the success in schooling of some individuals from the lower class also 
helps to strengthen the educational system by legitimating the dominant culture. 
Bourdieu's theory of cultural capital can be criticised for an inadequacy in 
evidence (Sullivan 2001), or for being more `a weak figure of speech' rather than 
a `potent and precise analytic tool' (DiMaggio 1979: 1468). Even so, the theory of 
cultural capital, on the whole, is heuristic in a more general theoretical sense. This 
means that his theory has inspired a generation of theoretical hypotheses 
(ibid: 1467) and has also been effectively operationalised in empirical studies, 
though `in various different ways' (Sullivan 2001: 896). The operationalisation of 
the theory is also expanded to studies of school performance along the lines of 
ethnicity or race (for instance, Kalmijn and Kraaykamp 1996; Lareau and Horvat 
1999; Olneck 2000). 
On the other hand, the adoption of the term `capital' or `institutionalisation' 
suggests that Bourdieu is cynical about possible changes to power relations that 
the dominated could make - marginalised groups in his eyes are primarily passive 
acceptors of the social system. In other words, Bourdieu's framework hardly 
allows one to theorise the attitudes and response of marginalised groups towards 
the repeatedly reproduced social mechanism, let alone strategies they may adopt, 
whether resistance or reluctance towards the system. More pessimistically, some 
individuals from marginalised groups are seen as (unintentional) contributors to 
the system when they achieve success in schools. By contrast, Ogbu seems to take 
minority students as relatively active actors in schooling. By going down to a 
more concrete level, Ogbu shows evidence that marginalised groups can be 
successful school performers who are also successful in combining the host 
society culture and their own cultures through education - an `additive' learning 
outcome in Ogbu's terms. Even poor school performers for Ogbu are, at least in 
part, conscious actors. In the light of their perceptions of the ways in which the 
system treats them and of their socio-economic status in the host society as a 
result of this treatment, these school children have actively adopted corresponding 
strategies against the (perceived) system. 
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The concept of social capital 
The cultural-ecological framework and cultural capital theory diverge from each 
other in their views of the role that marginalised group members play against the 
system. For Bourdieu, the social system is a result of certain power relations that 
in turn reproduce and reinforce the same pattern of power relations - cultural 
capital for him is a typical reflection of this reproduction mechanism. The 
dominated group members are not beneficiaries but either victims, passive 
acceptors or unintentional contributors to the persistence of the system. In 
contrast, Ogbu approaches the way in which marginalised communities take steps 
to overcome cultural or other barriers and make an optimal combination of 
cultural resources available to them from both schools and their communities; or 
they take action to reject schooling as a strategy of resisting the social mechanism 
by stressing or celebrating their own cultural heritages and identities. 
Ogbu's approach to community forces is, in some way, transcended by some 
other research in which the community can be seen to have been mobilised as an 
active, intentionally organised social network in helping their (younger) members 
to achieve upward social mobility through education (Min Zhou 2005). In Min 
Zhou's research, the Chinese ethnic community in the US are not seen as playing 
a passive or invisible role in relation to the social system as illustrated by 
Bourdieu (in his class-based theory); nor, as Ogbu suggests, do they merely 
employ an `opt-in' or `opt-out' strategy based on their perceptions of the 
treatment they have received from the system, aiming either to fit into the social 
system or to reject it. In fact, the marginalised community, as Zhou illustrates, can 
play a significant role in the attempt to actively participate in the (mainstream) 
social system through becoming a `Do It Yourself' actor in the first instance. 
Zhou's approach brings to our attention the concept of social capital. Unlike 
cultural and economic capital, `social capital inheres in the structure of relations 
between actors and among actors' (Coleman 1988: S98). It encompasses `social 
networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them' 
(Putnam 2000: 19). This is a network of connections characterised by mutual 
knowledge and recognition of its membership. This knowledge and recognition 
create, maintain and reinforce obligations and expectations between its members. 
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By effectively mobilising the network of relationships, social capital facilitates 
conversion from cultural capital to economic capital. By the same token, cultural 
and economic capitals also act as a basis to form social capital and further, add 
more value to it (Bourdieu 1986, Coleman 1988, Putnam 2000). 
Compared to the notion of cultural capital, social capital is not a theory that is 
particularly associated with educational issues. However, education is as 
important as other social institutions in the thesis of social capital in the sense that 
it `seemed the key to both greater tolerance and greater social involvement', as 
Putnam suggests (Putnam 2000: 18). Education indeed drew particular attention at 
the stage when social capital was popularised as a sociological concept by James 
Coleman in the 1980s (Coleman 1988). 5 One of the main ways illustrated by 
Putnam in which social capital helps academic achievement is that when parents 
and communities are engaged in schooling (e. g. have opportunities to 
communicate with the school or to participate in decision making in the school 
and are willing to help children with their school study, etc. ), the level of their 
support for their children's achievement is high and that of their children's 
misbehaviour is low (Putnam 2000: 296-306). By the same token, a lack of social 
capital means that communities and parents have few opportunities and/or little 
enthusiasm for their children's schooling, which is likely to further result in their 
children's disengagement from and poor performance in education. 6 
However, an important distinction that should be made between three types of 
social capital: bonding (exclusive), bridging (inclusive or horizontal) and linking 
° The notion of social capital that Bourdieu suggests is approached in a significantly different way 
from that of American positivists (e. g. Putnam). This will be illustrated later on. Here the 
conflation of the views of different theorists from distinctive traditions is based on the idea that, as 
a theory that is loosely defined as social relationships, differential approaches to social capital can 
be temporarily ignored when introducing it in a more general and broader sense of `relationships'. 
For an excellent examination of the problem and properties of social capital and its intellectual 
history, see Woolcock (1998). 
5 Social capital in fact has its roots in European social theory and in particular Bourdicu's work. A 
comparison between different perspectives towards social capital between Bourdieu and his 
American counterparts, and how this is connected with his notion of cultural capital will be 
discussed in detail below. 
6 Nevertheless it can be a danger of oversimplification in overlooking the importance of the form 
of parental involvement in favour of the extent of it. In fact what I am trying to do here is to 
review (particularly) Putnam's social capital theory coupled with the examples he provided rather 
than display my own arguments which appear below, or exhaust different forms of social capital in 
relation to education. 
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(vertical) (Putnam 2000: 22-23, Woolcock 2001: 13). 7 Bonding social capital 
refers to a social connection that tends to stress the identity of a group which is 
constituted in an inward and homogeneous way, and potentially excludes others 
who are external to it. In other words, it bolsters narrower selves and in-groups 
loyalty, and may also create out-group antagonism. Bridging social capital refers 
to a form of social networking that includes people across diverse social 
cleavages, and `can generate broader identities and reciprocity'(Putnam 2000: 23). 
Linking social capital, unlike bridging capital that functions horizontally, 
connects groups or individuals to others in different social positions, e. g. more 
powerful or socially advantaged, and hence refers to a vertical network. It is a 
linkage to formal institutions from which resources, ideas and information can be 
leveraged (Putnam 2000, Woolcock 2001, NESF 2003). 
Different combinations of bonding, bridging and linking social capital are 
responsible for the variety of outcomes for different cultural groups (Woolcock 
2001, NESF 2003). A desirable social capital combination is therefore a healthy 
balance between, or optimal combination of, its differential dimensions. Too 
much bonding capital and too little bridging capital stifle and restrict personal 
initiative and innovation within the group while at the same time it is likely to 
invite exclusion of those outside the group. Too much bridging and too little 
bonding will leave individuals personally vulnerable. Meanwhile, a lack of 
linking capital can leave certain social groups on the periphery of the centre of 
power, which will significantly undermine their rights and opportunities for 
realisation of their interests. Worse than this, marginalised groups will be exposed 
`to continuing marginalisation and disempowerment' when they are dispossessed 
from both linking and bridging capitals (NESF 2003: 34). In short, whilst social 
capital can be mobilised to empower communities, it can also play a negative 
role. 
Bonding social capital exists within a community and is thus inward, bridging is 
between communities and linking is beyond communities, and so outward 
7 The terms of 'bonding' and 'bridging' are not originally coined by Putnam; 'linking' is by 
Woolcock despite the fact that the idea is in part inspired by others' work. Sec Putnam (2000) and 
Woolcock (2001) for details. 
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(Putnam 2000, Woolcock 2001, NESF 2003). Linking capital is a form of social 
connection between formmal institutions and communities (and community 
members), and thus requires a connection beyond communities per se, either 
within or between. In this light, when there also exist gaps between distinctive 
subgroups in terms of class, gender, etc. within a community, it is necessary to 
distinguish personal connections of some individuals in a particular community 
with other communities or formal institutions from the collective connections of 
the community with other communities or formal institutions. In other words, 
although in everyday language it makes sense that an individual from a certain 
community is said to have bridging or linking social capital because she or he 
possesses relationships with other communities or institutions, it runs the risk of 
taking this individually based capital as the collectively based capital of the 
community as a whole. 
The need to make these distinctions is embedded in the understanding of the key 
elements on which social capital is built up: mutual knowledge and recognition. 
When some individuals possess outward capital, it does not necessarily mean that 
the community these individuals are from is understood and recognised by other 
communities or formal institutions as a whole. By the same token, when members 
of a community have achieved social mobility with the help of the fellow 
members (in advantaged or powerful social positions or otherwise), if the 
community as a whole is not recognised by other communities or institutions, 
members' success is still individual rather than collective. Min Zhou's study can 
be taken as an illustration of this kind of story in which the Chinese community is 
among the marginalised though individual successes seem to be growing, usually 
from the younger generation, who have achieved success both in schools and in 
the wider society. In other words, the Chinese community as a whole cannot be 
regarded as possessing linking social capital to formal institutions. This is also the 
reason why there is a need to mobilise community resources to help its members 
achieve social mobility - this is rarely the case among the dominant white ethnic 
population. Similar stories about the imbalance between successful schooling of 
ethnic minority populations and the marginalised socio-economic status of their 
communities have been widely reported across the Atlantic. (East) Asians in the 
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US and Chinese and Indians in the UK are two examples. 8 In short, social capital 
should be taken as `the collectivity-owned capital', which is `a durable network of 
more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and 
recognition' (Bourdieu 1986: 51). This is where Bourdieu distinctively stands in 
his social capital theory when compared to more positivistic interpretations. 
Capital, culture and power relations 
With their similar interest in the notion of social capital, there is a tension 
between the positivistic approach and Bourdieuian approach. The positivistic 
tradition, which is mainly North American, tends to emphasise the possibility that 
marginalised groups can mobilise their (inward) social resources/capital to 
overcome exclusion so as to forge access to institutions (Min Zhou 2005; Putnam 
2000; Woolcock 2001: 14). This is probably true in the American case in which 
the state largely leaves civil society alone, i. e. makes little intervention into civil 
society so that citizens, in theory at least, can prosper rather freely. The state 
promotes a radical philosophy of individualism, i. e. advocates individual 
endeavours so long as it will lead individuals to success in a free market economy 
- what is widely known as `the American dream'. This is also why this approach 
is labelled as `neo-liberal' in some research (see SARDONS 2001: 8). In this light, 
social capital is largely understood as bonding social capital or individually 
owned outward capital. However, In employing the notion of inward social 
capital as an analytical tool, we need to be cautious about the distinction between 
possession of social capital and mobilisation of it in the first place, or between 
what social capital is and what it does, in Woolcock's sensible observation 
(Woolcock 2001: 13). 
Whereas every community in theory possesses inward capital, what makes 
communities distinctive in socio-economic status is whether or not every 
community mobilises it equally. In the cases of dominant groups and dominated 
communities, the former are rarely in need of mobilisation of their bonding 
capital while it is quite often the case with the latter, as Zhou illustrated in her 
8 See for example `Ethnic Minorities and the Labour Market', in which it is reported that in the 
UK 'even those enjoying relative success, such as the Indians and Chinese - are not doing as well 
as they should be, given their education and other characteristics' (Strategy Unit 2003). Also see 
Woo (2002) for the Asian example in the USA. 
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Chinese community case. In other words, the fundamental difference between 
dominant groups and dominated communities in terms of social capital lies in 
whether or not a community needs to mobilise its bonding social capital. This 
need to mobilise inward capital is in fact a compensation for the lack of outward 
capital, bridging and/or linking. Therefore, the mobilisation of bonding capital is a 
reflection of imbalanced power relations between the dominant group and 
dominated communities. Linking capital, as the institution-related form of 
outward capital, is more responsible for the different roles distinctive 
communities play in power relations. 
When a community predominantly possesses linking social capital, this means 
that it constitutes the core part of formal institutions, which ensures that it has 
substantially accessed formal institutions. This will enable the community to 
become the legitimate player over the other communities. In this condition, its 
inward social capital substantially overlaps with its linking social capital, and in 
mobilising its linking capital in fact the community is also mobilising its bonding 
capital. The two forms of capital are interlocked and sustain each other so that the 
dominant group does not need to specifically, particularly or separately mobilise 
its bonding capital alone. One of the main results in playing this role is to 
institutionalise its own cultural heritage as capital, as Bourdieu observes. This is 
quite the reverse with dominated groups, who are deprived of outward social 
capital and forced to mobilise inward social capital. This is why Bourdieuian 
theorists, or neo-Marxists, 9 unlike positivists who tend to take inward capital as an 
analytical basis, are more likely to pay close attention to outward capital in 
general, and linking or vertical capital in particular. As differential forms of 
social capital function so differently in relation to the socio-economic status of 
various communities, it is necessary to disaggregate the package of social capital, 
and at the same time to ensure that social capital is not reduced to solely one of its 
dimensions, inward capital. 
The need and significance of unpacking but not reducing the thesis of social 
capital is fundamentally grounded in mutual acquaintance and recognition within 
9 The two terms `neo-Marxist' and `neo-liberal(ist)' are employed by Davies. See SARDONS 
2001: 8. 
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a community and between different communities, upon which social capital is 
premised. Whereas mutual knowledge and recognition are relatively easy to 
achieve within a cultural community, owing to shared cultural norms or values, 
they are not as easy to achieve between cultural communities. Dominated groups, 
in order to achieve such mutuality, have in the first instance to acquire the 
mainstream culture of the dominant group, i. e. cultural capital, regardless of 
whether or not the mutuality is eventually achievable. This mutuality-oriented 
acquisition aims to empower dominated groups themselves through establishing 
connections with formal institutions, and achieve the goal of putting them on an 
equal footing with the dominant group. 
In this light, the ideal pattern for dominated groups is to both keep their own 
cultural heritage and acquire institutionalised culture or cultural capital - additive 
learning from Ogbu's perspective (Ogbu 1987; Gibson 1988; Ogbu and Simons 
1997). In reality the situation is quite the reverse however. The acquisition of the 
mainstream culture is very likely to lead the dominated to subordination to the 
dominant cultural group. When dominated groups acquire cultural capital, it 
implies that their own culture is less valuable or inferior and useless, which 
inevitably further leads to a devaluation of the symbolic image of the ownership 
of the culture, i. e. the community, in society. In acquiring cultural capital, 
subordinated cultural groups are also at risk of being distanced from their own 
culture, and at worst, of losing contact with it. Acquisition of cultural capital is 
thus likely to occur at the cost of subordinated groups' cultures and symbolic 
image, and put them in a vulnerable or even diminishing position. In other words, 
the acquisition of the mainstream culture cannot bring in a legitimated status for 
marginalised cultures and communities, and can make matters worse, in the sense 
that they will be put into a more peripheral position. On the other hand, this result 
has the objective effect of helping to strengthen the hegemony of the dominant 
cultural group and forming a reproducibility circle for the institutionalised 
dominant culture, the essence of the social system. This is where Bourdieu (and I) 
become cynical. In this light, the success of some individuals from dominated 
groups can, to some extent, help their communities and members build up certain 
linkage with formal institutions, but it can rarely transform their dominated 
position or devalued symbolic image in relation to the dominant one as a whole. 
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All of this suggests the difficulty of changing the marginalised status of certain 
cultural groups even if they possess both cultural capital and inward social capital 
but lack outward (particularly vertical) social capital. At the same time, the 
`losers' in schooling due to a lack of cultural capital or positive inward social 
capital (community forces) - either because their communities possess 
inconsistent cultural heritages with the mainstream or because they resist the 
dominant group and its culture as a strategy of self-protection or self-defence - 
could also be used by some policy-makers or academic commentators as an 
example in comparison to the `winners' `to reinforce the idea that race and 
intelligence are linked, not genetically but culturally' (Noguera 2004: 182). In this 
sense, positivistic social capital theory has not fundamentally transcended Ogbu's 
community forces approach but in fact fallen into the similar stereotyping of 
ethnic minorities to the latter as pointed out earlier. 10 In other words, what 
fundamentally needs to be transformed is power relations as a whole, in both an 
instrumental (socio-economic) and symbolic (cultural) sense. To achieve this, it is 
inadequate (if necessary) for marginalised groups to empower themselves only 
with the given cultural capital and bonding social capital. This will otherwise still 
render them in a position of second-class citizens as a result of being passive 
acceptors of the social system, which is typically embodied in the existing and 
reproducible cultural capital mechanism. " 
In the light of these unequal power relations, even if subordinated group members 
possess cultural capital and bonding social capital, they are likely to be turned into 
`involuntary' school learners, and, further, poor school performers, due to a lack 
of a foreseeable promising future as a result of lacking outward social capital. 
Meanwhile, those who have succeeded in schooling in acquiring cultural capital 
10 Compared to the domination of the positivistic approach to social capital theory which is 
highlighted in the World Bank's use of the concept recently, the approach from a Bourdieuian 
perspective is much less popular so cannot be taken as the 'representative' of the theory. This is 
not to say that the boundary between the two approaches is clear-cut - the notion of linking capital 
that is more associated with power relations has actually emerged from the World Bank discourse. 
However this is still difficult to change the positivistic preference of the World Bank. 
11 In his email on 26 April 2004, Leon Tikly wrote: 'Gramsci is one of the theorists most 
associated with the role of education in the struggle by sub-altern groups to challenge the 
hegemony (intellectual and cultural leadership) of dominant groups through constructing a counter 
hegemony. ' Leon then made a very important point that supports my review of cultural capital and 
power relations here: 'In fact, Gramsci's prescriptions for this were quite conservative. He 
believed that sub-altem groups needed to master existing hegemonic forms of knowledge if they, 
in their turn were to harness this knowledge to their own struggle. ' 
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and/or mobilising bonding social capital have paid a higher price. In other words, 
they `could do significantly better and enjoy their education much more were the 
barriers to their success eliminated or reduced' (Gibson 1988: 167). As a result, it 
is unlikely that marginalised groups could achieve the goal of empowerment 
merely through mobilising their bonding social capital but without a top-down 
programme and action from formal institutions, which is manipulated by the 
dominant group elites. This programme will help them build up bridging and 
linking social capital as a group so as to help them overcome barriers that 
preclude them from accessing social resources beyond their communities, in 
particular institutional resources. Pessimistically, this goal seems hardly to be 
achieved when confronting the reality in which power elites from the dominant 
group in formal institutions exploit social capital to achieve their ends at the 
expense of the interests of other social groups (Putnam 2000: 22). In other words, 
social capital can be, and actually is, exploited by power elites as a tool to exclude 
other groups in order to maintain their dominant status. 12 Thus dominated groups 
will undoubtedly remain deprived of better socio-economic status as a result of 
their lack of outward social capital on the one hand, and on the other hand, their 
capability to build up connections with other social groups, particularly with the 
dominant group, will be undermined. 
Having so argued, it is doubtful that a top-down programme that is expected to 
help empower the dominated will automatically come to exist in due course. This 
initiative needs to be driven by a bottom-up resistance and fight against the 
imbalance sustained and reinforced by the existing system in the first place. In so 
doing, `culture' or `cultural differences' are usually employed by marginalised 
cultural groups, ethnic, class or otherwise, as the main tool to avoid being 
(further) disempowered and to demand social rights for equality. This is not 
surprising given the fact that it is cultural capital, a key embodiment or form of 
the dominant hegemony, that divides people into different ranks. This is not only 
a class culture division, but also a gender culture division, an ethnic culture 
12 Based upon the work of Bourdicu, Woolcock and Philips, NESF provides a succinct description 
of how those who are economically powerful easily gain cultural and social capitals, through 
which they are best positioned to exercise political power (2003). 
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division, and so forth. 13 Marginalised groups' adoption of culture as the main tool 
is hence a concern with power relations that aims to forge a counter hegemonic 
strategy. In other words, marginalised groups intend to take culture as `strategies 
of action' through drawing on `many tacit assumptions from the existing culture' 
to shape a repertoire or `tool kit' (Swidler 1986). In this vein, both `action and 
values are organized to take advantage of cultural competences' (ibid.: 275). This 
forms a culture war. 
This is why marginalised group members, and actually in particular those 
successful individuals from marginalised groups, still insist on the importance of 
their allegedly distinctive cultural heritage and identity even though they are 
equipped with plenty of cultural capital. What they aim to achieve in their 
assertion of difference is not the acquisition of cultural capital (if they are willing 
to `equip' themselves with the dominant culture), but rather, an appropriate social 
status in relation to other social groups in general, and the dominant group in 
particular. This reflects their desire for more outward, in particular vertical, social 
capital that is believed to be achievable by making some fundamental changes to 
power relations in order to provide them with a relationship of mutual knowledge 
and recognition with the dominant social group. This is in the end not a version of 
acquisition of the dominant culture in the name of mutuality, but rather, a 
(re)negotiated version between the dominant and other cultures. With this 
(re)negotiation, cultural capital is expectedly transformed to a new landscape, 
which is justly combined by both dominating and dominated cultures. 
Subordinated groups would otherwise still face barriers that are very likely to 
block their access to economic and other opportunities even if they possess plenty 
of cultural capital, which in theory enables them to achieve highly in schooling, 
and further to achieve upward social mobility in the wider society. 
Conclusion 
When setting up the system in opposition with community forces in his cultural- 
ecological framework, Ogbu has in fact singled out the system as pointed out 
earlier. In other words, his framework is largely about community forces alone 
13 Skeggs (1997) gives an excellent illustration of the way in which class and gender are 
intertwined. On the entanglement of race/ethnicity and class, see Fenton and Bradley (2002). 
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rather than interaction between the system and ethnic minority communities. 
Community forces are used to refer to minorities' interpretations of and responses 
to the system, so are psychological factors. That is to say, Ogbu does not look at 
power relations but focuses on disadvantaged groups' perceptions of power 
relations. In this sense, it is impossible to see evidenced minority educational and 
occupational attainments, by which we can tell whether or not minorities are 
disadvantaged systematically and so are disempowered, or to what extent they are 
disadvantaged or disempowered. This is not necessarily identical in all cases with 
their perceptions of the system. In this light, voluntary minorities may be forced 
voluntary communities and so are actually involuntary, given the fact that they 
have been aware that they cannot afford to turn back (to Asia, for example), so 
have to brace themselves to get ahead in the host society. This means that their 
high achievement in both schools and the larger society is not a result from 
disregarding themselves as opposed to the dominant group, but a choice without 
alternatives. In other words, their achievement is not on account of racism 
lessening in society. '4 
That is very likely why Asian American immigrant parents tend to tell their 
children of their immense sacrifice to move to the US, which usually leads to guilt 
and obligations felt by these youths, and then results in these children's hard work 
in schools (Kao 2004, Zhou 2005). In the meantime, some involuntary minorities 
have more leeway owing to the fact that they are `locals' in society (American 
Indians or African Americans). Interestingly, some other `voluntary' minorities 
tend to perform reluctantly and have achievement that is lower than average in 
schooling, for example Hispanics in the USA. They are affected by a certain 
specific type of integration into American society, which is characterised by a 
long-established pattern of labour migration, and/or by sets of social relations that 
are associated with a large and visible US-born Hispanic culture (Bankston 2004). 
14 This also associated, for example, with the Chinese cultural norm that prioritises education as 
argued in chapter four. However we must be very cautious when speaking about culture in this 
way in that we must avoid superficially labelling different cultural norms as positive or negative 
forces in educational performance of different groups before exploring what underlines the 
different cultural norms in different (historical) contexts. This is especially necessary in our 
attempt to deconstruct universalism that is characterised by the West dominated globalisation and 
the related package of cultural norms. For further information, see Hoogvelt (2001) and Parekh 
(2000). 
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In other words, they also possess a kind of leeway. In this light, voluntary 
minorities' choice of withdrawal from schooling (so with poor school 
performance) can also be understood as a voluntary decision or strategy but is not 
a result of involuntariness. Ogbu's in/voluntary distinction hence easily causes 
(linguistic) confusion and so is misleading. 
On the contrary, Bourdieu primarily lends space to explanations of the way in 
which formal institutions of the system work on different classes. For him, 
cultural capital is actually a result of social capital structure, in which the 
dominant group has institutionalised and capitalised its cultural heritage by 
exploiting the linking social capital it predominantly possesses. Human agency is 
largely invisible in the cultural capital theory. This is most likely because 
Bourdieu feels cynical about what the disadvantaged human agency could do 
about the social system of imbalanced power relations, and as a result he 
disregards the possibility of what human agency might be able to achieve here. 
This is perhaps why he is criticised as being inadequate in evidence (Sullivan 
2001). Relately, Bourdieu does not look at interactions between the system and 
the disadvantaged in particular at a concrete level as Ogbu does. However, his 
theory has disclosed a fundamental fact associated with imbalanced power 
relations of the social mechanism. 
The theory that has explicitly tackled interaction issues is that of social capital (of 
which Bourdieu is one of the founders). Unfortunately this thesis is reducibly 
understood by many of its theorists as bonding social capital alone, and so applied 
in their research. The consequence caused by this simplified version of social 
capital is that mobilisation of bonding social capital is not a compensatory 
strategy towards the lack of linking social capital. Rather, it is taken as separate 
and spontaneous community forces that have little to do with outward social 
capital, where power relations in the social mechanism are located. In other 
words, these studies `focus on the conceptualisation of social capital as norms 
rather than access to institutional resources' (Dika and Singh 2002: 43). This 
approach runs the risk of implying that bonding social capital should be primarily 
responsible for upward social mobility of ethnic minority communities. 
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Fundamentally, in attempting to identify social forces that facilitate or block 
minority school performance, cultural capital theorists tend to remain in an 
explanatory position with a pessimistic view towards seeking a remedy while 
(bonding) social capital theorists hold a prescriptive perspective which is based 
upon their more positive point of view regarding the possibility of upward social 
mobility of disadvantaged communities. In other words, cultural capital theorists 
can also be identified as vertical social capital theorists, both putting a premium 
on (oppositional) power relations between the disadvantaged and the social 
system. Bourdicu plays these two roles in his cultural and social capital theories 
by explicitly pointing out that social capital is collectively-based capital, and that 
disadvantaged communities as a whole lack access to resources in formal 
institutions, which is interlocked with their lack of cultural capital. On the 
contrary, bonding social capital theorists pay close attention to mobilisation of 
capital. In terms of school performance, for Bourdieu and his followers, the social 
system is fundamentally responsible for minority (or working class) children's 
failure whereas bonding social capital theorists, when emphasising the role 
disadvantaged communities play in `making it', (un)intentionally shift 
responsibility to disadvantaged communities themselves. This is the fundamental 
fracture between Bourdieuian theorists and their positivistic counterparts. '5 
As a whole, Ogbu's overlooking of the system, Bourdieu's relative blindness to 
human agency and many social capital theorists' ignoring of the outward 
dimension of social capital (as power relations), have all contributed to an 
inadequacy in theory and methodology. In light of this, my own theoretical 
framework is grounded in the concept of power relations that focuses on 
interaction between the social system and ethnic communities. This interactive 
perspective is both vertical and horizontal in that it entails the interaction between 
15 By the same token, the cultural discontinuity of certain groups is not as simple as the term 
implies. It is actually caused by the fact that the cultures of these groups have not been capitalised, 
institutionalised or legitimised while the dominant culture has been. Whereas Bourdieuian 
theorists are observing power relations when putting forward the cultural capital theory, their 
counterparts are diverging from (the basis of his framework, in Ogbu's case) power relations, by 
simplifying and so overlooking cultural discontinuity. Cultural discontinuity as a result of lacking 
cultural capital is in fact a form of social discontinuity as a result of lacking outward social capital 
so is a result of imbalanced power relations. Cultural discontinuity explanations therefore cannot 
be replaced by community forces approach as an analytical basis, just as outward social capital 
cannot be displaced by bonding social capital as an analytical tool. 
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social system and ethnic communities on the one hand, and on the other, engages 
with that between different ethnic communities, i. e. between the majority and 
minority communities, and between minority communities. Therefore this is a 
multi-dimensional approach that examines both the macro politics of the historical 
and policy backgrounds and the micro politics of schooling in relation to ethnic 
minorities. Bringing together the different levels and dimensions, the research 
looks into the forms of cultural exclusion experienced by ethnic minorities in the 
Chinese educational system, and suggests the new direction in which an inclusive 
policy could be developed. Therefore, in chapters four and five I conduct an 
historical investigation of Chinese culturalism that assumes the superiority of 
Chinese Han culture, and a critical policy and discourse analysis. Against this 
historical and policy/discourse backdrop, chapters six, seven and eight focus 
directly on the relationship between educational performance and ethnicity 
through looking at how community forces towards schooling have been shaped by 
the cultural and social capital of ethnic minorities (in this case, Muslims and 
Tibetans), and which is ingrained in power relations between the social system 
(which is in particular delineated in chapters four and five) and ethnic minorities, 
and between different ethnic communities. 
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Chapter Three 
Research Approach and Fieldwork 
Introduction 
My research is interested in the varied experiences of ethnic minorities of cultural 
exclusion, and the social exclusion that is interlocked with the former in 
contemporary China. It particularly focuses on an examination of how the cultural 
groups at the periphery of, or excluded from mainstream institutions, both 
historically and at present, perceive, react and respond to a highly standardised 
social system of education. Therefore two dimensions are in particular need of 
paying close attention to in data collection and analysis, namely the interactive 
and comparative dimensions. The former refers to an interactive perspective that 
looks into not only the ways in which different ethnic groups interact with one 
another at the micro level, but also the ways in which ethnic minorities interact 
with the social system at the macro level. The latter aims to explore similarities 
and differences in ethnic minorities' experiences of cultural exclusion that are 
affected by the social system, and relatedly, by interethnic relations. Therefore, 
this study adopts a qualitative approach. 
Nevertheless, a qualitative approach does not mean to exclude a quantitative 
approach, nor does it necessarily appear to be incompatible with the latter. In fact, 
my qualitative approach is supported by statistics in different chapters where 
necessary. The most important reason for me to adopt a qualitative approach lies 
in my intention to decipher the meaning that hides behind variation in the 
educational performance of different ethnic groups in general, and that of 
different sub-groups or individuals of ethnic minorities from different socio- 
economic backgrounds in particular. In doing so, I hope to establish a dominant 
pattern of explanation that is based on numbers or surveys in the first instance, 
and further, on the meanings behind these numbers or surveys. 
' In order to map 
1 Beyond these two approaches, a third paradigm of critical theory advocates action that largely 
aims to transform social inequality instead of merely understanding or interpreting it. Although 
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out a grand background that serves as one dimension of a triangulation approach, 
I shall conduct an historical review and critical policy and discourse analysis in 
chapters four and five. The empirical studies in chapters six, seven (focusing on 
ethnic minorities) and eight (focusing on the majority Han) will complement the 
macro approach and together complete the triangulation research. In the following 
sections of the chapter, I will explain my research approach, fieldwork and 
reflection on fieldwork. 
An interactive and comparative approach 
Interactive perspective 
In his `The Predicament of Culture', James Clifford asks: `what if identity is 
conceived not as [a] boundary to be maintained but as a nexus of relations and 
transactions actively engaging a subject? ' He then concludes that `[t]he story or 
stories of interaction must then be more complex, less linear and teleological' 
(cited in White 1991: ix). In this light, White (1991) has developed a methodology 
that he calls `middle ground', a place in between cultures, peoples, and in between 
empires and locals (ibid.: x). On his middle ground, diverse peoples adjust their 
differences which make up `a process of creative, and often expedient, 
misunderstandings' (ibid. ). As a result, different peoples remain identifiable while 
they learn about or absorb each other culturally. 
Interaction based on power relations between different social forces is crucially 
important as Ogbu argues (1987,1998). However, unlike Ogbu's cultural- 
ecological theory, my attention will not be only paid to community forces (see 
chapter two). Rather, I will investigate interaction between the state and ethnic 
minority communities as well as between different ethnic groups. This is not only 
an investigation of several separate interactions, but will also be an attempt to 
construct a multi-dimensional interaction `net'. By doing so, we can see how, for 
example, the positive or negative interaction between different ethnic groups, 
including that between different ethnic minority groups in the region, is entangled 
with national ideology that, for instance, relates to social evolution theory (see, 
particularly, chapter five); or whether Han people homogeneously voice the 
this is not an approach directly related to this research, interested readers can find some 
observations in chapter nine. 
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state's ideology that, for example, regards religion as more negative than positive 
in terms of social progress (see chapters five and eight). The interaction between 
different ethnic groups is particularly important for my comparative studies that 
are illustrated below. This requires locating my study of interaction at a local level 
where different ethnic groups regularly encounter each other in the normal course 
of life, which matters greatly to their daily life and also shapes their perception of 
each other and formal institutions (Parekh 2000: 212). 
To do research at this level permits a substantive picture of social networks in 
which individuals as members of different ethnic groups interact with each other 
and with state sectors, as well as with fellow members of their ethnic group. This 
is ideal for me to closely observe how three forms of the social capital, namely, 
bonding, bridging and linking (see chapter two) that ethnic minorities possess, 
have existed and changed. Further, a local level approach will also enhance the 
reliability of my research by reducing the potential arbitrariness which can result 
from selecting cases from geographically isolated areas, where there may not be 
any inherent association between the selected cases. However, to pinpoint a 
certain region as the only source of fieldwork data can also risk losing a broader 
view of diverse local contexts on which a comprehensive picture can be drawn. In 
other words, one context-specific case study should be, ideally, complemented 
with other context-specific case studies so as to avoid generalisation without 
sufficient evidence and at the same time to enhance representativeness. However, 
representativeness is not equivalent to generalisation and I shall consider how 
representativeness can be understood in `reflection on fieldwork' later on. 
I located my research in the borderlands between Qinghai and Gansu provinces 
(see the Map of China and the Map of the Ethnic Composition on the Qinghai- 
Gansu Borderlands, pages 278 and 279), a `middle ground' that links China 
proper (neidi, lit. the interior, inland) to Turkic Muslims in the far northwest 
Xinjiang, to Tibetans in the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau in the southwest, and to 
Mongolians in the northeast. The region is a nexus where several different ethnic 
groups have lived for seven or eight centuries, respectively identified with 
Buddhism (the Tibetan, Mongolian, Tu), Islam (the Hui, Salar, Bonan, 
Dongxiang) and Confucianism and atheism (mainly among the Han). In other 
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words, this is a frontier where the two main minority cultures that centre on 
Buddhism and Islam encounter each other, as well as confront the Chinese Han 
secular culture. This area is different from the Tibetan Autonomous Region 
(TAR), Xinjiang, or East China, where there is less complicated mixture of 
cultural diversity on the same massive scale, as opposed to domination by, 
respectively, Buddhism, Islam, or atheism/Confucianism. 
The borderlands between Qinghai and Gansu provinces are a hub of agricultural, 
pastoral and urban populations, revealing different socio-economic patterns. This 
allows people in this area to have the opportunity to be in contact with different 
social or economic groups, and to develop open perspectives and aspirations 
about their socio-economic status and future prospects which collide with their 
cultural traditions. This is very different from the ethnic minorities in remote or 
difficult-to-access areas, where they are usually isolated from the rest of China 
and live a life with few frames of reference beyond the local and few 
opportunities for social mobility. This is also a buffer zone between the central 
government and the two politically sensitive regions, TAR and Xinjiang. For the 
government, it is arguably a testing ground to pilot its minority policies (minzu 
zhengce) and strategies, and to nurture a role model for TAR and Xinjiang along 
the lines of the state's agenda of integrating ethnic minorities into the Chinese 
nation in terms of economy, culture and ideology. 2 
Comparative perspective 
Comparative studies are carried out between different ethnic groups in a 
mainstream school, and between different subgroups (rural and urban) 
respectively from a mainstream school and a minority school. Comparison will 
tackle the issues of achievement, perception and aspiration. 
2 The eminent sociologist Fei Xiaotong puts forward the idea of '/fang nan zing zang' (prosper 
Tibet under the impact of two `nans' (prefectures) which are located in the borderland areas 
between Qinghai and Gansu). This is the idea of integrating Tibet into the rest of China 
economically, and also culturally and politically by moving the Tibetan centre from Lasa to the 
Liangnan area. However, whilst Gannan prefecture in Gansu is agreed on by all researchers as one 
of the two `nans', the other prefecture appeares differently in different accounts or quotations: 
Sunan in Gansu (Fei Xiaotong 1998), Huangnan in Qinghai (Ma Rong 1996: 503), or Hainan in 
Qinghai (XKT). Nevertheless, all three prefectures are located in the borderland areas. Also see 
chapter five for a further discussion of state agenda of integration. 
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I chose Tibetans and Muslim Hui, Bonan and Salar as my research subjects. This 
is because they provide the best sample of the ethnic minority issue in terms of 
cultural profile, political role and socio-economic status. In other words, the 
coexistence of Tibetans and Muslims within the same geographic location makes 
it an apposite site for a comparative study of the various experiences ethnic 
minorities have of cultural exclusion. 
It is necessary to say a few words about Muslims in China before comparing them 
with Tibetans. There are ten officially recognized ethnic minority groups who 
adhere to Islam in China, which can be basically divided into two blocs, those 
mainly residing in Xinjiang (Kazak, Kirgiz, Tajik, Tatar, Uygur and Uzbek) and 
those across all China but especially in the Gansu-Ningxia-Qinghai (GNQ) 
borderland areas (Bonan, Dongxiang, Hui and Salar). Unlike the former, who are 
indigenous to Xinjiang, the latter are mainly the descendants of local people and 
of Muslims who migrated to China from the Middle East or Central Asia between 
the seventh and fourteenth centuries for business reasons or in the wake of war. 
This difference helps foster different ethnic identifications among, for instance, 
Uygur and Hui, 3 the largest groups in the two blocs. Academically (linguistically), 
Muslims in the Xinjiang are labelled as Turkic and Indo-European Muslim while 
the Hui are known as Chinese Muslim. In this study, `Muslim' refers to the GNQ 
bloc ('the GNQ Muslims' hereafter unless indicated otherwise). 4 
Tibetans and the GNQ Muslims are respectively among the most important 
representatives of Buddhist and Islamic ethnic groups in China. While Tibetans 
are the core of Tibetan Buddhism, Muslim Hui are the only minority group 
defined along the lines of religion, and are among the largest Muslim groups. s 
3 See chapter four for more information about Hui identification. 
4 My study does not include Dongxiang Muslims simply because I conducted fieldwork on the 
Qinghai side of the borderland areas whereas Dongxiang are primarily concentrated on the Gansu 
side. 
5 Both Gladney and Mackerras consider that ethnicity plays more important role than religion in 
the Hui identity whereas Israeli holds the view in favour of religion (Mackerras 2005). This is, as 
Mackcrras suggests, an issue that is not clear-cut. However, what is in need of distinguishing first 
here is the difference of identification between the government and the Hui. Second, it is also very 
important to break the Hui community down as context-specific sub-groups (which Mackerras 
also agrees on), e. g. those in China proper and those on Qinghai-Gansu borderlands. This is not 
the focus of my study although I hope my empirical study of the Hui (chapter seven) will add 
some valuable points to the debate. 
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The GNQ Muslims have a different political image from Tibetans or their Turkic 
Muslim counterparts. Both of the latter are internationally politicised as a result of 
attracting political attention from the international community such as the USA, 
EU or some international organisations, and correspondingly receive similar 
attention in state policy, while this applies much less in the case of the GNQ 
Muslims. 
The GNQ Muslims are mainly Chinese speakers, which draws a clear-cut line 
between this bloc and most other minority groups who have their own language 
and even script, e. g. Tibetans and Mongols. 
' This difference is significant in 
minority education and identity construction in terms of communication and 
socialisation in the wider Chinese Han cultural context. In other words, the GNQ 
Muslims are different from Tibetans and Turkic Muslims in the sense that the 
latter are among the least sinicised, which is partially attributable to their different 
linguistic backgrounds. Culture-wise, as I will argue in the remaining chapters - 
in particular in chapter eight - it is relatively easy for the mainstream Han to 
recognise or even identify themselves with (Tibetan) Buddhism on account of the 
age-long impact of Buddhism on Chinese culture (which in turn led to the 
sinicisation of Buddhism in Chinese history). In the meantime, Chinese Han feel 
distant from Islam and vice versa. This is particularly true in the northwest where 
Muslims are concentrated and largely maintain their tradition. 
Further, the Hui, the largest Muslim group in China, are distributed in all walks of 
life across the country, ranging from politicians to intellectuals, from public 
servants to self-employed businesspeople, from manual workers to farmers. Most 
Tibetans, by contrast, are rural and are concentrated in the TAR and the four other 
provinces neighbouring TAR in West China, Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and 
Yunnan. 
Meanwhile, comparison is achieved through looking at different types of schools, 
in which students from different socio-economic backgrounds are respectively 
6 This is a simplified categorisation. Actually amongst the four Muslim groups in the region, the 
first language of the three non-Hui groups is not Chinese. I have defined all of them as Chinese 
speakers because these three Muslim groups are very small in numbers (see chapter five and Table 
I on page 271), and have largely mastered Chinese. Also see Gladney (2003). 
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concentrated. In his theory, Ogbu (1987,1998) does not distinguish between 
different types of school, e. g. mainstream schools or minority schools. In fact, in 
some mainstream schools, the majority population may not be from the ethnic 
majority group, as my investigation reveals. On the other hand, Chinese 
researchers of the education of ethnic minorities rarely take minority students in 
mainstream schools as their subjects. 7 Actually, the difference in the school 
choice of ethnic minorities is in accordance with their different socio-economic 
backgrounds, i. e. rural or urban, grassroots or elites, as my case studies show. To 
take this kind of information into account can help the process of discovering 
what has significantly affected minorities' belief and performance in schooling 
and their different experiences in both schools and the larger society, as portrayed 
in chapters six and seven, and so avoid seeing minorities as an homogeneous 
whole. 
Therefore I chose a mainstream secondary school, the only one of its kind in the 
seat of the regional government, and a Tibetan minority senior secondary school. 
There are no minority schools for Muslims in the area, which in turn has formed 
the distinct experiences of Muslims and implicitly or explicitly impacted on their 
perception and evaluation of the educational situation in the region as a whole as I 
shall discuss in chapter seven. 8 However, because of the lack of direct relations 
between the Tibetan minority school and Muslim children, descriptions of the two 
schools are not provided here but in chapter six that deals with the Tibetan case. 
One possible objection to my decision to compare two types of school rather than 
the experiences of different ethnic groups within the same type of school concerns 
the extent, to which the selected cases are `comparable'. For example, opponents 
of my comparative approach may say that it is necessary to provide different 
7 In my reading of Chinese literature (1994-2004) on the education of ethnic minorities, I have 
only found one short article dealing with minority students in mainstream schools (Huang Baobing 
1997). An exception is that Tibetan students studying in inland mainstream schools have drawn 
academic attention. However these students are separately educated and so have limited 
opportunities to have contact with their Han schoolfellows. Hence both in terms of culture 
preservation and socialisation, their situation is more similar to that of their counterparts studying 
in Tibetan minority schools in minority regions. For further information see chapter six and 
Postiglione, Zhu and Ben (2004). 
8 There is a rich literature on separate (ethnic minority or otherwise) schools in English, either 
critical or supportive. Interested readers can consult chapter five, footnote 25. 
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students, ethnically or otherwise, with different types of school, which then can 
better meet students' needs or more efficiently or effectively manage the school. 
Correspondingly, different policies are introduced into different types of school. 
Therefore it is difficult to compare various types of school in, for example, 
student performance, school policies, and so forth. In this sense, under my 
primary research aim that focuses on the cultural exclusion of ethnic minorities, 
there might be several different understandings or interpretations of `exclusion' 
by people from the same or different ethnic groups as my case studies will show. 
However, this can also be taken as an advantage in exploring varying experiences 
of different students (through their narratives/understandings). This approach 
hence should be understood dialectically. 
Fieldwork 
My fieldwork lasted four months, from February to June 2003 in Longwu 
Township (Longwu Zhen), the seat of Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, 
Qinghai Province. Field settings are delineated respectively in chapters six and 
seven because Muslims and Tibetans are located in different settings, which are 
connected and interact with their distinct occupational, residential and physical 
mobility patterns. The fieldwork aims to turn my discussion from the macro level, 
which is based on the literature review in chapters two, four and five, to the micro 
level of interaction between different social forces, both within school site and in 
the local community in the region. To achieve this goal, I carried out several 
undertakings. 9 
Access and observations 
The first undertaking is observation within classrooms, schools, governmental 
sectors, entertainment and commercial areas, and private houses, accompanied by 
field notes where possible. Working this way, I aimed to get a taste and overview 
of the settings where my subjects were studying, working and/or living. This work 
has provided me with an entry to my interviews later on with a wide range of 
people from both within and without school. However, observation in classrooms 
9 Questionnaires and questions for interviews are offered as appendices on pages 286-292. 
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encountered some difficulties that forced me to reduce the length of time I would 
have spent on this type of observation. 
The head-teacher and the two deputy head-teachers in the mainstream school used 
to be the students, and later on the colleagues, of my parents some time between 
mid-1960s and the end of 1970s before my parents transferred back to their Han 
hometown. On the other hand, due to the intricate relationships between 
individual persons and groups that were demarcated in line with class, personality 
and ethnicity during the Cultural Revolution, the head-teacher did not show 
enthusiasm for my project despite his politeness as a sort of `acquaintance'. 
Instead, he first insisted that he would definitely help if their students were not so 
busy with their study and activities. 10 After I implied that I may get rid of them 
and conduct fieldwork in minority schools instead as my research was about the 
education of ethnic minorities, he reluctantly but also strategically agreed that I 
could do research in his school with the assistance from the two deputy head- 
teachers, who were respectively in charge of the junior part and the senior part of 
the school. 
After telling them my schedule, one of the deputy head-teachers introduced me to 
a few administrators from whom I could supposedly gain relevant figures and 
facts I needed about the school, the students and teachers, as well as textbooks 
and some official documents. In accordance with my observation guidelines, the 
administrators offered me all figures and facts they had, of which I verified some 
(with other teachers or students in person at different stages or on different 
occasions through my fieldwork) that I suspected were not fully reliable. 
I intended to observe the final year of compulsory education (the third year in 
junior secondary) and the first year of the post-compulsory education (the first 
year in senior secondary), i. e. take the two years as my sample. This is a 
transitional point through which one can tell if a student (and/or her/his family) 
10 The degree to which their students are busy with their study can be found in chapter six. In 
addition, 2003 was the fifth anniversary of the Prefecture, so that the prefectural government 
required and mobilised people in state sectors to rehearse shows for the coming celebration in 
July. Among these state sectors, schools were, as usual, the second most important source of 
human resources after the professional sectors such as the Prefectural Singing and Dancing 
Ensemble. 
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expects to finally move on to tertiary education, which reflects different 
aspirations among parents and/or students towards children's future. This is 
because I suspected that whether or not to continue the post-compulsory 
education is closely connected with ethnic and/or socio-economic background of 
students. For arranging my classroom observation, the deputy head-teacher in 
charge of the junior sector got in touch with the teacher in charge of Grade Three 
(teacher A hereafter). Although teacher A expressed her appreciation of the 
importance of my fieldwork for a quality research project, she kept suggesting 
that I do this with other grades as her students were in the last year of compulsory 
education and so were totally overwhelmed by their study - which was in fact 
also one important reason why I insisted on observing in this grade. With 
encouragement from the deputy head-teacher, who appreciated my reasons for 
choosing to study Grade Three, teacher A agreed to arrange for me to observe two 
classes and introduced me to the two form masters. Encouragingly, the form 
masters showed greater enthusiasm and curiosity towards my research. 
As agreed, I arrived in the teaching building the next morning. However, I was 
told that a senior teacher teaching the two classes objected to my observation in 
classrooms. Her worry, according to teacher A, was that I would excite the 
students leaving them out of control after I departed. Although I said that I did not 
mind explaining to this teacher that I was only focusing on students' performance 
in classrooms owing to my research looking at the relationships between ethnicity 
and educational achievement, I was told that more than one teacher, `actually 
almost every teacher', was unhappy with my arrangements with the school . After 
several discussions with the deputy head-teacher and teacher A, I was allowed to 
observe only one class (different to the two classes I tried approaching earlier) for 
4 days (observation had originally planned for one to two weeks), and in the 
meantime I was expected (as a kind of `role model') to give a lecture in the last 
class observation relating my biography as one of educational `success'. In order 
to ensure there would not be any more changes, I insisted that I should pay a visit 
to all teachers teaching in this class. Most teachers were in fact very friendly and 
curious about my research, which enabled me to encourage them to become my 
interviewees at a later stage. Although I experienced some more hassles from a 
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very few teachers in classroom observation later on, I felt that I achieved the goal 
of observation. 
In the following week, my observation moved on to a class in the first year of the 
senior or post-compulsory stage. Unexpectedly arrangements with this year group 
proceeded very smoothly. I got the transcripts of the students, a classroom plan 
with students' names filling in places by the order of their seats - which largely 
facilitated the accuracy of my observations of different ethnic students. As an 
incentive, I also agreed to give a talk of my `successful' story as I did with the 
other class. Everything was arranged in the same way as that with the other class 
but the process went through with few problems. I also wondered if this was 
connected with some observable differences between the two classes. In Junior 
Three all teachers were stricter in disciplining students and more distant from me. 
This was perhaps because students had to work very hard in order to enter a 
(better) senior secondary school after taking regional uniform examinations in a 
few months' time. Further, they were also younger and arguably less sociable. 
The senior students (and their teachers) appeared to be more relaxed. This is 
perhaps because they were already successful in entering the senior class while 
they were also older and supposedly more sociable. So whilst the senior students 
appeared to be more active in approaching me, the junior ones seemed to be more 
introverted even during class breaks. Another reason is likely to be that the senior 
grade was streamed into an ordinary class and an advanced one by examination 
outcomes, and the class I observed was the ordinary one - which meant that they 
received less attention or concern from their teachers. 
" By contrast, in Junior 
Three, the four classes were divided evenly in terms of students' achievement. 
Nevertheless, four days of observation in each class proved to be quite sufficient 
for me to get along with the students, both `good' or `bad', Han or minorities. As 
it was arranged that I sit at the back of the classrooms where `bad' students were 
usually concentrated - the majority of them were Muslim boys - both of us 
gained the opportunity to communicate with one another, with or without verbal 
language - they did not believe for quite a while that I was fluent in the local 
dialect. 
" More information can be found in chapter seven. 
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One thing that proved my success in getting along with both teachers and students 
was that they shortly started to actively chat with me when we met outside 
classrooms (or in classrooms). They saw me as a sort of insider from outside with 
whom they could speak about their personal feelings with confidence given my 
knowledge about the locality and my safe distance from the school official. 
Teachers usually complained about the quality of their students that they did not 
think were as good as some years ago. They also - outside classrooms - 
complained about the unfairness of the school policy (see chapter six), and any 
other things concerning them, ranging from cultural, economic gaps between 
western and eastern regions of China, interethnic relationships in the region, etc. 
Students were more interested in information about the outside world - China 
proper, coastal areas, abroad - as well as in my research. Using the telephone 
number I gave on the questionnaires (see below), students also phoned me up to 
invite me to watch them playing football or engaging in other activities. My 
inside/outside status particularly worked well with students who were usually 
very frank with me in communication. Nonetheless, a few teachers appeared to be 
quite ambivalent about whether or not or to what extent they wanted to answer my 
questions due to their uncertainty of the degree to which I was close to or distant 
from their superiors or the like, especially after they discovered that I had some 
sort of local `roots'. Therefore, the approach of discursive repertoires (see below) 
in analysis of data was more necessary with teachers. 
In accessing the Tibetan minority school, due to a lack of personal connections, I 
had to ask some governmental officials of the prefecture, who used to be my 
parents' students, for help. They introduced me to the local bureau of education 
where one of the deputy directors was very reluctant when she was told that I was 
a researcher based in the UK. We then decided to use another identity of mine -a 
lecturer from my home university in China. Under this guise they rang up the 
school and arranged for me to go there in the afternoon. I visited the school as 
scheduled, met with the two Han deputy head-teachers (no head-teacher at that 
time for some reason), a senior administrator who was Tibetan, and a Tibetan 
teacher who invited me to observe a class given by him so that I could 
disseminate questionnaires at the end of the class. In several following meetings 
with them, I felt that only one of the deputy head-teachers was actually in charge 
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of the school, who did not appear to be very keen to assist me. He usually asked 
the Tibetan administrator to look after me, and to give me the information needed. 
At the first meeting with this administrator, I felt that he was unwilling to tell me 
anything that (perhaps in his understanding) may not be approved by the deputy 
head-teacher. This situation was improved in our later meetings as we got to know 
each other better. However, compared to their counterparts in the mainstream 
school, they treated me more seriously - they showed me around their campus, 
and invited me to observe students doing callisthenics during the class break. 
In addition, I also kept informal contacts with both school people and those from 
outside, e. g. hospitals, restaurants, the street, monasteries, etc. on various 
occasions. These observations aimed to supplement and verify what I had 
investigated from `formal' fieldwork. 
Questionnaires 
In the last classroom observation after I told my `successful' story (as the 
observed! ) in the two classes in the mainstream school, I disseminated 94 
questionnaires in total to students from Han and ethnic minority groups, and 
received 81 on the following Monday. Of these respondents, 36 were Han, 31 
were Muslim, 12 were Tibetan, and 2 were from other minorities. Questionnaires 
aimed to collect personal information that will help in selecting samples for 
interviews at a later stage. Personal information ranges from their ethnicity, 
educational levels and occupations of their parents, languages spoken in the 
family to information about their siblings. At the end of the questionnaires I also 
asked whether or not they would like to have an interview at a later stage, and the 
time and place they preferred for the interview. My personal information, the 
primary aim of my research and information relating to the confidentiality of 
interviews12 were all given at the beginning of the questionnaires. 24 out of 38 
students in the junior class expressed their willingness to participate in an 
interview, of whom only one was Muslim boy. 13 41 out of 43 students in the 
12 More ethical concerns in field research are provided in the section of reflection on fieldwork. 
13 Unfortunately, this only Muslim boy dropped out just before the interview. In spite of the efforts 
I made (rang him up a couple of times) in trying to get hold of him -a typical 'bad' model in 
many teachers' and students' eyes - for an interview, he never turned up as promised until after I 
left the field site. 
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senior class would have liked to have an interview. On this basis, I chose 
interviewees with attention paid to balance between genders, between socio- 
economic backgrounds and between ethnic groups. Due to the shortage of Muslim 
boys from the junior class, I asked the form master of another class to introduce 3 
or 4 Muslim male students. As a result, an additional four male Muslims agreed to 
an interview and completed questionnaires beforehand. 
I disseminated a further 48 questionnaires in the Tibetan minority school where 
44 questionnaires were returned along with 3 invalid ones (see below). These 
questionnaires contained an extra set of questions excluded from the 
questionnaires for the mainstream school respondents. This was primarily 
compensation for the lack of time to interview these students (and further their 
parents). The majority of these families were scattered widely in difficult-to-reach 
rural areas. The extra questions were simplified ones that I used in interviews with 
the Tibetan students in the mainstream school. They included items with regard to 
the attitudes of their family/community towards schooling, use or learning of their 
ethnic language and culture, their evaluation of schooling in minority and 
mainstream schools, and any other issues they would like to address or ask. The 
three invalid questionnaires did not answer these extra questions. 14 
Interviews 
The essential goal that I aimed to achieve through interviewing was to listen to 
ethnically differing voices on such issues as state education, school performance 
and perceptions of both others and self while at the same time verifying some 
figures or facts against government or public accounts. First of all, I conducted 51 
semi-structured interviews in person with students from the mainstream school. 
This included 19 Han students (10 girls), 19 Muslim students (12 girls), 11 
Tibetan students (5 girls) and 2 students from other ethnic groups. All interviews 
were conducted in the flat of a retired teacher in the mainstream school where I 
had lived throughout my fieldwork. Most interviews lasted around 30-40 minutes 
and were recorded with a Sony Walkman with permission from the interviewees. 
14 The main approach I employ in data analysis is that of discursive repertoires that is explained in 
the section of reflection on fieldwork below, and in empirical and some other chapters. 
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With their consent, most interviews were carried out with two students at a time, 
and usually they were from the same ethnic group. 
I further conducted 15 semi-structured or in-depth interviews with Tibetan and 
Muslim parents from different socio-economic backgrounds, including 
government officials, public servants, manual workers, self-employed people, 
farmers and community leaders. This type of interview aimed to explore what 
Ogbu places significant weight on, namely, community forces, and the ways 
community forces are formed and the potential impact they have on minority 
students. In the first place I hoped to approach minority parents through the 
children interviewed from the mainstream school, but this soon proved not to 
work well for it lacked certain kind of authority from a parental perspective. As a 
result, I accessed 15 parents through my own social connections. To avoid 
unnecessary troubles, I did not mobilise my connections with the prefectural 
government officials for interviews. Interviews were conducted in schools, 
offices, urban dwellings or farmhouses. Most interviews lasted one to two hours 
and were recorded with the Walkman or pencil-paper, according to informants' 
individual preference. 
In interviewing some rural Tibetan parents who had difficulties in understanding 
Chinese, I invited the retired teacher I was living with to be my interpreter, who 
speaks the Tu language (his mother tongue), Chinese and Tibetan fluently. He is 
also highly interested in my research and often discussed some related issues with 
me, and gradually became pretty familiar with my primary research aim. This 
significantly promoted the effectiveness of his interpretation in interviews. In fact, 
this teacher was a primary informant throughout my fieldwork. I had learnt about 
many important and basic things in the region through semi-formal, and more 
often, casual chats with him on every occasion and site. It is not an exaggeration 
to say that he was an encyclopaedia of the local knowledge for me. 
I then conducted 10 semi-structured interviews with schoolteachers or school 
administrators mainly from the mainstream school and a few from the minority 
school. All interviews were recorded with the Walkman or pencil-paper, as with 
the parents. This part of the work aimed to examine the ways the social system 
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works at a micro level by probing school policy, hidden curriculum or the 
mainstream group's perceptions and treatments of minority communities and 
students. This part of the data was analysed in conjunction with the data collected 
from students from the mainstream group. During this part of the work, a few 
teachers who originally expressed their willingness to be interviewed did not 
participate in the end, most possibly because they heard about my `local roots' in 
the region as mentioned earlier. 
Reflection on fieldwork 
Research ethics is always a concern throughout fieldwork. During the fieldwork, 
the most difficult part was to get permission or assistance for access to 
organisations or peoples. As Longwu is a small township where many people 
knew each other, directly or otherwise, it was even more difficult to avoid being 
refused by potential informants who could not get along with some of my 
`acquaintances' (many of these cases are a legacy of intricate interpersonal or 
inter-group relationships based in class, ethnicity etc. in the Cultural Revolution15). 
On the other hand, due to the political sensitivity of the subjects of my research, 
people connected with state sectors, in particular with governments, appeared to 
be more cautious in making decisions on whether or not to accept my interviews, 
and how to answer my questions in interviews, or with what kind of official 
information to provide me. This quite often made me feel guilty when I had to 
probe more deeply or that I had been forced to approach my subjects under guise. 
In fact, I found I did stir up some kind of emotion among some people or sectors 
when I was visiting them. Meanwhile, the ethical concern also made me feel very 
frustrated when being refused by some government or school officials for the 
reason of (imagined? ) political security and, more probably, for the bureaucratic 
`habitus'. 
15 The whole country during the Cultural Revolution was encouraged and even forced to expose 
the reactionary minds and actions of others (as well as their own) so as to show his/her loyalty to 
the Party-state. Under this mobilisation from the central government, people had to draw a clear- 
cut line between 'us' and `enemies', no matter what kind of personal relations one had with his/her 
'enemies' - friends, relatives or colleagues. This line drawing was much influenced by differences 
in social, cultural or ethnic backgrounds that considerably made interpersonal and inter-group 
relationships complex and complicated. 
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Sampling is another issue that had concerned me even prior to fieldwork. In terms 
of sample size, I chose 19 Han and 19 Muslim students respectively that are 
proportionate to their populations in the whole school (37% versus 35% for the 
Han, and 37% versus 32% in the Muslim case). I chose 11 Tibetan students that is 
twice its percentage in the school population (22% versus 10%. Also see chapter 
six). The preference for minority students in sample selection lies in the fact that 
this research is concerned with minorities; further, the absolute numbers of 
minority students in general, Tibetans in particular, are smaller. In choosing field 
settings, schools, classes, and student informants, I experienced a few difficulties 
as mentioned earlier. For instance I had to give up the idea of interviewing 
Tibetan students in the Tibetan school due to time limit and difficulties in visiting 
their geographically distant families. Instead, I extended the questionnaires for 
them by adding the questions that were used in interviewing Tibetan students 
from the mainstream school. In the mainstream school I had also to request that 
some teachers introduce some Muslim boys so as to reach a balance in terms of 
ethnicity and gender for interviews. As a whole, student informants (from the 
mainstream school) were selected quite evenly in terms of ethnicity, gender, 
socio-economic background and educational performance that was principally 
based on the information collected from the questionnaires I disseminated to 
students as explained earlier. Teacher samples were chosen based on information 
I obtained from the retired teacher I was living with, the school officials and some 
other teachers, as well as my personal observation. Teacher interviewees were 
generally quite cooperative and helpful, probably because they were adult, both 
they and I lived in the school, and they also, to a significant degree, identified 
themselves with me in terms of age and socio-economic and cultural background 
(including most ethnic minority teachers). 
The most difficult part in approaching potential informants was associated with 
parents as briefly mentioned above. The only way I was able to approach them 
was through my personal connections, i. e. through snowballing, including through 
my Muslim nanny and her family, the teacher I was living with, other 
schoolteachers and so on. In doing so, I was trying my best to keep a balance in 
selecting informants that were expected to be representative in ethnicity, gender 
and socio-economic background. This also means that sometimes, coupled by a 
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guilty feeling, I had to `force' these gatekeepers to introduce someone with whom 
she or he was not familiar enough to arrange quite a private meeting for me. This 
was also because I knew I could not afford another period of fieldwork. As a 
result, even the small number of parents I eventually interviewed included people 
from a range of different socio-economic backgrounds as portrayed above. 
Through personal contact (interviews or otherwise) with different kinds of people, 
I did find quite a few students, parents or teachers were more accessible than 
others. In a later reflection on my fieldwork, I became aware that these people 
appeared to be more informed of or more interested in what is going on in other 
parts of the region, of China or of the world. They held stronger views about the 
necessity of transforming themselves as well as their hometown whilst at the same 
time they were also likely to be more enthusiastic towards their ethnic heritage 
and identity. They were largely from higher than average level of socio-economic 
backgrounds. All of this kind of information is employed in my empirical studies 
in chapters six, seven and eight. 
Nonetheless, I also found it very difficult to approach Muslims (particularly 
Muslim parents), regardless of their socio-economic backgrounds - and had also 
anticipated this would be difficult before starting fieldwork. The question I asked 
myself was why they rejected me or why I held this kind of feeling towards them. 
Certainly I am not Muslim, nor even am I local - but I am not Tibetan either. 
Luckily, some of my personal connections helped to smooth my access to Muslim 
parents. I heard the most frank, honest and saddest narratives even though I could 
only access them through the technique of snowballing, and had to record 
interviews with pencil-paper which always meant that I missed some accounts in 
interviews with Muslims - all of them asked me to record only with pencil-paper. 
Hence writing up fieldwork notes immediately after interviews became very 
important. Added to this encounter was and still is an understanding of the formal 
and informal processes of negotiating access to several different ethnic groups 
that significantly helped with my understanding of varying experiences of 
different ethno-social communities. As a result, it subtly and radically redirected 
my sympathy more towards Muslims rather than Tibetans, quite the reverse of my 
preconception of the two groups - which also led me to adjust my preconceived 
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themes and contributed towards the emergence of new themes. Moreover, this 
also made me aware of my age, gender, personality, ethnicity and socio-economic 
background that had together shaped my fieldwork, data analysis and writing up 
whilst acknowledging I am part of the world I study (O'Reilly 2005: 222). Some 
of these factors appeared to be advantageous (e. g. my lively and empathetic 
personality) while others are in between or shifting in different contexts. In the 
end, I found that in fact there was not an element that was entirely 
disadvantageous throughout the fieldwork on the one hand, and on the other hand, 
the downside of these elements could always possibly be reduced to some extent 
with more patience, empathy and understanding. 
I am aware that I am not entirely in the position of claiming the 
representativeness, or the validity and reliability, of my findings if this refers to 
generalisation of minority experiences in China, or even in western regions as I 
argued earlier. The value of my research lies in my approach of discursive 
repertoires in the process of data analysis (for validity), and what O'Reilly 
(2005: 225) calls `inferences' (for reliability). I had quite intuitively employed 
what I later learnt to be called the approach of discursive repertoires in data 
analysis before my co-supervisor Dr Leon Tikly, after reading chapter eight of my 
thesis, recommended Wetherell and Potter's framework of interpretative 
repertoires (1987,1992). Leon's recommendation promoted my awareness of the 
methodology which I am attempting to theorise here. This framework of discourse 
analysis is a critical amendment of Michel Foucault's theoretical account of 
discourse that lacks interest in actual linguistic performance or social practice. 
The interest Wetherell and Potter in particular hold is in the context of use and the 
act of discursive instantiation, which is characterised by broadly discernible 
clusters of terms, descriptions and figures of speech that are often assembled 
around metaphors or vivid images. These things can be talked of as systems of 
signification on the one hand, and on the other hand as the building blocks used 
for manufacturing versions of actions, self and social structures. This framework 
allows the authors to treat `action orientation' of discourse as primary in that the 
situated use of text or talk is regarded as not being derived from abstract meanings 
of the terms used. Moreover, this focus on discourse as social practice also 
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enables researchers to enter everyday conversation and texts, or to enter the 
implementation of discourses that work together and against one another in actual 
settings (Wetherell and Potter 1992). 
This analytical approach and ethnographic fieldwork are much on the same 
wavelength in that both respect the irreducibility of human experience, and 
acknowledge the messy nature of human life and understandings (O'Reilly 
2005: 226). The approach of discursive repertoires enables me to avoid 
oversimplifying rich and diverse human experience on the one hand, and on the 
other, enables research themes to emerge from substantiation. Having shared the 
similar interest to Wetherell and Potter, my empirical studies then consciously 
adopted an analytical approach of discursive repertoires to look into the course of 
discourse construction as readers will see in my empirical chapters, six, seven and 
eight. 
Meanwhile, the findings emerged from my targeted groups can have inferences 
for or transferability to other groups. In this sense, I am particularly interested to 
see, for example, (compared to my field site of a Tibetan autonomous region), 
what the interethnic relations are like in a Muslim autonomous region in general, 
and in particular what kind of social capital non-Islamic minority groups in this 
kind of region possess in relation to public institutions or the centre of power. 
This is of particular interest to me because a number of Muslim autonomous 
administrative regions are concentrated in the Gansu-Qinghai borderland areas, 
the nexus of different ethnic, socio-economic and cultural groups. Presumably a 
case study in a Muslim region would help map out an interconnected and 
comparable situation of interethnic relations as a whole for the region. Reliability 
is also associated with another possible approach, theories. In this respect, my 
case studies are oriented by the critical application of Ogbu's cultural-ecological 
framework, the cultural and social capital theory of Bourdieu etc. and the 
multiculturalism thesis to investigate the cultural exclusion of ethnic minorities in 
the Chinese context of power relations. This approach allows me to identify areas 
of relevance beyond the ethnographic situation (e. g. relevance for educators and 
policy makers), and also enables me to bring out both the power and limits of the 
aforementioned theories in Western literature through the Chinese context. In so 
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doing, I hope to make a contribution to the theories adopted as well as leaving 
them open to revision and refinement with new empirical data (ibid. ) as I attempt 
to do particularly in the previous chapter, theoretical framework. 
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Chapter Four 
Chinese Culturalism and Its Educational Legacy: 
An Historical Investigation 
Introduction 
This chapter is an historical investigation of Chinese culturalism that is 
characterised by the supposed cultural superiority and universality of the Chinese 
Han. Central to this culturalism is the belief that China was the only true 
civilization and this position had remained unchallenged even under military 
occupation and threats of aliens due to their backwardness. This trend had lasted 
until the nineteenth century when China encountered both domestic crises and 
foreign intrusion. Further, this culturalism means that rulers must be educated and 
govern according to Confucian ways of universal value. This is also applicable to 
aliens as asserted Han cultural superiority is believed to rest on education that can 
potentially civilize and so legitimise non-Chinese (James Harrison 1969, cited in 
Townsend 1992: 98-99). Firstly, therefore, this culturalism has determined ethnic 
community boundaries and membership. Secondly, it has shaped the Chinese 
educational tradition that in turn has held up a Confucian-based elitist view at the 
philosophical level, and operated an examinations-guided institution - what is 
known as the civil service examinations of imperial China - at the technical level. 
As a legacy, it has largely determined education policy and practice through the 
modem era of China, and relatedly, the educational experiences of ethnic 
minorities today although the exact form that the culturalism takes has changed 
over time. Changes occurred in particular in modem history when China and its 
civilization were seriously challenged and threatened by the West that provoked 
the New Culture Movement specifically directing at democracy and science 
within its pursuit of the European civilization (Dikötter 1992; Mitter 2004). In the 
meantime, the culturalism has also changed in relation to changing material 
conditions that is in particular evidenced by the new era of reform and opening-up 
of China since the late 1970s that centres on economic development. 
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Correspondingly, education policy with regard to ethnic minorities has kept 
changing whilst being grounded in the same idea of culturalism. Hence, this 
process can be seen as a shifting discursive (or interpretative) repertoire that 
draws upon a lexicon or register of terms and metaphors to characterise and 
evaluate actions or events (Potter and Wetherell 1987: 138; also see Wetherell and 
Potter 1992: 90 and chapter three). 
Section One describes the fluidity of ethnic boundaries as the result of age-long 
migration throughout Chinese history. Section Two explains how Chinese Han 
culture, premised upon Confucianism came to be the primary criterion of 
distinguishing between the Han and non-Han. This involves a look at the division 
between different modes of production that eventually led to different types of 
life- style and society. Section Three examines how internal and external crises 
that emerged at the end of imperial China have significantly changed Chinese 
culturalism and imbued it with a more nationalistic sentiment. This change led the 
rulers of China to a re-examination of the relationship between the Han and ethnic 
minorities driven by a political concern whereby culturally ethnic minorities were 
supposedly assimilated into the Han or overlooked. In Section Four, some very 
recent developments in culturalism with especial reference to the West are 
observed. In so doing, a constant pursuit of a new confidence in Chinese culture 
comes to light. Section Five is an examination of how Chinese culturalism was 
institutionalised and reinforced through the civil service examinations of imperial 
China, a system that was heavily reliant upon selecting government officials not 
only on the basis of an assessment of the career potential of a person, but also as a 
means of `discovering men of high moral character as well as of scholarly and 
literary attainment' (Schirokauer 1981: 7). This educational tradition has 
eventually forged a cultural norm in Chinese society that takes education as the 
top priority. Drawing on the previous investigations, Section Six analyses the 
wenhua (culture) discourse of China through looking into four aspects: literacy 
based educational tradition, civilizing projects, the suzhi ((human) quality) 
campaign and discursive practice. Finally, Section Seven briefly depicts and 
evaluates the current ethos in education that has been shaped by a combined 
package of the culturalism, the traditional philosophy towards education, a pursuit 
68 
of economic development, and state social control, from which educational 
policies, practices and experiences of ethnic minorities are formulated. 
The fluidity of ethnic boundaries of China 
When Fei Xiaotong (1989) likens the process whereby the Han takes shape to 
snowballing, and Gladney (2004) unpacks the category of the Han that is widely 
assumed to be the equivalent of a homogeneous and monocultural `Chinese' 
nation, both are actually revealing the same fact: the Han itself is always 
undergoing a process of re-construction from both within and without, historically 
and at present. So how does the boundary between the Han and non-Han groups 
come into being and keep changing, and what are the implications for 
distinguishing between the Han and non-Han groups? What follows is an 
historical investigation into the economic, cultural and political dynamics of this 
age-long boundary drawing. Some names that will be used with regard to the Han 
and non-Han groups are listed below just before discussion: ' 
Han: Hua, Huaxia, Nan, Qin, Song, Tang, Xia, Zhongguo, Zhonghua; 
Non-Han: Dalu, Di, Fan, Hu, Li, Liao, Man, Qiang, Rong, Yi, 
Han is certainly not used as a name of a people before the Han dynasty (206 B. C. 
- 220 A. D. ) (see the Table of History Timeline on page 283). However, a group 
of people(s) had already been named by itself and/or out-groups that is in the first 
place associated to the first dynasty, Xia (2070 B. C. - 1600 B. C. ), and then with 
certain geographically based administrative institutions (e. g. Zhongguo, lit. the 
Middle Kingdom, originally refers to the capital city). Both were located 
somewhere around the middle and lower reaches of the Yellow River (hereafter 
MLYR. Also see the Maps of the Beginnings of Ancient China 1900-1300 B. C., 
in particular Map I, page 280) (Chen Liankai 1988). The names on the one hand 
served as boundaries between this group (and its territory) and other groups 
1 Strictly speaking, this is not a suitable or `scientific' way of categorisation about group 
membership as I argue in the following section that the boundaries between the Han and non-Han 
groups are fluid. The more accountable terms may be `the group at the centre and periphery of 
culturalism', the essential idea about the difference between `Han' and 'non-Han'. However, for 
the reason that the term `Han' is much more familiar to readers, I have decided to use `Han' as the 
main term to reduce the complexity of the concept. 
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around it (for example Yi, Di, Qiang and Rong), and on the other hand were also a 
reflection of a gradually formulating concept of `all under heaven' (tianxia) that 
encompassed Five Lands (wu fang), namely, east, west, south, north and middle 
(ibid. ). This holistic concept of tianxia was actualised by the first emperor of 
China, Yingzheng, who called himself `shi huang-(di)' (the first emperor), when 
he established the first centralised empire, the Qin dynasty, in 221 B. C. The most 
influential policies he implemented for the empire were to bring all roads, writing 
systems, and weights and measures to the same standard, which largely facilitated 
the integration of previous states in economy, politics and culture into the empire, 
and more importantly, laid a firm foundation for the following empires that lasted 
for over two thousand years. 
The Qin was followed by the Han empire, whose people were called Qin Ren 
(Ren, people, person) or Zhongguo Ren for they primarily lived in the previous 
Qin territory around the MLYR area. The group of people(s) was finally called 
Han Ren during the following period of the Wei, Jin and Southern and Northern 
dynasties (220-581), a period characterised by the influx of nomadic groups from 
the north and northwest and the establishment of many dynasties by them. Since a 
number of empires particularly in the Southern and Northern dynasties that were 
established by nomadic groups were situated around the MLRY area, they also 
called themselves Zhongguo Huangdi (Zhonguo Emperor) as an expression of 
their willingness to share the legacy of Zhongguo. As a result, the name of 
Zhongguo Ren that previously referred to the group of people(s) living around the 
territory of the Xia and Qin dynasties was replaced by Han Ren, and their 
language was also accordingly called Hanyu (Han language). Correspondingly, 
all other groups were placed under a general rubric of Fan vis-ä-vis Han (ibid. ). 
Having settled in Zhongguo, a huge number of Fan Ren acquired Zhongguo 
culture, coupled with changes of their surnames to the Han style and/or their 
marriage with Han people. This eventually led them to absorption into the Han 
group (Ebrey 1996; Fei Xiaotong 1989; Lu and Yang 2000). On the other hand, 
the intrusion of nomadic northerners to Zhongguo also forced a great number of 
previous Han people to migrate to the south where they mixed with locals. This 
migratory pattern of people from the north to Zhongguo and from Zhongguo to 
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the south has been an aspect of the whole dynastic history of China, and the two 
most widely known cases are those of the Yuan and Qing dynasties, respectively 
ruled by Mongols and Manchu. This demonstrated that Han, as the name of a 
group of people(s) against Fan or non-Han, is like an old bottle with new wine in 
it, a reflection of the fact that the boundary between Han and Fan or non-Han is 
always fluid. By the same token, many previous Han people were Fanicised after 
they moved to the south or other marginal areas in comparison with Zhongguo 
(Jia 1989b). 2 This migratory pattern is also evidenced by linguistic typology - 
that the Chinese language has a long continuity with the dialects of the north and 
northwest being much closer to Altaic compared to their counterparts in the south 
that remain more relics of classical Chinese (Qiaoben 1985). 
3 
As a result of this fluidity of boundaries between the Han and Fan, Han was used 
quite freely in that it might include peoples from other origins, for example 
Niizhen, Gaoli and Qidan in the Jin dynasty who were originally from the 
northeast, and Mongols and Semu (lit. coloured eyes, Muslims in the Yuan 
dynasty whose descendants are roughly the group that is called Hui today)4 in the 
Ming dynasty (Jia 1989a: 148-150). On the other hand, numerous Han people may 
be labelled as Nan Ren (Southerners) for the reason that they lived south of the 
MLYR area, or both Han people who moved to the south and their indigenous 
counterparts together (ibid. ). In addition, Han people may have labelled 
themselves as Tang or Song people, `descendants of the great Tang dynasty (AD 
618-907) and its southern bases' (Gladney 2004: 24), or descendants of the Song 
dynasty (960-1279) which moved its capital from the MLYR area to the south as 
2 This moving pattern has long been thought to be the way in which civilization in East Asia 
spread from the MLYR area to southern and other areas. There is also another opinion that 
suggests, on the basis of different archaeological evidence, that East Asian culture was shaped 
through the path in which southern culture diffused to the north. See Qiaoben (1985: 186). 
3 However, some other scholars believed that Chinese dialects in the northwest have been 
influenced by the Tibetan language. A very recent argument further infers that the Sino-Tibetan 
language family was derived from the same family as the Altaic family. Given the linguistic 
assumption that Chinese and Tibetan are developed from the same language family, it is too 
difficult to convincingly map out the relationships between Han, Tibetan and languages from the 
Altaic family in the region when both historical development and territory based communication 
between different languages need to be taken into account. Interested readers can find out more 
information in Alcde'ertu (2004), Jin Yulan (1995), Dai Qingxia and Fu Ailan (2001). 
° The Yuan dynasty ruled by Mongols divided its people into four caste-like groups. On the top are 
Mongols, followed in order by Semu, Han and Southerners (nan ren). However, among 
Southerners, a large number are actually thought to be Han today by the government and 
academics alike. 
71 
a consequence of being driven out by northern nomadic groups. Some of these 
people were identified as Han by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
government in spite of their distinctive cultural and linguistic tradition compared 
to the present northern Han. 5 
Culture as the primary criterion in distinguishing ethnic groups in China 
One interesting question with regard to ethnicity in Chinese history is why 
different groups, after becoming rulers in the MLRY area, all claimed their status 
as the Zhongguo emperor either by alleging their tie to certain ancestry in the Xia 
dynasty, or by actively acquiring Han culture and language, i. e. sinicising 
themselves, or both. In other words, if the boundary between Han and non-Han 
kept changing as argued above, what was the meaning of this distinction to 
different groups? It is necessary to trace back to the period when two types of 
civilization took shape around 2,000 B. C. Wang Mingke (1997) argues that the 
natural environment in the areas from eastern Qinghai in the northwest, through 
Inner Mongolia to western Liaoning in the northeast had not been very different 
from that to the south, i. e. the MLYR area, until 3,000 B. C. In other words, 
people living in what are now two different types of area, the agricultural areas of 
the MLRY and the nomadic areas on their margins shared a similar life style of 
agriculture at that time, in spite of the fact that the latter also needed to engage in 
some husbandry owing to a slightly different climate that precluded the lands 
from producing sufficient food. This similarity in the meantime also allowed them 
to have contact with one another quite freely. This pattern of life had not been 
changed until about 2,000 B. C. when the global climate was gradually becoming 
dry whereas at the same time the population living upon lands increased as a 
result of the long-term settlement that agricultural life offered. The changes made 
it difficult for the peoples in the marginal areas to continue largely living upon 
lands or agriculture as they used to do. This forced these people to raise (more) 
herbivorous animals that ate plants that are inedible to human beings so as to 
improve the sustainability of agricultural production. This also meant that they 
had to give up raising animals such as pigs in order to save eatable resources for 
human beings themselves. This transformation eventually turned their life into a 
5 For heterogeneity within the Han group, see Gladney (2004). Also see, e. g. Friedman (2004) for 
a detailed investigation into a sub-group of the Han in south-eastern China. 
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nomadic style, involving a very different mode of production, and eventually, a 
different social organisation and ideology compared to those of their agricultural 
neighbours (ibid. ). 
Without doubt, one thing that most seriously concerned both peoples was 
redistribution of resources as populations kept growing. This caused (more) 
conflicts between different groups, and eventually resulted in a gradual building 
up of the Great Wall along the marginal areas by the MLRY peoples, from the 
northwest to the northeast, in the following 2,000 years. Meanwhile, backed up by 
agriculture, a political system of centralised dynasties characterised by complex 
bureaucratic institutions also emerged in the MLYR area, which was primarily 
maintained by corvees and taxes from peasants. This social order was in sharp 
contrast with what existed outside the Great Wall which was highlighted by 
increasing nomadicisation, mobility and militarisation. 6 More importantly, the 
process of division of the two types of society gradually forged a consciousness of 
difference between peoples, which resulted in difference in the way of naming 
distinctive peoples. Hua, Xia or Zhongguo therefore became the names of the 
agricultural populace while the names for (nomadic) out-groups are Yi, Di, Rong, 
Man, etc. many Chinese characters for the latter kind of groups with an animal 
radical. 7 This division is epitomised in the juxtaposition of Hua/Yi or Yi/Xia, with 
Yi generally referring to non-Xia, non-Hua or non-Han groups. This pair of terms 
is used throughout history and was not abolished until the early period of the 
Republic. 
Indeed, this division based on the mode of production inevitably led to a political 
division, which further led to a cultural division that, at least at the beginning on 
the part of Huaxia, devalued out-groups in favour of Huaxia. This is 
understandable given the significance that agricultural life can have in building up 
a complex and institutionalised society in comparison with the type of society that 
6 In fact, the existence of the Great Wall and the militarisation process is fundamentally associated 
with the issue of power as an underlying motive for reinforcing cultural difference between the 
Han and others. 
7 Dikötter (1992) sees this as evidence of the concept of civilization of the Chinese Han vis-ä-vis 
ethnic minority groups. This is not necessarily true at its earliest given the fact that naming was 
likely to be closely associated with their nomadic life of raising certain animals such as sheep or 
dogs. This even could be the case with the Han. See Alede'ertu (2004). 
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can possibly be developed in a nomadic life. 
8 Further, a nomadic life in that era 
meant a close tie with animals on the one hand, and on the other, inclined to 
militarisation. Both tendencies were thought to be the representation of primitivity 
or brutality vis-ä-vis advance or humanity of the Huaxia, and thus `barbarian' in 
the Huaxia's eyes. 9 Meanwhile, relatively less worry about a basic living standard 
was also more likely to enable development of a splendid life style characterised 
by, for example, `gorgeous attire and rich ornaments' or sophisticated literature. 
As a result, the cultural dimension backed by the Confucian classics eventually 
came to be the most important criterion in distinguishing between Huaxia and Yi 
or non-Huaxia. 10 This may be partially because of the difficulty in distinguishing 
different people physically in the first place, and partially due to constant 
communication, during peace, conflict or war, between different groups, which 
led people from different groups to mix with one another and therefore made it 
more difficult to distinguish between them. Constant communication also means 
that Huaxia culture kept changing its elements and content under the impact of 
various Yi cultures whilst it was always named the same, Huaxia, Han or the like. 
This fluidity left room for Yi people to become Xia and vice versa, dependent 
upon whether they behaved in Xia ways or Yi ways as a result of moving to Xia 
areas or Yi areas (Chen Liankai 1988; Xiao Jingyang 1995). The core of Xia ways 
is what was known as Confucianism that advocated the rule of rites and 
traditional morals, which supposedly could and should be acquired through 
learning the Four Books and Five Classics (Sishu Wijing), i. e. the Confucian 
classics. " In other words, Xia or Confucian ways were a set of institutions that 
8 Wang Mingke disagrees with the assumption which suggests that the development process of 
civilization follows the rule of fishing-hunting -+ nomadic - agricultural mode, and argues that 
agricultural populations could also be turned `back' to a nomadic populace as can be seen in the 
case of peoples living along the margins of the MLYR area between 3,000 B. C. and 2,000 B. C. 
(1997: 114, note 17). However, it is difficult to take this change of life style as evidence to 
disprove the assumption of civilization development if this change inevitably occurs due to 
circumstances out of control of the people. 
9 This emphasis on literariness over military is also reflected in the civil service examinations of 
imperial China. Sec below. 
10 Dreyer describes Han as a people of `silk-wearing, rice-eating and city-building' 'who 
considered themselves... began to create civilization that gradually overwhelmed that of their 
neighbours' (Dreyer 1976: 283, footnote I for the chapter of `The Imperial Legacy'). 
11 The Four Books are: the Great Learning (Daxue), the Doctrine of the Mean (Zhongyong), the 
Analects of Confucius (Lunyu), and the Mencius (Mengzi); the Five Classics are: the Book of 
Song/Odes (Shijing), the Book of History (Shujing), the Book of Changes (Yijing), the Book of 
Rites (Liji), and the Spring and Autumn Annals (Chungiu). 
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were based on the Confucian classics, and were set as the standard of culture, so 
were universalised cultural values. Therefore, when Confucianists did not practise 
the exclusion of various Yi peoples from the Xia group, this actually delivered a 
message that Yi could be transformed to Xia with the standard cultural values of 
Xia. This is why Confucius believed that Yi or yuanren (lit. people from afar) 
who did not obey or were not convinced by Xia could be attracted with (Xia) 
ways, i. e. its culture or morals, so as to come under control (yuanren bay fu, ze xiu 
wende yi lai zhi) (Lunyu: jishi 16). By the same token, when talking about rulers 
from different backgrounds, Yi or Xia, Mencius argued that they would be 
seemingly accountable so long as their behaviour accorded to Xia ways (dezhi 
xinghu Zhongguo, ruo he fujie, xiansheng housheng, qi kui yi ye) (Mengzi: lilou 
2). 12 This method of distinguishing Yi from Xia or Hua (huayi zhi bian) emerged 
again in the Ming and Qing Dynasties (1368-1644,1644-1911), the last two 
imperial periods, which even brought about a protest among English traders in the 
nineteenth century who were resentful to be seen as Yi people by the Qing rulers. 
This protest led to the creation of a new name with reference to foreign countries 
and peoples, Yang (lit. ocean) (Chen Liankai 1988: 103). 
This concept of universal culturalism (Dikötter 1992) is also reflected in the case 
of Hua, another name of the Han that originated from a self-bragging phrase 
`yiguanhuazu' (splendidly dressed up group of people) coined by a group of Han 
people. This group emerged after the Eastern Han dynasty (25-225 A. D. ) as the 
scholarship in the classics was gradually controlled by and transmitted privately 
in certain families. As a result, men from these families became government 
officials and eventually monopolised the top leadership in the government. This 
very high status and their related sophisticated life style won respect from Han 
and non-Han emperors alike, and at the same time led them to disdain other 
relatively poor or humble Han families. Eventually, Hua (or Zhonghua) 
developed into a concept with reference to the culture represented by the classics 
and/or the people who possess this culture, i. e. Han (Chen Liankai 1988: 104). 
This concept of (Zhong) Hua was also applied to many other fields such as the 
12 Baogang He (2004) also offered a similar example in which a Confucian scholar in the Yuan 
dynasty argued that Yi can rule China if they follows Confucianism (115). Also see Townsend 
(1992). 
75 
execution of law. In court, different peoples were treated differently in accordance 
with different customs of their groups: Zhonghua rites and morals versus the kind 
of customs by which one wears his hair down and folds his clothes to the left, and 
tattoos his body (pifa zuoren, diaoti wenshen) (ibid.: 107-108). In a word, this is a 
contrast between a sophisticated life and a primitive one. This sentiment of the 
cultural superiority of the Han or Huaxia was summarised by a scholar in the 
Tang dynasty as that Zhongguo is called Xia because it possesses great propriety 
and righteousness (Xia also means `large, great'), and is named Hua for its 
splendid clothes and literature (Hua mainly means `splendid', `colourful', 
`beautiful') (Zhongguo you liyi zhi da, gu cheng Xia; you firzhang zhi mei, gu wei 
zhi Hua) (shisan jing zhushu " chunqiu zuozhuan zhengyi Vol. 56). 
13 Ebrey also 
infers from the fact of many non-Chinese people claiming descent from Chinese 
migrants that either they wanted to believe it in looking down upon non-Han 
themselves or it was in their interest to do so for local politics, social prestige, or 
whatever (1996: 23). 
Correspondingly, phrases naming non-Han or non-Huaxia people were always 
associated with negative connotations whatever their original meaning. For 
instance, Fan was divided into raw and cooked (shengfan, shufan) by the degree 
of their cultural alienation as to whether they were `savage and resisting' (raw 
Fan) or `tame and submissive' (cooked Fan) (Dikötter 1992: 9). The raw/cooked 
distinction was also applied to some other groups in the south (this is the area to 
which the `raw/cooked' division is originally applied), for example Liao in 
southwest and Li in Hainan Island. `Cooked' Liao or Li usually included a large 
proportion of Han people who migrated there from the MLYR area (Jia 
1989b: 169,173). This has again demonstrated culture as a determinant of group 
boundaries and membership. Another phrase depicting non-Xia people that 
became widely used in the Qin and Han dynasties is Hu, which initially referred 
to Hun people (xiongnu) in the north, and then generally referred to people in the 
northwest. Among phrases with the morpheme Hu in modern Chinese, except for 
those related to such things as dancing, musical instruments, vegetables or fruits 
that indicate their regions of origin, most of the others describing certain kind of 
13 The classics cited in this paragraph, Lunyu, Mengzi and Chunqiu Zuozhuan Zhengyi, are not 
listed in references because they are widely available in numerous versions. 
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behaviours are connected to `recklessly', `wantonly', `outrageously', `nonsense' 
in spite of the fact that Hu is no longer applied to any particular group of people 
in modem Chinese. 
Culturalism under nationalistic sentiment in modern China 
Dikötter (1992) rightly argues that no serious challenge was posed to universal 
culturalism until the nineteenth century when China encountered both internal 
disorder and the external intrusions of foreign countries. 14 These crises were 
highlighted by a reluctant reflection upon the Confucian ideology in the first 
place, followed by an acute attack of the imperial orthodoxy, which eventually led 
to an entire rejection of the Confucian legacy and the upsurge of the New Culture 
Movement (xin wenhua yundong). 15 The New Culture Movement aimed to bring 
`science' and `democracy' to China that were hoped to displace or transform 
Confucianism-based Chinese traditional culture. This movement initiated a 100 
years' attempt by China to define its modern identity. This new tide, as Mitter 
puts it, of `the introduction of new ways of thought and living, and the influx of 
larger numbers of foreigners than had ever been seen before, was changing China 
forever... at all levels of society' (Mitter 2004: 69), and has underpinned `the 
whole history of twentieth century of China' (Mitter 2004: 4). This is the first time 
when Chinese culture has so fatalistically lost confidence in its superiority. 
Nonetheless, in the Maoist era (1949-1976) China isolated itself from the West 
which suspended the tradition of the New Culture Movement. This isolation was 
exacerbated during the Cultural Revolution when both the Western civilization of 
democracy and science and Confucianism tradition were overthrown. 16 It was not 
until 1980s when a new cultural reflexivity that is comparable to the New Culture 
14 The intrusion of Buddhism more than 1,500 years ago seems to be an exception. However, this 
cultural threat did not eliminate the superior sentiment of Chinese culture, and further, it was 
successfully sinicised. 
15 The New Culture Movement was triggered by and thus closely associated with the May Fourth 
Movement (wusi yundong) which occurred on the fourth of May 1919 as an `anti-feudalism, anti- 
imperialism' (fandi fanfengjian) movement. For more information on both, see Mittor (2004). 
16 So even though it claimed to establish a new culture, the Cultural Revolution was in fact a 
thorough damage of all cultures, Chinese tradition, the modern Western culture and the legacy of 
communism. The target of this revolution therefore was expressed as fengzixiu (feudalism, 
capitalism and revisionism). In this sense, it is divorced from the New Culture Movement (and the 
Heshang phenomenon discussed in here) in that the latter reflected an attempt to construct a new 
culture by destructing some old ones rather than to merely involve (thorough and complete) 
destruction. 
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Movement occurred as a remarkable television documentary series entitled 
Heshang (River Elegy) highlighted in the summer of 1988 as a reflection on and 
reaction to the Maoist era. Resonating the call that their predecessors made for 
science and democracy some seventy years before, the authors of Heshang argue 
that China should abandon its too somnolent and peaceful inward-looking culture 
(ibid.: 264-269) that had made its civilization wane. Instead, it should embrace the 
`deep blue' (weilan se) of the ocean, i. e. the outward-looking, creatively 
destructive culture of the West (ibid. ) that represents new ways of thought and 
living. However, Mitter warns, `there is a dangerously primordial tone to the 
series' desire to see fundamental changes in the Chinese `national character', or 
suzhi' (ibid.: 267). 17 
Nevertheless, the loss of confidence in Chinese Han culture does not necessarily 
alter the view of the superior status of Han culture to minority cultures among 
Han as well as many minority members, sinicised or otherwise, let alone 
reflexivity regarding the proper relationship between Han culture and minority 
cultures. At the risk of oversimplifying, `minorities' in here include those who 
were independent in some historical periods, such as Mongols, Tibetans and 
Uygur, as well as those who kept mixing with and melting into Han that were 
discussed above. 18 In spite of various relationships between the Han and different 
minority communities, a culturalist attitude among the `Han' towards all other 
groups that were seen or defined as an ethnic minority or nationality has changed 
little over time. 19 Zhonghua, with its superior connotation to peripheral groups, 
was not applied to all ethnic groups within Chinese territory until the twentieth 
century when Sun Yat-sen, the leader of the Nationalist Party and the Republic of 
China, incorporated the other four ethnic groups in the Zhongghua Minzu 
(Chinese nation) after realising the limitation of merely equating Zhonghua with 
Han when confronting foreign (the West and Japan) intrusions. This is progress 
17 Detailed information about the suzhi discourse can be found below. 
'g In discussing the complexity of the process of negotiating ethnicities, Harrell (1996) identifies 
three kinds of ethnic minorities in terms of Han-minority relations. Mongols and Tibetans who 
have some claim to historical nationhood; Utsat that have no claim on nationality but have a kind 
of attachment to groups outside China; Naxi, Ge and Prmi that are purely ethnic groups with no 
claim to nationhood. 
19 For a concise discussion of the concept of China and Chinese from a Han-minority relationships 
perspective, see Mackerras (2004). 
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compared with his earlier slogan, `drive away Dalu (Manchurians, the rulers of 
the Qing dynasty), restore Zhonghua (Han China)' (Quzhu Dalu, huifu 
Zhonghua), which was displaced by the concept of `unification of five ethnic 
groups (Han, Manchurian, Mongolian, Hui and Tibetan)' (way zu gonghe). Sun 
also gradually engaged with the notions of minority self-determination (minzu 
zijue) and minority autonomy (minzu zizhi). All of this apparently mirrored a new 
era of restructuring China with regard to both domestic and international affairs, 
as a response to the emergence of the modem nation-state that posed a threat or 
challenge to China in every significant way. 
However, this `progressive' idea still could not move beyond an essential concern 
or an ultimate goal of sinicising other ethnic groups. This is in the first place 
associated with Sun's perception of what placed China under threat from foreign 
forces. He thought that the differences of other four ethnic groups from the Han in 
language, territory and custom precluded their frontiers and those of China proper 
from integration and unification, and further, could not protect the whole country 
from foreign intrusion as an effect of vulnerable frontiers inhabited by these alien 
groups. In this light, the task of the rulers of the country is to assimilate the four 
minority groups into Chinese Han culture (Songben 2003: 74-155). To bind the 
five ethnic groups together as the Chinese nation was thus a political strategy over 
a cultural concern, a top goal on the Republic agenda. This was the demand from 
the serious international climate China was facing (e. g. intrusions into Chinese 
borderlands by Britain, Russia and Japan), and also was underlined by and an 
echo of the historical concept of `all under heaven' or Great Unity (dayilong) in 
China. 20 On the other hand, to merely refer to the five ethnic groups also reflects 
Sun's limitation with regard to ethnic composition in China. Sun simply took over 
the legacy from the Qing dynasty to whom these minority groups were vassals. 
Sun did not mention other ethnic minority groups in his notion of the Chinese 
nation. Instead, other minority populations, for example, those living in 
southwest, were delineated as `assimilated' and `lowly civilized' (ibid. ). 
20 This idea of unity was not only represented in the official ideology of dynastic and modem 
regimes, but also portrayed substantially in Chinese literature (see Stafford 2000) and public 
discourse. 
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This type of thinking about the ethnic composition in China was embedded in the 
way that Han scholars viewed ethnic minority groups in general in the early 
twentieth century as a result of their very limited knowledge about non-Han 
peoples. Correspondingly, ethnic groups were categorised by these scholars into 
three types, A, B and C, by the criteria of the geo-political importance of the 
territory where ethnic groups were located, their cultural level and disposition of 
intelligence (ibid. ). As a result, the ethnic group at Level A (the highest) was the 
Han. The four ethnic groups mentioned earlier constituted category B. Those who 
were scattered in the southwest such as Miao, Yao and Yi comprised Level C for 
the presumed absence of civilization and their geo-political insignificance (ibid. ). 
The extreme version of the ignorance of minority groups is found in the kind of 
state ideologies that arbitrarily alleged that ethnic minority groups are merely 
large or small branches of the same blood lineage (tongyi xuetong de daxiao 
zongzhi) of the Han, 21 and even asserted that `do not let a single (minority) ethnic 
group maintain their different costume, script and language (Jiang Zhongzheng 
1944, cited in Xie Jian 2004: 51). 
As argued earlier, for the Nationalist Party, there were four ethnic minority 
groups, Manchurian, Mongolian, Hui and Tibetan. Hui are the Muslims in 
Xinjiang (e. g. Uygur), and Tibetans are only those in the Tibet territory. In other 
words, they are not the Muslims and Tibetans I am discussing in my thesis - the 
latter communities are located in between the former communities and the 
Chinese Han as delineated in chapters one and three. While Tibet had tried to 
become independent throughout the first half of the twentieth century and 
therefore had had serious tension with the Chinese government (see, for example, 
Goldstein 1998), Muslim Hui had experienced very different relationships with 
the Chinese. Hui were ruthlessly repressed by the Qing rulers as a response to 
their rebellions that shook the Qing regime. This resulted in the Hui coming to be 
seen and treated as rebels, and hence the Qing regime lost its interest to guarantee 
their life and faith. Under these circumstances, Hui survivors from the Qing 
dynasty, intellectuals or religious leaders, started to explore how to clear up Han 
biases and so ensure their life and freedom of religion. Further, they reconciled 
21 This can be seen as shades of biological racism under the impact of racial discourse from 
Europe since the nineteenth century. 
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their attempts to revive their religion and to make a contribution to the Chinese 
revolution. This reconciliation resulted from their awareness that they cannot 
overwhelm Chinese or China, and so it does not make much sense to establish 
their own regime. As a consequence, they became co-operators with the Chinese 
Han although the Nationalist Party, based on the view of making a single Chinese 
nation, supported the idea that this Muslim group was Han who believed in Islam 
(Songben 2003). 
By contrast, the CCP recognised them as the Hui nationality, a different ethnic 
group from the Han. 22 That is to say that the CCP, following on from the 
Nationalist approach but also in relation to its own experiences and ideology, 
developed a more sensitive and sensible standpoint towards ethnic minorities. 
Except for the recognition of Hui (and Tibetan too), it was also aware of the 
existence of more groups beyond the five ethnic communities, such as the Korean 
in the northeast and the Taiwanese in Fujian in the Republican era, and also once 
guaranteed ethnic minorities rights of self-determination (ibid. ). The Ethnic 
Identification Project that was carried out after it came to power in 1949 is 
another proof of its divergence from the historically formulated assimilationist 
pattern that aimed to sinicise minority groups with superior Han culture or simply 
overlooked minority groups. Nevertheless, like the Nationalists, the CCP's 
concept of minority determination eventually gave way to the ideology of Chinese 
nationhood that resulted in the introduction of the concept of minority (regional) 
autonomy. Relatedly, the recognition of the minority population and the 
endowment of it with the regional autonomy system did not lead the CCP to full 
respect for minority customs or religious faiths. Rather, the idea of respect largely 
stays at the level of legal formalities, which concealed the real inequality between 
the Han and the minority population (Xie Jian 2004). 23 This is particularly 
striking during the period between the late 1950s and 1970s when minority 
22 To recognise Hui as an independent nationality is significant and unique in that the Hui is the 
only ethnic group identified in line with religion as argued in chapter three. Moreover, this 
recognition also deviated from Joseph Stalin's four criteria (language, territory, economy and 
psychology) to identify ethnic groups that have long dominated in ethnic identification in China. 
For further information, see Gladney (2004) and Songben (2003). For an examination of Marxist- 
Leninist prescriptions and the Soviet example on the nationality issue that predominantly 
influenced the CCP policy, see Dreyer (1976). 
23 The notion of `legal formalities' is borrowed from Kymlicka (Kymlicka 2001). Xic's expression 
here is 'a furious political equality'. 
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customs and religions were accused of being backward and feudal and this was 
coupled by the destruction of numerous religious buildings such as monasteries or 
mosques, or when the minority population was forced to melt (ronghe) into the 
Han under the CCP's civilizing projects, an arguably different version of the 
assimilationist model from that of the Nationalists. 
24 
New developments in culturalism 
Although the suzhi project (see below) is more directed towards peripheral 
populations, for example, peasants (in Murphy 2004) or ethnic minorities, it is 
nevertheless an agenda aiming to make fundamental changes in the Chinese 
national character as a whole, as observed by Mitter (2004). This is an inevitable 
result of the ambivalence that (Han) Chinese have towards its culture after 
encountering the science and democracy of the West in the nineteenth century, 
and of a long period of self-enclosedness under the CCP regime later on. Both 
experiences led to a painful reflexivity concerning the legacy of Confucianism 
(regardless of what content it actually contains) that provoked the New Culture 
Movement and the Heshang on the one hand, and on the other, fostered the 
catalyst of the Chinese nationalism of politicians, elites and the masses alike. 
25 
This ambivalence or ambiguity can be seen from China's moving back and forth 
between aversion to and promotion of foreign ideas, between repudiation to 
celebration of national traditions, and between the Cultural Revolution to post- 
Mao modernisation through modern Chinese history (Townsend 1992: 101). It is 
not an exaggeration to say that a hundred years' pursuit of enrichment of the 
country and of strengthening the military (fuguo qiangbing) is also a pursuit of a 
new confidence in Chinese culture. 
In 2004 when China has drawn global attention for its assumed role of threatening 
or motoring international economic growth, one of the Heshang's authors started 
24 Harrell (1995) charted civilizing projects as three metaphors that can be seen below. 
25 This shift is not agreed by all scholars, for example Duara (1993. Also see chapter one, footnote 
13). However the paradigm that holds this perspective was termed by Townsend (1992) as the 
`culturalism to nationalism thesis'. In his article, Townsend distinguishes between culturalism and 
nationalism, and at the same time points out the connections between both. In the meantime, 
he 
also criticises the weaknesses of the concept of culturalism that leads him to stress the value of the 
notion as a `heuristic device'. For more details, and in particular for more technical analysis of 
culturalism as identity and as movement, see Townsend. 
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to publish his latest work (in instalments online) that he claims draws on his 
observations in mainland China, Japan, the USA and Europe, and his reflexivity 
on human civilization over the last years (Xie Xuanjun 2004). Entitled `Chinese 
Civilization Integrates the Globe' (Zhongguo Wenming Zhenghe Quanqiu), this 
work turns its back on Heshang, and argues that European or Western colonial 
civilization is in fact a secular one of anti-Christianity, and the disintegration of 
the ex-Eastem European bloc is the beginning of the end of the European colonial 
system. Hence Europe or the existing post-colonial civilization system has lost 
power over itself and cannot resolve the most serious problems facing human 
beings today such as environmental pollution, species extinction, immorality and 
war. On the other hand, the challenge from Islamic fundamentalism to the world 
order is not worrying because it is anyway within the existing system of 
civilization and thus controllable. It concludes that Chinese civilization that 
centred on `lizhi' (lit. rite system), i. e. a system pursuing inter-balance between a 
central (capital) city and local vassal autonomy, is a suitable one to resolve 
increasingly salient extremist tendencies and so integrate human beings as a 
whole. Correspondingly, East Asians, the creators of this culture, are claimed to 
have the highest intelligence that is alleged to have been evidenced in historical 
studies, cultural philosophy and political development, as well as by the latest 
anthropological reports. The asserted superiority of the East Asian race (! ) is 
therefore justified by history, culture and science. In other words, even though 
Chinese culture lost its confidence at times in particular in modern history when 
confronting Western culture, culturalism is always crouching there for the 
moment when it can take the opportunity to stand out again over other cultures. 
Indeed, Confucianism-oriented Chinese culture has never been substantively 
uprooted in spite of devastating damages or challenges to it throughout history. 
The damages or challenges incorporate the cruel fenshu kengru (burning books 
and burying (Confucian) scholars alive) by the first emperor of the Qin dynasty 
over 2,000 years ago; the severe challenge posed to it by the West 100 years ago; 
Mao Zedong's attempts to eradicate it through his notorious persecution of 
scholars who were labelled as `thou laojiu' (the old stingy ninth people) during 
the Cultural Revolution; and the call for the deep-blue civilization to displace it in 
the television series Heshang more recently. In fact, all challenges, criticism or 
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damage towards Chinese culture have awakened, cultivated and reinforced the 
consciousness of the Han (Chinese) cultural identity against the Western 
imperialism on the one hand, and on the other, driven the Han to continue its 
civilizing projects towards its peripheral peoples more urgently in attempts, and in 
the name, of the modernisation of China. Meanwhile, this culturalism towards 
ethnic minorities can also be understood as a result of shifting oppression from 
Western forces that are much stronger and aggressive to vulnerable domestic 
minority cultures. 
In the light of the economic success of East Asia that supposedly benefited from 
the legacy of Confucianism, and of the disorder of the world system that is 
believed to be primarily caused by the Western new imperialism, the sentiment of 
superiority of Chinese Han culture has found room to voice itself, not only on the 
international stage, but also within its territory where Chinese culture is taken as 
the ideal model to conduct patriotic education as well as to foster a new 
confidence in Chinese culture so as to (re)construct a Chinese nation. 26 This 
(re)construction of the Chinese nation aims to unify ethnic groups within China 
under the same polity, and at the same time, under the same culture, i. e. Han 
based `China (as a nation-state) culture'. 27 This reconstruction is backed up by the 
kind of belief that the Chinese nation has been historically formulated as a result 
of interaction between and integration of different ethnic groups. In this historical 
formulation, argues Fei Xiaotong, Han culture became a nucleus of the 
civilization of the Chinese nation that consists of many different ethnic groups' 
cultures as a result of nomadic groups submissively and actively melting into the 
Han after entering plains, where the type of agricultural society with intensive and 
meticulous farming was located (Fei Xiaotong 1989: 3 1). 28 
26 Recently dujing (reading the Confucian classics) is flourishing among Chinese children, which 
emerged in Taiwan in the mid-1990s and spread to Mainland China, Hong Kong and the Chinese 
communities in the North America and Southeast Asia. In spite of its potential philosophy of blind 
loyalty to the regime and neglect of the role law plays in modem society, it is nevertheless 
believed to be able to bring out the potential of children, to help to improve language skills, 
enhance morality and develop their intelligence (Wanwei Wang 2004a). 
27 A subtle difference between two expressions in modem Chinese is worth noting: Zhongguo 
wenhua (Zhongguo culture) and Zhonghua wenming (Zhonghua civilization). The former is more 
associated with Chinese classics, i. e. high culture, whereas the latter is a hotchpotch of all cultures 
within China boundaries, although its core is still Han culture. 
28 Also see the concept of plurality and unity (duoyuan yiti) of the Chinese nation in the next 
chapter. 
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The educational legacy of imperial China: the civil service examinations 
The imagined superiority of Han culture or Huaxia civilization ran through all the 
dynasties of Han or non-Han rulers. This is evidenced in the sinicisation of many 
minority regimes, intentionally or otherwise, in history, as argued earlier. Xiao 
Jingyang (1995: 100) offers more examples. After coming to power, many 
minority rulers adopted a name of the dynasties ruled by Han people as that of 
their dynasty, and followed the example of bureaucratic institutions of Han-ruled 
dynasties, or venerated Confucianism, or changed their surnames to Han. 29 
Nevertheless, as both Mitter (2004) and Townsend (1992) rightly point out, 
culturalism (although only the latter author actually uses this term) is primarily an 
intellectual ideology or movement. This ideology or movement was not only 
premised on an abstract concept, but had in fact been institutionalised through the 
establishment of the civil service examinations of imperial China (keju kaoshi), 
and reinforced in the continuity of the examination system that lasted for thirteen 
hundred years before it came to an end at the end of the imperial era. During this 
long period, this tradition was almost uninterrupted, except for a forty years' 
suspension by the Mongolian rulers of the Yuan dynasty before it finally re- 
instituted the examinations (Schirokauer 1981: 7). 
Education in the imperial period was characterised by two features: public 
education was largely left to the people, and the civil service examinations system 
dominated and guided the education domain (Miyazaki 1981: 111-129). The civil 
service examinations system was formally introduced in the Sui dynasty (581- 
618) as a means of suppressing the power of the aristocracy (the `splendidly 
dressed up group of people' that emerged from the Eastern Han dynasty) who had 
dominated and transmitted top officialdom as a result of their monopolisation of 
29 Here again, I am trying to simplify the issue. As argued earlier, what is now called Chinese or 
Han culture has kept changing its elements and content through the whole history. This was 
particularly true in the periods when China was ruled by Mongolians and Manchus, whose culture 
made a considerable contribution to today's `standard' Han culture that is widely recognised as 
being Beijing based. On the other hand, owing to a different historical development, the Chinese 
Han culture in the south is distinctive compared to its northern counterpart. In a word, the notion 
of Chinese culture is very problematic itself. This is why some informed southern Han deride 
Beijingese as minoritised Han while northern Han ridicule southerners as uncivilized aboriginals. 
Nonetheless, the culturalism of Han as an abstract concept is still accepted and held by officially 
identified Han and other ethnic groups as the means of distinguishing between different peoples, 
some of whom are superior to others. For a fascinating account of the invention of the Manchu 
`people' and a Manchu language in the Qing dynasty, which significantly helped to shape standard 
Chinese culture that China has today, see Crossley (1994). 
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scholarship in the classics on a family basis as argued earlier. However, the 
examination system held up and reinforced the classics of Confucianism as a 
standard, and eventually became essential for the establishment of imperial 
autocracy in the Song dynasty. This is to say that the aristocracy had an 
advantaged position over other classes when it participated in the examinations on 
account of its greater fluency in the classics (for more details, see Miyazaki 
198 1). 30 On the other hand, one of the chief ministers of the Song period, Wang 
Anshi, established the capital university followed by the establishment of other 
local universities that aimed to displace the examinations system by cultivating 
candidates for positions in government. This reform did not succeed and selection 
of government officials was still enacted through the civil examinations, perhaps 
partially for economic reasons in that to run a school system is much more 
expensive than to merely manage an examination system. This caused a decline in 
public schooling and resulted in the existence of schools in name only in the Ming 
dynasty, or the role of schools as merely preparatory to examinations (ibid. ). 
One of the results of the survival of the civil service examinations system was that 
it kept producing a surplus of candidates for official positions. The examinations 
were therefore, carried out more or less only for the sake of complying with 
earlier precedents, which led to its end in 1905 and the establishment of the 
modem education system directed at mass education in schools. Undeniably, the 
civil service examinations system left a profound legacy after its abolition. The 
system was unusually democratic in that it was open to anyone regardless of 
background, 31 and its fairness in the way examinations were conducted with strict 
discipline. In addition, its emphasis on literary studies meant that the military 
officers remained subordinated to civilians. This subordination of the military 
30 However, this case is interestingly different from Bourdicu's observation of the process in 
which the culture of a certain group is capitalised through institutionalisation by the same cultural 
group. To what extent this process has influenced the shaping of the relationship between 
intellectuals and the regime, and the attitude of scholars towards their rulers are worthy of 
exploration. 
31 However, this democracy was not applicable to women. In this sense, gender disparity can also 
be considered another legacy of the imperial examinations system although it is not the 
phenomenon only in China. Moreover, gender disparity was not only the legacy of the 
examination system, but fundamentally was the legacy of Confucianism that located women in a 
subordinated position in both families and society before the establishment of the examinations 
system. In this light, whereby an ideal man was said to be the combination of both moral and 
literary matters (see below), a woman could not be regarded as possessing morality unless she had 
no literary/literacy knowledge (nüzi wu cai bian shi de). 
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power enabled the vast nation to stay in peace until the Qing dynasty when 
foreign forces intruded and got China involved in a number of wars (ibid. ). 
However, the abolition of the examination system itself is evidence of its intrinsic 
defects. This system embedded a careerist attitude towards scholarship, which to a 
significant degree shaped the education focus in today's China that is narrowly 
centred upon college entrance examinations. Relatedly, the examinations system 
also brought misery to the vast majority of examinees who failed in examinations. 
This is understandable given the fact that on the one hand to devote one's energies 
to the civil service examinations was an extremely costly pursuit although in fact 
it was only the middle class who could afford this (so the equality of the system 
very much stayed at the level of theory). On the other hand very limited demand 
for more government officials also meant that the number of examinees who 
could eventually receive a jinshi (the highest) degree after going through all levels 
of examinations was only one out of every three thousand (ibid. ). 
On the contrary, those who succeeded in the civil service examinations would 
then win their honourable status from the emperor, and at the same time their 
eminence was acknowledged by a public opinion that was formed and controlled 
by intellectuals (ibid. ). As a result, this group of people not only became political 
elites, but also cultural elites characterised by the literary orientation of the civil 
service examinations. This identity of cultural and political elites cultivated the 
notion of xiushen (cultivate oneself), qijia (put the family in order), zhiguo (rule 
the country), ping tianxia (unify the world in peace) among elites (xiu, qi, zhi, 
ping). This philosophy not only connected individual cultivation in moral and 
literary matters to ruling of the country and the world, but also regarded the 
management of family life and political life as inseparable. Therefore the state 
was thought to be the extended family. 32 This integration of four levels comprised 
the ideal package of intellectual accomplishment. Therefore, a system that was 
heavily reliant upon selecting government officials not only served as an 
examination of the career potential of a person, but also, if not more, as a means 
of `discovering men of high moral character as well as of scholarly and literary 
attainment' (Schirokauer 1981: 7). This fostered the kind of Chinese elites who are 
32 This integrating management of the family with that of the state is also reflected in the Chinese 
word for `country' or `(nation-)state', guojia, which literally means `state-family'. 
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always ready for taking the world (tianxia, all under heaven) as their own 
responsibility as a result of their confidence in their morality and cultural 
accomplishment. They believe in the fact that the moral and culture they 
possessed and represented were the ultimate standard that should be used to 
`integrate' the world (globe), and the path through which this can be achieved is 
to educate the masses with this universal culture. 33 On the other hand, since the 
literary studies involved narrowly memorising the Confucian classics and writing 
poems and essays, one of its main effects was that these intellectuals became 
inflexible in relation to the new learning, and at the same time too proud to 
engage in commerce while too weak to do physical labour (Miyazaki 1981: 125- 
126). This disconnection between education and the real world is still a noticeable 
feature of the modem Chinese educational system as argued in subsequent 
chapters. 
As a benchmark of career, political, cultural and moral achievement, education 
becoming the ultimate life goal of affordable (or unaffordable! ) people is 
understandable. This fad for education, or more precisely, for examinations, is 
condensed in numerous household phrases (and practised by the whole nation). 
To name a few, `the worth of other pursuits is small, the study of books excels 
them all (wanban jie xiapin, wei you dushu gao)'; `there are automatically gold- 
made houses in books; and there are automatically jade-like faces (i. e. beautiful 
women) in books (shu zhong ziyou huangjin war, shuzhong ziyou yan ru yu)'; a 
literary or intellectual family is respectfully called `a family with book fragrance 
(shuxiang mendi)'; hard working stories in schools were also recorded and passed 
on in families, schools as well as the larger society since imperial times. The 
stories are invoked to encourage younger generations to bear hard and bitter study 
conditions and life for the very moment when one's name appears on the list of 
successful candidates in the imperial examinations (jinbang timing shi, lit. when 
one's name is inscribed on the golden list). These kinds of story were not only 
involved with working hard in straitened circumstances (hanchuang kudu, lit. 
study hard by a cold window. ), but also, if not more, referred to self-maltreatment 
33 When portraying that the conviction that was triggered by the New Culture Movement as that 
'educated classes were the only ones who could save China (an idea which had so infuriated 
Mao)', Mitter observes that this conviction `echoed a mindset that went back even before May 
Fourth to the Era when Confucianism had dominated' (Mitter 2004: 269). 
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by which to force oneself away from, for example, tiredness or sleepiness during 
studying (tou xuan Jiang, zhui ci gu, lit. hang one's hair from a beam, pierce one's 
thigh with awl. ). Therefore imperial China produced an examination hell, both in 
terms of its competitiveness and hardship - as Miyazaki puts it (1981) - which 
has been taken over by modern and contemporary China as can be seen in the 
subsequent chapters. 
The wenhua (culture) discourse of China 
One of the main reasons why the examinations system could survive for thirteen 
hundred years in a massive country was closely connected with the first imperial 
emperor in Chinese history Yingzheng of the Qin dynasty. As mentioned earlier, 
one of the most influential policies Yingzheng introduced was the standardisation 
of the Chinese writing system, Chinese characters, which became the official 
writing system of imperial China ever since. This standardised system enabled the 
literary-based civil service examinations to be conducted across this massive 
country where languages in different locations, to a varied extent, were 
unintelligible. As a result, Ilanzi (Chinese characters), a highly standardised 
writing system, not only functioned as the conveyor of the classics, but also 
evolved a highly sophisticated form of art, calligraphy. To acquire Chinese 
characters is therefore not only a necessity for people to become literate, but also 
to access `universal' morality and culture, including high culture of calligraphy 
and Chinese painting - the latter was substantially influenced by and closely 
associated to the former. In other words, Chinese characters became the most 
basic and important symbol of Chinese (high) culture, and those who fluently 
master this system were considered highly respectable, particularly in early 
periods of imperial China when diffusion of literary culture was very limited 
because there were only both rare and expensive hand-copied books (Miyazaki 
1981: 113-114). On the other hand, even though printing, communication and 
public schooling together have made acquisition of Chinese characters widely 
accessible in modem China, difficulties in learning characters still prevents a 
large number of people from becoming reasonably knowledgeable and fluent in 
the system. In fact, only those who have been specifically trained, for example, in 
history or Chinese departments of universities, can possibly fluently master this 
system and are regarded as having a high cultural level. Therefore, education in 
89 
China is technically much related to acquisition of Chinese characters in the first 
place, which is symbolically associated to one's `cultural level' (wenhua shuiping 
or wenhua chengdu). 
It was not until the fifth national census in 2000 that the term `cultural level' was 
replaced by `educational level' or `the level of received education' (shoo jiaoyu 
chengdu), a relatively neutral term, although education started to include other 
subjects such as sciences, technology, rather than merely literary studies some 
100 years ago. In spite of this, `wenhua', or `culture', is still the preferred 
vernacular expression in public discourse that primarily complies with the 
traditional conception: acquisition of Chinese characters, and further, the whole 
package of culture it conveys and wraps (including sciences). 34 So for a long 
time, to learn culture (xue wenhua) primarily refers to learning characters. 
Further, when one is said to `have culture' (you wenhua), it means that he or she 
has knowledge of Chinese characters and of other subjects wrapped by and/or 
taught in Chinese characters. In other words, mastery of the kind of cultures 
wrapped with writing systems other than Chinese characters is probably not 
regarded as `having culture' or will be regarded as `having no culture' (mei 
wenhua). In his illustration of the conception of `culture' in the Chinese context, 
Gladney (1999: 59) describes an elderly Hui Hajji who did not think that he had 
culture despite the fact that this Hajji had spent 12 years living in the Middle East 
and was fluent in Persian, Arabic, and was a master of the Islamic natural 
sciences. 
This literacy-based education has fostered a feeling of worship towards scripts 
that is employed by the government as well as the public to distinguish 
backwardness from progress. As can be seen in the next chapter, the Chinese 
government helped establish writing systems for some `backward' ethnic 
minorities who did not have their scripts. Meanwhile, when asked about the 
relationship between ethnicity and education, one of my Muslim Hui informants 
commented that the Muslim Salar are even more backward (than Hui) because 
they do not even have their own writing system corresponding to their language (a 
34 For instance, some of my minority informants insisted that sciences and technology have been 
invented and developed by the Han, the 'old brother' (lao dage). Also see chapter five. 
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kind of Turkish) while Hui, as Chinese speakers, have Chinese characters. This 
literacy-in-Chinese-based education is actually reflected in the two characters of 
the Chinese word wenhua (culture) itself. Wen, translated as `literary, literature, 
script, inscription', is the `central part of the idea of culture' (ibid.: 60), and hua, 
translated as `change, transform', is the process of culturing people. Although as a 
modern Chinese word, `wenhua' is the translation of `culture' in the European 
languages that were imported via Japanese in the nineteenth century, it is 
nevertheless rooted in the classical concept of wenzhi jiaohua, for which wenhua 
stands. Wenzhi (zhi, rule, manage, govern) can be understood both as `government 
by civilians rather than military men' and `government promotion of literature 
and the arts', and is the Chinese mode of governance; jiaohua (jiao, educate, train 
in good manners) is the process of educating people so as to transform them, and 
hence can be understood as civilized intercourse. Therefore, the notion of wenhua 
covers a wide range of dimensions from culturalism, elitism, governance to the 
transformation of people. 
In conceptualising this transformation of people, or civilizing projects, Harrell 
(1995) highlighted three ways (or metaphors in his terms) with respect to 
relationships between civilizers and civilized: the metaphor of sex, of education 
and of history. In the metaphor of sex, peripheral people are eroticised and 
feminised in the way that minorities are thought to be erotic and promiscuous as a 
result of their presumably low level of culture or limited civilized morals of 
sexual repression. Peripheral people, who are in fact almost exclusively minority 
women, have been seen as objects of sexual desire, which reflected the hegemony 
in a male-dominant society. Peripheral people, like women, are also seen as 
polluting - both dirty and dangerous. The metaphor of education aims to certify 
peripheral people's civilizability once they have been demonstrated as inferior in 
the metaphor of sex. 35 Peripheral people are childlike, they are unacquainted with 
abstract or metaphorical thought. They are also presented in official discourse in a 
big brother/little brother relationship with the Han who are socially and 
35 However, it is not only the metaphor of sex that contributes to the discourse of the inferiority of 
peripheral people. Their presumed lack of ability in abstraction, analysis, or comprehension of 
academic concepts and so on, all contribute to this discourse as can be seen in the metaphor of 
education here and in chapter five. For the metaphor of sex, readers can also consult Gladney 
(2004). 
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economically more advanced and represent the big brother, and so have the duty 
to help minorities to become advanced. 36 Meanwhile, to see peripheral people as 
childlike is also embedded in the belief that children always `represent to the 
civilizers the best hope for accomplishing the civilizing project' (ibid.: 14). The 
metaphor of history is an attempt to find a resolution to the paradox between the 
idea that minority peoples are primitive and civilizable on the one hand, and 
innately backward and hence uncivilizable on the other hand. When minority 
people are placed on the scale of the development of human history, they 
therefore are ancient, unchanged and thus resemble the ancestors of the civilizers, 
and so the civilizers have some chance of success. In the light of the three 
metaphors, the people at the centre are representative of masculinity, adulthood 
and modernity, which is evidence of their legitimate status characterised by 
political and moral superiority (ibid. ). 
The recently noticeable practice of a civilizing mission is highlighted by the suzhi 
campaign that was largely introduced into public discourse in the 1980s. Literally 
`essential character', and generally translated as `quality' in English, `suzhi is an 
amorphous concept that refers to the innate and nurtured physical, intellectual and 
ideological characteristics of a person' (Murphy 2004: 2). In most academic 
articles discussing suzhi, the concept is divided into shenti suzhi (physical quality) 
and wenhua suzhi (cultural quality), and the latter principally refers to educational 
level (jiaoyu shuiping). The former is largely associated with the idea of eugenics 
that was imported with the discourse of race from Europe at the turn of the 
twentieth century (see Dikötter 1992, in particular chapter six), and more recently 
is embodied in the state one-child-per-couple policy. This policy is interpreted as 
`shaosheng yousheng' (bear fewer and better children) or `yousheng youyu' (bear 
and rear better children). The suzhi agenda, as a new official ideological concept, 
aims to transform the low quality Chinese populace at the periphery (the rural 
population in Murphy) that are characterised by tradition, poverty and agrarianism 
to modernity, prosperity and industrialism (Murphy 2004: 3). This transformation 
is particularly hoped to be realised through suzhi jiaoyu (lit. quality education) 
36 Baogang Ile (2004) provides an interesting perspective in explaining that this brotherhood 
relation is based on a paternalistic ideology towards all types of relationships such as relations 
between the ethnic majority and minority communities, between the rulers and the masses. 
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that aims to cultivate the kind of population with all-round development in 
physical, intellectual and ideological characteristics. To realise this principle, 
educational objectives should shift from traditional examination-driven rote 
learning to emphasizing `self-expression, manual dexterity, life skills appropriate 
to the local environment and extra-curricula activities such as music, sport and 
art' (ibid. ). Apparently, the suzhi campaign is hoped to be a remedy in that it aims 
to achieve both prosperity and equality in both economic and cultural terms. 
However, today wenhua can also be used in such phrase as `ethnic minority 
cultures' (shaoshu minzu wenhua). Wenhua in this context does not contain the 
same meaning as it does in `having (no Chinese) culture', but rather, refers to the 
historical heritage of ethnic minorities and so is thought to be static and should be 
kept in museums. 37 Different discourses about the concept of culture or wenhua 
are in fact constructed by discursive practices that favour mainstream culture over 
the others, as Wetherell and Potter argue (1992). In their portrayal of Päkehä 
positions in relation to Maori in New Zealand, the former people regard 
themselves as possessing society, having civilization, and holding a mundane, 
technical and practical outlook. These characteristics are not presented as culture, 
but as simple common sense. In this discourse, Maori people are thought to 
possess culture that makes them exotic and abnormal compared to the normal 
mode of the Päkehä majority. This culture discourse exactly mirrors the culture 
discourse in the Chinese context where an ethnic minority people with their own 
culture is probably thought not to have culture if they are not educated in 
mainstream schools or with the mainstream civilization, or in Chinese characters 
as argued above. In other words, their culture is primarily understood in an 
anthropological sense that parallels with colonialist or imperialist views of the 
primitivity and inferiority of the Other's culture in contrast with the complexity 
and superiority of their own culture. The metaphor of history in civilization 
projects portrayed by Harrell earlier is another version of this culture discourse. 
37 Gladney (2004) illustrates this `in-museum' culture. See particularly chapter three. 
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The current ethos in education 
As argued above, education, or examination-driven education, had long been the 
most important official way of achieving upward social mobility in imperial 
China. The educational system in modern China that is seemingly driven by 
examinations is, to a significant extent, the legacy of the imperial system. 
Learning from the lesson of Mao's devastation of scholars and the knowledge and 
education they represented, and also under rapid development of the global 
knowledge economy, the Chinese government in the late 1970s proposed the 
slogan of `respect knowledge, respect talent' (zunzhong zhishi, zunzhong 
rencai). 38 This indicated the beginning of a new era in China since then, an era of 
supposed reform and opening-up (gaige kaifang). The pursuit of knowledge came 
into fashion again, marked by re-introducing nationally uniform college entrance 
examinations in 1977. Thus, to successfully enter higher education means that 
someone from a low socio-economic urban family will significantly achieve 
social mobility whilst one from a rural family will become entitled to registered 
permanent urban residence (chengzhen hukou). 39 This is associated with the 
government that will allocate university graduates a job in a state work unit, 
which secures a regularly paid salary as well as all other kinds of state welfare 
benefits. This policy inevitably recalls the way in which the imperial system 
worked in selecting government officials. Nevertheless, unlike in imperial times, 
examinees or pupils did not pay for the education run by the Party-state until well 
after the economic reform. In other words, state-run schools before 1990s were 
primarily open to everyone that largely focused on cultivation of an elite class 
(through allocating jobs in state sectors to graduates). Hence, the democracy of 
the imperial examinations seems to be once achieved more thoroughly under the 
rule of the CCP. In addition to this career benefit, successful examinees have also 
won respect for their assumed cultural and moral merits as part of the educational 
achievement, which is partially a continuity of the role education played in 
imperial times. 
38 This idea is more associated with economic development rather than with transformation of 
Chinese culture or civilization that Heshang advocated. 
39 The inequality between rural and urban residents that is represented in the system of residence 
registration has drawn growing public attention recently, which has led to a call among academics 
for the termination of different policies for rural and urban areas. See Lu Xueyi (2004) for further 
information about this system. 
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Since the mid-1980s, to be engaged in commercial business increasingly became 
more and more profitable owing to an increasingly free economy, and this is said 
to have stirred up a new tide of `study is useless' thinking (dushu wuyong lun) 
that was once popular in the Cultural Revolution when Confucius and his doctrine 
were under acute attack. This was particularly salient between the mid-1980s and 
mid-1990s, which was characterised by a severe brain drain - public servants, 
teachers or otherwise turned away from state work units to the `commercial sea' 
(xiahai). It equally drew a number of students away from schooling to adventure 
in this commercial sea. The cessation of assigning jobs by the government to 
school or college graduates in 1996 exacerbated the situation. On the other hand, 
the continuity of the reform also means that the state gradually introduced policies 
of, for example, raising the salary of employees working in the state system, or 
providing other kinds of welfare benefits. These new policies aim to attract more 
knowledgeable, cultured and young talent into state employment while stopping a 
further brain drain from state sectors. At the same time the new policy of 
privatisation and devolution of the state-run enterprises was also introduced. This 
policy led millions of mainly unskilled or semi-skilled workers to be laid-off from 
their formerly secure positions. These unemployed workers therefore became 
what is called `go-off-post workers (xiagang gongren)'. 
The reform of the public servants system and of state-run enterprises has shed 
new light on the benefits that education can bring. Education has again come to be 
the essential concern of individual families as well as of the government at all 
levels, although it may be different as to what subjects to offer by the government, 
and what subjects to study on the part of the masses as the socio-economic 
situation keeps changing. The bottom-up strategy based in families aims to 
successfully enroll children in (good) colleges or universities, and in popular 
subjects; the top-down policy made by the central government aims to expand 
education to reach a wider population by increasing enrolment rates at all 
educational levels under the impact of a knowledge-economy-based global 
competitiveness 40 This educational carnival has been marching forward rapidly at 
ao This is a highly contested notion and is often used rhetorically by governments to justify a range 
of disparate policies/interventions. To counter-pose cultural rights to economic development is 
one example. For a discussion of this, see the concluding chapter. 
95 
the expense of appropriate and sufficient human and material resources for a 
quality education. On the other hand, it also means that parents, schools and 
society are increasingly putting pressure on students in terms of educational 
performance which places students in a new `examination hell'. 
41 In this light, 
examination results always come to be the most important, if not the only, 
criterion by which both schools and families measure students' achievement. In a 
word, education has come to be the top priority again under the impact of global 
development and the revival of the educational tradition of China. 
This (particularly college entrance) examinations-driven and competitive 
schooling has made demands for a highly standardised educational system, which 
has inevitably resulted in a degree of blindness to difference in gender, class, 
ethnicity and region. Although the educational system in the past, imperial times 
or otherwise, was also largely blind to difference in various cultures (broadly 
understood), an educational system blind to cultural diversity today is difficult to 
account for, given the growing consciousness of cultural difference and the 
importance of recognition of it among the government, academic commentators 
and the masses. In fact, in this blindness, Chinese (Han) culture has been under 
threat itself at the global level, and correspondingly, other cultures than the 
dominant one in China have been pushed to a more peripheral position. 
Nonetheless, at the national level, Chinese Han culture still firmly holds the 
hegemony whereas the requirement for `blindness' in education has brought in a 
wider gap between students owing to their differential backgrounds in socio- 
economic status, gender, ethnicity or region. Meanwhile, education has also been 
reduced to a merely careerist instrument that no longer emphasises individual 
cultural or moral accomplishment as the imperial system did. The concept of 
suzhi (quality) education was hence proposed under this societal climate, which 
also echoed the campaign of construction of two civilizations (liangge wenming), 
i. e. material civilization and spiritual civilization (wuzhi wenming he jingshen 
wenming), put forward by Deng Xiaoping in the mid-1980s. 
42 
41 Jiang Hong (2004) describes the high competitiveness in basic education (jichu jiaoyu) and its 
negative effects on the socialisation of children. 
42 Like the concept of suzhi education, the construction of two civilizations also focuses on 
spiritual or moral construction over its material counterpart. For more relevant information on the 
concept of spiritual civilization construction, see Zhongguo Jingshen Wenming Wang. 
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However, this blindness in education is not something that social entities 
deliberately exercise - either governments or various social or cultural 
communities. In fact, as argued in more detail in the next chapter, both 
governments and social or cultural communities have made efforts to narrow the 
educational gap caused by a wide range of factors. Governments at different 
levels have introduced more carefully tailored policies, whereas communities 
have also adopted more responsive strategies. Meanwhile, academics in their 
research are also attempting to make contributions by examining government 
policies and community forces alike. All of that is grounded in a broad consensus 
among governments, academics and the public that one primary aim of education 
ought to ensure a form of equality that is mainly indicated by equal achievement 
by students from different backgrounds. Where such achievement is unequal, it is 
crucial to explore what underlies these differences in achievement. Nonetheless, 
equality in education is a very long-term goal to achieve for two major reasons. 
First, a marketised or fee-charging education system is likely to exclude people 
from worse-off backgrounds, and this will be exacerbated if (sufficient) policies 
of aiding disadvantaged families are not in place accordingly and in time. 
Second, an education that is driven by a knowledge-economy based global 
competitiveness is actually leading to a more standardised knowledge package for 
teaching in schools that is supposedly going to benefit an economically oriented 
society. This is inevitably leaving even less room for consideration or even 
awareness of the kind of cultures that are derived from difference in gender, class, 
ethnicity or region. As a consequence, this education has and will put students 
from different cultural backgrounds on an unequal footing in that they supposedly 
possess standardised aptitude, or the cultural capital in Bourdieu's terms 
(Bourdieu 1977,1986), for schooling. 43 This education is characterised by a 
male, middle class, Han and the eastern areas (i. e. more advanced areas in terms 
of industrialisation and related interests) biased system in the Chinese case. When 
Bourdieu (ibid. ) was unmasking the process in which the embodied culture of a 
certain group is being capitalised through its institutionalisation by the 
Coincidentally, the Japanese scholar Yasuaki expresses his preference of the idea of pursuit of 
spiritual and material well-being over the idea of human dignity of Western liberalism as a 
universal value in a dialogue on East Asian values and human rights. See Yasuaki (1999). 
43 Bourdieu's thesis of cultural capital is describes in detail in chapter two. 
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educational system, he probably did not have in mind the idea of Han cultural 
hegemony dominating education, nor the imperial examinations system that 
highly institutionalised and so capitalised (! ) Confucianism. 
Nevertheless, a global-economy-driven educational system at present is also 
practising institutionalisation of a certain culture at the expense of other cultures 
on a globally massive scale that has never been seen before. 44 As a consequence, 
both historical and global impetuses have made up an educational context that is 
combined with age-long Chinese culturalism, career and self-accomplishment 
focused educational tradition, increasing competitiveness driven by the 
knowledge economy, and Chinese ways of governing and engineering society and 
people (which are largely reflected in state policies as described earlier and later). 
This is a complex and competing package in which contestation not only exists 
between different cultures, but also between economy and culture, as well as 
between the government and various social or cultural communities. This new and 
much more complicated educational landscape, in which the culture discourse of 
China has been deeply ingrained, has been shaping governmental policies of 
education and impacting (not only) ethnic minority educational experiences. 
Taking from the current ethos in education, I examine in the subsequent chapters 
how this educational system that is shaped by state political concern or social 
control, Han cultural chauvinism and the national pursuit of economic growth 
works. This examination focuses on current policies, practices and discourses 
concerning the education of ethnic minorities (chapter five), and how ethnic 
minorities and majority evaluate minority peoples in relation to culture and 
education (chapters six, seven and eight). 
as This argument needs further substantiation. What is here particular in need is to develop the 
links between the forms of knowledge required by the knowledge economy; the extent to which 
they have in fact been institutionalised; the view that the values of the minority cultures are being 
institutionalised. However, given the space limit and the relatively lower relevance of these issues 
to my research focus on the cultural exclusion of ethnic minorities in China, I will identify them as 
the further areas of research (see chapter nine). 
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Chapter Five 
The Education of Ethnic Minorities: 
Policy, Practice and Discourse 
Introduction 
This chapter sets out an overview of the education of ethnic minorities that has 
been simultaneously influenced by Chinese culturalism, a career- and self- 
accomplishment-focused educational tradition, the move towards a knowledge 
economy in recent years, and the Chinese way of governance. It will centre on 
policies and practices and academic evaluations of the education of ethnic 
minorities. In so doing, it aims to provide a macro backdrop for the remaining 
empirical chapters on minority groups and the mainstream Han (chapters six, 
seven and eight) whilst it also serves as one aspect of a triangulation approach that 
together with the empirical chapters provides corroborative evidence concerning 
the cultural exclusion of ethnic minorities. 
In Section One, I highlight the quantity of minority populations, their 
geographical distribution, and the distinctiveness and diversity of their languages 
and cultures. Section Two is a survey of the educational level of ethnic minorities 
in comparison with the majority Han. This is approached by looking at illiteracy 
first by ethnic group and secondly, in relation to geographical regions at the 
provincial level. Sections Three and Four together examine policies and practices 
regarding the education of ethnic minorities. Section Three outlines current state 
policies and practices towards minority education in general; Section Four further 
examines the concerns and objectives that shape minority education policies and 
practices, both at present and historically, mainly from a cultural perspective of 
ethnic minorities. Section Five is a review of the academic and public discourses 
that assess and diagnose the condition of the education of ethnic minorities. In 
doing so, the mainstream perception of ethnic minorities will come to light, which 
is discussed further in Section Six of the evaluation. 
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Ethnic minorities of China 
China has 55 officially identified ethnic minority groups. The minority population 
in total increased from 6.06 percent (35,032,085) of the total population as 
recorded in the first national census of 1953 to 8.47 percent (105,226,114) of the 
total population as recorded in the latest (fifth) national census of 2000 (RhSKT 
and JF 2003: 2-3). In 2000, the minority groups with a population of more than 
5,000,000 are Zhuang (16,178,811), Manchu (10,682,262), Hui (9,816,805), Miao 
(8,940,116), Uygur (8,399,393), Tujia (8,028,133), Yi (7,762,272), Mongolian 
(5,813,947) and Tibetan (5,416,021). Most minority groups inhabit the border 
areas of the northwest, southwest and northeast. There are political tensions 
between these regions and China proper based on territorial disputes as well as on 
cultural differences; there are significant populations of the same ethnic groups on 
both sides of the border, from the Far East of Russia to Central Asia, and then 
down to South and Southeast Asia (see the Map of China and the Map of 
Ethnolinguistic Groups in China, pages 278 & 281). Furthermore, over 50 percent 
of the minority population (53,492,763) is concentrated in western regions, which 
are traditionally referred to as the three minority autonomous regions, Ningxia 
Hui, Tibet and Xinjiang Uygur; six provinces, Gansu, Guizhou, Qinghai, Shaanxi, 
Sichuan and Yunnan; and one municipality, Chongqing. In the government's 
`Open Up the West' campaign (Xibu Da Kaifa), the other two minority 
autonomous regions, Inner Mongolia and Guangxi Zhuang are also incorporated 
in this category; the minority population in the `new' West thus amounts to nearly 
80 percent of the total (see the Map of the New West on page 282) (RPB & 
RhSKT 2002; RhSKT and JF 2003). 1 
The number of minority groups that are recognised by the state is much fewer 
than the number of groups (more than four hundred) who claimed their minority 
identity when China embarked on its `Ethnic (Minority) Identification Project' in 
the early 1950s. 2 Despite the relatively small ethnic minority population, the 
CCP's particular concern about minority groups is evident in its official 
recognition that the Chinese nation is constituted by different ethnic groups. The 
' In my research, western regions are referred to the traditional category. 
2 In the 2000 census there are still 728,113 individuals `unidentified' and awaiting recognition 
(RhSKT and JF 2003; RPB and RhSKT 2002). 
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CCP's view developed into the concept of minority regional autonomy (also see 
the previous chapter), and was formally put into practice in 1947 when the first 
minority autonomous region (at the provincial level), the Inner Mongolian 
Autonomous Region, was established. 3 By 1965, the other four autonomous 
regions of its kind were all established: Xinjiang, Guangxi, Ningxia and Tibet. In 
the meantime, a considerable number of minority autonomous prefectures and 
counties (minzu zizhi zhou, minzu zizhi xian/qi) were also set up. By 2000 there 
were in total 145 minority autonomous territories at the national, prefectural and 
county levels. In addition, 1,256 minority villages (minzu xiang) are also in place 
though they are not entitled to autonomy. Among 55 minority groups, 44 groups, 
who amount to 75 percent of the minority population in the country, have their 
own autonomous territory. Minority autonomous regions account for 64 percent 
of China's territory (Wang and Chen 2001: 4). 
There are 61 minority languages that have been identified by Chinese linguists, 
with some more waiting for identification. These languages belong to five (or 
four, see Gladney 2004: 7) of the world's language families: Sino-Tibetan (for 
example Mandarin, Tibetan, Zhuang, Miao, Yao), Altaic (for example Uygur, 
Kazakh, Mongolian, Manchu-Tungus, and perhaps Korean), Austroasiatic (for 
example Blang, De'ang (Benglong) and perhaps Vietnamese (Jing/Gin)), Malayo- 
Polynesian (for example Paiwan), and Indo-European (for example Russian and 
Tajik) (see the Map of Ethnolinguistic Groups in China on page 281). As far as 
the minority writing system is concerned, except for Manchu and Hui who use 
Chinese characters (and language), there are 39 different minority writing systems 
used by other minority groups. Of these, 24 were created by Chinese linguists 
with Latin letters for the basis of most of them (Teng and Wang 2001: 326-328). 
There are also around 20 minority groups who neither have their own writing 
system nor has the state created the writing system for them. Therefore they 
generally use the Chinese writing system (ibid.: 432-438). 
3 Both the Nationalist Party and the CCP used to propose the conception of minority self- 
determination that they eventually gave up. In the CCP case, the conception of self-autonomy 
displaced that of self-determination. For a detailed examination of this shift, see Songben (2003). 
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Another major dimension of the distinctiveness and diversity of minority cultures 
is their commitment to religious beliefs, which include Buddhism, Islam, 
Protestantism, Catholicism, Orthodoxy, Daoism and various primitive religions 
(Teng and Wang 2001: 174). About half of the minority population believe in a 
certain faith, which is also half of the religious believers across China. In 
comparison, believers among the majority Han who constitute the other half of 
religious believers make up only five percent of its whole population (Guojia 
Minzu Shiwu Weiyuanhui 2002: 4). Buddhism and Islam, `at least in terms of 
scale' (Mackerras 1999: 23), are the most important faiths among other religions. 
While (particularly Tibetan) Buddhism is the faith of Tibetans, Mongolians, Tu, 
Yugur and Monba in western and northern China, Islam is adhered to by ten 
minority groups who are largely concentrated in northwest China, from far west 
Xinjiang (Uygurs, Kazakhs, Kirgiz, Uzbeks, Tatars and Tajiks) to the Gansu- 
Ningxia-Qinghai regions (Hui, Dongxiang, Bonan and Salar). This last region is 
also the nexus between several differing civilizations, (Tibetan) Buddhism, Islam 
and Confucianism and atheism (also see chapter three). 
The educational level of ethnic minorities 
The normative criterion to assess the educational level in China (as it appears in 
the official statistics) is called the cultural level (wenhua chengdu) or level of 
received education (shou jiaoyu chengdu). 4 This is measured by looking at the 
number of years of education received or completed in the state educational 
system. Different levels are labelled as: no schooling, literacy class, primary 
school, junior secondary school, senior secondary school, secondary vocational 
school, junior college, university and postgraduate. Another categorisation 
method is to divide the 15-year-old-plus population into literate and illiterate 
s groups. I will take the latter as the main measuring tool to look at the educational 
4 'Level of received education', a more neutral term, replaced 'cultural level', a term underpinned 
by China's 'civilizing mission' (Gladncy 1999: 58) in the fifth census in 2000 (PBRSKT 2002). 
For a concise and persuasive discussion of the constellation of culture-related terms in the 
educational context, see Gladney (1999: 58-62). Also see the section of 'the wenhua discourse of 
China' in chapter four. 
5 In different censuses information provided with reference to (il)literacy is not identical. The 
information that the third census of 1982 provided is illiteracy and semi-illiteracy figures and rates 
of the 12-year-old-plus population, and illiteracy figures of the 6-year-old-plus population; the 
census in 1990 produced illiteracy and semi-illiteracy figures and rates of the 15-year-old-plus 
population; the census in 2000 provided figures of the 6-year-old-plus population who have non- 
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development of different ethnic groups. This is primarily because illiteracy in the 
minority population is a more serious problem in terms of its persistence and 
much larger scale compared to that in the majority population (RhSKTS & JF 
2003). For this reason, to wipe up illiteracy in the minority population is always 
the top agenda of the government (Jiaoyu Bu 2004b, 2005). Meanwhile, it is also 
difficult to compare the minority and majority populations at the primary, 
secondary and tertiary levels for the reason that the education of ethnic minorities 
is largely carried out in minority schools, colleges and universities. This means 
that minority education is largely separated out from the mainstream education 
that usually leads to segregation between minority and majority groups in the 
labour market. As a result, even if a minority community has a higher, for 
example, graduate rate than the Han, it does not necessarily means that the group 
is also more competitive in the labour market than the Han as I shall demonstrate 
in the empirical chapters. 
Whilst it is difficult to tell the general reliability of government data on which my 
analysis is based owing to limited resources, some unreliability with respect to 
this data was observable during my qualitative fieldwork. For example, according 
to a government official who was involved in the fifth census, her superior 
required that they should exaggerate of the level of education that people received 
by one level when reporting to the higher government in official documents. 
Doing so, it is said will have the effect of boosting the superior's achievement in 
his or her official career (zhengji, lit. political achievement). The same informant 
also said that this is a phenomenon spreading to different government levels and 
in various official statistics. In fact, general figures relating to the ethnic 
population in national censuses can be problematic as the example of the Han 
population in Tibetan Autonomous Region in the 1990 and 2000 censuses given 
by Mackerras shows (Mackerras 2004: 225). 
The kind of data relating to educational achievement by ethnic group that is 
available is at the national level. Meanwhile there is far from sufficient data at the 
schooling and attended wiping-out illiteracy classes (saornang ban). Meanwhile in the Tabulation 
on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China, the illiterate population aged 15-year-old- 
plus is available. 
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provincial, prefectural and county levels that are available to me. Given the wide 
range that different minority groups, as well as different members within a 
minority group, are distributed geographically, and their varied economic 
conditions, occupational patterns and educational traditions, it is necessary to 
combine two criteria, ethnic and regional differences in the attempt to find out the 
relationship between ethnicity and educational achievement. Therefore, my 
analysis as a whole will mainly focus on the educational level according to the 
national census. I will also highlight the educational gap through a comparative 
analysis of educational development by ethnic group and by regions (at the 
provincial level). 
Ethnic groups 
Table 1 (page 271-272) produces two types of information with regard to the 
ethnic educational level: the illiterate population of each ethnic group and the 
distribution in different provinces of each ethnic group. The illiteracy rate across 
ethnic groups varies from 62.88 of Muslim Dongxiang to 1.98 of Muslim Tatar, 
with the national average 7.75 and that of the Han 8.60. There are six ethnic 
groups with one of the highest illiteracy rates (around or above 50), Tibetan 
(47.55), Muslim Salar (49.11), Lhoba (50.79), Muslim Bonan (55.94), Monba 
(56.21) and Muslim Dongxiang. 6 At the other end of the spectrum, the most 
literate groups (an illiteracy level of less than 4 percent) are another ten minority 
populations (1.98 for Muslim Tatar, 2.50 for Muslim Uzbek, 2.68 for Muslim 
Kazakh, 2.71 for Xibe, 2.86 for Korean, 3.06 for Hezhe, 3.46 for Daur, 3.48 for 
Oroqen, 3.64 for Russian, and 3.81 for Ewenki). However, the number of ethnic 
groups with an illiteracy rate higher than that of the national average is 40 (who 
amount to 70.78 percent of the national minority population), and the average rate 
is 23.01, which is about three times higher than the national level 7.75. In the 
meantime, the average illiteracy for the minority population as a whole is 17.86, 
which is more than twice as high than that for the Han. 
The most literate ethnic groups are largely concentrated in Xinjiang in far 
northwest China or in Heilongjiang, Jilin or Liaoning in northeast China (the 
6 Compared to the six groups, all other ethnic groups have a significantly lower illiteracy rate than 
50 percent, i. e. from about 30 percent to 2 percent. 
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former Manchukuo), or in the Inner Mongolian Region, and to a lesser extent, in 
Gaungxi and Guizhou. Possible reasons cited in the literature for the relatively 
high achievement of these groups include that tradition of modern education and 
at the same time possess high socio-economic status, for instance, Tatar, Uzbek, 
Russian, Daur and Korean; some have rapidly enhanced educational performance 
to a high level with the special aid of the state due to the relatively easy 
manageability of ethnic communities that have a small population such as Oroqen 
and Hezhe (Ma and Wang 2002; Dongfang Minzu Wang); some are much 
sinicised, for example Zhuang. 7 On the contrary, minority groups with a higher 
illiteracy rate than the national average are substantially settled in western 
regions, amongst whom the six most illiterate ethnic minority groups are 
primarily distributed in Qinghai, Gansu and Tibet. The three Muslim groups are 
settled in the borderland areas between Qinghai and Gansu while the other two 
small groups (less than 10,000 populace), Monba and Lhoba, live along the 
border regions between Tibet and India. The largest group among the six, the 
Tibetans, are widely spread in the Tibet Autonomous Region and the vicinities in 
its neighbouring provinces, Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan. 
Lamontagne (1999) conducted a survey in which he divides ethnic groups into 
four phases with regard to illiteracy by examining the 1982 level of illiteracy and 
the degree of progress made between 1982 (the third national census) and 1990 
(the fourth national census): (1) the Low-slow phase; (2) the Low-fast phase; (3) 
the High-fast phase; and (4) the High-slow phase. Here the `low-high' division 
refers to the 1982 level of illiteracy, and the `slow-fast' distinction indicates the 
degree of progress made between the two censuses. The ethnic groups at the Low- 
fast and High-fast phases are `the moderately advanced nationalities (i. e. ethnic 
7 According to Yuan Shaofen (1991. Cited in Songben 2003: 30), the largest minority group, 
Zhuang people, did not have the consciousness of belonging to the Zhuang ethnic group but were 
being sinicised when the CCP came to power and embarked upon its `Ethnic Identification 
Project' over 50 years ago. Dreyer (1976: 269) further points out that Zhuang ('Chuang' in her 
spelling) had also had indigenous communist movement of some strength. This may partially be 
able to explain Zhuang's educational performance. Also see Goodman (2002) and Mackerras 
(2004). However, this is not the only case among the minority population, particularly in non- 
western regions, where minorities have long lived and communicated with Han that led to their 
sinicisation, for example the She in Fujian and the Tujia in Hunan (whose illiteracy rates are 11.81 
and 11.71 that are very close to that of the Han). Given the status as the first minority autonomous 
region, a relatively high educational level among the Mongolians in the Inner Mongolian 
Autonomous Region is also understandable. 
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groups)' who `have made significant progress during the 1980s towards catching 
up with the most advanced nationalities' (ibid.: 147). The High-slow phase 
indicates that educational development approaches a ceiling or saturation point. 
The Low-slow phase points to the situation in which `although the least advanced 
nationalities have made some progress, the gap separating them from the 
moderately advanced nationalities has widened' (ibid. ). As a result of a 
comparison, the four communities at the Low-slow phase in Lamontagne's survey 
(ibid.: 146), Salar, Tibetan, Bonan and Dongxiang, are still among the most 
illiterate populations in the 2000 census as can be seen from above. 8 This is to 
say, from a developmental perspective, the four groups still perform poorly. 
Province-level territories 
In 2000, the illiteracy rate across province-level territories varied from 4.93 in 
Beijing to 47.25 in Tibet, with a national average percentage of 9.08 (see Table 2 
on page 273). Among the ten territories with the least illiterate populations 
(Beijing, Guangdong, Guangxi, Shanxi, Jilin, Liaoning, Hunan, Shanghai, 
Heilongjiang and Tianjin), none of them are situated in western regions. On the 
other hand, the highest illiteracy rate (an illiteracy level of 15 percent or more) is 
found in western regions, Tibet, Qinghai (25.44), Guizhou (19.83), Gansu (19.68), 
Ningxia (15.72) and Yunnan (15.44). As a whole, these western regions have an 
average illiteracy rate of 18.87, which is twice higher than the national level. 
By and large, the minority population has a higher illiteracy rate than the majority 
Han across the country, and the minority groups with a higher literacy account for 
a very small proportion of the minority population. The highest illiterate 
population are concentrated in western regions, particularly in the Qing-Zang 
(Qinghai-Tibet) Plateau areas that spread from the border areas between Tibet and 
India to the borderlands between Qinghai and Gansu provinces. 
8 Some Chinese scholars distinguish between three types of group by the illiteracy criterion, 
namely, elimination (xiaochu xing), transition (zhuanhuan xing) and expansion (kuozhan xing). 
However, the Tibetan, Dongxiang and Salar still fall in the expansion category. For more details 
see Zhang Tianlu (1995); Zhang and Chen (1995). 
106 
Current policies and practices of the education of ethnic minorities 
The modern education of ethnic minorities in China has long been recognised as 
one that is different from ordinary education in Han-dominated regions. The 
establishment of the Manchurian and Mongolian Higher School (Man Meng 
Gaodeng Xuetang) in 1908, of the Qinghai Mongolian and Tibetan School 
(Qinghai Meng Fan Xuetang) in 19109 and of the Mongolian and Tibetan School 
(Meng Zang Xuexiao) in 1913 is regarded as the commencement of higher 
education (Gaodeng Jiaoyu), basic education (Jichu Jiaoyu) and secondary 
education (Zhongdeng Jiaoyu) of ethnic minorities in China (Teng and Wang 
2001: 265-266). This tradition, although underdeveloped during its earliest period 
for understandable reasons, was taken over and enormously developed by the 
CCP after it came to power in 1949. With more than fifty years' development, the 
education of ethnic minorities in China has been to a large extent systematised 
with various levels as well as forms of schooling for ethnic minority people 
(ibid.: 267-291). 
This recognition of difference regarding minority education is derived from the 
awareness of differences between ethnic minorities and the Han community in 
terms of history, geographical distribution, socio-economic patterns, and cultural 
tradition. However, particularities of minority education are essentially deemed to 
be embodied in some `special difficulties and problems' that are most lately 
illustrated in an official government document (Guowuyuan 2002): 
Due to a variety of historical, social, physical, and particularly economic reasons, minority 
education in our country is still facing some special difficulties and problems. The ideas about 
education relatively lag behind, educational reform proceeds very slowly, and education lacks 
strong bases. Popularisation of compulsory education and development of all other types of 
education are relatively sluggish. Teachers are insufficient in quantity and poor in quality. 
Inadequate financial investment makes it difficult to improve the conditions for managing schools, 
therefore the problem for the schooling of students is rather salient, and the pay for teachers is in 
need of further improvement... In recent years, hostile forces from overseas and religious 
extremist forces from neighbouring countries collude with domestic nationalistic separatists to 
create incidents in some minority areas in our country, and to conduct ethnic separatist activities. 
They try vainly to infiltrate our educational field, to foster ethnic separatist forces, and to contend 
with us for the next generation. 
9 Qinghai Tongshi considers that the modem education of Mongolian and Tibetan children started 
in 1911 when Menggu Banri Xuetang (Mongolian Half-Day School) was set up in Xining. The 
school was renamed Ninghai Mengfan Xuexiao (Ninghai Mongolian and Tibetan School) in 1912 
when it started to recruit Tibetan children (Cui, Zhang and Du 1999: 803-804). 
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This assessment of the difficulties facing minority education, ranging from 
historical, social, cultural, economic to political and ideological aspects, from 
foreign forces to domestic separatists, is in essence continuous with and a 
development of the CCP's earlier assessment fifty years ago, upon which it 
started to build up its policy for minority education (see, for example, Teng and 
Wang 2001: 292-297). The main difference is the underlying objective of minority 
education. Whereas the old objective targeted nurturing minority cadres largely 
with the aim of building state stability and national unity, the new objective under 
the reform and opening-up policy is more focused on fostering human capital, i. e. 
personnel in science, technology and management, as well as cadres. 
In the Party-state's attempt to realise its goal for minority education, preferential 
policies (youhui zhengce) are at the centre of the official agenda. These policies 
range from material support to cultivation of minority personnel. Bringing more 
financial investment in western minority regions is advocated. It also encourages 
introducing different types of schools in accordance with the distinctiveness of 
minority education. This is especially characterised by the establishment of 
minority schools (minzu xuexiao) that recruit minority students with a curriculum 
tailored for them. Some other types of school or class are also in place such as the 
mobile school for nomadic minority children and the girl-only teaching class for 
Muslim girls. Furthermore, there are also 13 higher educational institutes for 
ethnic minorities (minority universities or colleges or minzu yuanxiao, which 
originally aims to cultivate minority cadres) and 95 higher institutes that are 
located in minority autonomous territories with a significant proportion of 
minority students (Guojia Minwei & Guojia Tongjiju 2000). 
Except for government departments for ethnic minority affairs at the national, 
provincial and local levels, the state has also established sections of minority 
education in national, provincial and local governments that take particular 
responsibility for minority education. Meanwhile, provinces with a more 
developed economy and modern education (or `culture' in many public 
discourses), especially those in eastern regions, are required to give aid to 
minority concentrated western regions through material and/or personnel support, 
or running minority schools or classes for minority children. Cultivation of 
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minority teachers is also a priority in helping minority education given the high 
demand for qualified bilingual educators in different school subjects in minority 
schools. In addition, minority students enjoy special treatment in enrolment. They 
have priority in getting admitted if the results of their college entrance 
examinations are the same as or relatively lower than, mainstream Han students 
(Guojia Jiaowei & Guojia Minwei 1992; Guowuyuan 2002; Jiaoyubu 1986,1995, 
1998; Minzu Jiaoyu Si 1992; Minzu Weiyuanhui 2001; Quanguo Renmin Daibiao 
Dahui 2004; Teng and Wang 2001; Xinwen Bangongshi 2005). 10 
Recognition of the particularities of minority education also means recognition of 
minority cultures and languages, which are essential in considering the 
management of minority education. Therefore, bilingual education has long 
formed a key part of minority education, which involves the fields of teaching, 
examination and compilation and translation of textbooks (Teng and Wang 
2001: 342-353). After fifty years' experiment and exploration, bilingual education 
has gradually developed three basic models: instruction in the minority language 
plus the subject of Chinese, instruction in Chinese plus the subject of the minority 
language, and a gradual transfer of the medium of instruction from the minority 
language to Chinese. As a result, there are in total more than 10,000 schools 
nationwide that have employed 21 minority writing systems for their bilingual 
education (Minzu Jiaoyu Si 2002: 205-206). Minority students in theory are 
allowed to sit college entrance examinations in their minority languages. If 
students from minority schools received education in their minority languages and 
also want to enter a university or an academic department of a higher educational 
institute in minority autonomous regions where the medium of instruction is the 
minority language, the local government is responsible for setting examinations 
questions in the minority language for these students. If students of minority 
schools would like to enter a mainstream university (putong gaoxiao) with 
Chinese as the medium of instruction, they should take nationally uniform college 
entrance examinations. In this case, the examination of Chinese, though set 
particularly for minority students, should be sat in Chinese. Meanwhile, the 
10 Guojia Jiaowei (The National Education Commission) is the former name of Jiaoyu Bu (The 
Ministry of Education). 
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examinations of other subjects can be taken in the minority language (Teng and 
Wang 2001: 344-345). 
With the Ministry of Education taking the lead, several inter-provincial 
cooperative teams were established to co-compile textbooks in the minority 
writing systems (Mongolian, Tibetan, Kazakh and Korean) that are coupled with 
three committees for examining textbooks (in Tibetan, Mongolian and Korean). 
Meanwhile, the Ministry of Education has also set down the syllabus for the 
subject of Chinese in minority schools with a lower requirement for minority 
students. The general principles in textbook compilations and translations lie in 
requirements to consider four aspects: ideology, scientism, ethnic peculiarities 
and regional peculiarities. In terms of ideology, textbooks should serve to educate 
students with socialism, communism and patriotism. The requirement for 
scientism mainly refers to the function of textbooks to help the minority 
population in their socio-economic development. Moreover, textbooks should 
embody distinctiveness of minority areas and cultures (Minzu Jiaoyu Si 2002: 206; 
Teng and Wang 2001: 346-349). The four aspects are actually also the principles 
for minority education in general. 
The concerns and objectives shaping minority education policies and 
practices 
Understanding minority education policies and practices necessitates an 
understanding of the concerns and objectives that shape them. This section aims 
to broaden the examination of state policies by focusing on the status of minority 
cultures in education. It firstly looks at the present concerns and objectives of the 
Party-state, and then briefly illustrates the trajectories of state policies on bilingual 
education and the religious issue in education over the last decades. 
The present concerns and objectives 
Minority education has developed for over fifty years since the CCP came to 
power. So far as its current landscape is concerned, perhaps the most salient 
feature of minority education policy is that it is shaped by a fear that ethnic and 
religious allegiances may undermine the capacity of minority people to be loyal 
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political and cultural citizens of the Chinese nation-state. For the government 
official, the difficulty in education in China is in rural areas, and in particular in 
minority areas (Jiaoyu Bu 2002). This is embedded in the reality that the ethnic 
issue (minzu wenti, lit. ethnic question) highly intertwines with the religious issue 
(zongjiao wenti, lit. religious question) in education in most minority areas. 
" This 
applies particularly to West China, where Muslim and Tibetan areas are thought 
to harbour `violent and terrorist forces, religiously extreme forces and ethnic 
divisive forces' that are regarded as a particular threat to the unity of the nation, 
and the safety, stability, peace and order of the state (Renmin Ribao Shelun 
2001). 12 
A concern for diluting those kinds of knowledge bases that threaten to produce 
alternative forms of cultural citizenship has caused educational planners to 
separate out religion from popular education. One way in which this occurs is that 
Party functionaries educate the masses in general, and school students in 
particular, about atheism, materialism and scientism, and encourage citizens to 
establish a scientistic view towards the world and religion so as to consciously 
resist feudal superstition, cult (xiejiao, lit. evil or pernicious doctrine) and ethnic 
secession (Jiaoyu Bu 2002; Jiaoyu Bu Bangong Ting and Guojia Minwei 
Bangong Ting 1999; Guowuyuan 2002; Li Dezhu 2002; Renmin Ribao Shelun 
2001). In this light, the only religion-related content in textbooks is an 
introduction to the origin of religion. This introduction mainly serves to take 
religion as a target of criticism in the curriculum - that religion should not be 
regarded as a positive element in terms of social progress, but, rather, a backward 
one that will ultimately wither away (Lishi 2001: 116). 13 Nevertheless, the 
11 In his discussion of state policies of ethnic minorities in Eastern Europe, Kymlicka (2001) also 
illustrates the intersection between the ethnic issue and the religious issue, and how this affects 
state policies. 
12 Dreyer argues that the ethnic issue or `the minorities problem' is essentially a problem of 
integration that constitutes four concerns in Chinese policymaking: defence, economic and social 
well-being, and national pride (1976: 3-4). This concise insight into the whole national policy 
system towards ethnic minorities can serve as a general background of my analysis of government 
policies in educational and cultural dimensions, through which issues of security, socio-economic 
well-being and national ideology of propaganda come to light. For detailed information of Chinese 
'3olicies towards ethnic minorities from imperial to communist times, see Dreyer. 
While the CCP believes that religion is an historical phenomenon that follows an emergence- 
development--disappearance law, the Party also holds the same viewpoint towards ethnicity 
(minzu), i. e. minzu will eventually disappear. See for example Jiang Zemin (1992), Li Dezhu 
(2000) and Li Ruihuan (2002). Kymlicka (2001) has also observed that Western political theorists, 
Constitution guarantees citizens freedom of religious belief, which in education 
appears in some religion-related practices like diet, dress, funding of religious 
schools or even inviting a few religious clergy to act as language teachers 
(Gladney 1999: 84; Mackerras 1999: 38,43-44; Postiglione 1999: 6; Teng 
2002b: 269-270). Even so, this freedom is circumscribed by several 'must-nots', 
including proscriptions against propagation, instruction or practice of religion in 
the school, for religion is assumed to be presented by some religious or social 
groups as a force to contend with the Party-state for younger generations (Jiaoyu 
Bu 1983). 14 The direct result of this policy that excludes religion from schools or 
other formal institutions is a marginalisation of religion in both the classroom and 
the wider society. 
Caution on the part of Han pedagogies towards alternative bases of knowledge for 
cultural citizenship also means that minority education is characterised by 
chauvinistic approaches towards the language, history and other cultural aspects 
of the curriculum. Requests for official permission to teach minority languages 
and literature are assessed according to the perceived threat they pose to the wider 
national form of cultural citizenship. So when officials have permitted, for 
example, Tibetan language and literature to be introduced into the curriculum of 
Tibetan minority schools within the wider context of Mandarin instruction in the 
core subjects of the school curriculum (in particular at the level of secondary 
education), Tibetan students are more encouraged to master Chinese in order to 
facilitate their integration into the mainstream in the long run (see, for example, 
Ma Rong 2001: 231-249, Teng and Wang 2001: 311-312). Meanwhile, the demand 
for a course on Arabic by some Muslim minority schools is rejected by the 
government. One of the explanations is that the Arabic language has never been 
the common language of any (Islamic) ethnic minority group in history but used 
by a minority population as the religious script; in fact, it is suspected that the aim 
of this demand is to offer the subject of religion in the name of a language lesson 
(Jiaoyu Bu 1983). 
in a similar fashion, had long viewed ethnicity in much the same way in that it would gradually 
disappear in the course of modernisation. 
14 The idea of laicite in French public policy is comparable to the policy of religion in China, both 
place emphasis on state sanction over particularistic interests in and practices of one's own culture 
(Favell 2001: 74-79). A further discussion on this issue of relationships between the state and 
minority cultures is made in chapters two and nine. 
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As for the histories of minorities in the curriculum, all ethnic groups are ordered 
from a primitive to an advanced stage according to minority groups' socio- 
economic patterns in tune with social evolutionary theory. On this evolutionary 
scale, there are four types of society, namely, primitive, slavery, feudal and 
modem. 15 The Han and a few minority groups, for example the Korean and 
Manchu, two Confucian or sinicised minority groups, are located at the top with 
most minority groups sequentially following behind; thus the Han nation-state 
needs to carry out `civilizing projects' directed at the less civilized minorities 
(Harrell 1995; Zhongguo Jindai Xiandaishi 2000: 148-149; Zhongguo Lishi 
1995: 187-189). 16 
The history curriculum also allocates significant amount of space to mapping out 
a kind of constructive or positive interaction between the majority Han and ethnic 
minorities in history. By doing so, the curriculum attempts to demonstrate that the 
cultural, economic and political trend through history is collaboration and unity 
rather than conflict and disunity between ethnic minorities and the Han. This 
alleged collaboration or unity is conclusively reflected in the influential concept 
of duoyuan yiti (plurality and unity) that was first put forward by the eminent 
Chinese anthropologist and sociologist Fei Xiaotong in 1988 in a lecture at the 
Chinese University of Hong Kong (Fei 1989). The concept attempts to delineate a 
historical process in which different ethnic groups of distinctive cultures have 
closely interacted with one another, and as a result evolved a Chinese nation in 
L An alternative and also the earlier version of the theory encompassed five types of society, 
primitive, slavery, feudal, capitalism and socialism/communism. Due to the collapse of the USSR 
and the Eastern European bloc, and the sluggish economy in socialist society as a whole, it became 
difficult to insist the advancement of socialism in comparison with capitalism. To combine 
`capitalist' and 'socialist' as `modern' seems to be a compromise that is reflecting the reality of the 
world development on the one hand, and on the other hand, also not fundamentally violating social 
evolutionary concept. 
16 A similar evolutionary order is also allegedly found in the educational system of different ethnic 
groups that corresponds four types of socio-economic patterns, although this is not part of the 
history curriculum. Education in primitive society is not an independent and special activity that 
has particular education institutions or full-time teachers. Education in slavery society is 
characterised by school education that gradually replaces social and family education. Meanwhile 
education becomes the privilege of the ruling class. Education in feudal society is largely 
associated with religious education particularly among religious ethnic groups, which is 
characterised by independent education institutes and full-time teachers. Education in modern 
society is found among ethnic minority groups that are at the similar social development stage to 
the Han. This type of education includes education not only in the traditional culture, but also in 
such subjects as foreign languages, sciences and mathematics (Teng and Wang 2001: 88-92). 
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terms of a unified national culture and identity. `Chinese' in this context is 
therefore, a notion that is far broader than the notion of ethnic Han, who at the 
same time are said to be the nucleus of this unity (or concentration) (ningju 
hexin). In other words, minority history is disproportionately under-represented in 
the curriculum except for when it is being represented in the context of duoyuan 
yiti or the like. 
Instruction in other aspects of minority cultures in the curriculum is even more 
limited. For example, the only two minority-focused courses run in primary and 
secondary schools, Minzu Changshi (General Knowledge of Ethnic Minorities) 
and Minzu Lilun he Minzu Zhengce (Theories and Policies of Ethnic Minorities) 
respectively, barely serve as the means of enhancing the awareness of ethnic unity 
through educating students with a similar concept to duoyuan"yiti. '7 On the whole, 
publicity and education in minority cultures, wherever there is any, is not a 
systematic instruction or introduction; instead, minority cultures are frequently 
equated with colourful dress, beautiful dance and song, special dwellings, exotic 
food, or language and script against the Han culture (Teng et al. 1997), which is 
thought to be the culmination of various ethnic cultures as a result of the Han 
being a `compound of ethnic groups' (zuqun fiuheti) (Ma Rong 2003a) through 
Chinese history. '8 As a result, minority cultures are either fragmented and 
tokenised or politicised in the curriculum as suggested earlier. 
A final consideration affecting minority education policy is that the `troublesome' 
or `disloyal' minorities are concentrated in the economically least developed 
regions of West China (Hu and Wen 2002; Tang 2003). These regions have rural 
populations and rural-urban inequalities that are above the national average, 
19 and 
a physical environment that is harsh and inhospitable where minorities were, in 
17 Meanwhile, the two courses are rarely treated seriously by either teachers or students due to 
their very limited proportion in key examinations, such as national college entrance examinations 
which are ultimately closely connected with upward social mobility whereby the two courses are 
not at all. Also see the empirical chapters six, seven and eight. 
18 For more information about the discourse of `culture' in general sense, and in the notion of 
'minority cultures', see chapter four. 
19 According to the fifth national census, the rural population in western China amounts to 72.10% 
while the percentage of the coastal provinces and municipalities is 42.18% (Beijing, Tianjin, 
Shanghai, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong) (Zhongguo Guojia Tongjiju 
2000). 
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history, pushed by the Han who themselves occupied the fertile soil in inland 
parts (Shen 1995; Zhou 1957). This made the minorities' life harder, and 
prevented their economy and culture from developing effectively, and in fact has 
made development more difficult. This history casts a dark shadow on the 
minorities' mind (Zhou 1957: 237). These disadvantages ethnic minorities have 
suffered were recently highlighted as the `three backwardnesses' (sange luohou) 
of ethnic minorities by the chairman of the National Ethnic Affairs Commission, 
Li Dezhu, in his summary speech at the latest (fifth) national ethnic minority 
education working conference (Li Dezhu 2002): 
Compared to the whole country, in particular to the eastern coastal areas, ethnic minorities and 
minority areas in our country have `three backwardnesses': the productivity development standard 
is backward, the cultural development standard is backward, and the people's living standard is 
backward... These `three backwardnesses' are all closely connected with the backwardness of the 
educational development of ethnic minorities and minority areas. 
The Party-state is therefore increasingly placing hopes on education to play a key 
role in `developing' the West and integrating it with the rest of China. Much of 
this policy invokes the globally familiar developmental discourse of `catch up' 
(zhuigan, ganshang); it is widely assumed by both the government and the 
mainstream Han and minorities themselves, as well as western and eastern regions 
that, if they do not want to be `phased out' (laotai) by the rapidly progressing 
society, they have to catch up educationally in schools, which in turn, it is 
believed, will contribute to them catching up economically, ideologically and 
culturally in the long term. 20 
The trajectories of state policies of bilingual education and the religious issue in 
education 
Indeed, to integrate ethnic minorities into the Chinese nation-state has 
increasingly come to the core of the government agenda over the past decades. 
This is usually articulated in the way that every ethnic group would be benighted 
and so backward if it enclosed and isolated itself from advanced or developed 
ethnic groups or regions. Ongoing changes of the government policy of bilingual 
20 Harrell (1995) compares three types of civilizing projects carried out respectively by Confucian, 
Christian and Communist, and shows similarities, differences between them, as well as succession 
between Confucian theory and Communist theory. 
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education over the past fifty years particularly reflects a long course in which this 
ideology develops. Corresponding to the CCP's recognition and accommodation 
of ethnic minority groups, bilingual education in the early 1950s was much 
focused upon encouraging that minority schools offer the subject of their own 
ethnic languages, and further gradually adopt their languages as the medium of 
instruction in all school subjects. This was a golden age of bilingual education 
under a new era when the CCP just became the ruling party of China. This policy 
turned into a radically different direction from the mid-1950s to mid-1960s, when 
the Party-state deemed that the country had fulfilled the transformation towards 
socialism and was entering a new phase of thoroughly building up its socialist 
system. In this light, it was required that minority education should gradually 
catch up with the mainstream Han education (Teng and Wang 2002: 292-319). 
In this discourse of catching up, minorities were accused of their peculiarities that 
were understood as the synonymy of backwardness. This backwardness was 
believed to be able to overcome by terminating bilingual education so as to melt 
minorities into the Han. With Mandarin as the only medium of instruction in 
schools, minorities were presumed to be able to get access to Han culture, which 
would enrich and advance their own cultures. Following this period there was a 
correction to the policy of termination of bilingual education although the general 
principle on the government agenda was still to encourage minorities to master 
Mandarin so as to `promote' their cultural level. This ignorance of bilingual 
education was exacerbated in the following era of the Cultural Revolution that did 
not come to an end until the mid-1970s. In the first half of 1980s bilingual 
education was formally included in relevant laws (e. g. the Constitution, the Law 
of Minority Regional Autonomy), which marked the commencement of another 
golden age of bilingual education after it had suffered from political and cultural 
abuse for thirty years. However, from the 1990s a growing number of 
commentators suggest that education in Chinese be phased in to replace bilingual 
education at the senior secondary level of minority education (ibid. ). 
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The fluctuation in the government policy concerning bilingual education is an 
epitome of civilizing missions21 of the Party-state, and is also the result of a 
concern with the political threat possibly posed to ethnic unity and state stability. 
However, the cultural and political concerns are more closely connected to the 
religious issue in education as suggested earlier. Compared to the language issue 
that on the surface appears to be more associated to culture or to be a 
communication tool, religion is always suspected as being responsible for 
ideological or political wars between religious communities and the CCP. This 
worry has resulted in strict confinement of religion from the public domain that is 
evidenced by the fact that religious elements, except for those that appear as an 
inevitable attachment to bilingual education or as a target of criticism in history 
textbooks as mentioned earlier, has never been permitted in state education after 
the Religious Reform (zongjiao gaige) in the late 1950s. Abolition of religious 
buildings and disbanding religious personnel in the Cultural Revolution between 
1960s and 1970s further stigmatised and diminished religion and so seriously 
ruined many religion-centred minority cultures. 
Partially reacting against the CCP's repression of religion in the Cultural 
Revolution, and partially taking advantage of the Party-state's rectification of its 
chaotic policy of religion in the post-Cultural Revolution era, religion was held up 
by some religious minority communities as requiring further recognition and 
promotion in public institutions, in particular in education. This action was itself 
held up as an example of the interference of religion in school education, which 
directly led to the introduction of a government document in the early 1980s that, 
with detailed rules and regulations, stressed again the principle of separating out 
religion from state education (Jiaoyu Bu 1983). The general state control over 
religion was tightened up again nationwide, and in minority areas in particular. It 
has not been loosened up significantly since then and indeed becomes tougher 
from time to time when the Party-state feels threat from religion (see, for 
example, Wanwei Wang 2004b). 
21 On 'civilizing mission', see Harrell's articulation of civilizing projects in chapter four. 
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By and large, minority cultures as a whole can hardly win proportionate space in 
education in both cultural and political terms. Meanwhile, the limited contents 
that are relevant to minority cultures are also aiming at inculcating the kind of 
ideology of ethnic unity and state stability through `advancing' minority cultures 
with Han culture and fostering political loyalty of the minority population to the 
Party-state via patriotic education. As a whole, it seems to be difficult to foresee 
whether state sanction over minority cultures will become less strict. In fact, while 
minority languages are suspected to be precluding the minority population from 
absorbing advanced Han culture, and further, to be acting as the conveyor of 
religious education, the control over religion seems to be a determined and 
constant commitment of the Party-state towards its political ends. This 
commitment is recently articulated in the slogan of `guiding religion to adapt to 
socialism' (yindao zongjiao yu shehui zhuyi xiang shiying) (see, for example, Qin 
Huibin 1994; Wang Zhaoguo 2002). As a result, when the government sets out 
the principles for minority education, namely, ideology, scientism, ethnic and 
regional peculiarities, it is much more targeting poverty by introducing 
economically relevant curriculum to local situations at the expense of minority 
cultures as shown in the following sections. This economically orientated agenda 
on the part of the Party-state is very likely, though partly, to aim at distracting the 
public attention away from hard-to-compromise tensions between the Party-state 
ideology and minority cultures, which are largely counter-ideology or counter- 
scientism in the CCP's mind. 
The mainstream discourse of minority education 
Over the last fifty years since the CCP came to power, one of the most noticeable 
aspects is the dramatic change of state policy that has affected every aspect of 
Chinese people's public and private life, negatively or positively. The policy 
towards minority education and minority people has also experienced similar 
changes, especially in some `extreme' periods when minority education suffered 
huge setbacks (e. g. the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution between 
the late 1950s and the late 1970s). However, minority education has developed 
considerably in both quantitative and qualitative terms in the era since the late 
1970s when China embarked upon its reform and opening-up policy, which has 
led minority education to move towards a physiognomy that is more financially 
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secured, ethnically sensitive and increasingly sophisticated in its (preferential) 
policies. It is fair to say that the Party-state has made a remarkable effort in 
promoting the education of ethnic minorities in particular over the past two to 
three decades through its consistent commitment to minority education. At the 
same time, many Han dominated better-off provinces together with minority areas 
have helped to actualise the state's preferential policies through the material 
and/or personnel support of minority education. 
The latest development regarding minority education is that, after fifty years' 
experiment and exploration, the Ministry of Education sets to draw up `Zhongguo 
Shaoshu Minzu Jiaoyu Paoli' (The Ordinance of the Education of Ethnic 
Minorities in China), which aims to formulate `Zhongguo Shaoshu Minzu Jiaoyu 
Fa' (The Law of the Education of Ethnic Minorities in China) in due course 
(Xinhua Wang 2002). The work is carried out on the basis of relevant regulations 
and rules in laws and existing local ordinances of minority education. In the light 
of the `Open Up the West' campaign, the National Television Station, the China 
Central TV Station (CCTV), also put out a new programme of `Xibu Jiaoyu' 
(Education in Western Regions), which aims to draw more attention to helping 
improve education in western regions, particularly in minority areas (Jiaoyu Bu 
2004a). In a word, the minority education policy and practice that is supposed to 
be developed in the direction of privileging ethnic minorities has in particular 
been an essential concern at both central and local government levels. 
However, the education of ethnic minorities in China, while having made some 
progress (or even arguably, huge progress in the government discourse), still lags 
significantly behind the mainstream education, and the gap between ordinary 
education and minority education (particularly in many western regions) has 
widened. This is not only reflected in the high illiteracy of ethnic minorities as 
argued earlier, but also in their high drop-out rate and poor performance in 
schools (see, for example, Ai, Meng and Postiglione 1995; Minzu Jiaoyu Si 2002; 
Teng 2002a; Yuan, Yang & Li 2003). Is the lack of finance, facilities, effective 
management or quality teaching the main causes of the poor performance of 
minority students? Is inadequate government policy mainly responsible for the 
unsatisfactory outcomes? Or is it the reluctant attitude among ethnic minorities 
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themselves towards schooling that is more responsible for the poor educational 
achievement of the minority population? In what follows I will examine how 
academics and the public assess and diagnose the poor minority educational 
performance. `Academics' and `the public' are sometimes together termed 
`commentators' or `the mainstream' respectively in this and the next sections - 
the last term includes both minority and majority members in spite of the fact that 
it is only used to refer to the ethnic Han elsewhere. However, this category by no 
means stands for a homogeneous group in spite of the fact that different 
commentators do share some fundamental conceptions as will be revealed later 
on. In fact, given the heterogeneity or inconsistency in individual commentators' 
arguments it is more realistic to distinguish between different viewpoints or 
approaches that are put forward by different as well as the same commentators 
rather than between different groups of commentators. Different opinions will be 
principally labelled as two kinds of approach: integrative and multicultural. 
Echoing the government assessment, the academic and public discourse about 
minority education fundamentally focuses on its sluggishness in comparison with 
the education in the rest of China, and the widening gap between both (Teng and 
Wang 2001: 287-288). This sluggishness is claimed to be found at all levels of 
minority education, from pre-school to higher education (ibid.: 258,285-286). 
This is in particular embodied in several low and high rates with regard to 
minority education: the educated population rate is low and so the illiteracy is 
high; the enrolment, remaining and graduation rates are low while the drop-out 
and repetition rates are high; the proportion of the minority population in 
vocational and higher education is small (Lin, Jin and Chen 1990: 528-529; Teng 
2002b; Teng and Wang 2001: 85-286). Although there are more than ten minority 
groups that have a higher educational level than the Han, the lower minority 
educational achievement is nevertheless an overwhelming concern, which is 
evident in the very limited attention paid to successful minority groups in 
academic discussions that may serve as inspiration in helping failed minority 
groups. Alternatively, these minority populations are simplistically blamed for 
their `backward' modes of thinking against the minority groups with high 
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achievement who are portrayed to possess modem or sinicised education as can 
be seen elsewhere in the chapter. 22 
This is perhaps in part because all parties involved - policy-makers, educators and 
scholars - consciously or unconsciously have been aware of the tremendous 
variety in the cultural tradition, socio-economic patterns and geographical 
distribution, and relatedly, physical environment of different ethnic minority 
groups, which are usually believed to lead different minority groups to various 
educational outcomes. In other words, minorities in western regions (apart from 
Xinjiang) are considerably disadvantaged compared to minority or majority 
groups in the rest of China. This disadvantage is attributed by the mainstream to 
the physical environment, socio-economic development level and cultural 
tradition of these minority groups in comparison with those of other minority or 
majority groups, which at the same time are evaluated as unfavourable conditions 
or circumstances for education as will be revealed below (Chen 1998; Li, Cai, Li 
& Wang 1994; Li and Wang 2002; Liu 1994; Ma, Siqin, Ma, Su & Ma 1996; 
Wang and Liu 2002; Yang 1996; Yuan Xiaoyuan 2003; Zhang and Huang 1996). 
As a result of the domination of the western minorities in both quantity and 
geographical distribution among the whole minority population in the country, 
minority education on the whole appears to generate ineffective outcomes in spite 
of the growing investment of various forms from the government. This 
ineffectiveness is exacerbated under the devolution of responsibility for education 
from the central government to local governments that started some ten or twenty 
years ago because minority regions severely lack the financial resources to 
support local education. The direct consequences are that the type of school that is 
highly costly due to the hard manageability of the physical environment (e. g. in 
22 To explore what hides behind educational underachievement through looking at the successful 
cases is a valuable perspective that has been proved by many studies, for example, about the East 
Asian students in the US, Chinese and Indians in the UK, and some minority students in China 
(see, for example, Harrell and Ma 1999; Strategy Unit 2003; Woo 2002; Xinwen Bangongshi 
2005). However, the focus of my research is not on educational achievement but the cultural 
exclusion of ethnic minorities, both low and high educational achievers, as argued in chapter one. 
Therefore I discuss both successful and failed cases in the empirical chapters that are based on a 
common ground around the relationship between education and social mobility. In addition, as I 
argue here and in some other chapters (e. g. chapters one, two and nine) that it can run the risk of 
blaming victims when we take successful cases as a point of comparison to discuss failed ones. 
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mountainous areas where minority populations are widely but sparsely 
distributed) has to face closure; numerous minority schools have to run in extreme 
conditions including poor quality facilities or over-crowded classrooms, or even 
have to give classes in the open air throughout the whole year. The difficulties 
also mean that the management of minority schools always faces some dilemmas 
such as that between opening more small-scale schools in order to facilitate 
schooling of minority children in different locations, and having sizeable schools 
in limited selected locations so as to reduce the cost of school management (ibid. ). 
The integrative approach 
All in all, the backwardness of minority education has led some commentators to 
describe an ironical situation in which the minority population live in poverty on 
the one hand, and on the other hand, live alongside rich natural resources. They 
hence are labelled as the people who are suffering from poverty with a gold bowl 
in their hands (Piao 2002; Zhu and Zhang 1996). While it is said that the 
inadequacy of minority education and the poverty that the minority population 
have long suffered from are to some extent the responsibility of state policy or of 
the sluggishness of the local economy, the backwardness in the thinking modes of 
people is highlighted as the fundamental element that is responsible for the poor 
minority educational achievement (Lin, Jin and Chen 1990: 531). This is first 
described by academic commentators in terms of ethnic minorities' low view of 
education that leads to their lack of enthusiasm and motivation for education. This 
is also confirmed by my qualitative data in spite of the different explanations 
given to explain the phenomenon by the mainstream and by my minority 
respondents respectively (as can be seen here and in subsequent chapters). This 
inadequate evaluation of education among minorities is believed to be embedded 
in their entrenched environment, both physical and cultural, which are 
intertwined. 
It is said (Chen 1998; Li, Cai, Li & Wang 1994; Li and Wang 2002; Liu 1994; 
Ma, Siqin, Ma, Su & Ma 1996; Wang and Liu 2002; Yang 1996; Yuan Xiaoyuan 
2003; Zhang and Huang 1996) that ethnic minorities usually live in isolated areas 
where they seldom have opportunities to make contact with the outside world, and 
therefore are unfamiliar with the kind of modernising environment in which 
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education plays an important part. On the contrary, school education seems to 
have little to do with their routine, usually, self-sufficient life. Meanwhile, the 
sluggish local economy has forced them to prioritise their needs for labour over 
other things so as to hopefully ensure a basic living standard. This also means that 
the requirement for more labour always leads to a high birth rate that usually 
aggravates their poverty. Further, poverty is also said to make minorities easily 
distracted by the commercial business in a marketising era in that minority 
children are more likely to become uninterested in study or even drop out because 
they need (or `want') to earn money. All these elements, according to 
commentators, form a vicious circle around poverty, limited education and more 
family members. The disadvantaged status is largely traced back by the academic 
to the backward socio-economic patterns of the ethnic minority population that 
range from primitive to feudal society before the CCP brought them into the 
advanced socialist society (ibid. ). However, unlike these commentators, my 
minority respondents explicitly or implicitly argue in the later chapters that 
policies and practices of the social system are more responsible for the failure in 
getting minorities out of this vicious circle. 
The isolation of ethnic minorities is also thought to be a result of their cultural and 
in particular, religious tradition which is held to be responsible for their 
disengagement from education and their self-enclosedness. Minority communities 
have invested and are still investing considerable amounts of money and time into 
religion, which has helped to establish numerous resplendent and magnificent 
monasteries or mosques standing alongside collapsing school buildings. The piety 
of the minority population also means that more school-aged children have been 
sent to monasteries or mosques rather than schools. Some religions such as Islam 
are accused of being patriarchal because it is against sending girls to mixed-sex 
modern schools, and requires girls, if they are in schools, to leave school at a 
rather young age in order to get married. At a deeper and more fundamental level, 
religion is seen as encouraging believers to obey and preserve tradition, which 
leads its disciples to becoming entrenched and so resisting other cultures and 
cultural innovations. Tibetan Buddhism is in particular believed to diminish its 
disciples' willingness to compete in the world outside of their religious 
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community and to be content with their (impoverished) status quo (ibid. ). 
23 
However, this attribution of minorities' lack of enthusiasm for education in 
schools and, relatedly, for modernisation in the wider society, is explained rather 
differently by some other commentators and minorities as will be seen in the 
subsequent sections and chapters. They suggest that minorities' turn to religion is 
largely on account of their lack of access to education or of irrelevance of 
education to minorities' local socio-economic situation or their cultural values. 
While ethnic minorities are criticised for their backward thinking, their 
intelligence in schooling is also called into question in comparison with their Han 
peers, although it is claimed that their intelligence standard could be improved 
through appropriate training (Meng Liang 2002). Minority students are presumed 
to have encountered obstacles in the fields of memorisation, concentration, 
analytical ability and comprehension (Ding 1997). These obstacles could be 
caused by the physical environment on account of the reality that the regions that 
minorities live in either cannot provide a wide range of food for a balanced diet or 
have adverse circumstances which ruin their health. The obstacles could also be 
caused by their human environment or cultural background, which is closely 
associated with their life style - their closed, isolated life coupled with inter- 
marriage and bad hygienic habits, as well as their language and religion (Chen 
Xinyu 1998; Ding Yueya 1997; Zhang Chuansui 1996; Zhang Yi 1994). 
Furthermore, their physical and human environments are thought to separately or 
simultaneously affect their ways of parenting, child-rearing and pre-school 
preparation which are usually unlikely to nurture merits for schooling. As a result, 
minority children, who are usually from a nomadic or agricultural environment, 
tend to be sluggish in developing the kind of ability in abstraction, analysis, or 
comprehension of academic concepts (Deng 1997; Ding 1997; Meng Liang 
2002). Further, their background is also said to affect their personality which is 
more likely to suffer from low self-esteem, narrow-mindedness and inflexibility 
23 This is actually a view of rural Tibetans, particularly of those in remote areas where they rarely 
have contact with the outside world and so lack frames of reference. This is said to prevent them 
from engaging with what is happening in the outside world but to maintain them on their 
traditionally routine life track. In the case of urbanised elites, to remain a religious sentiment is 
more driven by a need of ethno-religious identity that is expected to provide them with a sense of 
security in a foreign (Han or otherwise) cultural environment. For detailed information, see 
chapter six. 
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or stillness in modes of thinking (ibid. ). The implication here is that the lack of 
intelligence caused by both physical and cultural environments is significantly 
responsible for poor minority school performance. 
Furthermore, the negative impacts of state preferential policies on minority 
education are pointed out by many commentators. The policies are criticised for 
fostering an inclination among minorities towards waiting for, relying upon and 
requesting government aid such as special policies and treatment, and extra 
funding (Minzu Jiaoyu Si 2002; Tang 2002). The preferential policy in the 
enrolment of ethnic minority students is said to form a vicious circle of lower 
entry requirements, laxity in learning and the limited academic outcomes of 
minority students, which eventually leads them to a situation of having a 
certificate but no quality (you wenping mei shuiping) (Li, Li, Zheng & Yang 
1994; Tang 2002). 24 As a result, many educators argue that the system of 
separating minority schools from ordinary schools should be abolished. 25 This not 
only would create an environment of healthy competition, make education 
resources be used more effectively or teachers more professional, but would also 
enhance mutual understanding between and self-reflexivity of students of 
different ethnic groups so as to promote ethnic unity (Bai Jierui 1994: 35). 26 
The multicultural approach 
Whereas many diagnoses of poor minority educational performance are directed 
at minority community forces, awareness is also growing among some academics 
24 The kind of schools discussed here is minority schools. This reflects a consensus amongst the 
government, academic and public that minority education equates the education in minority 
schools. In fact, minority education, or more precisely, the education of ethnic minorities, should 
also include the education of minority children in ordinary or mainstream schools given the fact 
that many ordinary or mainstream schools in minority areas have a large number of minority 
students as evidenced in my qualitative research case. Relevant information is also presented in 
chapter three. 
25 Separate minority school is also a controversial issue in many other countries, for example, in 
Britain and France. This is particular true in the case of separate religious schools, which is 
usually regarded as promotion of segregation, denomination, patriarchy or inequality over 
cohesion, secularity, democracy or equality. More information of the debate around separate 
(faith) schools in the UK can be consulted in such works as Chadwick (2001), Connolly (1992), 
Dobson (2002), Dwyer (2000), Halstead (1994), Haw (1995), McLaughlin (1992), Modood and 
May (2001), Osler and Hussain (1995), Rex (1986), Watson (2000), Yuval-Davis (1992). 
26 Rclatedly, a negative by-product of preferential policies is said to be that these policies have 
seduced numerous Han to change their ethnicity to minority, which has brought about chaos in 
implementing state policy and exercising social justice (see, for example, Min 1996). 
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that the nationally uniform curriculum has been examined and criticised for its 
failure to be responsive to differences in locality and ethnicity in minority areas. 
The curriculum is said to be irrelevant to the local socio-economic situation in 
two ways. Firstly, it is not designed in accordance with the present natural, social 
and economic conditions of minority areas, which makes the majority of minority 
students no longer accustomed to, good at, or keen to undertake manual work 
after returning to their home-village as a result of failure in college entrance 
examinations, and thus are regarded by their community as useless. This once 
again reminds us of those failed examinees in the civil service examinations who 
were unwilling or unable to engage in commerce or physical labour in imperial 
China. Therefore, confidence in school education among (particularly rural) 
minority communities has significantly declined, and to send children to school 
becomes pointless and merely involves spending time and money (Ba 1998; Guo 
2003; Li, Li, Zheng & Yang 1995). The irrelevance of the curriculum also refers 
to the situation in which it is divorced from historically shaped socio-economic 
patterns of ethnic minorities, which are usually at a backward stage by a social 
evolutionary criterion. In other words, minority communities are not fully in 
concert with the advanced socialist system in either social or economic terms 
though it is the case in political terms (Ba 1998; Piao 2002). The failure in 
response to local socio-economic patterns and development in the curriculum is 
primarily generated from the Chinese Han tradition of an elitist approach to 
education as illustrated in chapter four that, in its contemporary version, narrowly 
focuses upon college entrance examinations. This educational interest has long 
ignored vocational education that supposedly should be tailored in tune with 
various local socio-economic situations (Ba 1998; Guo 2003; Li, Li, Zheng & 
Yang 1995; Sun Yi 1997; Yang 2001). 
In spite of some (serious) deficiencies, vocational education is portrayed to be a 
kind of suzhi jiaoyau (quality education) that has been widely welcomed as a new 
concept over the last years. Suzhi jiaoyuu aims to cultivate the kind of all-round 
people as argued in chapter four who are, in one important sense, capable of 
making a contribution to the socio-economic development of their communities 
with what they have learnt in schools after returning there from schools (Ba 1998; 
Guo 2003; Li, Li, Zheng and Yang 1995; Meng, Qi & Kan 1998; Sun Yi 1997; 
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Teng et al. 1997; Yang 2001). If education is managed to meet the requirements 
of the masses rather than those of the elite, grassroots people are proved to be far 
more enthusiastic to send their children to school rather than to keep them at 
home to help with family labour or family-run business, or to send them to 
religious institutes (Cairangcuo, Chen & Liu 1997; Meng, Qi & Kan 1998; Meng 
Liang 2002). On the other hand, to take into consideration children's life 
experience, nomadic or agricultural, and related cognitive patterns will also 
significantly facilitate their learning in schools. In this fashion, what is more 
important is that the view that minority children are intellectually inferior will 
also largely be corrected in both majority and minority communities (Ba 1998; 
Cui 1995). 
To pay close attention to local situations also requires taking account of various 
ethnic minority cultures in the curriculum, which is interrelated and sometimes 
overlaps with the local socio-economic pattern and development. That is to say 
that the curriculum not only serves as an instrument to help create human capital, 
but also as a tool that guarantees and enhances the cultural well-being of different 
ethnic minority groups. This is especially associated with whether or not, or to 
what extent, minority languages and religions are provided with reasonable space 
in the curriculum. In this light, influenced by their western counterparts, Chinese 
scholars have developed a discourse of multicultural education. Since the state 
guarantees minorities freedom to use their own languages in relevant laws, 
bilingual education has been substantially practised in a great number of minority 
schools across the country as demonstrated earlier. Nevertheless, as some 
researchers rightly point out, bilingual education is far from a perfect system, and 
needs to resolve several crucial tensions, such as the tension between a high 
demand for bilingual textbooks and a serious lack of expenditure, bilingual 
teachers and reading materials, and the tension between efficiency and 
effectiveness in learning brought by bilingual education for minority students, and 
decreasing opportunities of using minority languages in the wider world (Teng 
2001,2003; Teng and Wang 2002; Teng et al. 1997). However, bilingual 
education is considered to be fundamentally important in providing minorities 
with more confidence in valuing their own cultures and their intellectual quality 
(Teng et al. 1997; Ma & Xiao 2002), although recent developments show that 
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advocacy of popularising Chinese Mandarin has gradually become strong as can 
be seen earlier (Ma Rong 2001,2003b, 2004; Jiaoyu Bu 2004b, 2005). 
Contrary to substantial and detailed arguments and practices in bilingual 
education, the religious issue has rarely been discussed to the same extent or in 
the same depth as the debate of the curriculum, despite some vague advocacy of 
(re)introducing religion into education (see, for example, Ding Hong 1991; Ma 
Jinhu 1998). More often, religion is assessed by academics in tune with the Party- 
state's policies that religion cannot interfere with education, and at the same time, 
religious leaders may be encouraged to help with recruitment of students from 
their community or to raise funds for education, or may become teachers of the 
minority language in some understaffed schools (Liu 1994; Ningxia Jiaowei 1998; 
Teng 2002b: 269). The religious issue is particularly complex in the Muslim case 
although this is not necessarily more sensitive than in the cases of other religious 
communities such as the Tibetan. The complexity of the Muslim case is firstly a 
legacy of the gap between Islamic tradition and Chinese culture, the conflict 
between (in particular) the dynastic regimes and Muslims in history as portrayed 
in chapter four, and a worry among Muslims that to study in the mainstream 
school will lead to sinicisation (see also chapter seven) (Bai Yan 1997; Ma, Siqin, 
Ma, Su & Ma 1996; Ma Jinhu 1998; Ma Mingliang 1999). 
Further, this complexity is also a reflection of diverse dimensions in the Muslim 
case of education that are entangled with or contradictory to one another. As 
mentioned above, state policy does not permit Arabic teaching in minority 
schools. Hui Muslims, as Chinese speakers, have no need for bilingual education, 
which may mean that they cannot take advantage of the equal preferential policy 
in college entrance examinations available to other ethnic minority groups (Ding 
Hong 1991). On the other hand, the state runs or supports some Islamic schools 
which provide students with substantial Islamic knowledge and the Arabic 
language, including the schools of this kind for Muslim women (Ma Jinhu 1998; 
Ma Qiang 2003). This partially seems to be a kind of compensation for the 
absence of Islamic knowledge and the Arabic language in Muslim minority 
schools. As a result, Muslim minority schools (particularly those for Hui) hardly 
function as more than a mainstream school with a Halal canteen (Sun Yaoquan 
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1997). Politicisation of religious education and discrimination against Muslims in 
employment, school enrolment and conscription with the excuse of being difficult 
to handle special customs are also believed to have cast a dark shadow on the Hui 
enthusiasm and motivation for education (see also chapter seven) (Kong 2001; La 
1995). 
Ignorance of local socio-economic needs or the exclusion of minority cultures 
from the curriculum also means that minority education has little to do with 
minority communities. That is to say that schools are not keen to get minority 
communities involved in education when attempting to develop a more responsive 
curriculum so as to attract more minority people to schools, although it is not fair 
to say there are no schools or government officials that have made some effort in 
this direction. However, mainstream attempts to include communities in the 
development and improvement of the curriculum so as to serve local minorities 
are very limited or narrowly focused in the way that it is more instrumentally 
directed, i. e. pays more attention to vocational education (Ren Yugui 1994), or to 
certain religious leaders who are encouraged to help with recruitment, fund- 
raising or language teaching as mentioned earlier. Hence, it is not difficult to 
understand why the limited textbooks that pay regard to ethnic minorities merely 
provide skin-deep knowledge about minority cultures, which tend to confuse 
students with their inappropriate content (Jin Dongping 1998: 38). 
Evaluation 
The minority population of China is diverse in cultural tradition and socio- 
economic development, as well as in educational level. However, the majority of 
the minority population have poorer educational performance in comparison with 
the ethnic majority Han, which is, to a large extent, a trend that has persisted 
historically. This is particularly the case with the minority population in West 
China. Nevertheless, this is not always comprehensible given the Party-state's 
commitment to increasingly sophisticated preferential policies and ethnic 
sensitivity in managing minority education on the one hand, and on the other 
hand, nationwide aid in the form of finance and/or personnel particularly over the 
past two or three decades. 
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Researchers, policy-makers and educators agree that the inhospitable physical 
environment and sluggish economy make the management of minority education 
difficult and at the same time particularly costly. Ironically, in some cases 
minorities are reported to be unwilling to send their children to schools even when 
the government or school rewards them in cash or by means of other material 
forms if they do so. Moreover, some minority parents would even `employ' some 
people to go to school instead of their own children by paying these people money 
(Yuan, Yang & Li 2003: 45). In sharp contrast to this, it is widely reported (and a 
subject of criticism) that some minority families would rather make a donation to 
their religious institutions from their very limited budget. In other words, 
minorities' reluctance or even resistance to education is more shocking to the 
public and academics than the harsh physical environment they are living in, or 
the sluggishness of their local economy. Due to this, along with facts such as the 
withdrawal of their children from schools for family business or marriage when 
children are still quite young, the public and academics conclude that minority 
people are backward. Therefore, whilst the mainstream claims that what needs to 
be changed is the physical environment as well as the socio-economic situation, 
essentially it is people's modes of thinking that are in urgent need of change. This 
mainstream concern about the backwardness of minority thinking modes is 
typically reflected in its discourse of suzhi, quality (to name a few, Fei 1989: 34- 
35; Lin Yaohua 1990: 528-531; Teng 2002b: 263; Wang Geliu 2001: 158. Also see 
chapter four). 
Indeed, it is fashionable for critics as well as supporters of the minority population 
to label minorities as a people or labour force of low quality. This view is also 
echoed by the mainstream and some minority members I interviewed as can be 
seen in the empirical chapters. However, this fashion is not only derived from 
what the mainstream has seen of minorities, but more rooted in the kind of 
concept they have that is shaped in line with the Party-state's ideology, namely, 
social evolution. Academics take the concept of social evolution so comfortably 
for granted that no research bothers to question its validity or applicability to 
widely varying contexts. The result in discourse construction is that the 
backwardness of the minority population can be easily located in terms of the past 
or history of minority people themselves. Meanwhile, in examining the 
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responsibilities for the poor minority performance, the social system that has 
primarily shaped education policies and practices has been largely singled out. 
This is to say that academic discussions that do not comply with the convention 
set out by the Party-state become taboo, of which the Party-state itself is at the 
core. One salient example is the mainstream attitude towards religion in education 
that is most likely to either parrots the Party-state's policy by insisting on the 
poisonous or primitive character of religion that is believed to be distracting 
minorities, or evades the issue at all, as illustrated earlier. In the meantime little 
research is carried out as to why the school has failed to win students in this 
`culture war' with religion. As a result, discussions of minority education are 
largely concentrated on practical issues such as bilingual education, demography, 
economic well-being, social mobility or occupational pattern. 27 
The absence of a consideration of the social system from public discussions also 
means that the lower socio-economic development stage at which the minority 
population presumably used to be located is believed to have acted and being 
acting as an essential obstacle ahead of their progressive course. This presumption 
has actually laid a basis for the academic to place the minority population in a 
primordial position that is primitive and against modernisation, and so to prove 
the necessity of enlightening minorities through modem education. This 
enlightenment is not only in the field of knowledge or skills transmission that 
aims to cultivate human capital, but also, in a more fundamental sense, in the field 
of transmission of culture, i. e. advanced thinking modes and moral standards that 
is believed to serve as a tool to transform the minority population and so their 
socio-economic situation in the long term. This is particularly useful when the 
two fields are difficult to reconcile with each other. So whilst Tibetans are 
criticised as being poisoned by religion so deeply that they are very passive in 
participating in the market economy (shichang jingji) or modernisation more 
generally, Muslims are rebuked for favouring material benefits by prioritising 
commerce (shengyi) or money-making (zhuanqian) at the expense of their 
children's education. In this context, Tibetans are thought to be unaware of the 
importance of education for the modernising society that is particularly 
27 In fact, these practical issues are inseparable from the way in which minority cultures are treated 
as argued in chapter one. Also see chapters two, six and seven. 
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characterised by the commercial economy. Meanwhile, Muslims, though 
economically active, are denounced as short-sighted profiteers and so are in need 
of education for enhancing moral standards in order to redress the imbalance 
between economy and morality. This is much the same as the mainstream 
narratives of Muslims and Tibetans illustrated in chapter eight. 
More examples of this kind are taken by the mainstream to justify the necessity of 
educating minorities of `being benighted', `short-sight' or `low moral standard'. 
Whilst the public and academics emphasise that education is the main means of 
upward social mobility so that minorities should value education if they want to 
achieve the mobility goal, some minority college graduates are also criticised for 
their tendency to seek a better-off life in China proper, where they studied, instead 
of returning to serve in their hometowns. A similar case is also found in the public 
and academic criticism of the kind of minorities who become less keen on 
schooling when they have realised that education will no longer necessarily lead 
them to cadre or public servant positions as the state terminates the policy of 
allocation of jobs to college graduates. The tendency to having more children in 
minority communities is also considered to be one of the main factors that has 
caused poverty though the fact that a large labour force is needed for a basic 
living standard in most minority areas is admitted. The public and academics 
conclude that the minority community is in a vicious circle of `yue qiong yue 
sheng, yue shengyue qiong' (the more impoverished, the more children (needed); 
the more children (they have), the more impoverished (they become)). `Vicious 
circle' is a preferred vernacular phrase in the public and academic description of 
the minority population as portrayed here and earlier. To name a few more 
examples of `vicious circle', poverty-illiteracy-high birth rate; religiousness- 
stubbornness-stupidity; backwardness of education-backwardness of economy- 
backwardness of culture (Teng 2002b: 263-264). As a result, the concept of 
`vicious circles' is most likely to lead to the blame of the minority population for 
whom poverty is a life style. 
It is believed that one major way that minorities can be effectively educated is to 
encourage them to acquire Mandarin, which is believed to serve their socio- 
economic needs that are presumed to help achieve social mobility in the long term 
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(Ma Rong 2001,2003a, 2004). In the meantime, advocacy of a good command of 
Mandarin may be more driven by the assumption of the backwardness of the 
minority population who are still living in the shade of their past primitive 
societies. This is to say that Mandarin will serve as a fundamental way through 
which the minority population will hopefully enhance its quality as a result of 
receiving advanced thinking modes, moral standards, and science and technology 
knowledge conveyed by Mandarin (Halike and Muhabaiti 1997). This degradation 
of the minority population has also been found in the advocates of 
multiculturalism. Unlike the integrative approach that focuses on self- 
improvement of the minority population, the multicultural approach justly points 
out the irrelevance of the curriculum to both cultural tradition and socio-economic 
development of minority areas as illustrated above. Nonetheless, this approach, 
like the integrative one, equally claims without questioning that the keenness on 
religion or commercial business among the minority population is a result of their 
lower cultural level, or specifically, of them lacking advanced modes of thinking. 
In fact, because of the leaving out of the responsibilities that the social system 
should take, there are inevitable difficulties or contradictions in criticism of the 
minority population. In other words, it is hard to make convincing cause-effect 
connections between numerous symptoms diagnosed by the mainstream for 
minority education as can be seen from many examples given above. This is to 
say that, in explanations of the poor educational performance of minorities, 
arbitrariness makes up a striking feature of the public and academic discourse. As 
a consequence, it is difficult to formulate a cure rather than a palliative for poor 
minority performance from numerous symptoms listed by the mainstream. More 
fundamentally, without interrogations of the social system, the symptoms are also 
very likely to be used to arbitrarily form more `vicious circles' for the minority 
population in the mainstream attempt at explaining the poor minority educational 
performance, which is in fact leading to the implication that the poverty or 
`stupidity' of the minority population is their life style or `habitus'. 
However, it is true that some research has involved analysis of the social system. 
For example, some academics keenly point out that preferential policies are 
insufficient in terms of social equality when more factors of the larger society are 
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taken into consideration, such as economic development, residential registration 
system, the proportion of the minority language in college entrance examinations, 
and the fact that metropolis like Beijing and Shanghai set lower entry 
requirements for candidates from Beijing and Shanghai to enter universities28 (Ma 
& Xiao 2002; Teng et al. 1997). Some research, as mentioned earlier, has also 
criticised the absence of religion and other cultural aspects of minorities in the 
curriculum, and discrimination against ethnic minorities in the larger society. All 
of this is believed to have led to ineffective learning outcomes and low motivation 
levels of minorities. Nevertheless, the extent and depth of this kind of research is 
limited, partially but significantly because of the fact that this kind of criticism of 
the social system is at the same time still largely embedded in the discourse of the 
primitivity of the minority population, or tends to avoid a direct clash with the 
political mainstream. As a consequence, its voice is too weak to be heard or 
convincing in discussions of the poor minority performance, in either critics or 
sympathisers of the minority population. 
This is in the end an argument of whether the minority population or the social 
system is more responsible for the poor minority performance, or of who is more 
in need of a transformation. If commentators insist that the minority population is 
staying in the shade of their past primitive stage, and religion is a political threat 
as well as a backward ideology, the conclusion that will be drawn is that the 
minority population needs to fundamentally overcome their primitivity or 
backwardness through education with advanced Han culture and its conveyor, 
Mandarin, in order to participate in the modernising society. If commentators did 
not turn their discussions away from the social system, explanations of minorities' 
lack of enthusiasm for education may be very different. That is to say that it is the 
social system that has principally prevented minorities from equal access to or 
participation in education as well as other related formal institutions in the wider 
society as a result of its policies that have marginalised rather than empowered the 
28 Indeed, despite the nationally uniform college entrance examinations, entry requirements vary 
provincially. Of which western regions and Beijing and Shanghai enjoy lower entry requirements 
that has in fact widened the unequal gap between both. As Beijing and Shanghai have declared to 
set their own college entrance examinations, the inequality is undoubtedly exacerbated in that it 
becomes more difficult for candidates from elsewhere to enter nationally most desirable 
universities located in Beijing or Shanghai as a result of more intakes easily go to candidates from 
Beijing or Shanghai. 
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minority population, as can be inferred from limited arguments of some 
aforementioned commentators. In this sense, the social system is hoped to create 
more opportunities for the minority population to facilitate their access to or 
participation in formal institutions in the larger society instead of merely urging 
minorities to transform their own communities and cultures themselves. In a 
word, the social system should take more responsibility to create the cultural and 
social capital for ethnic minorities that will enhance their life chances whilst 
avoiding simplistically putting the blame on ethnic minorities and/or their 
marginalised cultural norms and values. Based on chapter two, which examines 
on the theoretical level the role that the social system plays in determining 
minority performance, and on chapters four and five that produce an historical 
and policy backdrop, the following three chapters offer a sustained empirical 
analysis. Chapters six, seven and eight focus directly on the relationship between 
educational performance and ethnicity through looking at how community forces 
towards schooling have been shaped by the cultural and social capital that 
Muslims and Tibetans have, and which is ingrained in power relations between 
the social system and ethnic minorities, and between different ethnic communities 
(in this case, Han, Tibetans and Muslims). 
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Chapter Six 
Between `Ordinary' and Minority: The Tibetan Case 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the cultural membership choices and constraints facing 
Tibetan people. Although educational officials tried to transform Tibetan students 
into fully-fledged members of the Chinese nation-state, the process of integrating 
them into the Han mainstream community stigmatised their ethnic and religious 
identities, forcing them to abandon their Tibetan cultural membership in the 
pursuit of social, cultural, and economic privileges reserved for the Han majority. 
This prevents Tibetan students from acquiring the kinds of cultural capital that 
would enable them to `progress', and causes many of them to become academic 
underachievers. Meanwhile, those successful students also pay higher price in 
schooling. They could otherwise `do significantly better and enjoy their education 
much more were the barriers to their success eliminated or reduced' (Gibson 
1988: 167). 
The following sections draw on fieldwork in Tongren County in Huangnan 
Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Qinghai Province to examine the predicament 
that Tibetan parents and students face in school choice. Section One provides a 
geographical and historical background to ethnicity and education in the field site 
of Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai Province. Section Two 
examines how governments have created opportunities for the social mobility of 
Tibetans. Section Three explores the positive attitude of Tibetans towards 
schooling and their hopes for social mobility. Section Four describes educational 
policy and practice in two different schools: a mainstream or `ordinary' school 
(putong xuexiao) and a minority school. Section Five considers how parents 
justify their decisions to send their children to either ordinary or minority schools. 
Section Six examines students' evaluations of their own schooling type versus the 
alternative form of schooling. Section Seven discusses the predicament that 
Tibetan parents and students face in school choice, which is rooted in their 
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ambivalence towards the value of their culture - an effect of its subordination to 
the dominant discourse of advanced culture (xianjin wenhua). The conclusion 
reflects on whether or not inclusive education for Tibetans is possible and whether 
or not fully inclusive social citizenship - social and economic rights, and equal 
opportunities - can be achieved whilst at the same time preserving Tibetan 
cultural integrity. Together these empirical sections flesh out tensions between the 
desire of Tibetans for personal advancement in an era of economic change, 
counterbalanced against their competing desires to sustain the integrity of their 
culture and identity. 
Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture: an overview 
Huangnan Prefecture is located in the southeast of Qinghai Province. It adjoins 
two Muslim autonomous counties in northeast Qinghai, and is surrounded by the 
three Tibetan autonomous prefectures in Qinghai and Gansu provinces in the 
northwest, southeast and southwest. Huangnan consists of four counties; two of 
these are largely agricultural (Jianzha and Tongren), while the other two are 
pastoral (Zeku and Henan). In 2002 the minority population accounted for 92.19 
percent of the total. The breakdown of the ethnic minority population is as 
follows: 65.94 percent Tibetan, 13.65 percent Mongolian, 8.01 percent Muslim, 
4.55 percent Tu and 0.04 percent others (HZT 2003a, 2003b). The Tibetan people 
are distributed mainly in Tongren and Zeku counties (39.80 percent and 37.09 
percent), and to a lesser extent, Jianzha (22.76 percent). ' The ethnic population in 
Tongren, the seat of the prefectural government, is 72.06 percent Tibetan, 5.55 
percent Muslim, 10 percent Han and 12.16 percent Tu (HZT 2003b) (see Table 3 
on page 274). 
According to the 2000 census, the rural populace accounts for 72.16 percent of 
the population in Tongren County and 78.29 percent of the whole of Huangnan 
Prefecture. In Tongren County, the Han and Muslims mostly reside in Longwu 
Township, so they are urban dwellers. By contrast, most of the Tibetans are rural, 
engaged in agriculture and some animal husbandry. 
' The Mongolians are concentrated in the Henan Mongolian Autonomous County (99.34 percent) 
while the vast majority of Muslim (IIui, Salar and Bonan) reside in Jianzha (70.53 percent) and 
Tongren (25.08 percent). 
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Huangnan Prefecture is one of the three worst performers for education in 
Qinghai province, having an illiteracy rate of 30.30% - the other two prefectures 
are Guoluo (34.81%) and Yushu (43.77). Together these three prefectures form 
the Qingnan Diqu (South Qinghai Area), the least developed area in Qinghai as 
measured by economic and educational indicators. At the other end of the 
educational spectrum, Huangnan has a lower proportion of the college and 
university graduates (2.39 percent), as well as secondary school and vocational 
secondary school graduates (6.84 percent) than the provincial level (3.3 percent 
and 10.43 percent) (see Table 4 on page 274). 2 
Since 1990 there are 13 secondary schools in Huangnan Prefecture, and four of 
these are located in Longwu Township, the seat of the prefectural and Tongren 
county governments. Two are ordinary schools; the Huangnan Zhou Zhongxue 
(Huangnan Prefecture Secondary School), the oldest school in the prefecture with 
a history of more than 40 years, and the Tongren Xian Zhongxue (Tongren County 
Secondary School). The other two are minority schools: the Huangnan Zhou 
Minzu Gaozhong (Huangnan Prefecture Minority Senior Secondary School), 
established in 1990, and the Tongren Xian Minzu Zhongxue (Tongren County 
Minority Secondary School). Since minority education in Huangnan Prefecture 
refers primarily to the education of Tibetans or Tibetan speakers (Mongolians or 
Tu), it is not surprising that Tibetan students comprise the majority of the student 
body in the two minority schools. Han students traditionally dominate the 
Huangnan Prefecture Secondary School, the prestigious school of the prefecture. 
Muslim students make up the largest part of the student body in the Tongren 
County Secondary School (half of the students). This ethnic composition of the 
student body in the two schools reflects residential patterns in Longwu Township 
as well as the government policy of `going to school in the neighbourhood' (jiujin 
ruxue). 
Historically, Longwu Township was called Longwu Jie Qu (Longwu Street 
District). It emerged to meet the daily needs of the monks of Longwu monastery 
(Longwu si) and its dependants. It formally became a market town at the end of 
2 The figures are from the fifth census (see HZT 2002: 93-112). 
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the 19`h century when the reincarnation of Buddha in Longwu monastery 
permitted the business people from Gansu, Xunhua3 and the vicinities to engage 
in trade in the Longwu area. After the Longwu market area came into being, the 
Tibetans, the locally dominant ethnic group, called it jiakeri', which means `the 
Han city'. Half of these business people were Muslims and they eventually 
became the main residents of the Longwu market area. From 1954 onwards, a 
new town was built up to the west of the Longwu market town. This new 
settlement became the seat of both the prefectural and county governmental 
administrative sectors (HZZBW 1999; TXBW 2001; HZT 1999,2002,2003a, 
2003b). 
Longwu Township is therefore divided into two parts, xianshang (the county 
part), previously the Longwu market area, and zhoushang (the prefecture part), 
which is the new town centre. The new town centre is home to both prefectural 
and county administrative sectors in Longwu and commercial and entertainment 
blocks. In accordance with the `go to school in the neighbourhood' policy, the 
Huangnan Secondary School, which is located in the prefecture part, mainly 
recruits students from the new prefecture part of the town. Most of these students 
are the children of government officials, public servants, teachers, factory workers 
and so on, and/or from Han background. By contrast, the Tongren County 
Secondary School, which is situated in the county part, mainly recruits students 
from the old county part of the town. The students include a large number of 
Muslim children as well as those from some other ethnic backgrounds whose 
families are usually engaged in business. 
The two minority schools predominantly recruit Tibetan students, most of whom 
are from the agricultural or pastoral areas in the prefecture, and most come from 
Tongren County. In the mid 1990s, a donation from Shao Yifu, a businessman 
from Hong Kong, enabled another minority junior secondary school to be set up 
next to the Huangnan Secondary School, named the Yifu Minzu Zhongxue (Yifu 
Minority (Junior) Secondary School) and recruiting Tibetan or Tibetan-speaking 
students. In September 2002, the Tongren County Secondary School merged with 
3 Xunhua is the only Salar Autonomous County in Qinghai as well as in China. 
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the Huangnan Prefecture Secondary School because of the decline in student 
numbers owing to demographic transition. Longwu Township therefore still 
retains four secondary schools but the composition of the secondary education 
with particular regard to ethnic background of student is not the same as 12 years 
ago. 
Opportunities for social mobility 
State policy gives Tibetan graduates in Huangnan Prefecture priority access to top 
leadership positions in government. 5 The Tibetans are specifically selected, 
cultivated and employed as cadres6 at all levels of administration and in all kinds 
of scientific and technological positions within the autonomous governmental 
apparatus (zizhi zhengfu jiguan). They are similarly favoured by the recruitment 
practices of state work units, and also receive preferential treatment for enrolment 
in local schools, minority colleges or universities (minzu yuanxiao), within the 
province as well as nationwide. 7 
Tibetan culture is also enthusiastically publicised and advocated by state officials. 
As an example, state documents stipulate that the government at all levels should 
° The detail of this demographic transition, which was mainly caused by the move of the Muslim 
population from the county part to the prefecture part, can be found in chapter seven. 
This does not necessarily mean that they are also appointed as the top leaders of the Party 
committees, which are the factual top positions in the government system. 
6 The people working in state work units are traditionally called ganbu (cadre), who are in 
opposition with laobaixing or qunzhong (ordinary people, the masses), the rural people (e. g. 
numerous Tibetans, Mongolians and Tu) and self-employed urban dwellers (mainly Muslims). 
This is to say that ganbu have tiefanwan (iron rice bowl, i. e. a secure job), which entitles them to 
full state welfare services ranging from an urban residence permit (chengzhen hukou) to health 
care and education. In this sense, ganbu can also be used to refer to working class people in state 
work units, despite the fact that their socio-economic status is far lower than those non-working 
class ganbu. Recently there is a tendency that in many ways the line between ganbu and 
laobaixing is coming to be blurred under privatisation and marketisation, but the titles are still 
popular for the reasons of tradition and the fact that privatisation and marketisation have also 
resulted in a great number of used-to-be 'cadres', particularly working-class 'cadres', losing their 
job (also see chapter five). As a fact, it becomes more difficult to get a job in the state system 
owing to the significant decline in the numbers of the state work units while working in the state 
system still means secure, though various in quantity, welfare benefit. This is particularly 
desirable in remote areas like Huangnan due to a sluggish economy that precludes private 
enterprises from being prosperous on a massive scale. In a word, the disparity between cadres and 
the masses in China is still conspicuous, though in some different ways (also see chapter five). 
Therefore 'cadre' in this chapter will be referred to people working in the state system regardless 
of their socio-economic status. 
7 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minzu Quyu Zizhi Fa (Self-Autonomous Law of Ethnic Minority 
Regions in People's Republic of China) (see Wang and Chen 2001: 285-314); Huangnan Zangzu 
Zizhizhou Zizhi Tiaoli (Self-Autonomous Rules in Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture) 
(see HZZBW 1999: 1605-1615). 
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guarantee freedom of religion for the citizens of all ethnic groups. Tibetan, 
Mongolian and/or Chinese languages are used either simultaneously or separately 
in governmental documents. 8 
As early as 1955, just two years after Huangnan Prefecture was established, 
Tibetans became the majority ethnic group among cadres in Huangnan 
Autonomous Prefecture (HZZBW 1999). Although when compared to their 
proportion in the total population in the prefecture, the Han have a higher 
proportional representation, Tibetans nevertheless form the dominant group in 
terms of absolute numbers of cadres. The proportion of Tibetan cadres is 
especially high when compared to the proportion of cadres from other ethnic 
minority groups (see table 5 on page 274). 
In addition to the privileging of Tibetan people within the government, the local 
government also established a number of Tibetan-oriented key prefectural 
organizations and institutions for ethnic minority studies covering subjects such as 
Tibetology (Zangxue), ethnic folk art, and ethnic medicine (ibid. ). The Longwu 
Township area therefore is host to establishments such as the Regong Art Gallery 
(Regong Yishu Guan), 9 the Prefectural Ethnic Song and Dance Ensemble (Zhou 
Minzu Geivu Tuan), and the Prefectural Tibetan Medical Hospital (Zhou Zang 
Yiyuan). Longwu Township is also home to four (Tibetan) minority schools and a 
(Tibetan) minority teachers college. In fact, Tongren was recently honoured as a 
Nationally Renowned Historic and Cultural City (Town) (Quanguo Lishi Wenhua 
Mingcheng) for its Tibetan culture, the only town of its kind in the province. 
All these positive policies and measures towards Tibetan people and culture, 
coupled with a resurgence and popularisation of Tibetan Buddhism among both 
Tibetans and Han, 1° has fostered pride in Tibetan ethnic culture and a celebration 
of Tibetan ethnic identity among Tibetans. For example, among my informants, 
8 ibid. 
9 Regong is the Tibetan name for Tongren, renowned for its Tibetan painting, sculpture and the 
similar art works. Regong Art Gallery is a collection place of these art works. 
1°About this resurgence among the Tibetans in general, see Goldstein (1998) and Mackerras 
(1999). 
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some Tibetan elites are particularly keen to adopt the phrase bodajingshen 
(extensive knowledge and profound scholarship) to describe their culture. 
Education as the means to upward mobility 
This largely top-down creation of opportunities for occupational mobility has 
given Tibetans, both rural and urban, a strong incentive for better social status and 
quality of life. This section considers the different ways in which these 
opportunities have created incentives for parents from rural and urban 
backgrounds to value education for their children. 
Rural Tibetans observe the life opportunities enjoyed by their compatriots in state 
work units, and become aware that their lives could improve if they too could 
become cadres. They see education as the most direct route to upward mobility. 
This perception is not confined to the younger generations. Members of the older 
generations also prioritise education for their children, partly because they missed 
out on these opportunities for themselves. As some of my interviewees said, they 
will definitely secure the opportunity for their children to study in schools even if 
they have to ask for loans or postpone new house building plans. 
Individuals from rural backgrounds who have managed to escape farm and 
pastoral life through employment in a state work unit have a particularly strong 
sense of the importance of education. Some of these people were recruited into 
state work units because of their talents in aspects of Tibetan culture, for example 
Zang xi (Tibetan drama), while others received work unit employment as 
compensation after land was requisitioned from their village. These people have 
personally experienced the contrast between the hard and bitter life of labouring 
in the countryside and the easy, relaxed and regularly paid life of being a state 
work unit person Daily experiences in their new urban working lives further 
reveal to them the importance of the Chinese language education. One informant 
told me: `this is what I can never forget -I cannot even write a gingjia tiao (a 
note asking for leave) (in Chinese). If I could have gone to school in those days, I 
would have probably been a county magistrate (xianzhang)' (Interview 030103). 
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Like their counterparts with rural origins, urban Tibetans also value education, 
though for different reasons. " Unlike people from rural families, urbanites do not 
have rural land for their children to fall back on if they fail in college entrance 
examinations (gaokao). The only outlet for them is to find temporary jobs such as 
being a waiter or shop assistant in the township area. 12 These jobs cannot 
guarantee a financially stable life, particularly given the low levels of economic 
development in the area. The enthusiasm for and investment in education by these 
families therefore becomes one of their most important life goals. This can be 
seen in their undiminished enthusiasm for education even after the government 
abolished the job allocation system for university and college graduates in 1996.13 
Under the new policy, when students graduate, they are not guaranteed a job by 
the state but need to find one by themselves. They are therefore more at risk of 
unemployment after graduation (biye ji shiye) compared to their Han counterparts 
due to the lower competitiveness in the labour market as will be argued later. But 
this does not stop them from investing more energy and money in education, and 
many parents encourage if not force their children to study harder in order to enter 
secondary schools and ultimately a university. 14 Some parents have gone further 
by encouraging their children to try their best to enter a key or famous university 
(zhongdian daxue, mingpai daxue), whose graduates usually can find a good job 
relatively easily. 
Among all Tibetans, but especially more informed ones, there is also a growing 
tendency towards pursuing education abroad, a development that mirrors 
nationwide trends. This is not surprising given that some Tibetans feel a closer 
affinity with foreign countries than with China on account of the politicisation and 
internationalisation of the `Tibetan question' (Xizang wenti). Some of my 
11 Actually most urban Tibetans usually have an extended family based in rural areas, where they 
are originally from. 
12 Because the local cadre team is approaching saturation point, it is getting more and more 
difficult to become a cadre, particularly a non-working class one, without a degree, although there 
has been the policy that privileges Tibetans in recruitment into state work units. 
" This is a system in which the government institutionally rather than individually contracts with 
university/college/school students to assign them to a job in a state work unit when they graduate. 
14 Traditionally for financial and some other practical reasons, they tended to let their children 
have a job earlier, for instance when children finished their junior secondary school study, their 
parents preferred to send them to zhongrhuan (secondary vocational school), where they could 
learn some practical skills (shiyongjishu). There were basically two benefits they could get by 
doing so: the period of time they needed to sponsor their children became shorter, and their 
children could start to earn money earlier, i. e. supplement family income earlier. 
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interviewees told me that they had some relatives working abroad, and that they 
expected their overseas kin and relatives to sponsor their education, and perhaps 
even help them to go abroad if they can demonstrate good school performance. 
These kinds of expectations were usually fostered by their knowledge of others 
who have enjoyed such support. 
To sum up, rural people have identified education as the main way of freeing 
themselves from poverty and hardship, while urban dwellers see it as the main 
means for moving up the social ladder, and eventually joining the elite group 
wherever this is possible. Tibetan people's evaluations of education are therefore 
positively equated with material well-being and upward social mobility. 
Two schools: an `ordinary' school and a `minority' school 
Tibetan students in this region can choose to be educated in either an ordinary or 
minority school, as many minorities in other minority areas in China can do. 
Among four secondary schools in the township, the Huangnan Secondary School 
and Huangnan Minority Senior Secondary School are under the administration of 
the Education Bureau of the Prefecture; the other two schools, the Tongren 
County Minority Secondary School and Yifu Minority Junior Secondary School 
fall under the jurisdiction of the Education Bureau of Tongren County. In this 
section, I compare the two prefectural schools - the Huangnan Secondary School 
and Huangnan Minority Senior Secondary School. 
The Huangnan Secondary School is a prestigious local school. Since it merged 
with the Tongren County Secondary School in 2002, it has become the sole 
ordinary school in the Longwu area. Consequently it has experienced a noticeable 
increase in the number of the minority students in general, and the Muslim 
students in particular. According to figures provided by the school official, in the 
academic year 2002-2003, there were over 800 junior and senior school students 
in six grades, of whom nearly half were female. Among these, the minority 
students made up 65.21 percent. The ethnic breakdown of the minority students is 
Muslim 31.63 percent15 and Tibetan 24.09 percent. 16 With a slightly lower 
15 The Muslim students are made up of the Hui, Salar, Bonan or their mixture. 
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16 The number of Tibetan students offered by the school official is quite different from my 
investigation. My estimation, which is based on over 90 questionnaires and 50 interviews as well 
as observation, informal conversations with the people in this school, is that the number of the 
Tibetan students in terms of naming, language, heredity and psychology is around 10 percent. This 
will also be the figure used in the following analysis. The higher proportion provided by the 
school official is mainly a result of the change of nationality or ethnicity (minzu chengfen) among 
some Han and Tu, including those mixed ethnic children of Han, Tibetan or Tu who used to opt 
for Han for an `advanced' status. For these Han, they will benefit from the preferential policies for 
ethnic minorities after changing for minorities; the Tu who changed their nationality are either not 
satisfied with the categorisation of them by the state or because compared to the Tibetan, they are 
less visible or heard culturally or politically. 
(However, this footnote appeared even insufficient for some Chinese scholars to capture my points 
correctly. I therefore feel it is necessary to include an email correspondence between a 
postdoctoral fellow (H) from the UC Berkeley and me (Y) about this issue (12 November 2004). 
H: The school roster shows that there are much higher proportions of students/teachers registered 
as `Tibetan'. But you disregard this registration and said only a much smaller proportion are `real' 
Tibetans. I have problem with it. The fact that some Tibetans do not look Tibetan, do not speak 
Tibetan, and do not have cultural upbringing as Tibetan, shows that the ethnic categories are 
multi-facet, more complicated than people assume. This fact is especially important in a co- 
habitating region like the one you studied. This fact is also very telling in an era of massive socio- 
economic changes. In any case, you can say that some Tibetans arc not `traditional' Tibetans as 
people assumed, but you cannot say they are not Tibetan therefore you take them out of your 
survey of Tibetans. (The way you put it leaves the impression that the school is lying about the 
ethnic composition. I don't believe it is the case. ) 
Y: As for the ethnic composition in the school, I take your point regarding the possible influence 
of socio-economic change on ethnic redefinition or re-identification by the government or 
individuals. In the case of my school, actually in the region I studied, the people who changed 
their ethnicity to Tibetan from either Han or Tu (rarely from Muslim or Mongolian) are those who 
either want to benefit from preferential policies for the minority population (in the Han case) or to 
be more visible politically or culturally (in the Tu case which I think I explained in a footnote). In 
the Han case, some changed their ethnicity to Tibetan only in the official record that will, most 
probably, benefit their children in school or college enrolment - this is the key thing that concerns 
these parents with regard to their children's future; some other children may have some step- 
(grand)parent who claimed their Tibetan background, and so families are more likely to register 
their (grand)children as Tibetan. 
This is actually a nationwide phenomenon that occurred since the mid-1980s when preferential 
policies are quite sophisticatedly and confidently put in place, so in the 1990 census the population 
of some minority groups increased so dramatically such as the Tujia in Hunan that alarmed the 
government to introduce a stricter policy of ethnic identification or recognition. I would not say 
that the Tujia case is the same as the Tibetan case in my research. The former is more complicated 
in the sense that they were really very much sinicised at a very early stage and so make it less 
convincing when they were identified as an ethnic minority group while the Kejia (Hakka) people 
or the Huidong people in the southeast were not. 
If we go a bit further into the issue, we will see that the Zhuang group did not have an ethnic 
consciousness before the state embarked on its Ethnic Identification Project from early 1950s, 
which is evidence of (to some extent) the arbitrariness of this project. Another widely known case 
is Manchu, who are historically a minority population but were also historically sinicised and, 
more importantly, made up a significant part of the present Beijingese, among whom some are 
identified as Manchu some others are Han. 
Meanwhile, all those Tibetans, no matter whether or not they are able to speak the language, 
whether they look Tibetan physically (? ), whether they would not mind letting people know of 
their Tibetan background, in my research they are all counted as Tibetan. Even so, they are still a 
very small proportion among the school people. In a word, I removed the type of Tibetans who 
145 
percentage than the Han (34.79 percent), the Muslim students comprise the 
second largest group in the school. In other words, the only ordinary school in 
Longwu Township is significantly `minoritised'. All the Tibetan students are from 
urban areas and are residents of Longwu Township; many have parents working 
in state work units at the county or prefectural level, while a few have a parent 
working as a self-employed business person. The students usually pay 400 or 500 
yuan (Chinese currency unit renminbi) per semester, for tuition, facilities (e. g. 
computers), textbooks and exercise books, and some miscellaneous fees. 
Of the 76 teachers at the Huangnan Secondary School, 9.21 percent are Muslims 
and 25 percent Tibetans, while the remainder are Han. '7 There are currently no 
teachers of music and fine art, and there is a shortage of teachers of physical 
education and English. Qualifications-wise, 100 percent of the teachers for the 
junior grades meet the requirement for an associate college degree (dazhuan 
xueli) or higher, while 46 percent of those who teach senior classes have a 
university graduate degree (benke xueli) or higher. 
Like other secondary schools in China, the Huangnan Secondary School very 
much `dances to the baton of college entrance examinations' (genzhe gaokao 
zhihuibang zhuan). This is clear in both discipline and course arrangement. The 
students in year three at the junior level (chusan) and above are required to spend 
in excess of nine hours per day in school during weekdays, and nearly eight hours 
only recently changed their ethnicity in the official record, and apart from the official record they 
are by no means recognised as Tibetan, either by others (including government officials, Tibetans 
and other ethnic peoples), or by themselves. The good thing with a Tibetan identity de jure and a 
Han cultural background de facto is that they can benefit from preferential policies on the one 
hand, and on the other, enjoy the benefit of higher cultural or symbolic status in society that is 
brought by their Han ethnic origin. 
Another reason why I am quite confident with my doubt of the school figures is because I know 
many of them by myself or through my parents since I was a young child. Many of them are 
actually migrated from other Han-dominated provinces from the 1950s onwards for varied 
reasons. I knew at that time that they were as the same as my family in terms of their origin of 
ethnic background and region. The difference is that their families continued staying on there 
when my family moved back to Chengdu, and then I found they `became' Tibetan when I visited 
them again many years later. The funny thing is that nobody, including themselves, see them as 
Tibetan in every sense - they just registered as Tibetan with the government, and even the 
government officials know that they are Han. This is also why some people believe that 
preferential policies have more negative impact on policy implementation and social justice when 
looking at this type of story, and so advocate abolishing preferential policies. ) 
17 These are again different from my investigation: the proportion of the Han, Muslim and Tibetan 
teachers is respectively 75 percent, 9.21 percent and 2.63 percent. 
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devoted to classroom study. In addition, they also need to go to school for five 
hours on Saturdays. And when key examinations such as national college entrance 
examinations are pending, they even go to school on Sundays. 
The school has rules and regulations that reward students for high achievement 
and punish them for truancy or other disruptive behaviour. Once a student has 
been punished officially (chufen), he or she will not be able to get credentials 
issued by the school if the punishment has not been discharged by the time of 
graduation. On the whole, both the school and the teachers are satisfied with the 
attendance rate of the students, and few students drop out. 
Teachers at the Huangnan Secondary School are subject to strict punitive 
regulations for teaching performance. For instance, if a teacher does not meet the 
required number of teaching hours, he or she will have to pay a fine. This is 
despite the fact that the failure is usually caused by the school official not 
allocating the requisite number of teaching hours to the teacher. One of the 
regulations that the teachers complained about most bitterly was that they are 
fined when the percentage of students who have passed the end-of-year 
examinations falls short of the number designated by the school official. Almost 
every teacher has been punished for this `transgression', and the amount they 
have to pay varies depending on the percentage of failing students. Fines 
generally range from 40 yuan to some 6,000 yuan (for reference, the teachers' 
monthly salary is usually between 700 and 2,500 yuan). The key point of criticism 
towards this policy is not that the school has introduced such a regulation, but 
rather, that the criteria are not justifiable: the school has not set the percentage 
according to local conditions and abilities but according to standards in Xining, 
the capital city of Qinghai Province, where the quality of education is said to be 
the highest in the province. 18 
18 In a letter from a schoolteacher in January 2005, I was told that in the first semester of 2004- 
2005, under a new prefectural policy, more than 10 teachers in the school requested for retirement, 
of which 10 were approved. The ages of the ten teachers range from 38 to early fifties. Given the 
high proportion (13.16 percent) and the young ages of the retired teachers, it was said that this is 
largely a resistance to the strict and ridiculous punitive regulations of the school. 
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Like schools in other parts of China, the students are divided into two different 
classes when they enter gao'er (year two at the senior level): wenke ban (class for 
liberal arts) and like ban (class for science). This eventually leads to their study of 
specific subjects in universities. The school complies with the national curricula, 
and so uses uniformly compiled textbooks (quanguo tongbian jiaocai). Because 
of a shortage of teaching staff, music and fine art are not offered; once-offered 
courses in manual dexterity (laodong jishu) and demography (renkou) have also 
been cancelled. Additionally, there are some textbooks on local history and 
geography that are distributed to the students mainly for self-study, such as 
Qinghai Lishi (Qinghai History), Qinghai Dili (Qinghai Geography) and Minzu 
Zhengce Changshi (General Knowledge of the Policy of Ethnic Minorities). The 
medium of instruction is exclusively Chinese Mandarin (putonghua, lit. common 
language). 
The Huangnan Minority Senior Secondary School has a much shorter history than 
the Huangnan Secondary School, but it has a high profile nevertheless. It attracted 
nearly 500 senior school students in its three grades in 2002-2003. The student 
body comprises Tibetans (60 percent), Mongolians and Tu, and equal numbers of 
males and females. All the students are Tibetan speakers. They studied in 
minority primary schools and junior secondary schools before attending the 
Huangnan Minority Senior Secondary School. Most of the students come from 
agricultural or pastoral areas, and board in the school. The frequency of home 
visits greatly varies according to the distance between home and school - once a 
week at one end of the spectrum, once a semester at the other, though most return 
once every one to two months. The students pay 200-300 yuan per semester for 
their study and boarding, and have a grant-in-aid (zhuxuejin) of 40 yuan from the 
government per semester. 
The hours that the students are expected to spend in school exceed eight a day, 
with more than seven hours of classroom study. There are no classes on either 
Saturdays or Sundays. The students must also go out for physical exercise 
(chucao) at lam, five days a week. 
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The school has rules and regulations that rewards and punishes the students, but 
compared with the Huangnan Secondary School, discipline is quite lax. Unlike 
the Huangnan Secondary School, there is no school uniform for the flag-raising 
ceremony or any other special occasions. But like the ordinary school, the 
attendance rate of the students satisfies both the school and the teachers, and there 
are rarely any dropouts. 
There are 35 full-time teachers at the school and half of them are Tibetan, nearly 
half are Han, and a few are from other ethnic backgrounds. The teachers are well 
qualified with 85.70 percent of them having an undergraduate degree. Even so, 
there is a strong need for physics and chemistry teachers. Unlike the Huangnan 
Secondary School, there is no serious punishment system directed at the teachers' 
work. 
Apart from the courses that are commonly offered in both the ordinary and 
minority schools, the Huangnan Minority Senior Secondary School offers a 
course that has been tailored in accordance with government policy, i. e. Zang 
yuwen (Tibetan language and literature). This is the only course delivered in the 
Tibetan language at the minority school; all the others are taught in Chinese. Han 
yuwen (Chinese language and literature) and Zang yuwen are the only two courses 
that use Wushengqu Tongbian Jiaocai (uniformly compiled textbooks by five 
provinces and regions in West China where there are Tibetan residents, namely 
TAR, Qinghai, Sichuan, Yunnan and Gansu provinces). Fine art is also a Tibetan- 
related course, in which the students can learn Tibetan Buddhist painting 
(Tangka), and for which Tongren is renowned both within and without the 
Tibetan area. 
As in the Huangnan Secondary School, the students in the minority school are 
divided into the arts and sciences streams from year two (at the senior level) 
onwards. They are entitled to sit college entrance exams in Tibetan. 19 The 
majority of the students will enter local or regional minority colleges or 
universities, and be mainly majoring in Tibetan literature or science. In the past 
19 This is the policy called minkaomin, an idea that allows minority students to sit college entrance 
examinations in minority languages. Also see Sautman (1999) and chapter five. 
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few years, the number of the students choosing science subjects has increased and 
is now slightly higher than those choosing Tibetan literature, the most popular 
subject in the past. This is possibly in part influenced by the abolition of the job 
allocation system. In the past, university graduates were guaranteed jobs 
regardless of whether or not there was a social or economic demand for their 
subject. Since students must now find their own jobs, subjects need to be chosen 
with more careful attention to the job market. So even though all the science 
subjects are among the most difficult ones for the students in the Huangnan 
Minority Senior Secondary School (also see below), 20 they still tend to devote 
themselves to these subjects. There are nevertheless a high proportion of students 
who choose Tibetan - this choice usually enables them to enrol in a minority 
university or college more easily. 
The parental dilemma: where to send children? 
Justification for opting for minority schools 
There are differences among Tibetan parents with regard to school choice. 
Generally speaking, rural parents, farmers or village government officers, and 
working class parents in state sectors, send their children to (Tibetan) minority 
(primary) schools in their villages of origin. The parents chose this type of school 
because the fees are lower, travel to and from school is convenient, the medium of 
instruction is Tibetan and the students and teachers are Tibetan. The students 
with this kind of early schooling usually continue their education in minority 
junior secondary and then senior secondary schools, which tend to be located in 
urban areas. 
Parents preferred to keep their children within a Tibetan minority school 
environment because they feared that their children will not perform as well as 
their Han peers if they attended an ordinary school. Conversely, they thought that 
it will be easier for their children to study in their mother tongue and in a Tibetan 
cultural environment: language and thought are inseparable and so Tibetan 
students often experience difficulty in grasping concepts and communicating 
within a Han language and cultural environment. For example, in ordinary 
20 According to some teachers in this school, most students in the past got less than 20 percent of 
the exam questions correct in college entrance examinations. 
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schools, Tibetan students can hardly understand common sense aspects of the 
school routine that are taken for granted by the Han. As a consequence, even a 
brilliant Tibetan child who is able to perform excellently in a minority school 
remains, at best, an average student in an ordinary school. 21 
Parents who decided to send their children to minority schools were aware that 
many people in the larger society see the Tibetan language as useless. But these 
parents felt that the language will nevertheless be useful so long as the student has 
a good command of it. This means that when their children come back to 
Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture as university graduates, they can still 
work in the government, for instance, in a law court or village governmental 
sectors, where cadres need to know the Tibetan language to deal with rural 
Tibetan people. The view that Tibetan is useful also stems from a belief that their 
children will normally return to Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture after 
graduation. This is because they thought that Tibetan children lack the 
knowledge, social contacts and cultural proficiency (in Han) to be able to compete 
with Han people in finding employment outside the Tibetan areas. 
Parents also preferred minority schools because they believed that their children - 
and themselves as well - should be able to speak Tibetan before studying other 
languages, cultures or subjects. To justify their choice, they also addressed the 
negative effect of studying in ordinary schools. They said that their children will 
be affected by the Han way after studying in Chinese in an ordinary school, and 
will adopt a Han way of thinking. As a result, the children will become 
disobedient or not behave themselves, demand too many material comforts or 
become fastidious but not industrious, just like all those children who are born 
and grow up in a better-off family. 
Many parents told me that nowadays a Tibetan child could learn everything in 
minority schools that they can in ordinary schools. They pointed out that due to 
the adoption of the national curriculum in all state schools, their children could 
learn `advanced' knowledge like Chinese, English, and computing even in a 
21 Correspondingly, they also pointed out that a Han student would not be able to perform as well 
as Tibetan students if she or he were studying in a minority school. 
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minority school. The extra advantage they can obtain in minority schools is that 
students can also learn some Tibetan subjects like painting, literature and 
language, and some dance and song in regular or extra-curricula. This is what the 
children in ordinary schools can hardly get, or even worse, they will finally be 
unable to specialise in Tibetan language and culture like their Tibetan 
counterparts in minority schools, and they will not be as proficient in Chinese 
knowledge as their Han fellow students in ordinary schools. For this reason, 
Tibetan parents believed that a minority school education will provide their 
children with all necessary knowledge for today's world, and will also allow the 
children to acquire their own ethnic culture, in an environment of their own ethnic 
people, and in the Tibetan way. 
Justification for opting for ordinary schools 
The parents who sent their children to an ordinary school usually worked in state 
work units at either the county or prefectural level (but usually not as manual 
workers), and had educational experience in Chinese in ordinary schools, or an 
educational experience in minority schools followed by recruitment into a state 
work unit where the working language is Chinese. Their primary concern in 
school choice is the limited opportunity to use the Tibetan language, `even in this 
Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture', in the government sectors at the prefectural, 
county or even village level. In a word, Chinese is the working language in state 
work units, even in Tibetan-related institutions such as the Prefectural Ethnic 
Song and Dance Ensemble, the Regong Art Gallery, and minority schools. 22 Some 
examples they gave were that all documents from the authorities need to be 
drafted in Chinese, although they are also usually coupled with a version 
translated into Tibetan, and the formal language in meetings and conferences is 
Chinese, even when the majority of the participants are Tibetan. 23 The conclusion 
22 To adopt Chinese as the medium of instruction in secondary minority schools does not seem to 
be compulsory though this is encouraged by the local government policy, particularly in senior 
secondary schools. For instance, my investigation shows that the Huangnan Minority Senior 
Secondary School is the only one of its kind in the township where Chinese is thoroughly used as 
the medium of instruction, while the other two minority schools only partially do so. This is 
interesting concerning the cultural background of the head-teachers in three schools: the head- 
teachers in the Huangnan Minority Senior Secondary School are Han and those in other two 
minority schools are Tibetan. 
23 I was told that the only opportunity when Tibetan is employed as the main means of 
communication is during the period of the Two Conferences (Lianghui Qijian), i. e. of the 
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is thus that one must learn Chinese regardless of whether one stays in Huangnan 
or moves elsewhere. In their understanding, the dominant status of the Chinese 
language is determined by its status as the official language of the country, and by 
the fact that it is the first language of the vast Han majority. With regard to 
schooling, a competence in Chinese will enable a Tibetan student to study in 
Chinese at a regular rather than a minority college or university, and this will 
definitely become an advantage when looking for a job in competition with the 
Tibetan graduates from minority colleges or universities (also see below). 
In short, a good command of Tibetan without Chinese will cause inconvenience in 
daily life, and will become a job ceiling in personal advancement. Importantly 
though, no one who held this view explicitly endorsed the idea of giving up 
Tibetan. They still expressed willingness or claimed to require that their children 
master oral Tibetan, and to a lesser extent, written Tibetan. Another consideration 
in discouraging children from learning or using Tibetan is that, as Huangnan 
Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture is a multiethnic area (minzu zaju qu), it would be 
inappropriate to adopt Tibetan as a major means of communication. Moreover, 
many parents also argued or implied that the quality of education in ordinary 
schools is higher than that in minority schools. 
Some other reasons that inform the choice of parents who sent their children to 
ordinary schools are beyond an instrumental concern with language or quality of 
education, but are more ideological. One opinion is that Tibetan culture is closely 
connected with Buddhism, particularly when it goes up to certain levels. As a 
religion, Buddhism is a good choice in cultivating one's moral character and 
nourishing one's nature (xiushen yangxing). But this is not very useful for the 
progress and development of society, and could even come to play a hindering 
role in this respect. This is a popular view among some middle-aged Tibetans who 
were educated during the Cultural Revolution when all kinds of religion were 
criticised as feudal superstition (fengjian mixin), and as backward and opposed to 
advanced materialism (weiwu zhuyi). Another disadvantage in studying Tibetan 
culture, as some parents perceived, is that such a study would cultivate an 
Prefectural People's Congress Conference and the Prefectural Committee of the People's Political 
Consultative Conference. 
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antagonistic sentiment among Tibetans towards the government and the CCP, and 
further, foster a consciousness of secession. 
Where do students want to study? 
Evaluations of the students in the Huangnan Secondary School 
In the Huangnan Secondary School, more than 90 percent of the Tibetan students 
(10 in 11) in my investigation expressed a preference for studying in the 
Huangnan Minority Senior Secondary School. On the whole the students saw life 
in the Huangnan Secondary School as unattractive and boring. This is because 
major courses (zhuke) are usually too demanding because of college entrance 
examinations; they would have preferred to study minor courses (fuke) and extra- 
curricula activities, such as music, painting and sports. In addition, they would 
have welcomed the opportunity to study courses such as Tibetan language and 
literature. But these options were either not offered or were reduced to a bare 
minimum by the school. For example, even though there was ethnic minority 
content in the textbooks, many teachers did not bother to cover this material in 
class, and instead instructed the students to read it by themselves. The content of 
some teaching materials on ethnic minority issues was often perceived by the 
Tibetan students to be antagonistic, and this sense of antagonism was exacerbated 
by the negative ways in which some teachers spoke about Tibetan customs. In 
fact, the content is basically presented in line with the notion of social evolution 
as illustrated in chapter five. 
In contrast, they said that the Huangnan Minority Senior Secondary School 
students could not only study all subjects that were offered in the Huangnan 
Secondary School, including Chinese, English and computing, but they also had 
the opportunity to learn the minor courses mentioned above. In discussing why it 
was not possible for them to study the kinds of ethnic culture courses offered in 
the Huangnan Minority Senior Secondary School, the students of the ordinary 
school explained that their school could not offer such courses because they were 
not part of the core content of college entrance examinations. Moreover, 
educational planners assumed that the Tibetan students obtain culturally relevant 
knowledge from their families anyway. When asked why they were keen to study 
their own language and culture, more than 90 percent of them described their 
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embarrassment about their insufficient Tibetan, and explicitly expressed their 
need to improve their Tibetan. They thought that one should master his or her 
mother tongue, `the Tibetan language is a symbol of (our) ethnic group' 
(Interview 010204), it would be a disgrace otherwise; it would be unacceptable if 
their offspring were not able to speak Tibetan in the future; it was inconvenient 
for them when communicating with their Tibetan fellows, with whom they spent 
more time than with those from the other ethnic groups. As for their interest in 
and enthusiasm for studying their own culture and religion, they explained that it 
is always a good thing to acquire more knowledge; (their) religion advises people 
to be virtuous; they would have enough motivation to study excellently if the 
school offered courses in their culture and religion, and this would in turn enhance 
their confidence in learning other subjects in the school. 
In addition to curriculum issues, the overly stem discipline system of the school 
and the cultural chauvinism of the teachers exacerbated their boredom with school 
life. Generally the school and teachers kept requiring the students to study hard in 
order to be able to enter a (good) university. Meanwhile, as mentioned earlier, in 
order to keep up academic competitiveness, the school official also set up strict 
punitive regulations for teachers. The teachers therefore faced punishment if exam 
targets were not met, so they transferred this pressure onto the students through 
harsh discipline, e. g. giving an official punishment, or beating or scolding the 
students (regardless of ethnic background of the students) at will. In contrast, the 
students perceived that in the Huangnan Minority Senior Secondary School, the 
students were not disciplined so harshly. They believed that the teachers in the 
minority school respected and understood the students, treating them as their own 
children, because `they are also Tibetan' (Interview 010205). 
When it came to the practice of ethno-religious customs in the Huangnan 
Secondary School, the students told me that the practitioners of religion were 
teased by the fellow students and even by the fellow Tibetan students. They 
explained that some teachers did not even allow them to share or explain their 
customs: they told the Tibetan students not to bring `(minority) ethnic things' 
(minzu de dongxi) into the school, because they might be eccentric (xiqiguguai) 
and unhealthy (buliang). Some more informed students pointed out that this is 
155 
because that the school culture was based on Han culture. The students of the 
Huangnan Secondary School also had the impression that the Minority Secondary 
School does not discipline its students too strictly because they are able to wear 
their ethnic clothes and other ethnic- or religion-related accessories like Buddhist 
prayer beads. 
A final reason that the Tibetan students at the Huangnan Secondary School 
thought that they would have preferred to attend the Minority Secondary School is 
because their classmates would be fellow Tibetans who they felt to be more 
straightforward, authentic, broad-minded and cheerful. By contrast, they 
perceived their fellow Han students in the Huangnan Secondary School to be 
tricky, hypocritical or insular. Moreover, some of their fellow Han students were 
not interested in making contact with the minority students. This tendency was 
presumably embedded in the Han self-perception of their higher intellectual 
quality; this led the Han students to believe that they could have a higher 
academic achievement in the school, and consequentially a higher socio-economic 
status in society in the future. Tibetans therefore faced the prejudicial view that 
they are intellectually poor, and cannot perform as well as the Han students. 
Although a couple of Tibetan students said that they did not make friends along 
the lines of ethnicity but personal character, they expressed their preference for 
the personality that was usually perceived to be possessed by the Tibetan students 
as portrayed above. 
Evaluations of the students in the Huangnan Minority Senior Secondary School 
In the Huangnan Minority Senior Secondary School, 60 percent of the students 
(25 in 41) in my investigation said that they would have preferred to study in the 
Huangnan Secondary School. Language was the first concern: they believed their 
Chinese would have improved if they had studied in the ordinary secondary 
school. They also held a positive view towards the teaching quality and 
educational standards of the Huangnan Secondary School. And they felt that they 
would have benefited from studying alongside the Han students who they saw as 
knowledgeable and academically talented. Relatedly, they thought that studying at 
the Huangnan Secondary School would have the added advantage of enabling 
them to make friends with Han. 
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Among the Huangnan Minority Secondary School students who expressed a 
preference for staying in their own school, language was the main consideration; 
with poor Mandarin they felt that they would not be able to keep up with their 
Han classmates if they studied in the ordinary secondary school. This is 
understandable if we consider that ever since primary school they have received 
instruction in their Tibetan mother tongue. The perceived academic superiority of 
the Han students in the Huangnan Secondary School was another factor that 
precluded some of them from feeling confident enough to choose the Secondary 
School over the Minority Secondary School. While recognising the social 
function of the Chinese language, they were not particularly interested in Han 
culture; even among those who would like to study in the Huangnan Secondary 
School, only 1 in 41 students expressed an interest in Han culture. By contrast, the 
minority school students showed high enthusiasm for their own culture, religion 
and language. This was another key attraction of the Huangnan Minority 
Secondary School - that they could study their own culture, language, religion 
and history. Lastly, to study in an environment of Tibetan compatriots made them 
willing to stay in the Huangnan Minority Secondary School. 
To be `ordinary' or minority: the cultural dilemma 
Tibetan students and parents both valued education as a way of producing useful 
people who could benefit their own ethnic group, their family and themselves. In 
other words, they were not content with their status quo. Conversely, they strived 
so much for socio-economic mobility that sometimes this resulted in a desperate 
pattern of study without break and serious frustration with the ineffectiveness of 
24 their study, particularly in the Huangnan Minority Secondary School. 
Tibetan internalisation of the dominant critique of Tibetan culture and people 
Apart from the instrumental function of upward mobility, education was 
symbolically important for Tibetans because it was seen as a way to transform the 
24 There are two examples that are worth mentioning. A teacher in a minority school told me that 
some of his students had to spend 40 minutes just trying to memorise a physics theorem in 
Chinese (so they are regarded as intellectual inferiority). Secondly, many students I investigated in 
the minority school eagerly requested in their questionnaires that I instruct them how to study 
effectively. 
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traditional image of themselves as a backward people (luohou minzu) into an 
advanced people (xianjin ininzu). One of the most often used words in interviews 
was xianjin (advanced). They sensitively avoided employing `luohou' (backward) 
to describe their ethnic group by simply emphasising that Tibetans need to absorb 
or study the advanced culture in order to `get the traditional culture reformed and 
nurtured (buyu)'. Without this reform and nurture, they feared being `phased out'. 
In their mind, the advanced culture was Zhongyuan wenhua (Central Plains 
culture, i. e. Chinese I-Ian culture), and ivaiguo wvenhua (foreign culture) (Interview 
030106, -07, -09). In this vein, some of them even argued that when sending 
children to study in school, it was also necessary to teach the children how to 
distinguish between zongjiao (religion) and mixin (superstition). Others 
emphatically explained to me that nowadays many Tibetan practices were not 
religious practices, but customs - custom was at the top while superstition was at 
the bottom in their ideological ranking system, with religion in between. 
What is more, some Tibetans who migrated from other sinicised areas or with a 
sinicised education even acutely criticised Tibetan culture by claiming that the 
Tibetan modes of thought (guannian) were outdated and backward in the 
Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, because Tibetan tradition was so 
deeply rooted in this area (Interview 030109 and an informal conversation with a 
Tibetan teacher in the minority school). What I found most striking was the 
comments of a Tibetan school administrator, who was also a teacher of Tibetan 
language and literature and a would-be reincarnation of Buddha as I was told. 
When discussing the achievement of the Tibetan students in his minority school, 
he kept repeating (Interview 020201): 
Here it is a place the Tibetan people are concentrated, the modes of thinking (sLriang guannian) of 
the people are backward, and the economy is not developed, the desire for pursuing knowledge 
(giuzhiyu) is low. 
As a school official, he expectedly ethnicised economic and educational 
achievement by making a cause-effect link between cultural backwardness, 
economic underdevelopment and lack of motivation for education. 25 
25 On how hegemonies of race, civilization and economy are entangled with one another, Ong 
provides some interesting and insightful observations (Ong 1996). 
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This kind of view was echoed by the Tibetan students from both the Huangnan 
Secondary School and the Huangnan Minority Senior Secondary School when 
they compared Han and Tibetans. They thought that the Han students had more 
aptitude for analysis and inference (fenxi tuili nengli), and were more 
knowledgeable, open-minded (siwei kaifang) and rational (lizhi). For instance, 
unlike Tibetans, a Han student usually tends to make a concession to avoid 
trouble in a clash (xishiningren), while the former tends to fight to the finish. In 
their eyes, the Han students had a higher study level (xuexi shuiping) and cultural 
level (wenhua shuiping), and so were of high quality (suzhi gao). The Han 
teachers in the Huangnan Secondary School were also thought to possess more 
up-to-date knowledge. These factors allowed for a better study ethos (xuexi 
fengqi) in the Huangnan Secondary School. By contrast, they considered that the 
Tibetan students usually had lower academic achievement, were more 
conventional (chuantong) or conservative (baoshou), and less sociable 
(shejiaoshang buxing). Essentially, Tibetans thought themselves to be of poor 
quality (suzhi cha) and morally degenerate (daode baihuai). As evidence of this 
they cited an inclination to drink or fight, which even scared some of their 
teachers. It was not surprising that the negative comments on the Tibetan students 
were said in relation to those students at the Huangnan Minority Secondary 
School, and by the Tibetan students in the ordinary school. 
The comments of the Tibetan parents and students about the advancement of the 
Han and the poor quality and backwardness of the Tibetans suggested that they 
had internalised the critique of the dominant culture regarding their people, 
customs and cultural values. Their resulting ambivalence about their own cultural 
identity could be seen at even a very young age. When jokingly asked by some 
adults `which ethnic group do you belong to', some young children who lived in a 
state work unit environment were very likely to identify themselves (and the 
people they had intimate relations with, for example, their mother) with Han, but 
regarded others (even their father or siblings, for instance) as Tibetan (Interview 
030103, -09). 
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Discrimination against Tibetans 
Although few parents or students explicitly stated during the interviews that they 
(or their children) had experienced discrimination, this did not seem convincing 
given the exaggerated tone of their denials. In fact, information about 
discrimination was evident in some of the stories they told. For instance, when a 
parent explained why he was not interested in attending parent-teacher meetings, 
he gave the example of a parent-teacher meeting that he had once attended when 
his daughter was in the primary school: 
I asked the teacher 'how is my kid performing? ' 'Your Tibetan kids are all like that' was the reply. 
There is more to it than meets the ear. At that moment I wondered to myself why he said that, 
'Tibetan students are all like that! ' Like what? I did not fully understand but did not ask for his 
further elaboration. However he was the teacher of my kid... I have not attended a parent-teacher 
meeting since then (Interview 030110). 
Another parent told me that when his son was in the primary school, fellow 
students bullied him because he was a minority (shaoshu). The continued bullying 
slowly but surely reduced his enthusiasm for study and school life. This 
contributed to his mediocre academic achievement and disruptive behaviour. His 
parent concluded by saying that if the teachers had intervened with these bullies, 
his son's situation would not have been so bad (Interview 030104): 
The form master should have cared about and paid more attention to this kind of (minority) kid, 
rather than seeing them as the same (as the majority) and then leave them there carelessly. 
He finally sent his second child to a minority school. 
Some of the Tibetan students mentioned a word that is usually used by the other 
ethnic students to describe them: fan. This word basically refers to the nature of a 
type of person who is slow in response (chidun), mentally problematic (naozi you 
wenti). Sometimes even some of their teachers would make a connection between 
a student and rural Tibetan people when criticising his or her stupidity by saying 
`you are just as stupid as those pastoral Tibetans (muqu lai de Zangmin)' 
(Interview 010202, -05). Here pastoral Tibetans were located in the lowest 
position in comparison to urban and farming Tibetans. 26 
26 According to Harrell, Crossley also observes a similar view of difference between pastoral and 
farming populations (Harrell 1995: 19). 
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The dilemma facing the Tibetans emulating the Han model 
This devaluation of Tibetan culture and people by the Han schools and society 
leads to cultural ambivalence and alienation among Tibetans who had been sent to 
ordinary schools for their education. As some of my interviewees commented, in 
a cultural sense these Tibetans can hardly harmonise with their ethnic group of 
origin, particularly with the older generations, nor can they merge with the 
mainstream Han - though perhaps in the future their own children will (! ). 
Knowledge-wise, they cannot specialise in Tibetan language and culture, or Han. 
They then come to be `nothing' (shenme ye bushi). 27 There is only pain or tragedy 
left. They explained this is the very reason why these Tibetans, after becoming 
parents, tend to send their own children to minority schools, instead of following 
the example of their own parents and making sacrifices to send their children to 
`advanced' Han schools. Some other parents also expressed their regret about 
their choice to send their children to ordinary schools, which resulted in 
introducing and widening a cultural and linguistic gap between generations. They 
therefore wanted to stay in their village of origin after retirement so as to nurture 
their grandchildren there with Tibetan culture. Some parents also tried to arrange 
some family tutorials for their ordinary school children in Tibetan culture and 
language. But most such `experiments' are ineffective, due to the difficulty of 
finding time outside their children's school study, which is predominantly focused 
on college entrance examinations. In addition, Tibetan culture and language 
lessons can also stir up conflict between parents and their children. A common 
response on the part of the children is: now you are forcing me to study these, 
why did not you send me to a minority school in the first place? (Interview 
030110) 
The dilemma facing the Tibetans opting for minority schools 
Compared to the ordinary school, the average academic outcome for the students 
in the Huangnan Minority Secondary School is limited, since it focused on 
27 An interesting case as a point of comparison is the language ability of the Tibetan students in 
inland boarding schools where they study all subjects but Tibetan language in Chinese. This has 
made their language ability in Tibetan inferior to that of their counterparts who remain in Tibet 
while their Chinese ability is not necessarily strong though surely better than those remaining in 
Tibet. For more information see Postiglionc, Zhu and Ben (2004). 
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preparing the students for exams in many `useful' or `advanced' subjects like 
Chinese, English or science, to which the students had little exposure in their 
previous rural and/or minority environments. At the same time, they were usually 
required or encouraged to study these subjects in Chinese, an unfamiliar language 
to them since the medium of instruction in their primary, and to a lesser extent, 
junior secondary schools was Tibetan. In other words, their background and 
previous education did not equip them for dealing with Chinese language 
instruction in unfamiliar subjects. Following the minkaomin preferential policy of 
the state, 28 graduates from minority secondary schools usually enter local, mostly 
minority colleges or universities. The admission requirements for these 
institutions are usually lower than for regular universities. As an understandable 
result, employers normally prefer non-minority university or college graduates. 
Ineffective study and a perception of the better quality of education in ordinary 
schools as mentioned earlier become the immediate dynamics which drove some 
of the minority students to dream of studying in ordinary schools, while 
simultaneously pushing others further away from the ordinary school education as 
shown earlier. This desire to study in ordinary schools was not just driven by a 
concern with education alone, but also by an eagerness to become more `sociable' 
and `advanced' as argued above. Because most of the students in the Huangnan 
Minority Secondary School are from rural areas, having few social relations with 
the outside world, boarding in the school and the negative view of them 
emanating from local urban dwellers, including their counterparts in the 
Huangnan Secondary School, make it more difficult for and hence more desirable 
to them to socialise with off-campus society. All these reasons plus their language 
difficulty isolated them from both their far-away home community and the host 
community of their school. 29 
In other words, attending minority schools considerably reduces their 
competitiveness in the future job market and their opportunity to transform their 
traditional image as they strive for. Under such circumstances, the Tibetan 
28 See footnote 19. 
29 This segregation seems to become more serious with the Tibetan students studying in inland 
boarding schools. Details can be found in Postiglionc, Zhu and Ben (2004). 
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students in the Minority School were becoming increasingly devoted to the 
`useful' subjects associated with advancement and socio-economic mobility, 
which were taught in Chinese. At the same time, the need to master Chinese and 
the unfamiliar subjects taught in Chinese means that they had to de-prioritise their 
own ethnic cultural studies. Furthermore, in minority schools the opportunity to 
study minority cultures was actually very limited - the only tailored course for 
ethnic minorities was minority language and literature, which was no more than a 
training in language and writing skills, as I was told by the teachers of Tibetan 
language and literature. Another difficulty is that opportunities they had for home 
visits are limited due to impractical distance. All these factors together resulted in 
a fall in the standard of the Tibetan language among the students. Some Tibetan 
language teachers feared that this diminishing exposure of the minority school 
students to Tibetan would lead to their alienation from their community, people 
and culture, and eventually, undermine their ethno-religious community as a 
whole. 
This picture is quite different from that perceived by the parents who sent their 
children to minority schools. As they claimed, their children had access to all the 
necessary knowledge as well as their own culture in minority schools. But the 
study of necessary `useful' knowledge nevertheless resulted in ineffectiveness and 
the ethnic cultural content of the curriculum being reduced to the minimum. The 
only appeal of the Huangnan Minority Secondary School, apart from practical 
reasons (lower fees, grant-in-aid, boarding, etc. ), was that it was a Tibetan 
environment because the majority of the school people were Tibetan. The 
explanation of the 40 percent of the students in this school who said they 
preferred the idea of staying in their own school and did not want to attend the 
ordinary school generally centred on the idea that they wanted to feel safe rather 
than be exposed to a competitive, uncertain and even humiliating environment. In 
my investigation, the only Tibetan student who had studied in minority schools, 
and then opted to attend the ordinary school for a better education, transferred 
back to the Minority School after the first semester. She listed the reasons as 
follows: I could not get used to the teaching methods they used there, and also 
wanted to strengthen my Tibetan and learn more about our ethnic culture. I can 
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better settle down to study (geng anxin de xuexi) in an environment of my own 
ethnic compatriots (Questionnaire 144). 
At a superficial level, staying at the Huangnan Minority Secondary School seems 
to be a voluntary decision on the part of the parents and students. Most Tibetan 
students at that school, however, felt they had no other choice. Likewise, few 
students from the Huangnan Secondary School have actually transferred to the 
Huangnan Minority Secondary School despite the large proportion of them (10 in 
11) who expressed their desire to do so as shown earlier. Both consciously and 
subconsciously the students and the parents were very aware of how much they 
would lose for their future if they pursued education in the culturally relevant 
environment, as they perceived it, of a minority school. And at a more 
subconscious level, they had internalised ideas about the Han superiority and the 
need to be absorbed into the mainstream in order to progress. For example, they 
saw themselves as more advanced than their counterparts in minority schools 
when criticising their minority school counterparts as can be seen above. This 
idea is evident in the fact that I was told on some informal occasions that there 
was a much higher proportion of Tibetan children in the most prestigious primary 
ordinary school, the Third Primary (also see the next chapter), compared to that of 
one or two decades ago. 30 A parent explained that this was because Tibetans were 
`no longer biased against learning the Han Chinese language' (Interview 030109). 
Another voice I have heard is: this has happened under the pressure of state policy 
(Questionnaire 153). 
Conclusion 
In the process of making decisions about schooling, Tibetans in both ordinary and 
minority schools found themselves in a predicament. While they struggled against 
the perceived threat of being `phased out' economically or culturally by working 
hard in school and emulating the Han model of `advanced culture' and `high 
quality', this seemed to inevitably devalue their own culture and to put them at 
risk of losing contact with it. This dilemma placed them in a situation where they 
voluntarily pursued education but then found themselves involuntarily alienated 
30 I used to be a pupil in this primary school more than 20 years ago. I still remember that among 
my some 100 fellow pupils, there was only one who was Tibetan. 
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from their own culture, and further, degraded as the owner of their culture. 31 
Tibetan parents, students and intellectuals have responded by starting to think 
about what kind of education they need. Some Tibetans argued that transmitting 
Tibetan culture and language was not only a private responsibility, but also the 
obligation of public or formal institutions like schools. For instance, some 
Tibetans started to appeal for Tibetan to be the medium of instruction at all levels 
in minority schools. Others advocated combining the advantage of monastery 
(religious) culture and (Tibetan) rural culture with the school curriculum in order 
to preserve and develop the local culture as a whole. 
But it is unlikely that both the preservation of Tibetan culture and the education of 
Tibetan people for socio-economic mobility can be achieved. Factors from two 
sides attribute to this pessimism. First, on the side of schools and society, schools 
tend to discourage the desire for a Tibetan relevant curriculum in favour of the 
mainstream national culture. One of the typical remarks on this issue came from 
one of the top administrators who was also a teacher of history in a mainstream 
school (Interview 020105): 
[A student] is a secondary school student first, and then a minority student... Minority students 
should be equal with Han and other students, and cannot surpass the other students. The school 
treats all students from different ethnic backgrounds the same (dui ge minzu xuesheng dou 
yishitongren)... [When the students are] in the school, they should hold back (baoliu) some of 
their ethnic or religious customs; it will otherwise bring about a negative effect (buliang 
yingxiang) in teaching and among their fellow students. As for the curriculum, we offer courses of 
ideology and history in order to educate students with the correct view towards ethnicity and 
religion. For example, in history lessons [we] teach [students] the tradition of upholding 
unification of the country... We are an ordinary school rather than a minority school, even though 
we also have minority students. But if we practise distinguishing features (gao tedian) for this 
reason, it will become purposeless that the state runs schools (shiqu guojia banxue de zongzhi). 
Furthermore, even if a school, particularly a minority school, were willing to 
equally incorporate Tibetan language, religion and history into the curriculum, it 
alone cannot hope to achieve desirable results on a massive scale when confronted 
31 The pair of term 'in/voluntarily' is partially inspired by Ogbu's (1987,1998) distinction 
between voluntary and involuntary minorities though the pair of concept is quite misleading itself 
and is not adopted in my research. For further details, see chapter two. 
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by a national mainstream ideology that devalues Tibetan culture, because `the 
school is run by the state' (Interview 02020 1). 32 
The other side that contributes to this pessimism is Tibetans themselves, though 
this is largely subordinated to the symbolic violence of the mainstream. When the 
national agenda is trying to `fit' Tibetans into the mainstream, it is, at the same 
time, also cultivating a `self-loathing' or `an internalised devaluation' of their 
culture and group (Young 1990: 165). This internalisation is so deeply embedded 
in the Tibetan mindset that it has resulted in their sharp criticisms of their own 
group and culture as can be seen above, or their shame regarding their customs, 
though this may be in a relatively mild tone. A schoolgirl, when seeing that her 
parents invited some Lamas to treat an unwell family member with some rituals 
after a medical treatment in a hospital, uncomfortably asked: isn't it enough that 
we just see a doctor (Interview 030110)? Moreover, a Tibetan teacher, who is 
very comfortable of his incompetence of Tibetan, claimed that he could not accept 
the idea that people consider him to be one of the local Tibetans, because the 
Tibetans in this region `lag behind other ethnic groups in both cultural quality and 
personal sociability' (Interview 020203). 
In this cultural process of being-made and self-making (Ong 1996), Tibetan 
culture and groups are pushed to the periphery in opposition to the mainstream 
centre, which has resulted in their eventual adoption and adaptation to the 
mainstream culture at the expense of their own culture and group image. In this 
process, the social system - both as public institutions and the majority Han - 
plays a critical role that has provoked the Tibetan community forces mainly in the 
form of the mobilisation of its bonding social capital, and at the same time 
restrained its political mobility that goes hand in hand with the prevention of their 
culture from enjoying full freedom and flourishing. As a result, the Tibetan 
community has been caught in a dilemma with reference to cultural citizenship in 
general, and cultural capital in particular. Tibetans therefore have still to face the 
question of where, what and how to study. In other words, they have to choose, or 
32 Some research has also discussed the significant role in education with regard to ethnic minority 
cultures that the school itself cannot play alone. See for example Nieto (1999) and Tomlinson 
(1996). 
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have no choice about what they need to sacrifice in an attempt to `catch up' - 
catch up intellectually, economically or culturally? 
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Chapter Seven 
The Social Disengagement of `Familiar Strangers': 
The Muslim Case 
Introduction 
This chapter is to explore how Muslims have disengaged from formal institutions 
as a result of the larger society regarding them as `familiar strangers' (Lipman 
1997). This can be understood as a tension between their desire for full social 
citizenship in the form of rights to employment and education, and the decrease of 
the limited social and cultural capital they originally had due to their growing 
marginalisation in society. Therefore, education, the major way to achieve upward 
social mobility, becomes irrelevant to Muslims to a large extent. As a response, 
Muslims show little motivation, enthusiasm for and confidence in state education, 
which has led to their poor school performance. This is grounded in both their 
pessimistic expectations about their socio-economic status in the future, and the 
prejudice and hostility they have received from individuals as well as institutions. 
In other words, Muslims are hardly identified by the larger society as Chinese 
(Han) people unless they sinicise themselves, involuntarily or voluntarily, like 
many of their compatriots in China proper, by substantially hiding or removing 
their ethno-religious markers. 
Section One depicts the state education available to Muslims in the region. It 
discusses how this availability has experienced a significant transformation as the 
demographic composition, residential pattern and occupational traditions of 
Muslims have changed fundamentally as a consequence of the expansion of 
Longwu Township. Section Two will reveal the Muslim educational achievement 
by examining one Muslim community in comparison with three Tibetan villages, 
and the parents of the Muslim students in comparison with those from other 
ethnic backgrounds. It will then discuss the school performance of Muslim 
students by mainly looking at their academic achievement at the stage of both 
compulsory and post-compulsory education. Section Three investigates how 
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Muslim parents perceived their social and economic status in the larger society 
and how they evaluated the school curriculum from their ethnic point of view. 
Section Four reveals Muslim students' resistance to, or disengagement from, the 
mainstream school culture, along with their detachment from their own ethno- 
religious culture and group though to a lesser extent. On the basis of the previous 
sections, Section Five argues that Muslims, as `familiar strangers' to China, are in 
a disadvantaged position in terms of the social and cultural capital. This position 
has shaped a reluctant attitude among both Muslim parents and children towards 
school education, which in turn significantly reduces their competitiveness in a 
changing world directed at a knowledge economy and their desire and capability 
to participate in social and political life. 
State education for Muslims in the region' 
As depicted in the previous chapter, the Muslims in Longwu Township arrived in 
the area in response to a call from the reincarnation of Buddha in Longwu 
monastery. This call was made for business people from Hezhou (Linxia), 
Xunhua and other Muslim areas nearby at the end of the 19`h century. The local 
market town, Longwu Jiequ (Longwu Street District) therefore emerged after the 
arrival and settlement of Muslims (and some Han). As the town has considerably 
expanded since the establishment of the Prefecture, particularly over the last two 
or three decades, the economic situation and demographic composition in this 
district has changed accordingly, which partially but fundamentally caused 
change in the educational structure. 
There are four primary schools within the Longwu Township area, the First and 
the Third Primary schools (yiwanxiao, sanwanxiao), both of which adopt 
Mandarin Chinese as the medium of instruction. The Second Primary School, 
despite its `ordinary' name, recruits Tibetan or Tibetan speaking minority 
students, and correspondingly adopts Tibetan as the main medium of instruction. 
The last one is a newly established boarding primary school for Tibetan speakers. 2 
Among all the four secondary schools in the Longwu area, three are minority 
' Most figures or numbers in this section are extracted from HZZBW (1999) and TXBW (2001). 
2 There are also primary schools in Tibetan villages which exclusively recruit Tibetan children 
from the same or neighbouring villages, and instruct in Tibetan. Also see the previous chapter. 
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schools which cater for Tibetans or Tibetan speakers such as Mongols and Tu, 
and one is a mainstream or `ordinary' school. Even across the Prefecture, there is 
only one Muslim minority school established in the Jianzha County, where 
Muslims make up 24.31 percent of the county population and 70.53 percent of the 
Muslim population in the prefecture (see table 3 on page 274). In other words, 
most Muslim families in Huangnan have to send their children to mainstream 
schools or Tibetan or Mongolian minority schools. 3 In the Longwu area, the 
schools where Muslim families can send their children for their primary education 
are one of the two mainstream primary schools, the First Primary or the Third 
Primary. The only mainstream secondary school for the Muslims is the Huangnan 
Prefecture Secondary School. 
Muslim students mainly go to the First Primary that is located in the old town, the 
previous Longwu market area where Muslims are concentrated. The old town of 
the prefecture has experienced a gradual but significant change since 1953 when 
Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Region (renamed as Huangnan Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefecture in 1955) was established with its government sector 
located in Longwu Township, and particularly over the past two to three decades. 
After the prefecture was established, it quickly became apparent that the district 
where the old town is located in was too narrow and small for the rapidly growing 
seat of the prefectural government. Under these circumstances, a new town was 
developed between 1954 and the middle of the 1970s. From 1984, a town 
reconstruction project was embarked upon led by the Bureau of Urban and Rural 
Planning of Tongren County (Tongren Xian Chengriang Jianshe Huanjing 
Baohuju). Most state-run businesses such as institutions, bookstores, trading 
companies or restaurants in the old town were gradually either closed down or 
moved to the new town. This led a number of mainly Han residents who were 
working in the state system to move from the old town to the new one. Meeting 
the requirements of these people for the education of their children, the Third 
3I have interviewed a Muslim parent whose family had moved from the Xunhua Salar (Muslim) 
Autonomous County to the Henan Mongolian Autonomous County, and stayed there for a number 
of years when her oldest son was at the age for schooling. The son was therefore sent to a Tibetan 
speaking Mongolian school with a reduced tuition fee since his mother was cooking for the 
schoolteachers and students there. 
170 
Primary was established in the early 1970s in the new town. 4 As a result, the 
percentage of the Muslim students in the First Primary rose compared to the Han 
population which had largely vacated it. This change eventually turned the Third 
Primary into the most prestigious primary school in the prefecture in spite of a 
shorter history than the First Primary, and this was cultivated by the government 
officials whose children were studying there. 
This demographic move also meant that better-off customers (state employees) 
were drawn away to the new town. Gradually, a growing number of Muslim 
families had to close down their small stores or restaurants in the old town and 
open businesses in the new town where there were a significant number of better- 
off customers. At the same time, some more prosperous Muslim families in the 
old town who did not feel comfortable about living in the Tibetan autonomous 
region moved out from the old town to some Muslim regions nearby, as I was told 
by some Muslim community leaders and government cadres. After several years' 
'upward' mobility of residents from the old town, the traditionally market area of 
Longwu Township came to mainly function as a 'self-contained' residential area 
of the Muslim community, which was characterised by a declining economy and 
with daily life based around the Mosque. 5 
This demographic change also impacted on the secondary education in the 
Longwu area. Originally there were two mainstream secondary schools in the 
Longwu area, the Huangnan Prefecture Secondary, which was located in the new 
town, and the Tongren County Secondary, which was situated in the old town 
(also see the previous chapter). As the demographic changes described above 
were unfolding, some Muslim families, following the Han families, also 
transferred their children from the County School to the Prefecture School after 
they moved their business from the old town to the new one. Nevertheless, this 
mobility was also propelled by certain educational factors. Firstly, the campus of 
the County School was vacated by moving it to a bigger campus in 1985 in order 
to further develop the County Minority School for Tibetans or Tibetan speakers, 
' Nev. - cadres from outside the town were also an important source of the growing number of Han 
households in the new town. 
sA similar residential segregation of Muslims from other ethnic groups can also be seen 
clsc, 6%here. See, for example, Liu (1997). 
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which at that time was located next to the County School. Some fifteen years later 
a new primary boarding school for Tibetans was established in the new campus of 
the County School. This is one of the instances that the government has placed 
less weight on the County School. Some other measures introduced at the time 
were that officials began to select students with higher achievement for the 
Prefecture School meaning that less able students went to the County School. This 
resulted in sonic residents in the old town preferring to send their children to the 
Prefecture School in spite of the `go to school in the neighbourhood' policy. 6 
These residents included a growing number of Muslim parents who not only tried 
to run their business in the new town, but also wished to provide their children 
with a better school education. This led those for whom education is key in 
enhancing their socio-economic status to envisage moving the whole family to the 
new town eventually, where they believed there was a better social and 
educational environment for their children. 
Meanwhile, over the past decade or so, students in the Huangnan Prefecture 
School have kept moving out to the schools in Xining, the capital of the province, 
or its vicinities, an area named Haidong Diqu (Haidong Region) that people 
believe to have a higher level of education. ' For the families of these students, it 
will make a significant difference to send their children out of Huangnan for a 
brighter future after a better education, so long as they can afford this. In other 
61 was told by some students and teachers from the previous County School or the Prefecture 
School that the government itself does not implement this policy strictly sometimes. One of the 
important alternative principles is academic achievement of students as can be seen above. In this 
vein, students %%ho are residents of the new town but have a poorer school performance may be 
allocated to the previous County School. The reverse could also occur. This is closely related to 
another, if not more, important element, the social capital in relation to the state system that 
parents may have. In this light, academic performance and residential location might give way to 
the social network resources (particularly in relation to the state system) of a family in school 
choice. In this game, Muslims are usually the losers due to their lack of this valuable social 
capital. Iu ill discuss this in more detail later on. 
'I hale heard that there were some 2,000 students, mainly secondary school students, from 
lluangnan studying in fiaidong Region. The school official in the Huangnan Prefecture School 
denied this figure «hen I was trying to verify it with them. Instead, they told me a figure that they 
said was 'absolutely reliable': there were 300 secondary school students from Huangnan studying 
in Minhe County Number One Secondary School (Minhe Yizhong). Some public servants in the 
prefectural government told me that almost everyone working in the government at both 
prefectural and county levels had sent their children to Haidong Region or even some other 
provinces for secondary education. However, compared to the figure of students studying in both 
secondary and secondary vocational schools in Huangnan in 2002 that is 5787 (HZT 2003), the 
figure of 2000 may be a bit too striking to be accepted, but my estimation would also not be very 
far from this figure. 
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words, while the County School has declined substantially in the past decade, the 
Prefecture School has also been experiencing a certain decrease in student 
numbers. As a result, the County School was annexed to the Prefecture School in 
2002. Its students, half Muslim, were transferred to the Prefecture School, and 
most of its teachers were dispersed to some primary schools, other state work 
units or left the state system for the reasons like retirement. 
The educational level of Muslims 
One , tluslim community and three Tibetan villages 
The normative criterion to assess the educational level is called the cultural level 
(wenhua chengdu) or the level of received education (shoo jiaoyu chengdu) as 
explained in chapter four. This is carried out by looking at the number of years of 
education received or completed in the state educational system. The stage from 
primary to junior secondary lasts nine years and makes up nine-year-compulsory- 
education (jiurian yiºwwu jiaoyu). 
Longwu Township administers all three Muslim administrative communities in 
the Longwu area, and several Tibetan villages surrounding Longwu Township. 
Among these Tibetan villages, those closest to Longwu Township tend to have a 
higher educational level than those further away. I have surveyed the educational 
level of one Muslim community and the three closest Tibetan villages. The result 
is shown in table 6 (page 275), from which some trends can be seen in relation to 
the illiteracy rate and college students rate. 
" Traditionally Muslims in the Longwu area had a much lower illiteracy rate 
compared to Tibetans. The rate of the Muslims born before the 1970s is 24.70 
percent. By contrast, the Tibetans in three villages who were born before the 
1970s have an illiteracy rate of 44.58 percent on average (breakdown of three 
villages is respectively 41.03 percent, 42.56 percent and 50.30 percent). 
" The illiteracy rate of Muslims has not been reduced as much as that of 
Tibetans over the past two decades. The rate of the former has been reduced 
by 9.84 percentage points and that of the latter by 18.73 percentage points. 
Even in absolute terms, among the Muslim population who were born after 
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the 1970s, there are still 11 people who are illiterate. On the contrary, among 
the Tibetans, the corresponding number is 30 for three villages, i. e. 10 for 
each on average. Among those born after the 1980s, the correspondent 
number for the Muslim community is 3 (2.17 percent out of the cohort) and 
for the three Tibetan villages is 2 (0.59 percent out of the cohort). 
At the other end of the spectrum, the rate of the Muslim population at college 
level is the second lowest in three age groups. The rate is not significantly 
higher than the lowest Tibetan group (T3) whereas it is significantly lower 
than the highest Tibetan group (T1). As a whole, the Muslim community does 
not appear to be in an advanced position in comparison with the three Tibetan 
villages at the college level. 
In short, both from a developmental perspective and in absolute terms, the 
Muslims as a whole in the Longwu area have lagged behind in terms of education 
over the past one or two decades. This is particularly striking when taking into 
consideration the fact that the Muslims are urban dwellers whereas the Tibetans 
are rural. 
The parents of the students in the mainstream school and the Tibetan minority 
school 
Table 7 (page 275) is the illiteracy rate and average years of schooling of the 
parents of my respondents in both the mainstream school (MS) and a Tibetan 
minority school (TMS). The information here echoes the educational trend of the 
Muslim community. 
In the mainstream school, the parents of the Tibetans and of the students from 
other ethnic backgrounds constitute one end of the spectrum, characterised by 
lower illiteracy rates (0 and 3.85 percent respectively regardless of difference 
caused by gender, the same hereafter) and longer schooling years (11.46 and 
10.06). At the other end are the Muslim parents with higher illiteracy rates (28.33 
percent) and shorter schooling years (5.54). As urban dwellers, the cultural level 
of Muslim parents of the children in the mainstream school is just slightly higher 
than that of the Tibetan parents of the children in the Tibetan minority school, the 
vast majority of whom are rural. In other words, these two groups possess similar 
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patterns, including the pattern of the gap between the father and mother. 
Therefore in the mainstream school where the students are from the urban areas, 
the Muslim students possess the poorest educational capital. 8 
The school perj'ormance of 1lluslim students 
There are no official statistics available that set out the academic achievement of 
students along the lines of ethnicity. This problem became more serious after the 
County Secondary was merged with the Prefecture Secondary in 2002, because 
neither of the two schools held the achievement records of the students of the 
previous County Secondary, where Muslim students made up the half of the 
student body. 9 
As the Prefecture School became the only choice for the Muslims in Longwu 
Township, the Muslim students make up the second largest part of the student 
body (31.63 percent) after the Han (34.79 percent). The three sets of data in table 
8 (page 276) were collected by me in the Prefecture Secondary. The first set (EJ) 
is the outcome of the end-of-year examinations of the junior third year students in 
2002. The second (ES) is that of the senior first year students in the same 
academic year. The junior third year is the final year of compulsory education 
while the senior first year is the first year of post-compulsory education. The third 
set (EE) is the outcome of the senior secondary entrance examinations of the 
students in the Tongren area in 2002.10 Some of them were studying in the senior 
first year of the school when I was conducting fieldwork there. Table 9 (page 276) 
is the ethnic population in the mainstream school in 2002-2003 and in Tongren 
County in 2002. 
Some conclusions can be drawn from the data in tables 8 and 9: 
" This echoes a %kidely reported lower educational level of the Muslims in the borderlands between 
Qinghai-Gansu-Ningxia provinces. See, e. g. Liu (1997) and Ma Mingliang (1999). 
'I heard from some prefectural leaders when I was staying there for my fieldwork that the local 
bureau of education (i aoyuju) was compiling an educational yearbook of the prefecture as a gift 
for the 50th anniversary of Huangnan Prefecture. This yearbook was said to be comprehensive and 
detailed, covering all the figures from the establishment of the prefecture in 1953. However the 
date for it to be published was postponed to an unknown one. 
10 In order to enter the post-compulsory level, students are required to sit senior secondary 
entrance examinations (: hongkao) and must meet a certain standard. However, due to a decline in 
student numbers, in the past few years the school tended to take in all examinees, as I was told by 
a school administrator. 
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1. As a whole, the Muslim students perform poorly when compared to the 
students from other ethnic backgrounds. This can be seen in table 8. 
2. The Muslim and Tibetan students account for 25 percent in Class One of the 
senior first year and almost amount to 50 percent in Class Two. The 
distinction between the two classes is determined by the grades of the senior 
secondary entrance examinations of the students. The better half of the 
students was allocated to Class One (key class) and the poorer half to Class 
Two (ordinary class). 
3. Although the percentage of the Muslim students in the ordinary class was only 
1.5 times more than that in the key class while this discrepancy among the 
Tibetan students was four times, this did not necessarily lead to a better 
outcome for the Muslim students for the year as a whole (see ES in table 8 and 
SF in table 9). 
4. The percentage of the Muslim students in post-compulsory education was 
significantly reduced from 40 percent (the largest group) in the junior 
secondary third year, the final year of compulsory education, to 26.04 in the 
senior secondary first year, the first year post-compulsory education. By 
contrast, the other three groups turned out to have a higher percentage at the 
post-compulsory stage (see JT and SF in table 9). 
5. In the senior secondary entrance examinations in 2002, the number of the Han 
examinees was nearly 2.5 times that of the Muslim examinees (see EE in table 
8). On the other hand, the flan population in 2002 was below two times the 
Muslim population (see EP table 9). This demonstrates the lower proportion 
of the Muslim students entered for the examinations. 12 
" This streaming of students by academic achievement has been abolished officially on the 
principle of non-discrimination. This was also the reason why the school officials denied that they 
were still streaming students in this way when asked. Nonetheless, both the students and teachers 
in the senior first year told me that the students in this year were streamed though this was not a 
school-wide policy. For instance in the three years of the junior secondary, all classes were 
organised evenly in terms of gender and academic achievement of the students, and even in terms 
of ethnicity w herever this is possible to be taken into consideration. 
1' It is inappropriate to include Tibetan students in this comparison because the majority of 
Tibetans in the region are rural. According to my observation, almost all the Tibetan students from 
the Long %u urban area continued into the senior secondary study. This can also be seen from the 
difference of the percentages of Tibetan students in the junior third and senior first years, 8.72 and 
9.60. 
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In short, in terms of school performance, the Muslim students tend to have a 
lower record in academic achievement and fewer will continue to study at the 
post-compulsory stage. In addition, in an interview with a Muslim community 
leader, I was also told that there were about 12 or 13 Muslim students who 
dropped out in this academic year, and all of them were in the junior secondary 
phase. This is to say that about seven or eight percent of the Muslim students in 
total dropped out. This is a high figure compared to what I was told in interviews 
with schoolteachers, administrators or parents - that dropout was not an issue 
concerning them, i. e. that dropouts were rare in the school. 13 
Pessimistic views of Muslim parents: a key force 
An oven"ieir of: tfuslims and their school education 
As expected, no Muslim parents told me that it is useless to send children to 
school. Mteanww"hile, there were two shared ideas regarding school education 
among them. One is that, historically speaking, Muslims did not particularly 
invest in school education, and such a neglect of school education meant that they 
lagged behind Ilan, and more recently (over the past one or two decades) also 
lagged behind Tibetans because of this continuing neglect (Interview 030201, -02, 
-05). 
"' Second, there exists a disparity between cadres (ganbu) and ordinary 
people (laobaixing)rs in the degree of enthusiasm for sending their children to 
school. While cadres tend to encourage their children to study hard in order to 
eventually go to university, ordinary people usually lack such an expectation 
about their children's future. In other words, what ordinary Muslim parents expect 
their children to do with education is to confine to achieving two primary goals: to 
receive some basic education in relation to literacy and numeracy in order to be 
able to deal with (mostly family-run) business and daily life; and to obtain a 
graduation certificate (biye: heng), an essential passport of qualification for the 
labour market. This is also reflected in another concern among some ordinary 
parents that they are worried about the possibility that their children would go bad 
13 There was no dropout figure available to me. However, a higher dropout rate and lower 
academic achievement are a widespread phenomenon among the Muslim students in Gansu- 
Ningxia-Qinghai borderlands. See, for instance, Liu (1997) and Ma Mingliang (1999). 
" This is significantly associated with the oppression of Muslims during the Qing dynasty as 
depicted in chapter four, which undermined or ruined the Muslim loyalty to or association with the 
regime and formal institutions. 
15 On the classification between cadre and ordinary people, see chapter six, footnote 6. 
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(hianhuai) after hanging around with dubious characters (busanbusi de ren) in 
society if they were not sent to school. 
Nevertheless, their children can or are expected to stop studying when mature 
enough to help the family in business or with earnings. This usually happens 
when the children are fifteen years old or so, at the age when they just finish their 
studies in junior secondary schools, i. e. having completed the nine years' 
compulsory education required by the state. In addition, a tradition of getting 
married before twenty years old also makes many parents believe that it is the 
time for their children, particularly daughters, to stay at home preparing for 
marriage. I was told that to get children married is also the last obligation parents 
are supposed to undertake for their children as (Islamic? ) tradition requires. 
Therefore, this age was regarded by some parents as a turning point in their 
children's life in many respects. This picture is slightly different from my 
observation in one way. The number of Muslim girls is not less than boys in post- 
compulsory education. One explanation is that boys can help in family's business 
or with its earnings whereas girls can do little in this respect. This view usually 
leads parents to keep girls in school. On the other hand, ensuring that girls remain 
in school is also particularly important given the fact that many Muslim parents 
are extremely busy with their family business and can hardly find time to keep an 
eye on the people off-campus their daughters might get to know and even hang 
around with if the girls were not sent to school. This also reveals that parents do 
not adhere strictly to the idea that their daughters should get married at a 
traditionally acceptable age, for example, sixteen, as their community used to do. 
This allows these schoolgirls to have a senior secondary or even higher education 
if it looks promising for their future. 
I lowever, on the whole, the historical `tradition' of neglecting school education 
among the Muslims does not seem to have significantly reduced. This lack of 
enthusiasm for school study of their children is reflected in the poverty of their 
response to my question as to whether or not it is useful to send children to 
school. Instead, the Muslim parents from both cadre and ordinary backgrounds 
spent much more time speaking about the barriers they have encountered in the 
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larger society that are directly or indirectly associated with the school education 
of their children, and the resulting hopelessness 
Barriers from the larger society 
There are mainly three outlets (chulu) for their children that are envisaged by 
Muslim parents: to study in the Mosque or Arab countries with the aim of 
becoming a Mullah; to be engaged in family business or any other business 
outside state work units, i. e. irregular jobs such as temporary waiters, shop 
assistants or drivers; or to become a cadre working in a state work unit. To 
achieve any of these, they may or may not need to acquire a certain level of 
education in school although most of them nowadays are choosing to let their 
children have some schooling. Among the three choices, there is very limited 
demand for more Mullahs in mosques, and to go to Arab countries to study is not 
a better alternative either. This is because these children, mostly boys, will finally 
come back to China, and most likely, to this area; this is also because there are 
few families that can afford their children's study abroad. Last but not 
insignificantly, the change towards a knowledge economy also makes the idea of 
ending up in a Mosque much less desirable. They do not consider that they can 
learn the kind of useful knowledge, such as sciences or English, which will 
prepare them for a growing standardised labour market, both nationally and 
globally, in mosques. 
As for engagement in non-state business, given the hardship of this kind of job 
and the sluggishness of the local economy, this did not appear to be a more 
attractive choice to them. Moreover, the local Tibetans started to take over quite a 
number of businesses from the Muslims over the past decade after realising how 
much they had `lost' economically as they did not used to be engaged in 
commerce, a field that was traditionally dominated or `occupied' by the Muslims. 
Due to the fact that the Tibetans are the locally dominant ethnic group, the 
withdrawal of Muslims from business, whether or not voluntarily, and the 
engagement of the Tibetans in it, whether or not it can be regarded as an 
expropriation (boduoxing de), is understandable as society is rapidly becoming 
more economically orientated. One of the means Tibetans employed, as I was told 
by one Muslim cadre, is to ask for higher rent from their Muslim tenants who are 
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running a small enterprise, usually a small store or restaurant, in the rented 
room(s). The higher rent will eventually lead to financial difficulty in continuing 
running the enterprise and result in returning the room to the landlord or letting it 
to others (Interview 030202). Another reason I deduced from what I was told by 
several different Tibetans is that there was an informal campaign of boycotting 
the Muslim enterprises such as restaurants or shops among the Tibetans, i. e. 
whereas it is possible, they will definitely consume in the businesses run by 
Tibetans rather than by Muslims. A Muslim community leader also offered an 
explanation that Muslims would rather move to a Muslim-dominated area, 
particularly the Muslim autonomous prefectures or counties in Gansu-Ningxia- 
Qinghai borderlands so long as they have plenty of economic capability to allow 
them to do so, because they have felt oppressed by the dominant Tibetans and 
have been living a tiring life in Longwu (Interview 030205). The enterprises these 
Muslims used to run were also abandoned as they left the area. Although it is hard 
to say that there are not other important reasons, from my observation there are 
fewer Miuslini-run enterprises than when I visited Longwu eight or nine years ago. 
In the main commercial streets of the new town, half of the enterprises are run by 
Tibetans while only a few Tibetan enterprises could be found several years ago. 
The enterprises that can be found in the old town are even fewer as the district has 
been deserted commercially as portrayed earlier. 
The last outlet for Muslim graduates is to become a cadre in a state work unit. 
This, compared to the other two outlets, is even more difficult though it may be 
more desirable to those Muslims who feel strongly in need of a better socio- 
economic status. This has several different causes. Among the current local 
government officials, Muslims are underrepresented, particularly at the highest 
rank, namely, at prefectural level (see table 5 on page 274). I was told that, 
historically, one of the deputy magistrate positions (fu xianzhang zhiwei) in the 
Tongren County government was allocated to the Muslims, but this is no longer 
the case. When asked why this is so, one of my Muslim informants who works in 
the county government said it was because in every election, (quantitatively) 
dominant Tibetans voted for their Tibetan candidates. This situation, after lasting 
for some years, eventually meant that the government itself could not be bothered 
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to nominate any Muslim candidates for election (Interview 030202). It is even 
more hopeless for the Muslims to hold a similar position at the prefectural level. 
This disproportionateness of the Muslims among the top cadres has meant that the 
Muslim community as a whole lacks the social capital in relation to the state 
system. This directly affects the number of Muslims who are recruited by state 
work units as a cadre, either as an official or as a manual worker. Moreover, the 
perception that it is difficult for Muslims to enter the state system is also informed 
by the under-representation of Muslims in top leaders in the central government in 
general, and in the province in particular. 16 The top leaders of the prefecture or 
province seemed indifferent to this situation. This is anyway `a Tibetan 
autonomous prefecture', almost all of my respondents explained. Another 
practical obstacle preventing some Muslims from becoming a public servant is 
that the state in effect discourages public servants to go on a pilgrimage to Mecca 
by making it difficult for them to get a passport until they are old enough, i. e. over 
50 years old, when they are unlikely to stay on abroad (Interview 030202). 
In the meantime, the Muslims who work in state units also have less opportunity 
for promotion. Almost without exception, I was told that this was because they 
did not like to have social intercourse (yingchou) with their Han colleagues 
because they would have to smoke, drink, play mah-jong or go to Karaoke as their 
Ilan colleagues normally do. Being able to do these things is regarded as very 
important for a public servant to consolidate with his or her colleagues. More than 
this, some Muslim cadres who wear their caps or veils are disgusted by some of 
their superiors or colleagues because these superiors or colleagues `wanted 
everyone to look like Han, ' and `they would not feel comfortable until they could 
not distinguish on the basis of their appearance those who are Muslim from those 
who are Ilan' (Interview 030202). Under such pressure, some Muslims give way 
to these unofficial requirements made by officials, though they then face pressure 
from their family or community, especially from older generations (Interview 
030203). Those who keep practising their customs would be `kindly' reminded by 
their superiors from time to time that they had better not do so, or simply have 
16 On the situation in Qinghai, see Ma Mingliang (1999). 
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their names removed from the list of any promotion or award opportunity, which 
is directly linked to their salary and cadre welfare benefits. The most striking case 
I heard of is one Muslim woman, who, after working in a work unit for more than 
twenty years, is still at the lowest position as her youngest colleagues who have 
been just employed by her work unit, although she has always been working 
earnestly and assiduously. Eier superiors even (illegally) reduced her salary, and 
further threatened that she would be transferred to the canteen of the work unit as 
a cook, a person who is regarded on the lowest social stratum by traditional 
Chinese society. All this was because she `stubbornly' kept wearing her veil on 
the work site (Interview 030202). 17 
Some respondents also talked about the possibility of working outside the 
lluangnan area. But in their mind this was also difficult if not impossible. As a 
Muslim, it is not easy to stay in Han-dominated areas in eastern China or some 
other regions where both everyday life and work would be difficult because of an 
unbridgeable gap between their lifestyle and that of the Han or other ethnic or 
religious groups. Furthermore, they also believed that they were not able to 
compete with the dominant Han or other local people because of a lack of the 
necessary cultural level or social networks. In conclusion, the ideal area for them 
to live and work is Gansu-Ningxia-Qinghai borderlands where Muslims are 
concentrated (Interview 030202, -05). Unfortunately, the GNQ region is among 
the physically harshest and economically most impoverished in China, and 
provides very limited opportunity and space for them to prosper. In comparison, 
in I luangnan, in spite of the domination of Tibetans, there is still some historically 
formed space in business for Muslims, though this is also threatened today. 
In this light, while tuition fees steadily go up, to send children to school is not a 
more persuasive option. This is not to say that there is not a reasonable number of 
Muslims who would like to provide their children with a school education. This is 
reflected on two levels. On an individual level, some cadre parents insisted that it 
" This discrimination against the dressing customs of Muslims can also happen on other occasions 
in the larger society. One informant told me such a story in which he was teased by a conductor in 
a train journey when he was trying to defend a passenger who was being offended by the 
conductor: 'Look, it is not necessary to wear your white cap if you piously hold your religion in 
your heart. ' This is the way in which I want to better discipline myself' was his reply (Interview 
030202). 
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is necessary to have their children educated at a fairly high level, at least at a 
college level, and the higher the better so long as they can afford it financially. On 
a community level, some cadres or community leaders have realised the 
importance of encouraging their younger generations to receive a reasonable level 
of education to enhance the public profile and status of the community, which will 
in return create the opportunity to promote their economic performance. 
Nevertheless, due to significant barriers ahead of them as mentioned earlier, some 
of them, while expressing their definite willingness to give their offspring a 
school education, and also encouraging other Muslim parents to do so, presented 
their uncertainty and confusion about what they really need to do and to what 
extent they are able to manage this when confronted by the hard-to-overcome 
barriers generated in the larger society. When I asked a cadre if he would like to 
send his son to study in a Mosque in the end, he responded: `in the future when he 
has a good command of Chinese, I would like to send him to the Mosque to study 
Arabic (i. e. Islamic knowledge). ' It is also the same parent who told me as to how 
frequently he encouraged the parents of his students to place considerable weight 
on schooling when he had been a schoolteacher before becoming a cadre. He 
warned that the Muslim community would otherwise lose its political position in 
some 20 years' time (Interview 030202). These barriers become more serious 
when Muslim parents are ordinary people, i. e. without any relations with the state 
system. One of my interviewees told me how much Chongcao (Chine se 
caterpillar fungus) he had to keep giving to the leaders who were in charge of 
education in order to be offered a place for his son to study in a school, and how 
this did not lead to the result he expected after `wasting' so much Chongcao, and 
that he had to go to see the magistrate twice before the problem was resolved and 
his son was accepted by a school (Interview 030206). 
All in all, the Muslims generally feel marginalised in society, and particularly in 
recruitment to and promotion in state work units. This has caused the limited 
social capital in relation to the state system they originally had to decrease. 
Sequentially, this marginalisation has significantly reduced the opportunity and 
enthusiasm of the Muslims for participating in public life, particularly in the 
political arena. As a consequence, it seriously cast a pessimistic shadow on their 
motivation to send their children to school. In return, their social and political 
183 
status has kept dropping as their political and social awareness of participation 
becomes -weaker. A telling example is that, when religious or community leaders 
are invited by government or school officials to participate in some public affairs 
such as sitting on the rostrum in a conference to promote an incentive for them to 
help recruit students, they will be deeply touched (see, for example, Teng 
2002: 269-270). They have apparently taken it for granted that they should be in a 
peripheral position to the centre of power, and normal participation in public or 
political life is seen as a bonus honoured by the government. 
Barriers from the school 
The enthusiasm of Muslim families for sending children to school is also affected 
by the school curriculum. This is reflected in their dissatisfaction about the school 
culture and what is being taught in school, and also in their desire for a Muslim 
minority school. In schools Muslim-related practice, such as praying, wearing 
caps/veils or leaving for holidays, is discouraged. 8 Concern with this among 
Muslim parents is common. As most of them put it, even if Muslim children are 
required to stay in school during the holidays such as Muharram, they cannot 
really concentrate on studying. By contrast, if they are allowed to go home for the 
holiday, parents and children both will be grateful, and in return they will support 
the school more actively. Nonetheless, Muslims, including Muslim teachers, are 
subjected to this form of ethnic penalty. In a Muslim-dominated mainstream 
school, a Muslim teacher decided to put on his white cap because he wanted to 
influence his Muslim students positively by publicly offering a model of 
disciplining himself in this way. As an unexpected result, one of the deputy head- 
teachers who had trusted and respected this teacher stopped speaking to him for a 
week (Interview 030202). 
The more serious concern is that the curriculum excludes Islamic knowledge and 
the Arabic language from the teaching content. One community leader traced this 
back to the 1950s, when the Democratic Reform and Religious Reform terminated 
the course of Islamic knowledge that the school offered students. Until that time 
" Contrary to my expectation, few Muslim parents addressed the issue of a mixed gender school, 
«hich seems to be a concern among the Muslims that Gladney has observed (1999). This seems to 
be associated to the distinction between rural and urban areas. 
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he had been a primary school pupil and so had had an opportunity to study 
Islamic knowledge. 19 He insisted that introducing a course of Islamic knowledge, 
even if only for one or two hours a week, would be politically significant, because 
it would embody the equality policy of the state in the sense that this would 
promote the status of the Muslim community and their religion-centred culture 
(Interview 030205). This is a wide consensus among my respondents (Interview 
030202, -03, -05, -06). 
In terms of knowledge itself, most parents also expressed the importance for their 
children and themselves of having the opportunity to be educated in Islamic 
knowledge. They would otherwise become `false Hui' (jia Hui). In other words, 
what concerned many parents is the potential sinicisation of their children while 
some parents themselves have already been sinicised since the education they had 
received is Han ever since they started to go to school. As a result, Muslim 
children and some parents resisted Islamic knowledge due to an atheistic 
education in school, which `has already been branded (into their mindset)' 
(Interview 030203). 20 This tendency is undermining the grounds of their 
community in that they are worried that the Muslim, as an ethno-religious 
community, will eventually be silenced or sinicised. 
Sinicisation of their children can be also carried out in school when their children 
are required to engage in entertainment activities such as dancing and singing. 
Parents said that to become famous in entertainment circles is recognised and 
admired by the Han and Tibetan, but not the Muslim. Nevertheless, there are also 
some parents who do not mind emulating the model advocated and promoted by 
the mainstream society and would encourage their children to develop themselves 
in any respects wherever possible, including entertainment such as dancing and 
19 The relevant information can be obtained from HZZBW (1999: 1430); Teng (2002: 297); Teng 
and Wang (2001: 197-198). 
20 Based on John Bowen's model generated from a Muslim Malay community, Gladney proposes 
a similar suggestion of two disparate streams in the transmission of Islamic knowledge - the 
Muslim community and the state education. These two streams are respectively characterised by 
those educated in Islamic knowledge and those in the Marxist-Leninist view of Islam and religion. 
`This two track system has led to increasingly distinct public and private spheres among Muslims 
in China' (Gladncy 1999: 85). 
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singing. In so doing, they always face considerable pressure from the older 
generations as well as the community as a whole. 
A call for Muslim minority school(s) 
Due to the complex situation in terms of ethnicity in this area, Muslim parents do 
not expect to be offered a reasonable amount of Islamic knowledge in the 
curriculum of mainstream schools. On the other hand, they are also worried about 
the probable sinicisation after their children have been engaged in Han culture and 
entertainment activities in mainstream schools. With such concerns, Muslim 
parents wish for a Muslim minority school that provides students with Arabic or 
other Muslim languages (e. g. Salar) and religious content rather than one which 
merely offers a Halal canteen, as can be found nationwide. 21 In their mind, 
establishing a minority school with a relevant curriculum for Muslims would 
enhance enrolment rates of Muslim students. `Even we adults would go to study if 
there was such a school, ' the wife of one informant emphasised (Interview 
030202). To back this up, they pointed out that because of the introduction of 
Muslim-related content in the curriculum, the enrolment rate among Muslim 
students in some Muslim autonomous prefectures and counties in the Gansu- 
Ningxia-Qinghai borderlands has significantly increased. 22 To further justify their 
suggestion, they also mentioned to me that across the whole country, there are 
few institutions where people can learn the Arabic language, and if this was 
introduced into the curriculum of Muslim minority schools, this would benefit 
both the community and country rather than do harm to the state. In other words, 
the country will benefit through cultivating personnel specialising in Islamic 
knowledge and the Arabic language, which is appropriate for an increasing 
development of the relationship between China and the Arab countries. 
21 Gladney (1999) observed that Arabic language study is much more advanced in Xinjiang Uygur 
Autonomous Region due to the influence of the Arabic script in Uygur and the proximity to 
Pakistan of the Region. 
22 Unfortunately, a higher enrolment rate does not necessarily lead to a better school performance 
according to some of my respondents who are from those Muslim autonomous regions in the GNQ 
borderlands. The main reason appeared in their descriptions is that (most) Muslims in these 
regions are rural. Relatedly, these Muslims appear more religious (Interview 030109,010306, - 
07). For similar findings of poor performance of Muslims see Gladncy (1999). 
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A desire for a Muslim minority school also reveals a concern about a safe space 
for the well being of their children in schooling. Muslims are generally perceived 
not to be interested in or good at schooling. According to some parents, since 
teachers hold such views about Muslims, they will be very likely to stereotype 
Muslim students: do you want to learn culture (knowledge)? Isn't it true that 
(Muslim) girls will get married and boys will run a restaurant when they are 
eighteen years old (Interview 030203)? Even Muslim parents themselves also 
encounter such prejudice. When some teachers reject views or suggestions about 
school education from Muslim parents, they will say: why do you have so much 
to say? You have just got such a (poor) child (Interview 030205)! It is even 
difficult for Muslim students with high academic achievement to avoid such a 
label from teachers: yes you are capable (of study), this is not easy for you (as a 
Muslim) (Interview 030203). Another reason for Muslims to call for a minority 
school is driven by the severe problem of bullying of Muslim children both within 
and without schools, which is very likely to end up with their dropping out from 
school. `Because the police did not intervene, nor did the school', a parent said. 
One of his children experienced twice physically severe bullies and dropped out 
twice. This eventually put his school life to an end. In his words, his son had been 
one of the top students in the school every year, and it was an unacceptable 
decision for the child to withdraw from schooling (Interview 030206). 
A call for a state-run Muslim minority school is reflected in the Muslim 
community's lack of confidence in the Islamic knowledge imparted in their 
community-based education. In their words, religious education offered by their 
community, either by older generations or the Mosque, is neither systematic nor 
deep enough (Interview 030202, -03). Some parents even said that they preferred 
not to send their children to the Mosque to study because of a concern with 
sectarianism, which is usually cultivated by religious leaders in the name of Allah. 
In the same vein, they would also not send their children to study in Arab 
countries, because `children who are educated in different institutions or countries 
in Arab society will only be keen to establish their own sects. ' `The more there 
are such students, the more clashes there will occur between Muslims' (Interview 
030201). Interestingly enough, both parents who either emphasised religious 
education or put school education in the first place shared the view that the state 
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should support and organise religious education for Muslims, since this would 
make the education of Muslim students formal and systematic, and would also 
avoid the clashes that may be caused by the Muslims who are running religious 
education themselves. 
This desire for a state-sponsored Muslim school also reflectes their trust in the 
high level of the Han in terms of modem education. For many of them, it is very 
important to have an education geared to a type of society characterised by a 
knowledge economy. In this respect, they believed that the Big Han (Da Hanzu)23 
have a higher cultural quality (wenhua suzhi), i. e. plenty of knowledge which on 
the one hand is evident in their advances in scientific research for the larger 
society. On the other hand, their knowledge also enable them to provide their 
children with family tutorials. In a word, the high quality of the Han is what is 
needed in a knowledge economy society. This admiration of the Han has led some 
parents to transfer their children from the County School to the Prefecture School. 
Their explanation is that compared to the County, the teachers in the Prefecture 
discipline children more strictly, and the parents of most students there possess a 
high cultural level. These have helped build up an advanced ethos and a high 
quality of education in the Prefecture School. The reason for this is that `there are 
more Han students and teachers in the Prefecture' (Interview 030201). 
Nevertheless, their arguments usually ended up in pessimism. It would be 
extremely difficult if not entirely impossible to establish such a school in the 
Longwu area for two reasons: this is a Tibetan-dominated region, i. e. the Muslims 
do not have voice; the Muslim population is not large for a Muslim minority 
school. 
To sum up, on the one hand, it is hard for Muslim parents to see the benefits that 
accrue to them by sending their children to school, and this has reduced their 
enthusiasm for doing so. At the same time, encountering physical or symbolic 
hostility from the national mainstream cultural group, the Han, or locally 
dominant group, the Tibetan, in the process of schooling or the larger society, has 
23 This term is a reflection of dichotomous discourse of superiority of the Han and inferiority of 
ethnic minorities. Also see Harrell (1995). 
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also negatively affected the school performance of their children. On the other 
hand, they were well aware that their public profile and social status would be 
even lower and finally result in less opportunity for them to prosper if their 
offspring did not receive school education as Tibetans and Han are doing. 
Nonetheless, they feel confused about and hence struggle over how (and how far) 
to reconcile the two contested sides. 
Students' struggle between different `cultures' 
As indicated earlier, Muslim students on the whole have a lower achievement 
than average. In my investigation, the highest achievers among the local Muslim 
students24 are at the upper intermediate level. However, there are just a few 
students on this level. Most of them are among the lowest achievers. The most 
salient phenomenon relating to their school performance is that there is a reluctant 
attitude to school study that prevails among Muslim students. This can even be 
the case among the best Muslim students. Two of the high achievers, when asked 
if they would like to consider studying in the Mosque instead of the state school, 
clearly said they would. Their explanation is that to study the Koran, something 
familiar to them, would not be probably as difficult or tiring as to study the school 
subjects (Interview 010307, -10). Nonetheless, most Muslim students wanted to 
study in a Muslim minority school when compared to either a mainstream school 
or the Mosque. For them, to study in a Mosque is not realistic because they would 
not be able to access `useful' knowledge, which would equip them for the labour 
market and a reasonably good life in the future. On the other hand, compared to 
mainstream schools, in a Muslim minority school they could study both `ordinary' 
knowledge, as they are doing in the mainstream school, and their ethnic and 
religious culture. In addition, to study and stay with their Muslim peers would 
also make the study more effective and school life more relaxing. This would also 
comfort their parents in terms of the curriculum and tuition fees. `The Prefecture 
School asks for quite high tuition. My parents are always complaining about this. 
If there was a Muslim minority school (though asking for the same tuition), they 
will definitely support me. Because this is good for both ourselves and our ethnic 
24 There is a Muslim student who has been the top student every academic year. Her family 
migrated from Shandong province, a coastal area and therefore very much sinicised compared to 
the local Muslim students. 
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group' (Interview 010305). However, three in nineteen respondents expressed a 
preference for studying in mainstream schools, because they thought there would 
be more opportunities to study something different or more time to study useful 
knowledge, and to benefit their social life rather than to only stay with Muslims. 
For them, their ethnic group is conservative, unwilling to improve itself by 
attempting to become open-minded. They did not explicitly deny the need to 
study Islamic culture but said that they had been already taught it at a very young 
age or they could teach themselves in the future. For the moment, `to study 
(scientific and cultural) knowledge is the most important thing' (Interview 
010303, -06, -13). 
Nevertheless, for students who would either like to stay in the mainstream school 
or prefer a minority school, the fundamental obstacle they have faced in their 
study and life in the mainstream school is a deep feeling of discomfort. This 
discomfort is constituted by pressure from their community and family, and their 
school and the larger society, which is reflected in their confusion about and 
struggle for where to locate themselves in society in terms of socio-economic 
status, which are directly referred to their educational level, cultural identity and 
personal safety. In other words, they always found that their attempt to integrate 
these contested facets into a coherent whole had resulted in a tiring failure. A 
prosperous socio-economic future requires a relatively high educational level. In 
attempting to achieve a good school performance, they have confronted severe 
barriers caused by the prejudice and hostility towards the Islamic cultural tradition 
of their community. 
Factors from outside the school 
Although the abolition of assigning jobs to graduates in 1996 may have affected 
the motivation of Muslims to study hard in order to enter a university or college, 
the job ceiling Muslim students are facing is nevertheless a significant obstacle to 
sustaining their motivation to aim for high school performance. Two respondents 
complained to me that political leaders such as the president of the country, 
provincial governors or mayors, are all non-Muslim. In this region it is 
particularly the case that there is a very limited chance for Muslim graduates to 
find a job in the state system while this is relatively easy for both Han and 
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Tibetans (Interview 010304, -09). One of them considered that this is caused by 
the ethnic difference between Han, Tibetans and Muslims, `that is to say, people 
tend to look down upon Hui (Muslim)' (Interview 010304, -09). 
The most direct factors that have reduced the motivation of Muslim students in 
the mainstream school are those from family and school. Many student informants 
thought that their parents are concerned about their study, though in very different 
ways. Few said that their parents either are directly engaged with their work 
through supervision or checking, 25 or buy whatever they thought might help their 
children with their study so long as they can afford it. There are also some parents 
who are just interested in the examination results of their children, and more 
likely to humiliate them for their poor performance. Some students told me that 
their parents do not care about their study, or are even unhappy that their 
daughters must go to school in the evening and can hardly find the time to help 
their family with housework. In other words, for parents, to send girls to school is 
usually not a consideration associated with academic achievement, 26 but rather, a 
concern with a possible negative impact on their daughters from the outside world 
if they were not safeguarded by the school. As an understandable result, there are 
few, if any, Muslim girls who are among the top Muslim achievers. As a whole, 
few students thought that their parents would be able to effectively help them with 
their study because they themselves have a very limited educational level. In other 
words, they have to rely entirely on teachers' instruction in school for a better 
performance. At the same time, they felt that their parents keep putting pressure 
on them by requiring them to work harder or complaining that they have worked 
or consumed too much but without benefiting the family. 
25 Though this was rarely the case given the fact that the parents of most Muslim students have 
received little or have not received school education. 
26 As a whole, female Muslim students do not seem to have a lower, but rather, a similar 
achievement compared to their male counterparts in my survey. One of the possible reasons might 
be that a number of Muslim girls have never attended school or dropped out at a very early stage, 
e. g. after two or three years study in primary schools while their brothers tend to stay much longer 
in schools. This is particularly the case in the ordinary Muslim families I interviewed. That the 
family needs someone to do housework when both parents have to stay away from home to earn 
money is one of the explanations. 
191 
Factors from inside the school 
Low perceptions of Muslim students 
The school, where students spend on average over 50 hours a week, has played 
the key role in shaping its students' attitude towards and performance in 
schooling. Why do Muslim students on the whole perform poorly in school? 
While other people gave a number of explanations, I heard little from Muslim 
students themselves. That is to say that on the one hand they tended to avoid 
invoking the explanations made by people from either mainstream or other ethnic 
minority groups, which are insulting in most cases. On the other hand, they 
themselves also tended not to comment on their achievement, usually say `I do 
not know' instead. This does not necessarily mean that among Muslims 
themselves, nobody shared the views of Han or other ethnic members to some 
extent about their school performance. Indeed, comments from non-Muslims are 
actually a key element shaping both non-Muslim perceptions and treatment of 
Muslims and Muslims' self-perceptions and have therefore significantly 
influenced their school performance. In this sense, apart from the similar 
examples given by parents that are mentioned earlier, it is worth quoting what a 
Muslim girl (M) explained when I (I) asked about Muslim academic achievement 
(Interview 010304): 
M: I feel that usually Muslims, anyway in my class, according to my observation, apart from X (a 
boy's name), all Hui students do not perform well. Normally it is Han students who perform well. 
I: Then why is this so? 
M: Everyone has said this that Hui are people born for trading business, but culture, that is studied 
by Han. All have said so. 
I: So what do you yourself think about this (comment on Hui)? 
M: I think, Han and Hui both are the same. Mainly because we Hui students, after hearing these 
(comments), do not seem to have confidence (in study, thus we do not perform well). 
This is particularly relevant to secondary school students who, compared to their 
primary counterparts, are much more aware of the image that is generated from 
other's perceptions and comments. Therefore understandably, almost without 
exception, the Muslim low achievers I interviewed told me that they had 
performed very well or not badly at the primary level, and did not know why they 
could not do the same after entering the secondary school. 27 What has in 
27 Some teachers claimed that Muslim students tend to perform poorly from the very beginning 
when they start to go to primary school due to the poor educational capital they can get from their 
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particular drawn my attention is the association of Han but not Hui with schooling 
(culture-studying), as in the quote from the Muslim girl above. On the part of 
Muslims, this has two implications: 1) if a Muslim performs well it would be 
regarded as acting Han; 2) if a Muslim cannot perform well it would be natural, 
i. e. not a problem because she or he is not supposed to have the obligation to do 
well. 
Thus, with reference to the school performance, Muslim students are perceived 
not to be able to perform well, and as a fact, they have largely performed poorly. 
This in turn has cultivated in non-Muslim teachers or students a negative 
perception, attitude or treatment of Muslim students. Although most of my 
respondents did not reckon that teachers were treating students differently because 
of the difference in ethnicity, but because of their school performance, some 
stories have obviously reflected the prejudice towards Muslims from teachers. 
When asked whether or not his teachers' view of him is different from his own, a 
boy who was the only Muslim student with high achievement in a class told me of 
a conversation which happened between him and the most understanding and 
open-minded teacher in his mind (Interview 010303): 
I think there is some difference (between my view and that of my teacher of me). When I 
transferred (from another school to this school) in the second semester, I was registering with 
teacher X. We were talking. She asked me which nationality I belong to, I said 'Salar (Muslim)', 
then she sighed. I was feeling (at that moment), this might be generated from the ethnic difference, 
(this) seems (to generate from) some sort of barrier (between different ethnic groups). Yes, it is. 
In my observation inside classrooms, one of the common scenes is that Muslim 
students are mainly concentrated at the back of classrooms. `The teacher arranges 
seats in the order of academic achievement. Higher achievers are arranged to sit in 
front of the classroom and lower achievers are behind. ' This is what all 
interviewees said to me. `We Hui usually sit behind... Han and Tibetans sit at the 
front... because we do not perform well' (Interview 010304). The main reason 
teachers make such an arrangement, according to my respondents, is that 
`... teachers do not want to take care of poor performers any more, and only hope 
that they would allow other students to study by disciplining themselves (in the 
family. In my informal observations, this is not the case, or at least not a phenomenon particularly 
associated with Muslims at the primary level. This no doubt needs to be explored further. 
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classroom)' (Interview 010308). `The teacher said to the poor performers: since 
you do not want to study hard, please just discipline yourselves, be a good person, 
so that you can receive a certificate (when graduating)' (Interview 010304). 
In this low view of poor students, these students are much less likely to be asked 
to answer questions in classrooms, and more unlikely to be believed when they 
have given a correct answer. Meanwhile, teachers tend to criticise them more 
often and cruelly (scolding or beating), and are more likely to ask them to send 
messages to their parents for a meeting with teachers, at which the students are 
complained about to their parents. This treatment has aroused complaints, 
reactions or rebellions among the students. They believed that it would help them 
with their confidence, motivation and performance if they sat at the front and 
were asked to answer questions more often; they also did not agree that all the 
students sitting behind were poor or bad. Some more radical actions are always 
taken by a few `brave' girls and many boys, ranging from making trouble in 
classrooms, playing truant to dropping out. This is why most official punishments 
I could find on the public notice board of the school had something to do with 
Muslim students. Sometimes there are Muslim students who are trying to make 
progress by disciplining and behaving themselves both inside and outside 
classrooms but who are still likely to be driven back to the `bad group' by 
teachers' careless punishment based on prejudice. A girl told me such a story 
about one of her fellow male students (Interview 010304): 
He is unlucky. He is recently trying to change himself, and making an effort to behave properly, 
but was asked again by the teacher to send his parents a message for a meeting with the teacher. 
He thus once again did not come to school recently. (Question: why did the teacher ask him to 
send the message to his parents if he was trying to change himself? ) Before he started to try to 
behave properly, he was always playing, chatting, eating (in the classroom) with those (Muslim) 
boys, and was discovered by the teacher. But he was making an effort after these things, but he 
was still asked to go to see the teacher for what happened in the past, and was asked to send a 
message to his parents. 
Cultural customs and the curriculum 
Religious practices of Muslims are also informally monitored by the school. 
Muslim boys are usually discouraged from wearing their religious caps. Teachers 
would ask them not to bring their religious things (zongjiao de clongri) to school, 
or would say that they do not look like a (serious) student in a Muslim cap, or 
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would simply scold them for making trouble (shiduo). One boy described what he 
encountered on registration day when he came to the school in his Muslim cap 
(Interview 010306). 
When I went to the school for registration, I was wearing a (Muslim) cap, and then it seemed that 
one of the teachers (after seeing me in the cap) said: `the students (i. e. the Muslim students) from 
the street district (i. e. the old town) usually do not study hard. Do not register him! ' Then I took 
off the cap, and was registered... (Question: so why did you put on your cap when going to 
register? ) At that time I did not know (that it was discouraged to put on Muslim caps in this 
school). When I was studying in the First Primary, because the school is in the old town, I had 
been used to wearing (the cap). All (Muslim) pupils wore (their caps there), so I also did the same. 
I did not know (about capping) when I came to the new town (where the secondary school he is 
studying in is located)... However now nobody wears his cap, there are 23 Muslim students in my 
class (about half of the class), none of us wears it. 28 
Another clash that occurs between Muslim students and the school is about 
Muslim holidays. Muslim students said it is unfair that whilst the school had 
holidays for the Han and Tibetan new years, it requires them to go to school in 
Muharram. 29 As Muslim parents also tend to support children asking for leave in 
Muharram, I was told that students then took a more open and collective action 
against the school policy when told by teachers that they must stay in school. 
They collectively played truant that day. As expected, they were punished by their 
teachers when coming back to school. They were asked either to stand outside the 
classroom for several hours, or to write a self-criticism letter. 30 
They also felt uncomfortable about the curriculum. 31 They complained that there 
is little content concerning their ethnic religion or culture. Many of them were 
also not satisfied with the content because it is too simple and boring for the 
students who are interested in their ethnic culture, and false and a waste of time 
for the students who are not keen on religious issues. Due to the irrelevance of the 
28 I noticed that there were some Muslim boys wearing caps when I arrived in the school on my 
first day. Interestingly enough, most Muslim boys I interviewed in the junior third year or senior 
first year were unaware of this phenomenon when I pointed it out to them. After close observation 
in the following several months, I found that the boys in caps were largely from the first two 
years, i. e. the junior first or second years. One explanation is that the older Muslim boys prefer 
fashion to `conservative' customs of their community; another is that students in the more senior 
stage are disciplined more strictly, which it is believed could help them better concentrate on 
study. 
29 The Tibetan New Year roughly coincides with the Chinese New Year. 
30 After this `accident', the school official passed a policy that Muslim students will be allowed to 
leave for half a day for Muharram in the future. 
31 Gladney (1999) attributes the reluctance of Muslims in schooling primarily to the exclusive and 
negative curriculum of Islamic knowledge and the mixed sex school environment. This seems to 
be a more complicated issue to me, as can be seen from the arguments presented here. 
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curriculum to their culture, some of them would show enthusiasm, motivation and 
confidence when coming across such content in textbooks. `Last semester we 
touched upon the Koran in a history lesson...! usually do not understand history 
well, when talking about that (the Koran), because I myself knew it, and then it 
seemed that I suddenly became confident, that kind of feeling' (Interview 
010302). At the same time, some other students would rather invest most of their 
time and energy in science subjects, less ideologically directed ones, although this 
may not be an ideal option. One of the students, when explaining the reason why 
the school curriculum incorporated little Islamic culture, said (Interview 010308): 
The school does not promote these (Muslim culture and customs). Teachers, they do not have this 
habit... They consider that these things of ours, for instance, Buddhism or Islam of Tibetans or 
Muslims, all are superstitious. Although (they know) they are religious beliefs, (they think) they 
are still a bit superstitious. 
The linguistic issue also precludes them from full engagement in school study. 
They claimed that the local dialect they speak is `gaidao hua' (street language), 
which is different from putong hua (Mandarin Chinese). In the school all the 
students are required to speak Mandarin, especially in class. They described their 
embarrassment when they have to answer questions in Mandarin in class, because 
some of them feel this is acting Han while others feel unconfident and worried 
about the possibility of being teased by fellow students or criticised by teachers. 
This is particularly difficult for those who previously were students in the County 
Secondary, where they were allowed to answer questions in class or communicate 
with teachers in the local dialect because a high proportion of students as well as 
teachers in the school were Muslim. 
The relationship between Muslim and other students 
Another important reason why they felt uncomfortable in school is the 
relationship between themselves and the students from other ethnic backgrounds. 
Most of them told me that they tend to make contact with their Muslim fellows 
rather than Ilan or others when asked about their preference in making friends. 
They gave different explanations for this preference. Some thought that some Han 
students are too self-confident about their assumed high quality. They therefore 
would not like to make contact with Muslim students although some Muslims said 
196 
that they were willing to make friends with Han if Han accepted them. However 
the reality seems quite the reverse. `Sometimes Han students spend time with Han 
students, and do not do so with us. Sometimes they do not want to tell us when we 
are asking them questions (in some subjects)... When playing football, we are 
divided into two teams, one is Han and the other is Muslim... (I think) sometimes 
they look down upon us' (Interview 010307). 
This lack of understanding of Muslim students among non-Muslims can also be 
seen in some verbal insults directed at Muslim students. Some non-Muslims 
deliberately make a connection between Muslim students and Iraq, a negative 
image in their mind, during the Iraq War. Moreover, like their parents, they felt 
that bullying towards Muslim students is common, particularly that from Tibetans 
to Muslim boys. The bullying usually would develop into physical violence 
between Tibetan and Muslim boys, within and without the school. `Tibetans are 
just violent. ' 'They seem to be the principal enemy (of ours). ' These are common 
remarks in their comments on Tibetans. A girl said this is because that `some 
Muslims are very pious about their religion, and very honest. Some Tibetans or 
Ilan do not like these customs of Muslims... They are only used to their own 
lifestyle, belief or religion, and thus do not like ours, just (because they) are not 
accustomed (to ours)' (Interview 010311). 
On the other hand, Muslim students preferred to spend time with their Muslim 
fellow students. Some explained that they have stayed with their Muslim fellow 
students from a very young age because their families live in the same district, the 
old town, and also because they share the same language and religious customs 
with their Muslim fellow students. All these factors would make it easier for them 
to understand each other and more congenial for them to spend time together. I 
pointed out that the 'language' they speak is one of many Chinese dialects, which 
can be understood by many Chinese speakers across the country in spite of some 
potential difficulties caused by different accents. Moreover, the local Han also 
speak this dialect. Even so, they still emphasised that all the Han people, both 
teachers and students, tend to adopt standard Mandarin Chinese over the local 
dialect wherever this is possible. Given the high social status of Mandarin in 
China and the llan's overly high perception of themselves mentioned above, 
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Ban's preference for Mandarin Chinese is not difficult to understand. Hence, 
Mandarin was regarded as the language of Han, i. e. that of the `Other' from the 
Muslim perspective, and the local dialect was thought to be the language of 
Muslims, i. e. that of `Us'. In this light, they told me that they usually speak the 
local dialect because `anyway we spend time with Muslims... and usually do not 
speak Mandarin. If (we) speak to strangers or teachers, (we) will definitely use 
Mandarin' (Interview 010304). 
To sum up, the Muslim students felt uncomfortable in the school system. This is 
because they are perceived to be poor academic performers and trouble-makers, 
who are believed to tend to flout the regulations and rules of the school. The 
school also restricts them in religious practice and in the use of dialect, and 
provides little Islamic knowledge in the curriculum. The discrimination or 
bullying from students of other ethnic groups makes their stay in the school 
unsafe, which further exacerbates their negative situation in the school. 
The influence of modern cultural values 
Muslim students are also inevitably influenced by the epidemic which is modern 
cultural values. They are keen on music, painting, sports, fashion, internet, 
studying abroad, individual development, 32 or even shouting, smoking, drinking 
or sex, though to a lesser extent. Correspondingly, they have revealed less interest 
and knowledge in their religion-centred ethnic culture while all parents, as I was 
told, are concerned that their children study Islamic culture, although some of 
them do not feel it is so important or urgent to familiarise their children with the 
ethnic culture. These choices in modern cultural values, as they put it, are always 
discouraged or strongly criticised and opposed by either their parents or teachers, 
or both. However, they usually do not share the same opinion with either their 
teachers or their parents. They said that they are in the 21" century, they like 
being pretty or fashionable. They rebuked their parents as feudalistic, their 
teachers as too strict controllers. 
3' When explaining %%hy Muslim parents are not keen to keep their children 
in school after 
compulsory education, a boy offered this analysis: to go to school for some 
basic knowledge will 
benefit the family in business. More knowledge is not necessary for family business but good for 
the individual development of students in the future. So parents will not encourage them to study 
further even if they themselves might like to (Interview 010306). 
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This is particularly salient in the case of Muslim girls. Beside the viewpoints 
mentioned above shared by both girls and boys, when talking about family or 
community life, some girls were unhappy with the lower level of attention their 
parents paid to them than that to their male siblings regarding schooling, and with 
stricter control over their freedom. They said that because their parents consider 
that boys would have a promising future, and girls are not as good as boys; a girl 
should not go out, particularly in the evening. Rather, she should stay at home 
helping the family with housework (Interview 010301, -09). They also did not 
feel contented about the very limited opportunity for them to become a Mullah in 
mosques, which they considered to have reduced their career chances, although 
few of them showed interest in attending religious activities in the Mosque. `Girls 
over 13 years old are not allowed to appear in Mosques unless they are in a veil. ' 
They all attributed their absence from the Mosque to Muslim customs. 33 
In school, in sharp contrast to Muslim boys' attitude towards caps, none of them 
showed willingness to wear a headscarf. While they laid the blame on school 
discouragement of ethno-religious practice, they also explicitly expressed their 
disgust at wearing headscarves. Two girls explained: 
If you are a Muslim, you come to school in a headscarf... everyone will.. . tease you by saying 'disgusting, in a headscarfl'... So nobody (wears it), all of us care for face (ai mianzi)... Muslims 
themselves will also certainly say so: 'what? Wearing a headscarf in the school, in the classroom? 
Arc you mad? ' (Interview 010304) 
(That is) normal (for boys to wear) Muslim caps. (Fellow students) will not laugh at this... That is 
just a cap. If girls come along in headscarves, they will definitely laugh... When a girl is wearing a 
headscarf, w hat (we) will feel about it is: oh, a nanny is coming in (laughing)! (Interview 010308) 
Some girls admitted that this keenness on modem cultural values particularly 
among girls has distracted them from school study. When I asked why they are 
more attracted by these things than school study, they tended to say `I do not 
know' or 'the study in the school is too much and too boring', without particular 
" One student respondent told me that in his hometown in Gansu province, quite a number of 
female Muslims went to study in some mosques in the Linxia Hui Autonomous 
Prefecture, the 
traditionally cultural centre of Muslims in the Gansu-Ningxia-Qinghai borderlands, or Lanzhou, 
the capital of Gansu. A few of them, usually those who started to study earlier, 
became Mullahs; 
most of them went back home to play the same role of mother, wife or 
daughter in their family. 
The only difference before and after their study in mosques is that they may start to 
instruct their 
children or husband in the Islamic knowledge they acquired. 
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reference to girls. However, when speaking about the reason why they do not 
perform well in schools, a girl told me: `anyway people all are saying this that 
after entering secondary school, boys perform well but all the girls have slowed 
down, fallen behind' (Interview 010304). 34 
Conclusion 
The Muslims living in this region lack the social capital in relation to the state 
system, which is the preferred choice in terms of career for its power to guarantee 
a higher socio-economic status and financially secured life. Meanwhile, they also 
possess very limited cultural capital that will provide their children studying in 
mainstream schools with strong foundations. Therefore, education, the major way 
to achieve upward social mobility, becomes irrelevant to Muslims to a large 
extent. As a response, Muslims show little motivation, enthusiasm for and 
confidence in state education. Furthermore, their economic capital in which they 
traditionally stood ahead is being diminished because of the lack of 
competitiveness in a knowledge economy society. This competitiveness is derived 
from the social and cultural capital, and more directly, educational capital. This 
loss of economic capital in return undermines the other forms of capital among 
Muslims. In the course of losing capitals, community forces (Ogbu and Simons 
1995)35 have played the role of an initial dynamic that does not make school 
education a priority while this is the absolute priority nationwide, both at the 
governmental and the individual levels. The experiences of the Muslim students 
in the mainstream school have exacerbated the lack of motivation, enthusiasm for 
and confidence in schooling to the point of reluctance. This reluctance is 
grounded in their shared pessimistic expectations with their parents about their 
socio-economic status in the future, and in the prejudice and hostility they have 
received from individuals as well as institutions. The fundamental cause of the 
marginalised status of Muslims is that Muslims are still regarded as `Other' both 
institutionally and individually (also see the next chapter) in many ways, although 
they have been settled in China, particularly in the northwest, for several 
34 Also see footnote 33. "Ogbu develops similar theoretical models in his other works though he does not necessarily 




centuries. One of my respondents evaluated the situation Chinese Muslims are in 
as follows (Interview 030203): 
(For Chinese), Islam is an imported religion, (Muslims) are not Chinese nation (zhonghua minzu). 
The state defined 56 ethnic groups, this is just to do Muslims honour. (It) only calls for unity of 
the 56 ethnic groups, but has not really given Muslims (as plenty of) preferential policies (as it has 
given to many other ethnic minority groups)... (The state) speaks `we descendants of Yan and 
Huang emperors (Yan Huang zisun)... 9}6 which is implying that you (i. e. Muslims) are not Yan 
Huang zisun. It reveals a tone of discrimination... (The state) has brought (some preferential) 
policies to you, provided your children with education, and let you have plenty to cat and drink, 
but still regards you as outsiders (haishi ba ni dang wairen). 
Muslims in this region are hardly identified by the larger society as Chinese (Han) 
people unless they sinicise themselves, involuntarily or voluntarily, like many of 
their compatriots in China proper, by substantially hiding or removing their ethno- 
religious markers as many cases showed earlier. This oppression is more apparent 
among those who strongly encourage their children to study hard by emulating the 
Han model, and correspondingly do not regard it as appropriate to go to school 
with a recognisable Muslim appearance. A parent, when explaining why he did 
not encourage his child to go to school in his Muslim cap, said (Interview 
030201): 
Here is a multiethnic area, Han and Tibetans do not consider this (Islam) is important, and 
meanwhile if they see a Muslim wearing a white cap, they will have some discomfort in mind due 
to the symbolic difference emerging through capping between Muslims and non-Muslims; 
furthermore, after class, fellow students will be driven by their curiosity to ask about the meaning 
of capping, about holidays, customs of Islam, and then about Muslims themselves, many 
questions. So if Muslim students do not wear caps, other children will not have such ideas as who 
is Han, who is Tibetan or who is Muslim. There will not exist such a kind of clash. 
By and large, the Muslims' status quo, and further, their community forces, have 
been formulated in relation to the social system of public institutions (both 
schools and otherwise), to the majority community (also see the next chapter), as 
well as to other minority communities (the Tibetan in this case). In other words, 
when they have advantages as Chinese speakers and urban dwellers, they are 
quite ghettoised in the Chinese Han context of the larger society by the state, the 
majority and other minority communities. Ghettoisation has deprived them of 
both bridging and linking social capital largely as a result of their lack of Han 
36 Legendary rulers of China in remote antiquity. This is taken to rcfcr to ancestors of the Chinese 
people. 
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(non-linguistic) cultural capital. In the meantime, this ghettoisation also means 
that except for external constraints, the community lacks positive bonding social 
capital that is supposed in general to be able to benefit ghetto residents and assist 
social mobility. This is in particular the case in some Muslims' fear of 
sectarianism among the community so that they would rather hand over their 
cultural rights to the state in their call for a Muslim school. This is also true when 
their elites try to encourage their community to stress education, an effort which 
fails to prevent the continuing neglect of education among the Muslim masses as 
a result of the continuing exclusion of their culture from the mainstream society. 
This is in particular salient when compared to the Tibetan whose members have 
been mobilised in political, economic and educational arenas as illustrated in the 
previous and this chapters. This is the very reason that minority communities are 
divided into ethnic ghettos and enclaves in terms of (bonding) social capital 
(Loury, Modood & Teles 2005) that parallel the Muslim and Tibetan cases 
respectively in this study. 
In a word, the Muslim status has been forged by external forces not only at a 
macro level of public institutions, but also at a micro level in relation to both the 
majority and other minority communities. Furthermore, this status has also been 
maintained by `the damaging form' of its bonding social capital (ibid.: 13). They 
therefore are placed in the position of a minority of minorities. As a consequence, 
Muslims have still to struggle over whether or not it is worth engaging themselves 
more in state education by investing significant energy and finance in it. It seems 
to be predictable that they will not become more motivated, enthusiastic and 
confident if they cannot see the social system delivering significant or substantive 
improvement with regard to the social and cultural recognition and 
accommodation of their community as a whole. In addition, Muslim school 
performance also hinges on whether or not, or to what extent, both parents and 
teachers recognise and accommodate the pursuit of modern cultural values 
prevailing among Muslim students so as to make an effort to reconcile the 
community tradition and the school culture with modern values. 
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Chapter Eight 
The Mainstream Discursive Repertoires 
of Muslims and Tibetans 
Introduction 
Minorities' evaluations of their status in society against the mainstream as 
presented in the previous two chapters could be biased in favour of their 
communities. It is, therefore, necessary to invite the mainstream group's view on 
minorities to serve as a point of comparison with ethnic minority narratives. ' This 
chapter looks at how the mainstream group in the school, both teachers and 
students, perceive Tibetan and Muslim minority communities and students. 
Through close scrutiny of the similarities and differences in the mainstream 
group's perception of Tibetans and Muslims, it will decipher the discursive 
repertoires in which the ideological agenda or discourse of integrating minorities 
into the mainstream develops. The relationship between discourse and discursive 
repertoire can be understood in the way that the study of discourse aims at the 
discovery and theorization of pattern and order. To achieve this goal, suggests 
Wetherell (2001), we need to explore three main domains or discursive repertoires 
in which discourse proceeds: the study of social interaction order or the nature of 
social action that is the fundamental building block of social life and social 
science; the study of social actors that is associated with minds, selves and sense- 
making; and finally, the study of culture and social relations or the historical and 
institutional features of discourse. In doing so, we can see how contesting or 
messy discursive repertoires are actually proceeding along the lines of the pattern 
1 While there are some studies focusing on ethnic minorities' perceptions of state policy and/or the 
mainstream group's treatment of them (e. g. Gladney 1996,1997,1999,2004; Hansen 1999; 
Harrell 2001; Lee 2001; Postiglione 1999; Safran 1998; Schein 2000), fewer studies look at Ilan 
perspectives on the basis of interviews with Han about ethnic minorities, but usually analyse ways 
in which media, publications or state policy, etc. treat ethnic minorities instead. In 2001 'the first 
thoroughgoing study of Han perspectives about minorities' (Gladney. See the back cover of Blum 
2001) was published. Given the heterogeneity and diversity within the 'Han' category (see Blum 
2001, Gladney 2004) and the 'Han' discursive repertoires, it is certainly in need of conducting 
substantial and detailed case studies concerning Han perspectives about ethnic minorities. 
Meanwhile, as far as I am concerned, the kind of studies combining both minority perspectives 
about Han and Han perspectives about minorities, and to a lesser extent, minority perspectives 
about other minorities, has not appeared in publications. 
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or order of power that underlies discourse. This chapter concentrates on the 
second domain of social actors that is coupled by the other two domains in this 
chapter and others (chapters four, five, six and seven). 
In this chapter, the mainstream ideological agenda is embedded in a familiar 
discourse of culturalism and social evolution that locates the Han and its culture 
on the top of the progressive ladder and is therefore, regarded as more advanced 
than both Tibetan and Islamic cultures, though in different senses (see chapters 
four and five). In the meantime, different members of the mainstream group 
show differential degrees of knowledge and recognition of minority communities. 
Unfortunately, this cannot change the fact that minority communities as a whole 
are still expected by the mainstream group members to make considerable cultural 
improvements if they want to significantly change the stereotypes that have long 
existed in the mainstream group's mind. In other words, they need to acquire the 
cultural capital that is believed to be the prerequisite for the knowledge and 
`quality' (suzhi, lit. essential character. Also see chapter four) on which the right 
direction for the development of society is supposed to be based. 
In Section One, I look at the mainstream group's evaluation of minority school 
performance in the form of their school attendance, dropout tendencies and 
academic achievement. Two separate pictures are sketched with regard to the 
Tibetan and the Muslim communities, which delineate the mainstream's 
differential perceptions of them as community forces influencing their children's 
school performance. Section Two examines the status of minority cultures and 
people within schools by looking at three dimensions: minority cultures and the 
curriculum, school policy on minority cultural practice, and the relationship 
between the mainstream group and minority students. Section Three explores the 
mainstream group's discursive repertoires about minority people and cultures. 
This is approached from four dimensions: the mainstream group's appeal for 
minority cultures; dispensable minority cultures; the mainstream group's 
perception of Islam and Muslims vis-ä-vis the Han and their culture; and the 
mainstream group's perception of Buddhism and Tibetans in relation to the Han 
and their culture. Reflecting on the previous analyses, I conclude in Section Four 
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by probing the fundamental idea that underlies and forges the mainstream's 
perception of minority communities. 
Minority school performance and community forces 
School performance 
In the mainstream school, both attendance and dropout rates are not a serious 
concern among teachers. All the teachers interviewed showed their satisfaction 
with these rates although some claimed there are still a few cases of truancy or 
dropping out. However, most teachers clearly expressed the view that the cases 
are more likely to occur with minority students, especially Muslim students. In 
their explanations, some thought that the main reason why Muslim students 
appear to be more visibly disruptive in behaviour is that the Tongren County 
School was annexed to the Huangnan Prefecture School in 2002, which brought 
in a large number of Muslim students to join in the merged school (Interviews 
020102, -0202). Similarly, most of the teachers reported that minority students 
have a lower academic achievement on average, and Muslim students are 
2 particularly more unlikely to have higher achievement. 
In the case of the Tibetan students in the mainstream school, there seems to be a 
polarised tendency according to teacher respondents. Some students study very 
hard and are either among the top students across ethnic groups, or their 
achievements do not correspond to their efforts. Some others are simply at the 
bottom of the achievement ladder, mainly due to `being lazy'. When it comes to 
Tibetan minority school students, without exception, all the teachers believed that 
the Tibetans in minority schools perform poorly compared to their ordinary 
school counterparts. This has two indicators. The separate school students are of 
low quality (suzhi cha), i. e. of disruptive behaviour. They tend to come to blows, 
to get drunk, or to wear eccentric clothes, to make noise, etc. In a word, they 
severely lack discipline. On the other hand, their academic achievement is also 
`lower by several levels' in comparison to mainstream school students, 
particularly in science subjects (Interview 020103). Given the fact that the 
2 While official school attendance and dropout rates are not available to me, the information of 
academic outcome of different ethnic group students can be found in Table 8 (page 276). However 
there is not the corresponding information available regarding minority schools. 
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majority of Tibetan students are studying in minority rather than mainstream 
schools, the Tibetan school performance in Huangnan as a whole is lower than the 
mainstream group students. In other words, the number of Tibetan students with 
high achievement (in the mainstream school) is very limited and hence cannot 
represent the Tibetan school performance as a whole in the region. 3 
The system 
A range of factors determines the `low quality' and low achievement of minority 
students. In the case of the mainstream school, a few teachers alleged that the 
school policy might be unfair on minority students. This unfair policy is usually 
driven by the pursuit of high scores of students, which is directly linked to the 
benefits teachers are entitled to. The school designates different ratios of students 
who meet certain score levels in some key examinations, such as national college 
entrance examinations or regional entrance examinations for senior secondary 
schools. Teachers complained that they have to try every way to meet designated 
ratios, and face salary deductions if they fail to meet these targets, as a form of 
punishment. They also admitted that, as a result, students face high pressure from 
their teachers who will punish them physically or otherwise if they do not satisfy 
teachers with expected scores. These are apparently similar views to those held by 
minorities presented in the previous two chapters. Under this pressure, students' 
enthusiasm and motivation for school study tend to be undermined considerably. 
Even so, to be included in the ratio group by teachers is still desirable to students 
(though there is no visible line explicitly drawn by teachers between the ratio 
group members and the excluded). 4 This will significantly help guarantee the 
3 Again, there is no relevant information regarding minority schools is available. However, 
according to the minority school officials, their students usually enter local minority universities, 
which set lower entry requirements than regular or mainstream universities do. Meanwhile, there 
are about one thousand and five hundred Tibetan students studying in three secondary minority 
schools in the region, while only about some seventy or eighty studying in the mainstream school. 
Also sec chapters six and seven. 
4 Indeed, this in theory may cause confusion among students with regard to whether or not they are 
included in the ratio group. In reality this is rarely the case. The most important way through 
which both students and teachers get to know, though may be inaccurately, the division between 
the included and excluded is to look at publicised league tables of each half-of-semester (qi: hong) 
and end-of-semester (qimo) examinations. Since there is rarely dramatic change with regard to 
ranking of students on different league tables, and at the same time the school official designates 
certain ratio to each class, it is not difficult for teachers to select corresponding ratio of 
`cultivatable' students from the class. Nevertheless, there is still a buffet zone between high and 
low achievers where a certain number of students are situated. These students are usually expected 
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high achievement of the selected students while not being selected simply means 
that teachers abandon some students from `cultivation' (peiyang). As minority 
students usually do not perform better, or do significantly poorly, there are only 
few individuals who are included in the ratio group for `cultivation' as teachers in 
fact have been forced by the school policy to do so (Interview 020104). In short, 
due to the low academic achievement of minority students in general, they are 
most likely to be abandoned by their teachers. This is true, in relation to 
classroom study primarily, and in disciplining with the consequence that many 
drop out without the teacher making any effort to keep them in the school 
(Interviews 020102, -04). 
A few teachers also partially attributed poor minority school performance to the 
societal environment. This is particularly connected to the Muslim students. They 
explained that nowadays the government does not allocate jobs to college 
graduates as it used to do. The new policy affects parents in that it becomes quite 
pointless to send children to colleges or universities. `Because many Hui are 
ordinary families (i. e. no people work in the state system), from a social relations 
perspective, they do not have a strong background. They are hence relatively 
realistic' (Interview 020104). This means that Muslim parents do not believe that 
it will make difference whether or not their children hold a college degree - they 
anyway are very unlikely to find a job after graduation, unless they have got the 
kind of social connections with the state system as many Han and some Tibetans 
do. It is thus unnecessary to keep children in (particularly senior secondary) 
schools, which will expectedly lead them to college. 5 
Teachers also claimed that the school policy formulated for minority schools is 
not as strict as that in the mainstream school although it has still to focus on 
to perform as well as possible, and therefore will be monitored by teachers rather than be 
excluded. 
5 This is also a consensus among Muslim parents and students as my interviews with them 
showed. They complained about the 'unfairness' in finding a job in the state system. They thought 
that due to a lack of connections with state work units, when Muslim students are equally good 
school performers compared to their Han or Tibetan peers, they are very unlikely to be offered a 
job in the state system in competition with the latter. For further information with regard to the 
social status/background of Tibetans and Muslims, and how this affects their competitiveness in 
the labour market in general, and in recruitment by the state system in particular, see chapters six 
and seven. 
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college entrance examinations. They explained that this is in tune with the 
government policy of positive discrimination that is characterised by relatively 
lower requirements for college entrance examinations for minority students. At 
the same time, the positive discrimination policy also means that minority schools 
receive more funding from the government. 6 The positive discrimination policy is 
regarded as producing less academic pressure but a relatively secured financial 
situation for minority schools. This factor, said teacher respondents, has 
undermined the dynamic of the quality of education in minority schools. 
7 
Another factor is related to teachers. According to my respondents, the 
government assigns teachers of higher educational levels (automatically coupled 
with `higher quality' in their minds) to mainstream schools and those of lower 
levels to minority schools. A lower educational level can also be caused by cases 
like teachers not doing what they have been trained in (xuefeisuoyong). One 
extreme example I was told about is that a college graduate who studied fine arts 
was assigned to a Tibetan village school to teach English. `How can he improve 
himself? And how can he enhance the quality of his students? ' (Interview 
020104). 
Community forces 
However, the dominant view that teachers have is that the poor performance of 
minority students in both the mainstream and minority schools is owing to the 
educational level and/or the attitude of their families that have decisively affected 
minority school performance. In other words, while attributing poor minority 
school performance to a variety of elements, they regarded community forces as 
being fundamentally responsible for the poor minority school performance. 
6 There is no such 'extra' funding for ordinary schools regardless of whether or not these schools 
have minority students or how many they have. On the other hand, minority students from 
mainstream schools are equally entitled to sitting college entrance examinations catered for 
minorities. This means that they can take relatively easy examinations, and enter, mostly, minority 
universities that set out lower entry requirements than mainstream universities. However, minority 
students from mainstream schools tend to sit nationally standard examinations so long as they 
consider they are capable to try. This choice will lead them to study in mainstream universities 
rather than minority ones, and therefore allow them to stand on an advanced footing in the labour 
market compared to their counterparts from minority universities. Another reason that they want to 
enter mainstream universities is that most of them can speak very limited mother tongue Tibetan, 
since they are sent to mainstream primary schools or even kindergartens by their, mostly, cadre 
parents. 
Head-teachers in the minority schools in the Longwu area complained that more financial aids 
went to minority schools in more impoverished and remote areas, which produced less 
effectiveness. 
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Tibetan students usually face linguistic barriers in the first instance, which make it 
difficult for them to study efficiently and effectively in schools. To overcome this 
barrier, it was said that the majority of Tibetan cadres8 have sent their children to 
mainstream schools ever since they started schooling, either in the prefecture or 
elsewhere. Moreover, these cadre Tibetan parents also pay close attention to their 
children's study. However, this cannot guarantee good performance. One of the 
important reasons is that, as many teachers told me, students who do not study 
hard feel that since their parents are government officials or other kinds of cadre, 
they can have a job anyway after leaving school. This can be done through their 
parents' social connections, which are rooted in the social status that derives from 
working in the state system. As a result, these children might become very 
careless about their study. 
Nonetheless, that some Tibetan parents do not share the same value of sending 
children to Han schools, said my teacher respondents. Quite the reverse, what 
these parents have in mind is that `I want to preserve my own culture' (Interview 
020102), so they send their children to minority schools. More than this, 
according to my teacher respondents, they even also want all the local Han people 
to learn Tibetan. This is because in this prefecture there are a large number of 
Tibetans. They consider themselves to be the dominant group, nor do they reckon 
themselves to be inferior to the Han as they did in the past. Furthermore, 
government policy also encourages and stresses the development of ethnic 
minority education. As a result, I was told, there are relatively many Tibetan 
minority schools in the prefecture. 9 However, the real number of Tibetan parents 
working in the state system who have sent children to minority schools is small, 
`the majority is rural' (Interview 020203, -04). 
Indeed, as all the teachers in both the mainstream and minority schools I 
interviewed said, Tibetan children who attend minority schools usually come 
8 People working in the state work units regardless of their occupation, government officials or 
manual workers. For more information concerning 'cadre' and its opposite 'ordinary people', see 
chapter six, footnote 6. 
9 In 2003 when I was doing research there, there are three secondary and two primary Tibetan 
minority schools, and one secondary and two primary mainstream schools in the township. For a 
developmental chart of minority education in the region, sec chapters six and seven, and l-IZZBW 
(1999). 
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from rural areas with limited `merit', which makes their study especially 
inefficient and ineffective, although as a matter of fact the majority of the Tibetan 
school students are very studious, as all the teachers reported. These Tibetan 
students do not speak Chinese well due to the background of their own language. 
Their comprehension of school subjects is poor too. This is because they lack a 
foundation in what is being taught in schools, to which they were underexposed in 
their rural environment before moving to secondary minority schools. In addition, 
some teachers also explained that their parents cannot help in any way due to 
illiteracy or a low educational level. At the same time, the secondary minority 
school students are usually required to board in the school; it has become 
impossible for their parents to monitor their study even if they had the intellectual 
capacity. It was believed all of that would become severe barriers for Tibetan 
students to achieve highly. At the same time, some teachers also believed that the 
relatively loose school discipline and lack of parents around make it easy for 
some Tibetan school children to go out drinking or making trouble. These factors 
make it difficult for them to devote themselves to school study. 
Compared to the comments on Tibetans that largely focus on linguistic and 
cognitive issues, teachers perceived that Muslim community forces are more 
complicated and deep-rooted, so harder to eliminate. Whilst there are both 
Tibetan and Muslim students in the mainstream school, the former are children of 
cadres, `though they are Tibetans'; unlike Tibetan students, the latter `have 
parents of self-employed businesspeople' and live in the old town, `which is 
simply a Muslim village' (Interview 020103). This difference results in distinctive 
attitudes towards schooling as I was told. Whereas Tibetan cadres were said to 
pay close attention to their children's education, Muslim parents are busy making 
money everyday, and do not have time to contribute to their children's study. This 
shortage of time becomes more serious when children are from a single parent 
family. A teacher inferred that because Muslims are travelling around frequently 
for business, it easily invites marriage crises and finally leads to divorce (ibid. ). 
Divorce is more likely to leave mothers looking after their children on their own. 
A female teacher sympathetically pointed out that this is particularly difficult for 
Muslim girls who are studying in schools. They are more likely to be asked to 
withdraw from schools when the family needs someone to help with housework; 
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moreover, Muslim girls have to stay at home doing whatever they can while their 
male siblings can relatively easily go out to find a job when their single mother 
cannot afford their study anymore. 
Furthermore, Muslim parents are also said not to be enthusiastic for education. 
One teacher told me about a consensus among teachers with regard to Muslim 
parents (Interview 020202): 
They (teachers) say that at home (Muslim) parents tell (children), `you just go to school like this, 
no need to work hard. It would be fine so long as you will have a certificate in hand when you 
graduate from Junior Three (chusan, the final year of compulsory education). Just learn some 
(Chinese) characters, then go to do business. ' Parents speak to children in this way very directly, 
and then they (children) do not work hard. 
Other teachers held a similar view of Muslim parents. They all thought that it is 
not good for Muslim children to have parents who have their own business, which 
is actually spoiling Muslim children by fostering laziness among them. Muslim 
children will think that their families have a shop, or a restaurant, where they can 
always go to do something after graduation, or even without graduating. `It is 
anyway not the end of the world' (Interview 020102). Under such circumstances, 
teachers deemed that Muslims are driven by the idea of material benefit, and all 
other things should run around this life goal. Guided by this goal, teachers 
concluded that Muslim parents also tend not to send children to kindergarten (a 
place that is regarded by mainstream parents as a significant starting point of the 
socialisation of their children), which is more useless for the skills their business 
needs, and just involves spending money. In the same vein, teachers also 
considered that for Muslim parents, to send children to schools is also merely to 
enable them to acquire basic literacy and numeracy knowledge that will equip 
them with basic (and enough for Muslim parents) skills for business. On the other 
hand, schools are also regarded as serving as a `nursery' that can keep their 
children away from an increasingly unhealthy and chaotic societal environment. 
This `nursery' idea has particularly annoyed and insulted some teachers, who 
defined this as `typical' Muslim thought (interview 020104). In a word, Muslim 
parents were blamed for having no lofty ideals, and so no enthusiasm for the 
education of their children. 
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Teachers believed that Muslim parents are not keen to provide their children with 
education. This is largely because of their own low educational level (mei shenºne 
wenhua, lit. have little culture). Whilst Muslim fathers were reported usually to 
have low educational levels, Muslim mothers were thought not to have received 
school education at all and so are illiterate (wenmang, lit. script blind). 10 With 
such a poor educational background, some Muslim mothers in particular only 
know the jingming of their children (lit. sutra name, i. e. nicknames of their 
children that are derived from Koran), but not their formal names, as I was told. " 
A teacher gave me an example to justify her argument, which happened in a 
parent-teacher meeting (Interview 020104): 
There was one parent who struck me most. She ran to me, with the grade report form (of the class) 
and said: 'teacher, could you have a look for me at where my child (his name) is (on the report 
form)? ' Can you guess how she held the form? She simply held it upside down. Then I said: 
`parent, your kid is here. ' I reversed the form to show her. 
This inadequate educational level among Muslim parents, their little enthusiasm 
for but pragmatic attitude to education, are all believed to have been a seed-bed 
for the lack of motivation of their offspring for education. Community forces are 
perceived to have played such a negative force in the education of Muslim 
children that some teachers claimed that even though some individual Muslim 
students have good school performance, this has not been on account of their 
parents (Interview 020203). On the other hand, teachers judged, even Muslim 
students who would like to do well because they have realised the importance of 
education cannot understand this as deeply as Han students. They simply do not 
have parents who hold positive view towards education. Eventually, according to 
a teacher, all the negative community forces lead to Muslim children's inferiority 
complex in schooling. 
10 Also see Table 7 (page 275). 
" One of the possible reasons of ignorance of their children's formal names among Muslim 
mothers is that formal names are usually given by fathers, which just serve to enrol in schools. In 
fact in Chinese, formal name is termed as 'school name' (xueming). Relatedly, school names of 
Muslim students have nothing to do with their nicknames but an imitation of the Ilan naming 
tradition. Given the close connection between the (Chinese) naming and its cultural tradition, it is 
not surprising that Muslim children's formal names are difficult, and also unnecessary, for 
illiterate Muslim mothers to (fully) understand or memorise. 
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Han students also echoed their teachers' evaluations about their Tibetan and 
Muslim fellow students. For instance, they pointed out to me that both Tibetan 
and Muslim students are similarly easily influenced by people in the wider society 
in a negative way. The explanations they gave for this tendency among minority 
students are that their minority peers want to repress others when they go out to 
make friends who are hooligans in society (the evidence of their moral 
inferiority), or they feel free outside the school (the evidence of their lack of 
discipline). One student further elaborated that usually teachers look down upon 
minority students because they do not have high achievement. This treatment 
drives them to find something alternative to do, by which they can show their 
value or power. Furthermore, they did not think that Tibetans have as serious 
problems as Muslim students do. Like their teachers, they largely laid blame on 
the Muslim community that they did not think is a positive force for Muslim 
children to study in schools. Muslim parents in their mind are backward in their 
thinking, of a low cultural level and are materialists, and this has driven them to 
discourage their children's study by telling their children that they just need to get 
a certificate for a diploma-dominated society (wenpin ale shehui). Having held 
such a view, they do not help at all with their children's study while this is 
common in Han families. The way in which they treat their children was also 
reported to be simplistic and rough, such as beating and scolding at will when 
they do not feel satisfied by their children. This treatment has damaged their 
children's enthusiasm for study. This negative treatment also includes such stories 
that Muslim parents tend to complain without caution that their children have 
spent too much money on schooling. This is always a serious mental pressure on 
children. In a similar fashion, students told me, Muslim parents would rather 
make their children start to work for the family business as early as possible. In all 
cases, Muslim girls are the first sacrifices, because, according to my Elan 
respondents, in the Muslim community men are superior. 
In short, the mainstream group considered that minority students by and large 
perform relatively poorly in schools when compared to Han students. This is 
mainly caused by some objective elements like the linguistic barriers, which make 
Tibetan students study inefficiently and ineffectively. On the other hand, the poor 
performance is also caused by a number of subjective factors particularly in the 
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Muslim case, though there are a few societal causes but these are not deemed to 
be determinants. Linguistic barriers could be overcome if Tibetan parents did not 
insist that their younger generations should prioritise Tibetan language study in 
order to preserve their culture, and send their children to Tibetan minority 
schools. The subjective factors are embedded in the `nature' or `history' of the 
Muslim community, which is closely associated with their low educational level, 
and results in their discouragement of, complaints about or even sacrifice of their 
children's education, particularly education of their daughters. Having been 
impacted by these kinds of community forces, Muslim students appear to have 
little enthusiasm, motivation for and confidence in schooling. 
The status of minorities and their cultures in schools 
Minority cultures and the curriculum 
Without exception, all the teachers interviewed admitted that there is little space 
for minority cultures in the curriculum. The primary reason is that they did not 
think that the school can find more time to allocate to such a subject. This is 
because students have too many subjects to learn, which are designed with 
reference to the national college entrance examinations, in which minority 
cultures occupy little space. For the same reason, the syllabus is designed in close 
accordance with college entrance exams. It is impossible for teachers to go 
beyond the syllabus (which is also nationally standardised) for two reasons. They 
can hardly find time out of their `normal' teaching task to deal with minority 
cultures, although very few teachers said that they tried their best to introduce as 
much knowledge of minority cultures as possible in their class. Secondly, as 
schoolteachers, they do not enjoy the same freedom in classrooms as their 
counterparts in universities, where one of the major educational principles is to 
encourage both professors and students to challenge orthodoxy through 
exploration. In a word, in secondary schools, for both teachers and students, every 
effort should be made to focus student attention on college entrance examinations, 
in which there is little space for minority cultures. 
On the part of teachers themselves, some of them admitted that teachers' lack of 
knowledge of minority cultures also makes it difficult to offer relevant knowledge 
to students. This is especially salient among the younger generation of teachers, 
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some of whom emigrated from Han-dominated areas to this minority region when 
assigned a job in this school by the government after their graduation some years 
ago. They would otherwise have no knowledge of minority cultures at all, as they 
themselves admitted. Moreover, even if students need or want to learn something 
about minority cultures, they were supposed by some teachers to be able to reach 
that goal in their daily life when they are spending time with their fellow students 
from different ethnic groups - students anyway spend most of the daytime in 
schools. Meanwhile, even if the school is willing to introduce such a course, from 
a technical angle, some teachers did not think it is feasible given the variety of 
their students' ethnic backgrounds. It is difficult to keep a balance and at the 
same time to explain distinctive cultures clearly. 
Another teacher, when explaining why there is little teaching content tackling 
minority cultures that are religion-laden, claimed that religion might play a 
negative role in minority school performance (Interview 020203). 
If a student is too pious in regard to religion, it will certainly invite a clash with our moral 
education... especially in such an era and environment (in which society is becoming more secular 
and materially-driven)... for instance Islam... ultimately aims to.. . enable 
(its disciples) to enter 
Heaven. We now advocate atheism... there is no such things as ghosts or gods. Our ultimate goal 
is to realise communism (which is associated with materialism). 
Correspondingly, the very limited content concerning minority cultures in the 
classroom can only be found occasionally in such courses as `ideology' (zhengzhi 
ke) or `history', for the goal that a teacher of ideology depicted (Interview 
020104): 
(We) introduce something (in the ideology course) simply about the three major religions in the 
world, ... something 
like the source of religion, its functions. It (religion) fundamentally advocates 
certain kinds of worldvicw. (We) mainly tell students that it (religion) is an idealist worldview, 
... and pinpoint 
its functions, 
... emphasise 
its negative functions... 
Equally, the Han students also demonstrated that there is little content of minority 
cultures in the curriculum. Meanwhile, teachers showed little enthusiasm for 
teaching minority cultures, `because people inhabiting this region have already 
got used to minority cultures and customs, there is no need for teachers to 
mention them more', so explained a student (interview 010109). In parallel, some 
students considered that it is a part of everyday life to spend time with minority 
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students, who will quite often tell them something about religion, festivals, etc. 
Some other students felt that the methods teachers employed in teaching minority 
culture have made the study boring. `If he taught better, ... we would like (to 
study). But I feel it is boring to listen to the courses that teachers have offered' 
(interview 010105). There are also some students who complained about the 
content of minority cultures in the textbooks because it is mostly `about war and 
occupation of a country, etc... all very political, not cultural' (interview 010104). 
In short, both teachers' lack of time, knowledge and enthusiasm for teaching and 
mainly political concern with minority cultures in the curriculum have principally 
undermined students' interest in and motivation for studying minority cultures. 
School policy on minority cultural practice 
School policy on minority cultural practice in the school is not expressly 
provided. This is why some teachers could not confirm the existence of the 
relevant policy when asked. However, teachers admitted that there are some 
requirements concerning minority cultural practice. These requirements are 
communicated to the teachers at a managerial level. One of the informants, who 
has both teaching and administrative duties, recalled a meeting that took place 
some years ago, at which the head-teacher publicised his requirements for 
minority cultural practice in the school (interview 020104): 
... for 
instance among the Hui teachers in our school, there are some females. If a Hui family has a 
strict tradition of family education, the female must wear all the things required after getting 
married. I remember it was 1997, our head-teacher said that we arc the Han school, all staff must 
not bring minority customs and habits into the school... As it requires teachers like this, there 
would be even stricter in requirements for students. 
Since this is merely an implicit policy, when it goes down to the student level, 
their understanding of whether or not there exists such a policy becomes very 
vague. While a few students declared that the school should have regulations (for 
other things as well as religion), most students believed that minority students 
tend not to practise their religious customs just because they would be 
embarrassed. However, some of them admitted that the school culture is based on 
Han culture. On the other hand, teachers were usually more aware of the existence 
of such a policy than students were, though they expressed things differently 
when asked about their evaluations of and attitudes to it. When the invisible 
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policy is being implemented on a massive scale by ordinary teachers, the methods 
that teachers employed could vary to some degree because of the different 
preferences of teachers and their differential understandings of the policy. Some 
teachers said that when they see students in Muslim caps or Tibetan dresses they 
will take this as a resistant message students are trying to deliver, or a disruptive 
behaviour that needs to correct, and thereby will ask them not to do so; some 
others openly expressed their hostility to Muslims and hence tend to exercise 
control over Muslim dressing more strictly. 
Nonetheless, the majority of teachers told me that usually teachers tacitly approve 
of some religion-based minority cultural practice because `this is their religion (so 
we should respect it)' (interview 020103). Usually teachers do not intervene much 
into minority cultural practice, particularly when it occurs during minority 
festivals or on other special occasions. Equally, teachers tend to permit minority 
students to leave for their festivals (possibly without consulting with the school 
official in order to avoid `unnecessary hassles'), though this used not to be a 
tradition in this ordinary school. Correspondingly, if some minority students break 
the law to practise their religious customs, they are not punished too seriously, 
`because these students lack (the ability to) take responsibility for their conduct. 
The school and we teachers must correct (their mistakes)' (interview 020203). 
Some other explanations of why teachers are not too hard on minority cultural 
practice are that teachers are essentially expected to closely monitor the academic 
achievement of every student, which occupies most of their energy and time so 
that they can hardly find extra energy and time for anything else (interview 
020103). 
However, to sinicise minority students by monitoring their cultural practice, 
though not very formally, is a definite (though hidden) agenda of the school 
official, as a teacher put it (Interview 020203): 
Take Islam as an example. Their... festivals are always clashing with our regular teaching time... 
It is impossible to set a precedent for them (for everyone in the school should be treated equally). 
That is why in this respect our school has not made (a decision) of permitting them to leave for 
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their festivals. '2 As for dressing, we.. . still require that students should come to school 
in more 
popularised clothes (dazhonghua de fiuzhuang), i. e. more sinicised clothes. Do not obviously show 
(minority) ethnic style clothes. So the school does not advocate (minority clothes)... Religious 
activities should be practised in religious venues. By and large, the school is (a place where) the 
state cultivates people who will serve its own class and this polity, especially in this special 
(multiethnic) environment of the school, it must not permit (religion-centred minority cultural 
practice). 
This is why Muslim students, who used to study in the Tongren County School 
where they were allowed to wear their religious caps, do so less and less often 
after transferring to this school (also see chapter seven). `Because now they are 
almost sinicised by the school' (interview 020102). In a similar fashion though 
sounding contradictory, minority students are required to wear their ethnic clothes 
in events or activities organised by school officials regardless of whether or not 
students themselves are willing to do so (see also chapter five). This was taken as 
an example by some teachers to prove that the school does not forbid minority 
cultural practice, but in fact encourages it. 
Relationships between the mainstream group and minority students 
When asked whether or not there is a difference in their attitudes to students, most 
teachers said that they treat students differently along the lines of academic 
achievement. In other words, all teachers preferred students with high 
achievement. `If you study hard, no matter who you are, Tibetan or Muslim, I will 
be very pleased to teach you when you come to ask me questions' (interview 
020102). By the same token, teachers tend to ask good students more often to 
answer questions in the class, and also arrange for them to sit in the front of the 
classroom. Meanwhile, teachers also tend to be concerned with some kinds of 
students more, though the kinds of students are diverse. Some said that they tend 
to (be concerned about and so) discipline extroverted students more openly, some 
said they discipline students who are either on the top or at the bottom of the 
achievement ladder more often, and some others said that they like students with 
high achievement, as well as those with any other strong points such as being 
good at singing and dancing or sports. In other words, the variety of treatments of 
these students has shown the fact that teachers are paying more attention to 
12 The mainstream school has finally introduced a policy that permits Muslim students to leave for 
their festival after a clash between Muslim students and the school for this reason in 2002, when 
the school received a considerable number of Muslim students from the Tongrcn County School 
that was closed down. Also see chapter seven. 
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desirable students, who either possess an easy-going personality (extroverted); or 
are below the average achievement but are willing to study and hence are 
expected to perform better with teachers' disciplining, or above the average 
achievement and should keep their advancement or do even better; or the kind of 
students who show their ability in other aspects than academic achievement. 13 By 
contrast, teachers tend to punish undesirable students more severely, or simply 
ignore them. Nevertheless, no teacher said that she or he treats students differently 
because of their ethnic background. This also seems to be proved by Han students 
who said that teachers usually treat students along the lines of academic 
achievement, and to a lesser extent, in accordance with their personality. 
However, a few also mentioned that Muslim students are usually allocated to sit at 
the bottom of the classroom because of their poor school performance, so teachers 
can concentrate their attention on other students, who are supposed to be more 
willing to study. This is also one of the common phenomena I observed in 
different classrooms. 
Indeed, the difference in treating distinctive ethnic group students is evident in the 
conflict between the ethnic-blind principle teachers professed and their personal 
`taste' or practice. When asked what kind of students they prefer to have contact 
with, although not everyone held the same opinion, some responses were 
revealing. For most teachers, the family background of students plays a key role. 
The common `taste' they share is that they prefer to have contact with the students 
from a family with an intellectual background or the like. Teachers believed that 
these students are more of a sanguine disposition, and tend to give original views 
about people and society. Furthermore, the view of `intellectual quality' or `merit' 
they hold is automatically associated with Han students but usually not with 
minority students. While few teachers may think that occasionally some Hui but 
not Tibetan individual students are of intellectual merit (most likely to benefit 
from their first language Chinese when compared to Tibetans), more teachers 
might claim that they have communicated very little with Hui students because 
they have little merit but an unfavourable disposition. In a word, while Han 
13 When I asked for clarification of the claim of concern about students at the bottom of the 
achievement ladder, the respondent said that he considered this was something that every 
responsible teacher must do. Of course, if students 'really do not want to study', he said, he will 
ignore them finally (interview 020203). 
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students as a whole are the favourite communicators by teachers for meritocratic 
reasons, there are only a few minority individuals with whom some teachers will 
communicate for the same reason. Given the relatively poor performance of 
minority students, this is certainly easy to understand, `because everyone likes 
excellent people' (interview 020104). As a comparison, there is only one teacher 
who feels that the students with whom it is easier to communicate are Tibetan and 
Muslim, because `although there are more Han students, they do not come to ask 
me even when they have questions. Hui and Tibetan often come to ask me 
questions' (interview 020202). This is the only `real' Tibetan teacher I 
interviewed in the mainstream school. 14 Her `preference' is actually not her 
choice, but forged by students' attitudes towards her. Moreover, this teacher also 
revealed that some form masters tend to allocate grant-in-aid (zhtxruejin) to Han 
rather than minority students for the presumed cultivatability of the former over 
the latter. 
Compared to their teachers, students appeared to be much franker when asked 
about their preferences in making friends or spending time with their fellow 
students. Most of them said that they tend to make friends or spend time with 
those from the same ethnic group as they are from, rather than with others such as 
Tibetans or Muslims. They explained that the lack of common language is the 
essential concern. When spending time with their Han peers, they feel there is a 
tacit understanding between them, which is believed to be the basis for good or 
easy communication. On the contrary, they said that Tibetans cannot express 
themselves clearly and therefore are difficult to understand, and insisted on this 
even after I reminded them that the first language of almost all the Tibetan 
students in this mainstream school is Chinese. Equally with Muslims, who are 
Chinese speakers, Han students considered that it is inconvenient and 
uncomfortable to communicate. According to these Han students, they are afraid 
when speaking to Muslims that they would wound Muslims' self-esteem if they 
14 I actually interviewed two Tibetan teachers in the mainstream school. The two teachers are 
entirely different from each other in terms of sinicisation. The one I quoted here is from this region 
and has Tibetan as the first language while having difficulties in Chinese writing. The other is 
from a Han-dominated area and cannot speak Tibetan at all, of which he is proud. He also claimed 
that he could not accept the fact that he was regarded as one of the local Tibetans and thus avoided 
telling people about his ethnicity. Actually he appeared more critical of Tibetans than most Ilan 
teachers. 
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ignorantly say something wrong with respect to Muslim customs (so they 
complained that Muslim students are oversensitive). This is because, according to 
them, between Han and Muslims there is an unbridgeable gap in terms of ethnic 
cultural customs. Some students attributed their preference in making friends to 
the bad ethnic personalities of Tibetans and Muslims. While they quite generally 
labelled Tibetans as `bad', they particularly complained about the cunningness 
and calculatingness of Muslims, which are presumed to be closely connected to 
their occupational pattern as businesspeople. To convince me, they quoted a 
popular saying describing a common view of Muslims among the local Han (and 
other ethnic groups as well): Muslim food is eatable, Muslim words are 
unlistenable (i. e. untrustworthy) (Huihui di fan chicheng li, Huihui di hua 
tingbucheng). They thus concluded that friendship should be based on trust, 
which lies in long-lasting contact with each other. Possibility or willingness to 
have contact with others is generated from shared cultural norms and customs. 
The mainstream discursive repertoires about minority peoples and cultures 
The mainstream group's appeal for minority cultures 
As a whole, minority cultures appear little in the curriculum, and at the same time, 
minority cultural practice is discouraged in schools. Nevertheless, for both 
teachers and students, religion-centred minority cultures are not as negative as the 
school policy, a reflection of the government policy, implies. Most teachers 
believed that religion, the core of the cultural life of both Tibetans and Muslims, 
cannot be simplified as an entirely negative or useless component, especially in 
education. They believed that it is necessary to know about religion-centred 
minority cultures for mutual understanding and respect. In the meantime, it is also 
positive for minority students to strengthen their consciousness of their ethnic 
history and identity, which is supposed to be able to help them with their self- 
esteem on the one hand, and on the other hand, to help them build up the values or 
ideals of making a contribution to their hometown after graduation. Some teachers 
went further to make the judgement that minority cultures in general, and religion 
in particular, must be useful, because `something that can survive should be 
useful' (interview 020103). While most teachers did not think there is a direct link 
between religion and school performance, they presumed that religion, as a belief 
(xinyang), plays a positive role in nurturing the character of a person, because 
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religion aims to lead a believer towards virtues rather than the reverse. The 
examples they gave are that no religion encourages its disciples to commit 
murder, theft or robbery, or to take ill-gotten wealth, or to drink or smoke. So they 
came to the conclusion that to have a belief is better than not, as one of my 
respondents suggested (Interview 020103): 
I think this is a bit like our ideology course, to some degree. (Ideology course) serves to refine 
one's ideology and morality (sixiang daode), so does religious culture... you cannot say that the 
Koran advocates patriotism, but at least it serves to enhance one's moral level. (In this sense 
religion) helps. 
Like their teachers, most students held a positive view of learning minority 
cultures. For the majority, to learn about minority cultures will enable them to 
know how to respect minorities or how to avoid wounding their ethnic self- 
esteem. It is also interesting to study minority cultures because they are something 
that they live alongside and so is close to their own life experience. A large 
number of students also treated minority cultures from an entertainment 
perspective, saying that minority cultures are about beautiful singing and dancing, 
colourful dress, nice scripts, martial art, legends or mystery. In this fashion, one 
student (S) illustrated his interest in minority cultures to me (Y) (interview 
010101, emphasis added): 
S: I like history, so I like to learn histories of other races (thong u). (As for) other things, I am not 
interested. 
Y: so (you meant you) are interested in this subject (history) rather than ethnic minorities (of the 
history)? 
S: Yes. ... The Han, 
does not seem to have its own history; the Hui, if they are minorities, they 
have their own ethnic history... 
Y: What did you mean that the Han does not have its history? 
S: I meant, from my point of view, the Han, seems, it is not like ethnic minorities who have 
something like legends, such as an ethnic (minority) group, when did it come to being, what was 
its source? 
This inevitably recalls us to the portrayal of Pakehä positions in relation to Maori 
in New Zealand by Wetherell and Potter (1992) in chapter four, in which the 
image of the former is mundane and so invisible whereas that of the latter is 
visibly exotic. The metaphor of history in the mainstream civilizing projects 
(Harrell 1995, also see chapter four) and the `in-museum' characteristic of 
minority cultures (Gladney 2004, also see chapter four) are too reflecting the 
same discourse. 
222 
At the same time, according to some students, knowledge of minority cultures 
will benefit them in examinations if some relevant questions appeared. 
Dispensable minority cultures 
Nevertheless, this appeal for minority cultures among the mainstream group does 
not seem to lead them to a substantive knowledge of minority cultures. This is due 
on the one hand to the lack of opportunity offered in institutions, specifically in 
schools, and on the other hand also reflects their real attitude towards minority 
cultures. Minority cultures can be, at best, a kind of decoration or an expensive 
taste in their life. On the other hand, to learn about minority cultures could lead to 
a better mutual understanding, according to many respondents. But this awareness 
largely stopped at the level of theory and was not put into practice. Because they 
believed that they are living here in this multiethnic region, to acquire 
comprehension of minority cultures is a matter of course in everyday life. `Even 
if you are not willing to listen, to learn, you will know everything, since they 
(Tibetans and Muslims) are speaking (about their ethnic cultures) all the time' 
(interview 010107). 
They also admitted that in fact minority cultures are not important for their 
everyday life as they stay out of institutions that provide them with the principal 
opportunities to contact (work or study) with minorities, i. e. because they have 
limited contact with minorities in their leisure time. This is why for some students 
and teachers, minority cultures are useful only for examinations. Moreover, 
although for some teachers and students religion is supposed to be able to bring 
spiritual peace or well-being, it did not seem to concern them seriously even if 
they were severely feeling tired of routine, either hard, boring, or increasingly 
competitive, life from time to time, and then claimed that they tend to believe in 
certain religion in order to cure this tiredness and become calm and self-sufficient 
with the help of religion. In other words, they just paid lip service to religious 
belief. This is because religion cannot bring any tangible benefit (e. g. material 
gain), particularly at present, in an increasingly secularised and materialised era. 
Because `these things (in religion) are a little bit too illusory, no realistic 
meaning', `no scientific grounds' (Interviews 010105, -09). This is why some of 
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them also claimed that minority cultures that used to be a little bit important are 
no longer important for today's world, as a student illustrated in the following 
interview (interview 010101): 
... every student 
is the same... For instance, Hui used to avoid saying 'pig' as taboo. Now every 
student can say this equally. So I feel (every student) is the same... (Question: for whom it is not 
important? ) Not important for myself. Those Hui believe in another religion, we Han, and me, do 
not believe in those superstitions. 
Holding such a view of minority cultures, it is no surprise that the majority of the 
mainstream are far from enthusiastic to learn about minority cultures, and 
therefore, do not consider it to be a serious problem that there is very limited 
space for minority cultures in the curriculum, or even believe it is right to get rid 
of minority cultures from the curriculum. As a result, the mainstream's 
knowledge of minority cultures is usually not more than that of very basic 
customs, such as `never say `pig' or `pork' before Muslims'. Their interest in 
minority cultures is also limited to, for example, occasional visits to Buddhist 
Temples in special events like festivals, usually for fun. Moreover, when they 
were trying to impress me that they respect or tolerate minority cultures by 
claiming that they `do not mind (i. e. intervene into) them' (interview 010109), it 
is not more than a gesture of political correctness and also in fact a condescending 
fashion - they were trying to show their `generosity' of giving minorities freedom 
of religious belief as if they were giving a bonus to minorities, which is 
apparently an echo of the fashion in which the state promulgates its policy with 
regard to religion. In short, whereas minority cultures in the school are largely 
politicised in the way in which they are treated in the curriculum and cultural 
practice as depicted earlier, in everyday life practice they are simply tokenised in 
the way in which the mainstream group members appreciate them. As a 
consequence, minority cultures remain on the periphery of their public and private 
life. 
Discursive repertoires about Muslims 
Indeed, the mainstream group members could be to some extent positive towards 
and enthusiastic for minority cultures and people in specific environments where 
they personally stay together with minorities, with whom they are acquainted, for 
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instance in the school or any other institutions. On the other hand, it is also a fact 
that essentially they do not care about minority cultures as just discussed, or are 
even very likely to be critical of minority cultures and people when they think or 
talk about them in a general sense, i. e. without their acquaintances involved. 
There is apparently a contradiction in the mainstream group's narratives of 
minority cultures. This contradiction can be further illustrated in two cases 
respectively concerning Muslims and Tibetans vis-ä-vis the mainstream group. 
While in theory affirming the positive role of religion as a whole, some of the 
mainstream group members showed scepticism about religion as discussed earlier. 
Even so, when asked which religion they tend to believe in if they had to choose, 
all the respondents pointed to Buddhism rather than Islam. They reasoned that 
Islam is not the religion of the Han, but of `those Hui', so they know little about it 
and have no interest in it. Furthermore, Islamic doctrines were considered to be 
too stem, and disciples who break its regulations or rules will be punished 
severely. Some examples of `strictness' they gave are that male Muslims are not 
allowed to smoke or drink, females must attend the Mosque in headscarves; they 
also have to fast, which is physically unbearable and mentally undesirable. As a 
Muslim one cannot eat pork or even say the word. On this basis, they said that 
Muslim students, regardless of their academic achievement, are all very pious. So 
they came to the conclusion that Muslims are `inborn disciples'. While they 
believed that to be pious is a good thing for self-discipline, they also associated 
this `Muslim characteristic' with conservativeness. By this they meant such 
`facts' as that Muslims are not willing to tell others about their religion, and even 
would not allow people to listen to them speaking about Islam. Moreover, non- 
Muslim people are also not allowed to enter the Mosque or their cemetery. In a 
word, the Muslim community is self-enclosed. For them, this closedness of the 
Muslim community functions as the fundamental determinant that sustains and 
even reinforces their `feudal customs' like the patriarchy. 
On the other hand, Muslims were unexceptionally labelled as `innate merchants'. 
This `innate' character determines that the only thing Muslims are interested is to 
take money from others through doing business with them, but are not willing to 
invest in education, a long-term investment that cannot create profit immediately 
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(so they are short-sighted). When this view of Muslims is mixed together with the 
Chinese traditional view of trade business that believes there is no single 
merchant who is not unscrupulous, and that one cannot be a merchant if one is not 
unscrupulous, Muslims are profiteers, and so untrustworthy, in their eyes. 15 In 
this sense, Han actually perceived that Muslims are smart people, which could 
have enabled them to achieve highly in schooling. Unfortunately, I was told, 
Muslims are not keen to utilise their smartness for schooling, but for commercial 
businesses, (some of which are even illegal, such as trafficking in arms), or 
making trouble instead. This is why their smartness was believed to have reduced 
to cunningness and calculatingness. Having spoken about Muslims in this way, 
atheist Chinese educated along social evolutionary lines and philosophy of 
belittling trade business were trying to prove that Muslims are culturally foreign 
and morally evil, by the criterion of the Chinese cultural tradition. Since these 
characteristics of Muslims are innate as perceived by the Han, they (Muslims) are 
hence uneducable and untransformable (bukejiaohua), as well as being 
unapproachable and untrustworthy. 
Discursive repertoires about Tibetans 
Having so criticised Islam and Muslims, the mainstream group claimed that 
Buddhism is, relatively speaking, a kind of `approachable' and thus `trustworthy' 
religion. They explained that Buddhism is more popular in this (Tibetan) region; 
they have learnt more about it; among the Han, people usually choose it as their 
belief if they want one; Buddhism emerged from Tibet and therefore, is 
indigenous to the locality; Buddhism blesses and protects people. The 
environment seems to play a key role while it also shows that they lacked some 
general knowledge of Buddhism or religion in general (for instance the last two 
explanations they offered). In addition, Tibetan Buddhist culture, rather than self- 
enclosed Islam, is also highly entertaining for them as mentioned earlier. 
However, when the mainstream group members rejected Islam in favour of 
Buddhism by claiming that Islamic doctrines are too strict, the very important 
15 It is not true to say that Chinese society still belittles commerce as strongly as before, or actually 
it could be admirable if someone is regarded as being capable of commercial business in a global 
knowledge economy. Nevertheless, self-employed Muslims are still evaluated with the traditional 
frame. 
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implication is that Buddhism is far from conservatively strict or feudal in 
comparison with Islam. This can also be translated into the idea that Tibetans are 
not cultivated as strictly as Muslims, because the former do not appear to be as 
reserved and unapproachable as Muslims do. This is evidence that Tibetans are 
less `stubbornly' self-entrenched in a cultural sense. Nonetheless, this is not the 
whole story. In fact, this view has laid grounds for the mainstream group to 
negatively comment on Tibetans despite the fact that the latter share Buddhism 
with the Han and are also relatively `trustworthy' when compared to Muslims. 
They explained that Tibetans are usually much less restrained by their families, so 
they are quite uncultivated as an ethnic group. They therefore, tend to be much 
less self-disciplined but to be violent and have bad hygienic habits, etc. instead. 
Correspondingly they also lack intellectual merit due to a lack of cultivation with 
discipline. 
In the attempt to prove this `Tibetan character', both Han teachers and students 
provided some examples by comparing the differences between the Tibetan 
students who are being cultivated in the mainstream Han school and those in 
minority schools - the latter were seen as `more' or `typically' Tibetan. They 
considered that the former are easier to communicate with because they have a 
good command of Chinese, although a few of them are still `unable to make 
people understand them very well' (interview 010108). They also said that the 
quality of the Tibetans in the mainstream is higher than their counterparts in 
minority schools. This high quality is characterised by such features as quietness, 
obedience, self-discipline and understanding. Contrary to this, it is impossible to 
reason with Tibetans in minority schools because they are just rude and 
unreasonable, coupled with disruptive life style as mentioned earlier. In terms of 
academic achievement, the mainstream group also suggested that top Tibetan 
students in minority schools can only reach the average level when they are 
studying in the mainstream school. In this sense, when they acclaimed that 
Tibetan students in minority schools tend to work hard, usually harder than the 
mainstream school students, the comment (and tone! ) in fact highlighted their 
perception of Tibetan intellectual inferiority. Because no matter how hard they 
work, it usually results in a limited academic outcome. In short, morally poorly 
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disciplined and intellectually inferior, `typical' Tibetans were considered unable 
to easily fit in with the increasingly modernised society. 
Furthermore, the idea of separate minority schools brings along corresponding 
policies of positive discrimination as shown earlier that were not regarded by 
many teachers as positive or helpful as originally intended. They thought that the 
practice of concentrating minority students in separate schools has actually 
isolated Tibetan students from mainstream schools that were believed to possess 
high quality (Han) students. That is also to say, minority students are of low 
quality in the first place, and further they are educated in a low quality and 
separate environment of their minority school rather than study alongside Han 
students of high quality. All of that has deprived them from being promoted in 
quality and language. The low entry requirements (for language and cognition), 
separate education and low outcome of minority school students have formed a 
`vicious circle' (interview 020203). 
On the contrary, they judged that the parents who have sent their children to the 
mainstream schools have foresight, which is indebted to their experience in 
Chinese Han education and/or in the state system as a cadre. This is because they 
`clearly know that they are not good', `know that they lack quality (for study) 
(zishen tiaojian buhao)' (interview 020104). The mainstream group explained that 
the educational experience in the mainstream school helps Tibetan parents be 
aware of the importance of education in Chinese mainstream schools for having a 
high cultural quality (wenhua suzhi) and social status (shehui diwei), which is 
exemplified by the ideal consequence of becoming a cadre eventually. This kind 
of experience was said to encourage these Tibetans to provide their children with 
a Chinese education in the mainstream school. They concluded that this has 
shaped a `virtuous circle'. In a word, if a Tibetan student hopes to get cultured 
through enhancing his or her intellectual merit and personal quality, the 
mainstream school will be an ideal institution for providing efficient and effective 
education. This cultivation of Tibetan students in the mainstream school will 
eventually enable the Tibetan community as a whole to transform its population 
quality (renkou suzhi). 
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To justify their viewpoint of cultural and educational superiority of the 
mainstream school, both Han teachers and students agreed that it is the 
mainstream school that fundamentally functions as an institution of cultivating 
useful people with better academic standard. Whilst teachers praised the type of 
Tibetan parents who have the `foresight' to send their children to the mainstream 
school, most students also expressed the view that they prefer to study in the 
mainstream school even if they were minorities. They explained that Chinese 
Mandarin is the official language in China, it would be much more convenient if a 
minority student has a good command of it, for both daily life and a future career. 
What is more, a good command of Mandarin is actually a signal of high cultural 
quality and so will win the respect of society. They emphasised that given the 
need to communicate with people outside the region where no one understands 
Tibetan, it can avoid or reduce potential discrimination that one might confront 
when showing his or her `stupidity' by speaking non-Chinese or Chinese dialects 
(particularly from less developed areas), or even by not being able to ask for 
directions properly in Mandarin. In this sense, a good command of Chinese is able 
to boost one's cultural confidence. Furthermore, Han teachers and students also 
declared that Chinese Mandarin is more profound (shen'ao) than other languages, 
and the quality of education in the mainstream is also higher, for it offers a 
broader cultural horizon, i. e. Han Chinese culture, which they did not believe to 
be offered in similar depth in minority schools. 
Indeed, most Han students preferred to study in the mainstream school as they 
believed that minority cultures are not unimportant but not so important that they 
are worth being formally introduced in schools. This is why for them both 
mainstream and minority schools nowadays adopt the national curriculum, and 
even minority schools offer little education in minority cultures. This is evidence 
for them that minority cultures cannot help cultivate useful people while minority 
students are presumably able to acquire their ethnic culture in their families 
anyway. On the other hand, minority schools only appear desirable for the kind of 
minority students seeking an intimate cultural environment. For instance, some 
Han students said that they might attend minority schools when asked to imagine 
that they were minority students, the explanations they gave have all to do with 
the ethnic environment of the school. They said that it might be convenient to 
229 
spend time and communicate with people from the same ethnic groups, and, in 
their ethnic languages. It is also comfortable because they share the same norms 
and values that will make them feel intimate with each other. On the other hand, 
unlike what usually happens when staying in the mainstream school with a 
multiethnic student body, to stay in minority schools can also avoid potential 
discrimination from other culturally distinctive ethnic groups as all the students in 
minority schools are Tibetan speakers and practitioners of Buddhism (Tibetans, 
Mongolians and Tu). 
Conclusion 
The mainstream group members complained about the low quality or low 
`cultural' level of minorities. Meanwhile they expressed appreciation of, for 
example, some minority head-teachers who have adopted the kind of policy to 
promote the Chinese language in education, which reflects their emphasis on the 
importance of Chinese. They told about their definite preference for the kind of 
minority students, who are either Tibetan but are quiet and polite, not very keen to 
speak the `useless' Tibetan language, or are Muslim but consciously distance 
themselves from their self-enclosed Muslim community and Muslim fellow 
students. These minority students all have `high quality' and achieve highly, i. e. 
are `cultured'. In addition, the mainstream group members also revealed their 
complacency over the situation when minorities `humbly' come to study 
something from them. In contrast, whilst Tibetans, under the encouragement of 
the state's preferential policies and as the dominant group in the region, are 
celebrating their culture and identity, a large number of mainstream group 
members nonetheless showed their scepticism and even criticism towards this 
policy. They said that this has made Tibetans (who are of low quality! ) feel proud 
of themselves, and even come to be arrogant. Some examples they gave are that 
Tibetans will ask them to shut up if they are trying to discuss Buddhism with the 
latter, because Tibetans do not believe that the Han understand Buddhism (as well 
as they do). Tibetans consider that they are dominant in this region and everyone 
should be required to learn the Tibetan language. In some teachers' eyes, this was 
definitely `retrogressive' (daotui). `How does it come to be possible for everyone 
to learn Tibetan? It is more reasonable (for everyone) to learn English (if not 
Chinese)' (interview 020102). 
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It also appears to be different when they were evaluating and judging minorities 
by the degree to which different minority groups behave along the lines of Han 
Chinese culture. This is typically reflected in their discourse of `cultivation'. 
Cultivation is a good thing when it works along the lines of Chinese culture. In 
this light, they praised the Tibetan community which as a whole has been making 
an effort to approach this benchmark by actively sending their children to 
mainstream schools. So they praised that `Tibetans have started to value 
education' (Interview 020102). Therefore they declared that because some 
Tibetans have improved themselves in this direction significantly, they even can 
hardly be distinguished physically from the Han (interview 020103). This is 
evidence of the educability of Tibetans. Meanwhile, cultivation can also play a 
retrogressive role when it is adopted as a tool to reinforce ethno-religious tradition 
as what has occurred in the Muslim case. Unlike Tibetans, Muslims in the Ulan's 
eyes still appear to be very nationalistic, `if you say something about Muslims, 
they resist very acutely' (interview 020104). This led the mainstream to the view 
that the way in which Muslims are cultivated with their ethno-religious tradition 
has in fact resulted in their resistance to Han culture within as well as without the 
school, and thus are uneducable with the framework of advanced Chinese culture, 
which is coupled by the facts that they still look distinctive in their features from 
the Han. Despite the fact that explicitly biologically-based discrimination has 
largely become a historical scene, it is by no means a died away discourse. 
Relatedly, when declaring their appreciation of minority cultures, this is, to 
borrow Wetherell and Potter's terminology (1992: 129-139), a discursive practice 
in which minority cultures are treated as heritage that is worth cherishing, and as 
therapy that is able to help them with their self-esteem, feeling of settling down, 
as well as the building up of the values or ideas of making a contribution to their 
hometown. However, this appreciation of minority cultures, as Wetherell and 
Potter put it, is in fact `deep-down' nothing to do with the mainstream group 
(1992: 137). Conversely, the mainstream group tends to describe the atmosphere 
in Tibetan minority schools and in the old town of Muslims as `more ethnic and 
religious' when compared to that in the mainstream school and the new town of 
Han (interview 010109). This atmosphere was attributed by them to the 
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fundamental cause of social disorder and the low quality or low cultural level of 
minority communities. The message that is hidden behind this is that minority 
cultures, though appreciable, belong to history nevertheless (e. g. in the 
conversation with two students on page 222). In terms of social progress, it is 
believed that both Tibetan and Muslim communities as a whole are in need of 
becoming better educated and more cultivated in line with Chinese culture, in 
either a cultural or moral sense, or both - the uneducability of Muslims is 
manifest that Muslims are actually more in need of education in this fashion. This 
is what Stevan Harrell means by `civilizing projects' with regard to ethnic 
minorities in China as depicted in chapter four (Harrell 1995). 
In this light, the suggestion on the part of the Han is that minority students should 
be sent to the mainstream school in order to receive `more formal' or `more 
sinicised' education. It is believed by the Han respondents in doing so, the 
progress of Tibetans and Muslims in the direction of social evolution would be 
facilitated, leading to an enhancement of minority school performance. In short, in 
order to promote their quality and culture so as to be recognised and accepted by 
the mainstream society, there is only one way for ethnic minorities to go: to be 
acculturated into the mainstream. This is apparently associated with the familiar 
developmental discourse of modernisation as can be seen from the mainstream 
perception of `uncultivated' Tibetans and `conservative' Muslims earlier. 16 What 
is disappointing to them is that the vast majority of Muslim students who are sent 
to the mainstream school have low achievement but disruptive behaviour. This is 
because Muslims lack willingness to study in mainstream schools as chapter 
seven argued. On the other hand, the majority of Tibetan students are sent to 
minority schools instead, which are regarded as not possessing `adequate' 
academic conditions for enhancing their achievement or promoting their sense of 
discipline or their `quality' in general as can be seen in chapter six. However, 
from Muslim and Tibetan perspective, they have suffered from the lack of social 
and cultural capital for better performance in both schools and the larger society 
16 Two important books on Chinese modernisation from a cultural perspective that deserve 
particular attention are of Masini (1993) and Mittor (2004). The former illustrates the change of 
the Chinese language landscape under European and Japanese influence in the second half of the 
nineteenth century whilst the latter goes through the whole Chinese modern history to explore how 
Chinese New Culture has taken shape in an unprecedented upheaval period of history. More 
information about the latter can be found in chapter four. 
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as demonstrated in the previous two chapters. This lack of capital is critically a 
result of the exclusion of their culture from public institutions that has inevitably 
put their culture, and themselves, in a second-class position, which has in turn 




The social system 
On the part of the government and public, standardised public education is seen as 
essential for citizens to have equal opportunity to access formal institutions 
(usually operating in the dominant language), i. e. to participate in a common 
societal culture. This is thought to enable citizens to have equal opportunity to 
work in the modern economy (Kymlicka 2001: 20). On the other hand, to 
participate in a common societal culture is also regarded as essential for fostering 
in citizens a strong sense of common identity and membership, and at the same 
time to facilitate understanding between the peoples under the same government 
(ibid. ). Kymlicka thus concludes that `promoting integration into a common 
societal culture has been seen as essential to social equality and political cohesion 
in modem states' (ibid.: 20-21). However, government policies are much more 
interested in outcomes than processes in which citizens are cultivated. This has 
masked hidden agendas disadvantaging ethnic minorities as culturally different 
peoples that would be able to be uncovered by scrutinising processes of 
integration as shown in the previous three chapters. 
Government policies with regard to education largely exclude ethnic minority 
cultures from schools where the mainstream culture is institutionalised. This 
exclusion in the first place means there is little space for ethnic minority cultures 
appearing in the curriculum. Relatedly, some predominant academics advocated 
Mandarin rather than bilingual education as discussed in chapter five. One of the 
results that is connected with the shifting of state policy is that ethnic minorities 
invest much more time to learn Chinese whereas at the time when the CCP just 
came to power some fifty years ago, Han cadres and professionals working in 
minority areas all actively studied local minority language(s) (Ma Rong 
2003b: 133). Further, the limited content involving minority cultures is likely to be 
politicised and tokenised as discussed in chapter five and the empirical chapters. 
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The politicisation of minority cultures is in particular associated with the religious 
issue that is taken as a backward and extremist force (supposedly) hindering its 
disciples from modernisation, and cultivating disloyal citizens for the state. The 
tokenisation of minority cultures is evidenced in the way that minority cultures 
are superficially treated as colourful and so exotic, or historical, whose members 
serve as entertaining subjects on the margins of public and private life of the 
mainstream. The absence of minority cultures from the curriculum, or the 
politicisation and tokenisation of them has resulted in precluding minority 
cultures of integrity from institutionalisation. This has sequentially prevented 
minority cultures from flourishing as living cultures, and in fact, has facilitated 
their decline. ' 
The policies towards minority cultures are driven by the pursuits of economic 
development or modernisation of the state and ethnic unity and state stability. 
They are also embedded in age-long Chinese culturalism that has been 
strengthened by the more recently sinicised concept of social evolution as 
discussed in chapter five. These discourses all tend to place the minority 
population in a position of anti-modernisation, anti-unity or anti-progress in the 
larger society, which has presumably led to their `low quality' in schooling or the 
workforce as illustrated in chapters five, six, seven and eight. Therefore the aspect 
in need of fundamental change in the progress of the minority population is their 
modes of thinking, according to the government and public as illustrated in 
chapter five. The ideas of social equality, political cohesion and culturalism 
together have led Chinese public policy to appear to be similar to the idea of 
lalcite in French public policy (Favell 2001: 74-79) as briefly mentioned in 
chapters two and five. 
Like the latter, Chinese policy allows religious freedom under the pre-condition 
that religious practice should recognize the principles of public political order. In 
other words, particularistic interests in and practices of one's own culture is 
1 When asked about bilingual education, a Tibetan informant assessed that it is not because the 
Tibetan language is unable to express certain concepts in sciences or technology; rather, because 
these kinds of expressions have not been translated into Tibetan or not timely. This is largely the 
reason why the Tibetan language is perceived handicapped compared to the `expressive' Chinese. 
By the same token, he evaluated that Chinese may be seen as inferior to English. 
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structured or `disciplined' through a state political engagement in the form of 
public associations in that the interests and practices would impair the liberty of 
others if an official sanction is not in place. As a result, the political structure 
imposes its priority over cultural interests when there is a conflict (ibid. ). Under 
this principle, the Chinese government has established national associations for 
several officially recognised religions (Buddhism, Islam, Daoism, Catholicism 
and Protestantism). All religious organisations need to register with the 
government for a lawful status (ZFS 2000). The explanation for this is that the 
government regards religion at one level as a personal affair, but also as a social 
phenomenon and entity for the reason that religion draws the attention of society, 
and so gets involved with other entities and society as a whole. Religion therefore 
becomes a social or public affair that produces a variety of connections, actions 
and activities that are associated with social or public interests (ibid.: 22-23). This 
policy has illustrated what Aihwa Ong called the `pastoral' role the Chinese state 
plays in transforming backward (or disloyal) citizens into modem (and loyal) 
citizens, in spite of the difference of this pastoralism owing to differential 
historical contexts (Murphy and Fong 2005). 
This public policy towards minority cultures in general and their religions in 
particular has left a gap between the formal level of laws and constitutions and the 
informal level of public discourse and attitudes (Kymlicka 2001: 58). This is to 
say that public discourse, including the government discourse (such as the claim 
of `yanhuang zisun', lit. descendants of Yan and Huang emperors. See chapter 
seven), has not shown sufficient respect for diversity in spite of the fact that at the 
level of legal formalities it guarantees freedom of, for instance, religious belief. In 
other words, when the Party-state guarantees citizens freedom of religion, the 
societal culture that the Chinese nation-state has offered to its citizens tends to 
exert control over a large number of other aspects except for a standard language, 
such as religion, recreation and economy. Among these, religion is a key factor 
that is under strict control throughout the history of the PRC, particularly after the 
Religious Reform in the late 1950s. Therefore, the societal culture is not a thin 
one that only centres on a shared language (ibid.: 18), but rather, a thick one as can 
be seen from the exclusion of Muslim and Tibetan cultures illustrated in chapters 
six, seven and eight. In a word, the gap between legal formalities and public 
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discourse essentially lies in the ambivalence and ambiguity of Chinese political 
philosophy, which provides citizens with cultural rights in law on the one hand, 
and on the other hand keeps sanctioning citizens' exercise of these rights for the 
state agenda of nation-building and modernisation. In this light, it is undesirable 
for the government to promote more societal cultures corresponding to different 
ethnic (or otherwise) cultures at the risk of undermining the societal culture based 
on the ethnic majority culture. 2 
Community forces and their consequences 
State policy and public discourse, as discussed in chapters five, six, seven and 
eight, did not lead the CCP or the mainstream to full respect for minority customs 
or religious faiths. In the meantime, the idea of respect largely stays at the level of 
legal formalities, which conceals the real inequality between the Han and the 
minority population. This inequality is especially reflected in minorities lacking 
the cultural and (bridging and linking) social capitals that enable them to 
meritocratically compete for schooling and to equally access resources, ideas and 
information from formal institutions so as to achieve upward social mobility. This 
inequality is revealed in ethnic minorities' interpretations of, responses to and 
attainments in the social system as a result of their varied experiences in the 
cultural exclusion. Firstly, this means that some minorities desperately seek 
opportunities for social mobility and economic prosperity at any cost, including at 
the cost of their ethnic languages and cultures. This is evidenced in the case of a 
large number of rural Tibetans who are struggling at the bottom line of the living 
standard as shown in chapter six. 
By contrast, their elite counterparts who have a secure socio-economic status and 
life are keen to actively engage in the issue of ethnic identity that is backed by 
promotion of their culture - the latter is decreasing rapidly though, largely as a 
by-product of their achievement in social mobility. In this respect, elites and 
masses share little consensus on whether or not ethnic minority cultures are worth 
2 The Party's ambivalence towards the relationship between cultural and political loyalty and 
cultural tolerance when trying to integrate the ideas of political control, cultural diversity, 
citizenship cultivation, etc. into a coherent whole has also been portrayed by Potter as can be seen 
from his comprehensive arguments over the Party's contested attempt to maintain a balance 
between political loyalty and popular autonomy with particular regard to the religious issue 
(2003). See also chapter two. 
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preserving and ought to be allowed to flourish whilst both are equally seeking 
empowerment. For the elites, without a valued and institutionalised culture, the 
value of its people can always be in danger in that its people have to pay a higher 
price in achieving prosperity in both schools and the wider society, and 
meanwhile risk (further) stigmatisation of their symbolic image coupled by the 
rapid decline of their culture. For the masses, survival is the top priority so that 
their ethnic culture can be sacrificed for a presumably promising future -a future 
(hopefully) characterised with a material well-being. At the same time, this 
material attainment is likely to uproot them from their culture as that has occurred 
to their elite counterparts. Further, this is also likely to make elites lack legitimacy 
when attempting to represent or speak for their ethnic community. As a 
consequence, socio-economic achievement has not led to an elimination of 
cultural identity claims as the Party-state expected, and in the meantime cultural 
diversity is under threat in the process of achieving social mobility. 
In this light, minority communities have been caught in a dilemma in which they 
are demanded to absorb the behaviour, values and goals of the mainstream. This 
means that they accept and adopt an alien identity. In the meantime, when they 
are making an effort to participate in the mainstream, they are actually also being 
reminded by both others and themselves of their identity, i. e. of their negatively 
marked difference. This dilemma is irresolvable (Young 1990: 165). Facing this 
dilemma, minorities can also opt for the third way in which they disengage from 
the social system or formal institutions. This usually leads them to become 
perfunctory students in schools and passive citizens in society even though they 
are encouraged by the government to prosper or may be in fact better-off 
economically, as the Muslim case I discussed in chapter seven has shown. 
Muslims supposedly benefit from their relatively close connections with the 
mainstream Han in geographical distribution and language use (Chinese), yet they 
are in reality more likely to be socio-culturally excluded from the larger society 
and, relatedly, be disadvantaged in schooling. On the other hand, the economic 
prosperity of Muslims owes little to their educational achievement, nor does it 
lead them to being positive towards the social system (schools or the larger 
society). This is contrary to the government and academic assumptions that 
education plays the key role in socio-economic prosperity, and the poor minority 
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educational performance is largely a result of poverty in economy or `smartness' 
as can be seen in chapters five and eight. 
Further, the policy that disadvantages ethnic minorities has also complicated 
interethnic relations negatively. As argued in chapters six and seven, Tibetans 
benefit from a larger number of state preferential policies and have a higher 
profile in the public domain compared to Muslims. However, politically Tibetans 
are still located in the second place compared to the Han due to their large 
absence from positions in the top CCP leadership, and culturally they are also 
marginalised as depicted in chapters five, six and eight. This has led them to 
oppress and ostracise Muslims below them in their autonomous region in attempts 
to gain more economic and political capitals so as to empower themselves against 
the Han domination. This political strategy is realised by them mobilising their 
vertical social capital - which also means that they are mobilising their bonding 
social capital as political elites. However, this strategy cannot lead them to gain 
mutual recognition from the cultural-politically dominant Han group. In fact when 
they are exercising their strategy against the Han domination, they are also risking 
rousing conflict with the Han, which usually ends up with their `defeat' whilst 
strengthening the Han consciousness of holding power against increasingly 
powerful Tibetans. In this light, many Muslims as Chinese speakers attempt to 
justify their socio-economic and linguistic intimacy so identify themselves with 
the Han that hopes for a kind of coalition with the latter against the Tibetans. 3 
Nonetheless, this goal is difficult to achieve. The Muslims possess limited vertical 
social capital on the one hand, and on the other hand are perceived by the Han as 
more alien as depicted in chapters seven and eight. And in fact, the ghettoised 
residential pattern of the Muslims (see chapter seven) has forged (particularly) in 
the Muslim grassroots the rejection, resentment towards or conflict with both the 
Han and Tibetans. Under these circumstances, interethnic relations are always a 
top political concern for government officials. 
3 For instance, some of my Muslim informants told me that they were very happy when the top 
CCP leadership in the region was back in hands of 'our Han' from the Tibetans. In fact many 
Muslims explained to me that the Muslims actually have little difference from the Han but the 
Tibetans are really different. 
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Economic development, political cohesion and cultural difference 
In short, as a result of the lack of fully inclusive membership of minorities in 
terms of cultural rights in the larger society, minorities tend to appeal to identity 
and difference or even secession, or maintain a `passive obedience to the law, and 
reluctant acceptance of the status quo' (Kymlicka and Norman 2000: 11). This is 
because for those who either emulate the Han model or opt for a minority 
environment in education or the larger society, to claim the importance of their 
ethnic culture is actually to attempt to construct strategies (through drawing on 
`many tacit assumptions from the existing culture') so as to shape a repertoire or 
`tool kit' (Swidler 1986). These strategies are expected to help reduce inequality 
or injustice between their `unsettled' social position and the `settled' one of the 
dominant group. 4 Moreover, the feeling of disempowerment can lead some 
minority groups to oppress those more vulnerable ones. This tendency to minority 
disengagement from or resistance to the mainstream and ethnic disunity cannot be 
overcome even if minorities are encouraged to prosper or are better-off 
economically. In other words, one cannot equate equality with economic well- 
being so as to ignore cultural rights or counter-pose these rights to survival or 
development rights (shengcun quan, fazhan quan), i. e. economic prosperity, in 
achieving the latter. 
Indeed, equality has long been economically orientated. Nonetheless, it has been 
realised that different forms of inequality spring eternal. These forms of inequality 
are not only generated from class or economic difference, but the difference of 
ethnicity, race, gender, religious belief and language. Therefore, in seeking new 
equality, the idea should transform from equality as sameness to equality as 
difference (Modood 2001: 563). Equality as sameness is an embodiment of 
redistribution backed by rules of law while equality as difference is an appeal to 
recognition of cultural difference politically in the light of the importance of a 
culture for its people to be able to have a meaningful life (see also Kymlicka 1995 
and Parekh 2000). This is to say that different groups should be treated positively 
but differently in accordance with their differences in ethnicity, religion, gender 
or sexual preference. It would otherwise block `the opportunity to exercise 
4 The pair of terms `settled' and `unsettled' is borrowed from Swidlcr (1986). 
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capacities in socially defined and recognized ways' (Young 1990: 54), which 
leaves minorities with `uselessness, boredom, and lack of self-respect' (ibid.: 55). 
Hence, the idea of redistribution cannot displace or dissociate from that of 
recognition, and in fact redistribution always has an implicit or explicit cultural 
agenda (Parekh 2000: 2). 
Indeed, an economically orientated agenda on the part of the Party-state is very 
likely, though partly, to attempt to distract public attention away from a hard-to- 
resolve tension between the Party-state ideology and minority ethnic cultures, 
which are run largely counter-ideologically or counter-scientifically in the CCP's 
mind. However, as Kymlicka rightly points out based on his case studies in the 
West, `the accommodation of ethnocultural diversity will remain a powerful 
source of conflict ... even when all of these other goods are 
in place', namely, 
democratisation, economic prosperity and personal tolerance (Kymlicka 2001: 84). 
This is in the end about the way in which the state sensibly handles the package of 
(the majority based) nation building (national identity) and minority rights so as to 
move to the resolution of conflicts between the two. 
Conversely, to recognise cultural difference in the public sphere does not 
necessarily conflict but can be compatible with the state's agenda of turning 
supposedly `disloyal' or `troublesome' minorities into `good citizens' or 
responsible citizens. In other words, minorities will be more likely to possess 
qualities encouraged by the state like public reasonableness, mutual respect, 
tolerance, active participation and responsibility (ibid. ). 5 This is to say, to become 
responsible citizens in the first place needs people to have a secure sense of 
belonging and then engagement. In order to achieve this goal, the first step is that 
the social system culturally frees minorities from a position of being marginalised, 
oppressed or devalued by guaranteeing them minority cultural rights. When 
discussing different types of rights, Levy suggests that `symbolic recognition of 
the worth, status, or existence of various groups within the larger state 
5 Responsible citizens, Galston suggests, possess civic virtues that include qualities such as 
courage, law-abidingness, loyalty, independence, open-mindedness, work ethic, capacity to delay 
self-gratification, adaptability to economic and technological change, and capacity to discern and 
respect the rights of others, willingness to demand only what can be paid for, ability to evaluate 
the performance of those in office, willingness to engage in public discourse (Galston 1991. Cited 
in Kymlicka & Norman 2000: 7). 
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community' is more important than others in the sense that this recognition will 
`directly affect the well-being and self-respect of citizens of minority cultures, as 
well as their enthusiasm to participate in the political life of the larger state' (Levy 
1997. Cited in Kymlicka and Norman 2000: 25,29). 
In this light, encouragement or promotion of the civic virtues of ethnic minority 
citizens is largely determined by a full recognition of their different cultures in 
state policy and by the public alike. This policy and public climate will then 
encourage ethnic minorities, as either individual or group members, to cultivate a 
sense of belonging both to their own ethnic community and the larger society or 
state. As a result, this will remove barriers preventing ethnic minority members 
from being fully engaged in public life as well as public institutions with their 
own cultural heritage. In the educational arena, this policy will allow for a school 
culture for equality of educational opportunity, one that is responsive to ethnic 
minority cultures in both school life and curriculum, and `is intended to assure 
that children will be rewarded, both in school and afterwards in the work place, 
according to their merit' (Feinberg 1996). 6 Without this responsive policy and 
attitude towards minority cultures, it is difficult to say that the government policy 
is built up on the principle of equality. 
The new cultural landscape in the domestic and international climate 
In short, culture matters, and cannot be displaced by or dissociated from either 
economic development or political cohesion. The findings will offer a new 
direction that policy should take for the project of nation-building and 
modernisation of the state and minority rights in China. They first call for the 
redress of state policy that has excluded or politicised minority cultures while 
carrying out unequal treatments of different ethnic minority communities. This 
policy has been proved to be counter-productive for ethnic unity or cohesion and 
so for state stability. Further, a call for a policy that promotes the cultural 
inclusion of ethnic minorities requires a re-examination of the assumption of the 
inevitability of ignoring cultural rights or of counter-posing these rights to 
6 This raises the further question of what recognition would mean in practice. However, this is 
quite beyond the scope of this thesis that centres on the explanatory direction of the cultural 
exclusion rather than the prescriptive dimension, and so will be considered as a further research 
area. . 
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survival or development rights, in achieving the latter. Here the important balance 
that needs to be made is that between political, economic and cultural well-being. 
Political citizenship and economic development are undoubtedly desirable to 
ethnic minorities. 7 However, even if ethnic minorities enjoy both economic well- 
being and political rights as formally equal members of the larger society, it will 
not foster in them an enthusiastic commitment to and a sense of moral and 
emotional identification with the nation-state where there is a limited place for 
their culture. 8 In other words, without recognition, accommodation and 
cherishment of minority cultures, i. e. without minority feeling of its cultural ethos 
and equal opportunity of self-expression, ethnic minorities will still feel that they 
are outsiders that do not quite belong to the larger society even if they are entitled 
to all the formal rights of citizenship. This is how my Muslim subjects feel about 
the Chinese society, and why my Tibetan respondents struggle in between their 
own and the Han communities. 
Nonetheless, the pursuit of an inclusive policy also necessitates a removal of the 
cultural superiority of the Han majority that is ingrained in the Han mindset both 
historically and at present, which can be seen throughout chapters four, five, six, 
seven and eight. This culturalism has underlain the hidden biases of rules and 
procedures in public institutions, which have caused inequality of treatment in 
significant areas of life such as employment, education and public services 
(Parekh 2000). This culturalism has in fact been a shifting discursive repertoire 
that has chronologically gone through the cultural contexts labelled as 
agrarianism, Confucian-based literariness and morality, science, democracy, and 
economic development in Chinese history. Concomitantly minority cultures have 
been interpreted by this culturalism into nomadicism and militarism (so 
7 However, the concept of 'political citizenship' cannot be generalised, i. e. it is always associated 
with a sense of identification with the nation-state. Modood (1997a) argues that there are different 
conceptions of state or citizenship, and each has a different state-individual, or public-private 
idealisation, and therefore each has a different response to cultural diversity. Also see chapter one 
'the politics of multiculturalism', Passenn d'Entreves, M. & Vogel, U. (2000), and Weintraub, J. 
& Kumar, K. (1997). Given the difference between the West and China in the concept of private- 
public, interested readers can also consult Bonnie S. McDougall & Anders Hansson (2002), which 
is more based on literary criticism though. 
8 The arguments made here are mainly based on Parckh (2000: 236-237) 
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primitivism and barbarianism), feudalism and religiousness (so conservative and 
self-entrenched), extremism, and sluggishness of economy. 9 
Under these circumstances, a new cultural landscape that aims to ensure citizens 
equal opportunities to acquire the capacities and skills needed to prosper in 
society is in need that is inclusive of different ethnic cultures. To achieve this 
goal, it is necessary to create a common culture that emerges from a dialogue 
between equal citizens - what Parekh calls `interculturally created and 
multiculturally constituted culture' (Parekh 2000). Contents of this common 
culture should be broadly but not universally agreed by its citizens, and remain 
subject to dispute. Further, the dialogue should be carried out in both private and 
public realms (ibid. ) in which citizens of different ethnic groups can equally 
dialogue with each other as well as with the state. However, to constitute this 
common culture requires in the first place that the Chinese government allows a 
democratic mechanism to emerge and develop that is in opposition with, for 
example, its provisions on religion-based minority cultures as argued earlier. In 
carrying out these provisions, the Party-state has publicised and therefore 
politicised minority cultures (chapter five) that aims to legitimate its 
monopolisation of the rights of interpreting and `disciplining' the religious and 
other similar issues in the light of its own political interests and ends, and so 
deprive its citizens of the rights of debating on these issues. 10 
Moreover, it is also the state's responsibility to protect its culturally diverse 
citizens from the side-effects of globalisation that has been posing a threat to 
many, in particular, non-Western cultures, instead of pushing domestic minority 
cultures to a more peripheral position as a passive and so destructive response 
(largely one-way accommodation) to the Western dominated global isation. 11 In 
9 When criticising his community of being uncultured, a Muslim respondent said that it was the 
Han who have invented technology, medicine and other sciences. 
10 Harrell (1996) argues there was and is some room for local minorities to negotiate ethnicitics 
with the Party-state. Nevertheless this is still very far from freedom of expression and debate on a 
large scale but more associated with passive or individual reaction. 
"A Tibetan college student judged that the more money Tibetans have, the higher their living 
standard is, and the more they forgot their own culture. And with or without the Chinese, that 
would be happening (Barry Sautman and Irene Eng (2001) Tibet: development for whom? China 
Information: A Journal on Contemporary China Studies, 15(2): 74. Cited in Mackerras 2004: 225). 
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this globalising era, receiving countries of new industries and systems of 
management are required to create the cultural precondition, i. e. to move towards 
a culture of `international business civilization' (Parekh 2000; Hoogvelt 2001). 
This has been changing networks of social interaction, and creating new social 
norms globally, and reconfiguring domestic social structure with regard to, for 
example, employment, education and human rights. As a result, a new hierarchy 
of the world order has taken shape (Hoogvelt 2001). Playing in between domestic 
policies and those towards the international community, the state is being put in 
the test of whether it can share the destiny with its citizens by transforming both 
itself and its citizens to the cultural hybridity whilst reducing potential damages to 
its majority-based national culture in general, and its diverse minority cultures in 
particular, to the minimum. Therefore, the central question that has emerged from 
my findings and should be addressed in making up a united multinational or 
multiethnic country (tongyi de duominzu guojia) is: how does the sovereign 
reconstruct society with respect to such sensitive issues as the (re)definition of 
national identity, historical memory of culture, sense of citizenship, and the 
pursuit of a shared economic well-being. 
Future research agenda 
However, I have just started to explore this central question in this research. The 
question is in fact more generally grounded in the interaction between ethnic 
cultures and economic development. Based on my methodological approach 
(discursive repertoires and empirical studies), my subjects (ethnic minorities) and 
the geo-political and socio-economic significance of West China for the long-term 
development of the whole country, it is very interesting to further explore the 
interaction between economic equality, social cohesion, and cultural difference 
particularly in West China where ethnic minorities are concentrated. Therefore, 
further research areas will hopefully focus on diverse experiences at the local 
level to uncover the interplay between external factors of global capitalism (so it 
is necessary to invite a global perspective) and internal social structures to explain 
the divergence in local historical trajectories (Hoogvelt 2001). In other words, 
new research is seemingly more orientated to actor rather than structure that aims 
This is a good example demonstrating the vulnerability of minorities when confronting the global 
modernisation, and implying the responsibility that the state should take. 
245 
at the goal of `empowerment through participation' in development practice. This 
is also the direction that the `politics of development' heads in (ibid.: 52-53). In 
this light, some elements that are particularly in need of examination by 
developing the links between them are, for example: the forms of knowledge 
required by economic development in the Chinese cultural and political context; 
the extent to which they have in fact been institutionalised; the view that the 
values of minority cultures and languages are being institutionalised. This 
approach extends beyond purely human capital theory to look into the historical 
and economic conditions, and cultural, political and social mores in which a 
national economy is embedded and with which the economy is entangled (Brown, 
Green & Lauder 2001; Tikly et al. 2003). It thus allows scrutinising not only the 
issues of productivity and economic growth but also such issues as employment 
opportunities and life chances of ethnic minorities. 
Reflection on this research 
As a whole, the primary research aim has been achieved in that it has explored the 
different forms of cultural exclusion experienced by the Muslim and Tibetan 
communities, and to a lesser extent, by their sub-communities from different 
socio-economic backgrounds particularly in the three empirical chapters. In doing 
so, this study has answered the five research questions set out in chapter one 
through an historical investigation of Chinese culturalism (chapter four), a critical 
policy and discourse analysis (chapter five), an examination of the narratives of 
Muslim and Tibetan students and parents on education, social mobility and 
cultural difference (chapters six and seven), and a scrutiny of the mainstream 
Han's perceptions of minority students and community (chapter eight). Further, 
the research has also suggested a more inclusive policy in regard to minority 
cultures that is directed at the idea of developing a common culture that is 
interculturally created and multiculturally constituted. 
The research has made a theoretical contribution by bringing together a few 
theoretical models that have been critically examined in relation to the education 
disparity under the interactive framework of ethnic minorities and the social 
system. A sophisticated link has been made between these models and between 
the gaps in the existing studies through my key interest in power relations. 
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Further, the study has also made an important contribution to the debate on 
Chinese culturalism by explicitly and substantially connecting culturalism with 
the educational legacy of imperial China and the current policy and practice with 
regard to minority education. 12 This has made it possible to understand 
culturalism at a technical or institutional rather than merely philosophical level. 
By doing so, it is possible to apply the contemporary Western social theory of 
cultural capital to the Chinese tradition, particularly given the high 
institutionalisation of the imperial politico-cultural system as illustrated in chapter 
four. In addition, this connection of culturalism with education has cast new light 
on the debate concerning racism and/or multiculturalism in relation to education 
in the West as to how racism, when becoming a more culturally related discourse 
(see chapter one), is practised in Western society, and whether or not this `new 
racism' overlaps to some degree with Chinese culturalism. It is equally important 
to look into how, if at all, Chinese culturalism has been influenced by the racial 
discourse in the West. 
Nonetheless, the representativeness of the study would be strengthened if the data 
had also been collected from different case studies (e. g. a Muslim autonomous 
region) or samples of parents had been more evenly selected rather than merely 
by the technique of snowballing. In addition, in future research, the concept of 
critical theory could be employed critically so that it is not only based on an 
understanding and explanation of social phenomena and situations people are in, 
but is also oriented to the transformation of society, which in particular pursues 
the emancipation of the disempowered (Cohen, Manion & Morrison 2000: 28). 
12 Townsend (1992) did associate education with culturalism. However, he has not discussed this 
idea in detail. Also see chapter four. 
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Appendix 1 
Table 1: Ethnic Groups by Illiterate Population and 
Distribution in Different Provinces 
EG (population) IL DDP 
NA 7.75 
Dongxiang (513,805) 62.88 Gansu, Xinjiang, Qinghai, 
Ningxia 
Monba (8,923) 56.21 Tibet 
Bonan (16,505) 55.94 Gansu 
Lhoba (2,965) 50.79 Tibet 
Salar 104,503) 49.11 Qinghai, Gansu 
Tibetan (5,416,021) 47.55 Tibet, Qinghai, Sichuan 
Lisu (634,912) 32.54 Yunnan, Sichuan 
Nu (28,759) 32.02 Yunnan 
Pumi (33,600) 30.06 Yunnan 
Hani (1,439,673) 29.76 Yunnan 
Unidentified (734,438) 29.14 Guizhou 
Dulong (7,426) 26.80 Yunnan 
Bouyei (2,971,460) 23.77 Guizhou 
Lahu (453,705) 23.72 Yunnan 
Va 396,610) 23.51 Yunnan 
Blang (91,882) 23.43 Yunnan 
Yi (7,762,272) 23.20 Yunnan, Sichuan 
Tu (241,198) 23.20 Qinghai, Gansu 
Shui (406,902) 22.06 Guizhou 
De'an 17,935 21.25 Yunnan 
Miao (8,940,116) 19.83 Guizhou, I Iunan, Yunnan 
CCFD 941 19.71 
Gelao (579,357) 18.23 Guizhou 
Hui (9,816,805) 17.77 Ningxia, Gansu, Ilenan, 
Xinjiang, Qinghai, Yunnan, 
Iicbei, Shandong, Anhui, 
Liaoning, Beijing, 
Inner Mongolia 
Jinuo (20,899) 17.13 Yunnan 
Jingpo (132,143) 15.71 Yunnan 
Dai (1,158,989) 15.71 Yunnan 
Naxi (308,839) 15.21 Yunnan 
Yu ur 13,719) 14.62 Gansu 
Achang (33,936) 13.56 Yunnan 
Tajik (41,028) 13.32 Xinjiang 
Li (1,247,814) 12.09 Hainan 
She (709,590) 11.81 Fujian, Zhejiang 
Tujia (8,028,133) 11.71 Hunan, Ilubci, Guizhou, 
Chongqing, 
Bai (1,858,063) 10.99 Yunnan 
Dong (2,960,293) 10.87 Guizhou, Ilunan, Guangxi 
Qiang (306,072) 9.42 Sichuan 
Yao (2.637,42 1) 9.32 Guangxi, I lunan, Guangdong, 
Yunnan 
Uygur (8,399,393) 9.22 Xinjiang 
Kirghiz (160,823) 9.05 Xinjiang 
Han (1,137,386,112) 8.60 
Mongolian (5,813,947) 8.40 Inner Mongolia, Liaoning, 
Jilin, Rebei, llcilon gjiang 
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Jing (22,517) 7.92 Guangxi 
Maonan (107,166) 7.52 Guangxi. Guizhou 
Zhuang (16,178,811) 6.83 Guangxi 
Mulao (207,352) 5.96 Guangxi. Guizhou 
Gaoshan (4,461 5.58 
Manchu (10,682,262) 5.54 Liaoning, Ilebei, 
llcilon Jiang 
Ewenki (30,505) 3.81 Inner Mongolia, Ilcilon jian g 
Russian (15,609) 3.64 Xinjiang. Inner Mongolia 
Oro en (8,196) 3.48 licilon Tian . 
Inner Mongolia 
Daur 132,394) 3.46 Inner Mongolia. Jilin 
Hczhe (4,640) 3.06 l lcilon Jiang 
Korean (1,923,842) 2.86 Jilin 
Xibe (188,824) 2.71 Liaoning, Ilcilongjiang. 
Xinjiang 
Kazakh 1,250,458) 2.68 Xinjiang 
Uzbek (12,370) 2.50 Xinjiang 
Tatar (4,890) 1.98 Xinjiang 
CCFD = Chinese Citizens of Foreign Descents; 
DDP = Distribution in Different Provinces; 
EG = Ethnic Groups; 
IL = Illiteracy (%); 
NA = National Average 
Sources: DfPSSTS and DEED 2003; RPB and RSKT 2002 
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Table 2: Illiteracy (%) and Minority Population (%) In 
Province-level Territories 
Province IL 11IP 
National Average 9.08 8.47 
Tibet 47.25 93.94 
Qinghai 25.44 45.97 
Guizhou 19.83 37.84 
Gansu 19.68 8.75 
Ningxia 15.72 34.56 
Yunnan 15.44 33.42 
Anhui 13.43 0.67 
Inner Mongolia 11.59 20.83 
Shandong 10.75 0.70 
Sichuan 9.87 5.00 
Shaanxi 9.82 0.50 
Hainan 9.72 17.38 
Fujian 9.68 1.71 
Hubci 9.31 4.34 
Chongqing 8.90 6.47 
Hebei 8.59 4.35 
Zhcjiang 8.55 0.86 
Henan 7.91 1.25 
Jiangsu 7.88 0.36 
Xinjiang 7.72 59.43 
Jiangxi 6.98 0.31 
Tianjin 6.47 2.71 
Heilon 'ian 6.33 4.89 
Shanghai 6.21 0.63 
Hunan 5.99 11.13 
Liaoning 5.79 16.06 
Jilin 5.74 9.15 
Shanxi 5.68 0.32 
Guangdong 5.17 1.49 
Bci'in 4.93 4.31 
IL = Illiteracy (%) 
MP = Minority Population (%) 
Sources: DfPSSTS and DEED 2003, RPB and RSKT 2002 
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Table 3: 2002 Ethnic Minority Population in Huangnan TAP 
Area TP MP(P) TP(P) MP(P) MuP(P) TuP(P) OP(P) 
Prefecture 212504 19597 140126 20()13 1-01 1 9(, 72 75 
(92.19) (h5. ')4) (I3. h5) (,. 111) (4.55) (0.04) 
Tongren 77165 69442 55602 129 4285 9385 41 
(90) (72.06) (5.55) (12,16) 
Jianzha 49672 44151 31873 46 12075 131 26 
(88.89) 
Zeku 54761 52545 52161 15 303 58 8 
(95.95) 
Henan 30906 29759 490 28823 348 98 
(96.29) 
EMP = Ethnic Minority Population; 
MP = Mongolian Population; 
MuP = Muslim Population; 
OP = Other Population; 
TP = Total Population; 
TbP = Tibetan Population; 
TuP = Tu Population. 
Source: HZT 2003b 
Table 4: 2000 Illiteracy Rate, College and University Graduate Rate, and Secondary 
School and Vocational Secondary School Graduate Rate in Qinghai and tluangnan 
Area TP IR2000 CUGR SSGR 
Province 515 1560 I S. 03 3.3 10.4 3 
Huangnan 225462 30.30 2.39 6.84 
Tongren 50856 23.04 3.33 9.58 
Jianzha 48971 27.72 2.44 6.14 
Zeku 57334 39.97 0.73 3.08 
Henan 33707 38.31 1.23 3.88 
Yushu 268825 43.77 0.76 3.85 
Guoluo 140397 34.81 1.33 5.76 
TP = Total Population 
IR = Illiteracy Rate (%) 
CUGR = College and University Graduates Rate (1%, 1 
SSGR = Secondary School and Vocational Secondary School Graduates Rate (U ) 
Source: IIZT 2002 
Table 5: 2002 Ethnic Population and Government Officials in Huangnan 
Han Muslim Tibetan Mon olian Tu Othc! . EP % 7.81 N'. UI h;. 9 -I 13.0 .J S5 0 U4 
OPC % 38.28 4.62 44.88 6.93 4.115 0.33 
OP % 32.86 2.86 45.71 10 7.14 1.13 
EP = Ethnic Population 
OP = Government Officials at Prefectural Level 
OPC = Government Officials at both Prefectural and County Levels 
Sources: the local government documents. 
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Table 6: Illiteracy Rate and College Students Rate of Muslims 
in Comparison to those of Tibetans 
A: TP 
BA70 BA80 T 1) 1% D2 % D3 % 
M PU 438 2')2 I >> 
IR 12.01 3.77 2.17 -8.24 -1.60 -9.84 
CR 0.66 0.68 0 0.02 -0.68 -0.66 
TI PUJ 321 194 116 
IR 15.26 0.52 0 -14.74 -0.52 -15.26 
CR 4.67 6.70 2.59 1.84 -4.11 -2.08 
PU 418 253 153 
T2 IR 23.44 5.93 0.65 -17.51 -5.28 -22.74 
CR 0.96 0.79 0 -0.17 -0.79 -0.96 
PU 518 320 187 
T3 IR 18.73 4.36 0.53 -14.37 -3.83 -18.20 
CR 0.39 0.63 0 0.24 -0.63 -0.39 
A: TP = Total Population; 
B: BA70 = Bom After 1970; 
C: BA80 = Bom After 1980; 
CR = College Students Rate 
DI= Discrepancy A-B; 
D2 = Discrepancy B-C; 
D3 = Discrepancy A-C; 
IR = Illiteracy rate; 
M= Muslim community; 
PU = Population; 
TI, T2, T3 = Tibetan village I, 2,3 
Source: the local government documents 
Table 7: Illiteracy Rate and Years in School of Muslim Parents in Comparison to 
Rate and Years in School of Parents from Other Ethnic Backgrounds 
Illiteracy Rate Average Schooling 
Years 
Father Mother Father Mother 
Tibetans in MS 0 0 12.36 10.55 
Ilan & Others in 
MS 
2.56 5.13 10.74 9.38 
Muslims in MS 13.33 43.33 7.10 3.97 
Tibetans in TMS 19.51 43.90 6.41 3.59 
Sources: fieldwork questionnaires 
' In this community there are also 89 Han residents, accounting for about one sixth of the 
community population. 
2I have chosen the two age groups in comparison with the whole community or the older group 
for two reasons: 1) those born in 1970 should have gone to school in around 1977 when China 
embarked on its open-door policy, which triggered a wave of schooling after u ten years' gap: 2) 
from 1986 or 1987 onwards, the desire to take advantage of new economic opportunities at the 
cost of education emerged when those born in 1980 should have started schooling. This wave 
drew a great number of both teachers and students to abandon education in order to enter the 
larger society of marketisation. 
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Table 8: Outcome of Examinations in the Mainstream School in 2002 
Exam Score In Total Han Muslim Tibetan Others' 
EJ NE 180 70 78 17 15 
AS 318.83 342.95 288.65 337.65 330.28 
BA 34.29% 60.26% 41.18% 50% 
ES NE 96 38 25 10 23 
AS 320.78 336.49 283.20 284.95 362.74 
BA 50% 68% 90% 43.48% 
EE NE 120 51 19 ------ 
AS 316.40 321.19 301.86 325.16 ------ 
BA 50% 62.75% 47.37% ------ 
AS = Average Score; 
BA = Below Total Average Score 
EE = Outcome of the Senior Secondary Entrance Examinations of the Students in 
Tongren County in 2002; 
EJ = Outcome of End-of-Year Examinations of the Junior Third Year 
Students in Huangnan Prefecture School in 2002-2003; 
ES = Outcome of End-of-Year Examinations of the Senior First Year Students in 
Huangnan Prefecture School in 2002-2003; 
NE = Number of Examinees 
Source: the school database 
Table 9: Ethnic Population in the Mainstream School in 2002-2003 and in 
Tongren County in 2002 
Total Han (%) Muslim Tibetan (%) Others (%) 
JT 195 70 35.90) 78 (40 i772) 30(15.3K) 
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SF 96 38 39.58 25 26.04) 10 9.60 23 23.96 
Class One 48 21 (43.75) 10 (20.83) 2(4.17) 15 (31? 5 
Class Two 48 17 (35.42) 15 (31.225) 8(I0.67) I( 16.67) 








EP = Ethnic Population in Tonbren County in 2002; 
JT = Ethnic Background of the Junior Secondary Third Year Students of the Prefecture 
School in 2002-2003; 
SF = Ethnic Background of the Senior Secondary First Year Students of the Prefecture 
School in 2002-2003 
Sources: the school database 
' `Others' include students from other ethnic backgrounds as well as from mixed ethnic 
background such as Han-Tibetan, Tu-Tibetan, etc. This group is thus highly heterogeneous in 
terms of both ethnic identification and academic achievement. This category does not include 
students from a mixed background of different Muslim minority groups such as Hui-Salar, Hui- 
Bonan. . In other words, all the 
Muslims show a significant homogeneity in ethno-religious 
identification and academic achievement, and therefore make up a single group. 
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Pinyin, used in the People's Republic of China since 1958, is a system which uses 
the Latin alphabet to represent the sounds of Mandarin Chinese. Pinyin is used 
extensively in Mandarin dictionaries and phrasebooks. In what follows I list some 
consonants that may cause confusion to English speakers. 
c is pronounced like is as in `hats'. 
ch is pronounced like ch as in `chalk', with the tongue curled back somewhat. 
g is pronounced like g as in `go', but is pronounced more lightly than in English. 
j is pronounced like j as in `jeep', with the tongue forward. 
q is pronounced like ch as in `cheep', with the tongue forward. 
sh is pronounced like sh as in `shop', with the tongue curled back somewhat. 
x is pronounced like sh as in `sheep', with the tongue forward. 
y is pronounced like y as in `yes'; except that the syllable yi is pronounced like ce 
as in `bee'. 
z is pronounced like ds as in `weeds'. 
zh is pronounced like j as in `jam', with the tongue curled back somewhat. 
For a complete list, see `The Pronunciation of Mandarin Pinyin'. 
Source: The Pronunciation of Mandarin Pinyin 
(http: //www. fortunecity. com/bally/durrus/153/cnianpin. htini) 
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Map of China 
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Maps of the Beginnings of Ancient China 1900-1300 B. C. 
Source: http: //map. huhai. net/9. jpg 
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Source: http: //www. sis. pku. edu. cn/wanglian/mzwt/map/china_ethno_1971. jpg 
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Xia 
1700-1027 B. C. Shang lj 
1027-771 B. C. Western Zhou 
Eastern Zhou 
770-221 B. C. 
770-476 B. C. - 
Spring and Autumn period 
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Appendix 13 (1) 
The Questionnaire for the Mainstream School' 
My name is Lin Yi, a PhD student in the Department of Sociology at the University of Bristol, 
England. I need to collect some data and information on ethnicity and education in Northwest 
China for my thesis, and hope to have your assistance in this case. Below is a questionnaire of 
your personal information, could you please complete it? Your information may only be used 
in my research, hence I will not let any third party in any form know about it, and your real 
name will not appear in my research wherever you are cited. Thanks for your cooperation! (If 
there is no enough space, could you write your answer(s) on reverse side with the number of 
question(s)? ) 
1. Your name: 
2. Your gender: 
3. The date you were born: 
4. The place you were born (family village, county and province): 
5. The place your family is from (if different from 4): 
6. The grade you are in: 
7. Do you take any responsibilities for your classmates (subject representative, group head, 
classmonitor or a member of the Class Committee): 
8. Are you a member of the Communist Youth League of China: 
9. Are you transferred from another school? If so, where and when: 
10. Have you ever been rewarded (jiangli) or punished (chufen) in the school: 
11. The nationality group you belong to: 
12. The group your father belongs to: 
13. The group your mother belongs to: 
14. Your first language(s)/dialect(s) or the language(s)/dialect(s) you use at home: 
15. Any other language(s)/dialect(s) you can speak (quite) fluently: 
16. How many years did your father attend school (from primary school onward)? 
17. How many years did your mother attend school (from primary school onward)? 2 
18. Your father's occupation: 
19. Is he retired or laid-off (xiagang)? 
20. Your mother's occupation: 
21. Is she retired or laid-off? 
22. Do you have any brothers or sisters? 
23. Have they been to school? 
24. If so, how long? 
1 This is to be conducted in order to select student samples, and will not be formally conducted 
again in individual interviews. 
2 Students are to be asked to obtain the information for questions 16 and 17 in consultation with 
their parents. 
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25. What are your brothers/sisters doing if they are not in schools? 
26. And where? 
27. Generally speaking, your academic achievement (grade) in your class is: high, upper 
intermediate, average, lower intermediate, low: 
28. Your attendance rate: 3 
29. Are you boarding in the school? Who pays for your boarding fees? 
30. If you are not boarding, how do you get to the school (walking, cycling, etc. )? 
31. How much is the tuition fee per semester and who pays? 
32. Are there any other fees (books and exercise books, computing or miscellaneous fees): 
33. Do you sometimes assist in your family's work or business or do some work somewhere 
else to supplement your family's income? 
34. I will interview some of you individually at your spare time, in March or April. The 
interview will be lasting 30 to 40 minutes, on ethnicity and education. Our conversation 
will be recorded by me. This interview is confidential and anonymous, i. e., I will not let 
any third party in any form know about our conversation, and your real name will not 
appear in my research wherever you are cited. If you would like to accept an interview 
and your parents also approve it, could you leave your contact information below? You 
do not need to do it otherwise. 
Have your parents approved: 
Your telephone no.: 
Your email address: 
Your family address: 
Time you prefer to have an interview: 
Place you prefer to have an interview (must be quiet enough and with least interruption); 
1) school 2) your place 3) my place 4) any other places (please specify). 
If you have any further inquiries or requests (for instance if you prefer to be interviewed with 
some of your fellow students together), please do not hesitate to let me know. 
Below is my current contact information: 
3 The data in questions 27 and 28 will also be collected through teachers. 
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Appendix 13 (2) 
The Questionnaire for the Minority School 
1. Your name: 
2. Your gender: 
3. The date you were born: 
4. The place you were born (family village, county and province): 
5. The place your family is from (if different from 4): 
6. The grade you are in: 
7. Do you take any responsibilities for your classmates (subject representative, group head, 
classmonitor or a member of the Class Committee): 
8. Are you transferred from another school? If so, when: 
9. And where: 
10. Why: 
11. Which primary school were you studying: 
12. What were the subjects: 
13. What was the medium of instruction: 
14. Which junior secondary school were you studying: 
15. What were the subjects: 
16. What was the medium of instruction: 
17. The nationality group you belong to: 
18. The group your father belongs to: 
19. The group your mother belongs to: 
20. Your first language(s)/dialect(s) or the language(s)/dialect(s) you use at home: 
21. Any other language(s)/dialect(s) you can speak (quite) fluently: 
22. How many years did your father attend school (from primary school onward)? 
23. How many years did your mother attend school (from primary school onward)? 
24. What does your father do: 
25. What does your mother do: 
26. Do you have any brothers or sisters? 
27. Have they been to school? 
28. If so, how long? 
29. What are your brothers/sisters doing if they are not in schools? 
30. And where? 
31. Generally speaking, your academic achievement (grade) in your class is: high, upper 
intermediate, average, lower intermediate, low: 
32. Your attendance rate: 
33. Are you boarding in the school? Who pays for your boarding fees? 
34. How often do you do back home, how and how long does it take: 
35. If you are not boarding, how do you get to the school (walking, cycling, etc. ) and how 
long does it takes? 
36. How much is the tuition fee per semester and who pays? 
288 
37. Are there any other fees (books and exercise books, computing or miscellaneous fees): 
38. Do you sometimes assist in your family's work or business or do some work somewhere 
else to supplement your family's income? 
39. Are your parents concerned about your study (keep supervising and accelerating (dato 
jiancha) or tutoring your study, or keep in touch with your teacher(s))? Do you like the 
way they are concerned about your study and why? 
40. Are they also concerned about your study of your own nationality's culture, religion and 
language and script? Do you like their concern? 
41. The reasons you come to this school rather than a common school (for example the 
Prefecture School): (you may choose more than one answer according to your actual 
situation) 
0 You can sit in the college entrance examinations in the Tibetan language 
" You have opportunity to learn the language, culture, etc. of your own nationality in 
the subject(s) of... 
" You can relatively easily keep up in the study because... 
" You can more easily set your mind to study in an environment in which the 
compatriots of your own nationality are surrounding 
" You need to board in the school 
" The fees you need to pay is less (than that in the common school) 
"A decision made by your parents 
" Any other reasons (please specify): 
42. If possible, would you like to study in a common school (for example the Prefecture 
School) and why? 
43. Your contact information: 
There are any other things or comments you want to say or make: 
If you have any questions or suggestions with regard to the questionnaire, please get in touch 
with me via: 
Tel: xxxxxxxx 
Address: xxxxxxxx 
Please put the completed questionnaire back into the envelope provided and give it to me. 
Thanks! 
289 
Appendix 14 (1) 
Interview Questions for Han, Muslim and Tibetan Students 
Study Life 
1. Do you usually like the study life in your school? If so, is this because the 
study is interesting or to stay with your fellow students is interesting, or for 
any other reasons? Or sometimes not? Why? 
2. Are your parents concerned about your study (keep supervising and 
accelerating or tutoring your study, or keep in touch with your teacher(s))? If 
not, why? If so, do you like it, why? (For minority) Are they also concerned 
about your study of your own nationality's culture, religion and language? 
3. Students from different ethnic groups may sometimes confront different 
problems in the study life in the school. Could you tell me some specific 
causes that would affect the minority/Muslim/Tibetan student's achievement 
in study 
" Personal: gender, personality, age and previous achievement, etc. 
" Familial: ethnic and religious background, parents' educational level, 
parents' occupation and family's economic condition, etc. 
" Social: the relationship between study and development in the future, 
attractions as well as unhealthy atmosphere in society, etc. 
4. (For minority) Can you learn (about) the culture, religion, history or language 
and moral values of your own nationality and other minority nationalities in 
some subjects, activities or from teachers in the school? If so, did you find 
them useful and interesting? Is it necessary and interesting to you to learn 
more (about) them? If you have not learnt (about) them, do you feel necessary 
or interested to learn? Why? 
(For Han) Can you learn (about) the culture, religion, history or language and 
moral values of minority nationalities in some subjects, activities or from 
teachers in the school? If so, did you find them useful and interesting? Is it 
necessary and interesting to you to learn more (about) them? If you have not 
learnt about them, do you feel necessary or interested to learn? Why? 
5. May this happen that the way in which the teachers treat the students is 
different according to the student's gender, achievement, personality, 
appearance, seat in the classroom and the socio-economic status of the family, 
ethnic background etc.? (For instance, are the teachers equally patient in 
responding to different students' requests/questions in the classroom, what 
kind of students they prefer to ask, whether they discipline and punish 
students differently, etc. ) 
6. Is there this situation that the school disciplines students not to practice (some 
of) their own cultural customs in the school (or maybe on certain occasions) 
(for example, dress, food, holiday/date, language/dialect, religion and so on)? 
Or they would be punished otherwise? If so, would it be verbal or physical 
punishment, or administrative one? 
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Association and Identity 
7. (For minority) Generally speaking, among your fellow students, with whom 
do you feel easier to have social intercourse (jiaowang) or closely contact 
(shenjiao), those from your own ethnic/religious group or from other groups? 
If the latter, from the Han group or other minority groups and why? What 
about with teachers from different ethnic groups? 
(For Han) Generally speaking, among your fellow students, with whom do 
you feel easier to have social intercourse or closely contact, those from your 
own ethnic group or from other groups? If the latter, from the Muslim, 
Tibetan or other minority groups and why? What about with teachers from 
different ethnic groups? 
8. (For minority) Can you describe any customs listed below that affect your 
everyday life? 
" Banning certain food and drink 
" Participating your own nationality's cultural entertainments (music 
performing, dancing or singing), or other cultural activities 
" Taking classes in your own nationality's culture, language, religion, etc. 
" Practising your religion 
" Speaking your ethnic language or dialect 
" Celebrating certain holidays/dates in a given way 
9. Bullying and giving some fellow students nicknames (waihao) are quite 
common in school life. Do you think that some students would be more likely 
to be bullied or given a nickname because of their differences in gender, 
achievement, personality, appearance, ethnic or faith background, or socio- 
economic status? 
(For Han) What would you think about them if you got to know some of your 
fellow students who have a religious belief? Would you mind if you had a 
religious belief and the others also knew this? If not, would you possibly 
believe in a religion? If so, what, and why? 
10. (For Tibetan) Last I would like to ask you, how and by whom the decision 
was made that you came to this rather than a minority school to study? If 
possible, are you willing to study in a minority school? Are you interested in 
studying in the Monastery (siyuan)? 
(For Muslim) Last I would like to ask you, if there was a minority school that 
exclusively or mainly recruited Muslim students, and in which you could 
study common knowledge of science and culture, as well as Islamic culture 
and knowledge, would you prefer to study in that school? Would you like to 
have the Islamic education (jingtang jiaoyu) in the Mosque (gingzhensi)? 
(For Han) If you were a Tibetan or Muslim student, is it possible for you to go 
to the minority school for Tibetans or Muslims to study? Why? 
Is there anything else you would like to say that has not been covered? 
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Appendix 14 (2) 
Interview Questions for Teachers 
1. Are you concerned with the attendance of your students? What do you think are the main 
reasons that some students play truant? Are minority students more likely to play truant? 
If so, why? 
2. Is dropout a severe problem? What do you think are the main reasons that some students 
drop out? Are minority students more likely to drop out? If so, why? 
3. Roughly speaking, how do you perceive the academic achievement of minority students: 
are they more likely to have higher or lower achievement than their Han peers or have 
similar one? Are there differences between the Tibetan and Muslim students? 
4. Minority students may sometimes confront special problems in the study life of the 
school that other students do not face. Could you tell me some specific causes that would 
affect their study (personal, familial, social, economic, cultural, linguistic, religious, etc. )? 
Are there differences between the Tibetan and Muslim students? 
" Personal: gender, personality, age or previous achievement, etc. 
" Familial: ethnic and religious background, parents' educational level, parents' 
occupation and family's economic condition, etc. 
" Social: the relationship between study and development in the future, attractions as 
well as unhealthy atmosphere in society, etc. 
5. Can the students learn (about) the culture, religion, history, language or moral values of 
ethnic minorities? If so, how are they offered and how did you find the content? If not, 
what would be your viewpoint about it? 
6. Among your students, who do you feel you can more easily communicate with, female, 
male, the Tibetan, Muslim, Han, or those from certain place, family of certain 
socio-economic status, or with other backgrounds or characteristics? Why? 
7. If you knew some of your students hold pious religious belief, would you think this has 
an effect on their study? If so, positive or negative, and why? 
8. Is there such a situation that the school disciplines students not to practice (some of) their 
own cultural customs in the school (or maybe on certain occasions) (for example, dress, 
food, holiday/date, language/dialect, religion and so on)? Or they would be punished 
otherwise? If so, would it be verbal or physical punishment, or administrative one? 
9. May this happen that the way in which some of the teachers treat the students is different 
due to the students' gender, achievement, personality, appearance, seat in the classroom, 
the socio-economic status of the family, and ethnicity, etc.? (For instance, are the teachers 
equally patient in responding to different students' requests/questions in the classroom, 
what kind of students they prefer to ask, whether they discipline and punish students 
differently, etc. ) 
10. Last I would like to ask you that from your point of view, what are the severest problems 
in the education of minority areas? 
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Mandarin 
Qinghai Qinghai Province j! rjk 
shaoshu minzu ethnic minorities jj 
shoujiaoyu shuiping educational level, level of received 
education "tA 
ff jJt. 'j'- 
Sishu Wujing Four Books and Five Classics; 
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